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The best of people are those that bring most benefit to the rest of mankind.
– Prophet Muhammad
…
Preach the Gospel at all times, and when necessary, use words.
– St. Francis of Assisi
…
When Philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it 
cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy;
the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.
– Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
…
Indeed, ask every man separately whether he thinks it laudable and worthy 
of a man of this age to hold a position from which he receives a salary dispro-
portionate to his work; to take from the people – often in poverty – taxes to be 
spent on constructing cannon, torpedoes, and other instruments of butchery, 
so as to make war on people with whom we wish to be at peace, and who feel 
the same wish in regard to us; or to receive a salary for devoting one’s whole 
life to constructing these instruments of butchery, or to preparing oneself and 
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The idea for this book came about when I attended the 38th annual Future 
of Religion conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in April of 2014. The director, 
Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert, of Western Michigan University’s Comparative Religion 
Department, has been my academic mentor, friend, and guide for over 20 years. 
Always faithful to the advancement of dialectical philosophy and theology, 
Dr. Siebert has never missed a year of the Dubrovnik conference since it was 
founded in 1976 at the request of Ivan Supek, a Croatian anti-fascist physicist, 
philosopher, and humanist author. The theme of the 2014 conference was Wit-
nessing and Confessing – a perfect theme for my interests in Muslim communi-
ties in Europe, relations between the West and the Muslim world, as well as my 
main theoretical foundation, the Critical Theory of Religion, as developed out 
of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of society. After presenting my paper in 
the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, and listening to the other scholar’s 
valuable critiques, I chose to continue my research and expand it into a book. 
The result is this modest volume.
To the reader, I hope my use of technical and foreign language, born out of 
philosophy, religion, theology and sociology, doesn’t prove to be too impen-
etrable. For some this verbiage may seem like mesmerizing jargon; I assure 
you it is not. Certain categories, concepts, and notions (and some in languages 
other than English) are necessary in order to clarify, analyze, and debate the 
subject at hand. As philosophers dealing with complex issues that pertain to a 
multiplicity of cultures, wherein we both have to speak about the universal and 
the particular, the use of various languages to penetrate into the heart of the 
vexing problem is sometimes necessary. Each language provides another av-
enue by which the thinker can journey into the darkest recess of the dilemma. 
Through our conceptual language and categories we come to understand, in-
terpret, differentiate and engage the world. If we are lacking in the conceptual 
tools to do so, we experience the world as an untranslatable phenomenon that 
lacks determinacy, lacks clarity, and consequently lacks subjective importance. 
In this blunted form of living, existential issues are reduced to a series of ex-
periences and sensations that do not find sufficient articulation in meaningful 
language, which essentially leaves us with an amorphous biography of random 
impressions and passions. However, the world becomes unlocked to many 
students and scholars once they’ve acquired the language and conceptions 
to think systematically, abstractly, dialectically, concretely, as well as through 
what Walter Benjamin called “constellations.” Without such philosophi-




reified – it is experienced as simply “the given” and not the socially constructed 
and therefore mutable phenomenon that it is. Although much of mankind’s 
history is the product of mere nature, most of it is the product of the way man 
choses to be through his labor, his passions, and his will. History and society are 
not fixed, nor are they on an unalterable trajectory, nor are they simply the 
product of the natural world. Society, and therefore history, can be changed 
when we can first understand their internal dynamics and characteristics. If 
we are able to articulate our worldview, identify our disagreements, and find 
the courage to transcend the status quo, than we can construct better and 
more penetrating arguments through which social change can be imagined 
and actualized.
In Marx’s article, The Ruthless Critique of Everything Existing, he calls upon 
his reader to (1) have courage to accept the consequences of one’s critique, 
and (2) to not be afraid to challenge the status quo, i.e. to be martyr material if 
history calls one to be such. In light of the increasing barbarity of the modern 
world, it may be an absolute necessity to adopt this attitude if we are to remedy 
the seemingly intractable ills that plague our present world. As every student 
of political philosophy knows, Karl Marx’s famous 11th Thesis on Feuerbach 
states, ‘Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point is to change it.’ In this quote, Marx presupposes that philosophers 
already have the linguistic and conceptual capabilities to interpret the world 
adequately – some more than others for sure – but does not slip into a state of 
ataraxia (ἀταραξία – tranquility) in doing so, but rather becomes maladjusted 
to the pathological sickness of their society. Philosophers, and consequently 
those who learn from philosophers, must go beyond the mere conceptualiza-
tion of the world – although it is the necessary precondition – they must also 
contribute to a radical praxis adversus mundi (against the world) with its un-
necessary injustices, and must never fuga mundi (flee the world) like cloistered 
mystics.
This same desire to transubstantiate the world for the better was echoed in a 
religious form by Pope Francis in his 2013 exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (The 
Joy of the Gospel) when he wrote,
An authentic faith – which is never comfortable or completely 
personal – always involves a deep desire to change the world, to transmit 
values, to leave this earth somehow better than we found it.1





For the critical theorist of religion and society, it is the role, some may even say 
the duty, of those who find themselves with the intellectual tools to see beyond 
the necessary appearances of the given, who have escaped Plato’s Cave, who 
can pierce through the façade of the mesmerizing consumer society, and see 
clearly through the impenetrable darkness of the night-side of neo-liberalism, 
to engage not only the world via thought, but through deed as well. The Slove-
nian philosopher Slavoj Žižek encourages intellectuals to return to thinking, 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Marxist international. 
For him, we need to think through the catastrophic that was communism, and 
to also take stock of the ingenuity of capitalism to survive its own inner-contra-
dictions, catastrophes and frequent collapses. However, as right as Žižek is, and 
he is most assuredly correct about the need to re-think, we must also not lose 
sight of revolutionary and Socratic praxis. The victims of the world’s pathologi-
cal exploitation and oppression – created by the distorted logic and rapacious 
greed of globalized neo-liberalism – are still being manufactured, still being 
abused, and still being oppressed, and have not the time for self-satisfying in-
tellectual theorizing. Yet this is not a call for action for action’s sake. It is clear 
that the immediacy of unnecessary human, animal and environmental suffer-
ing needs not to be rethought. As such, we should avoid a perpetual state of 
praxis paralysis – satisfied within ourselves to only think about the victims but 
do nothing concretely to stop the creation of new victims. If religious believers 
and secular revolutionaries cannot change the world entire, or bring about the 
utopian Kingdom of God on earth, and must content themselves with waiting 
for the long-awaited and long-delayed messianic figure, we must not in our 
activist-slumber forget the suffering that is in the world at this very moment. 
Those whose suffering will never be recorded in the footnotes of history must 
not be forgotten, but rather their suffering must be expressed, as all perennial 
suffering, Adorno reminds us, has the right to be expressed, and academics are 
in a privileged position to articulate the suffering that today’s societies fights to 
mute. It may be the appropriate moment in which philosophy retires its feeling 
of intellectual superiority and once again learns from the prophetic religions, 
especially as it has been articulated today by Pope Francis, who encourages the 
faithful to live in solidarity with the poor, which means to ‘eliminate the struc-
tural causes of poverty and to promote the integral development of the poor.’2 
Pope Francis reminds us to remember that,
as long as the problems of the poor are not radically resolved by reject-





attacking structural causes of inequality, no solution will be found for the 
world’s problems, or, for that matter, to any problem. Inequality is the 
root of social ills.3
In light of the overwhelming social degradation that is occurring around the 
world with the spread of values that are diametrically opposed to the pro-
phetic values of mercy, solidarity, and brotherly love, Pope Francis bravely calls 
the world to cultivate its inner sense of fairness and justice as a countervail-
ing force to the tyranny of the markets and to engage in loving praxis in the 
hopes of redirecting our ailing world towards a greater sense of brotherhood 
and equality. Critical theorists of religion share this sentiment, albeit through 
humanist philosophy.
In the process of writing this book, I attended not only the 2014 Dubrovnik 
conference in Croatia, but also the Loyola University conference on Critical 
Theory in Rome, Italy, a week later. However, during the Dubrovnik confer-
ence, I listened intently to an individual with nationalist leanings voice some 
of the crudest stereotypes about Muslims and their faith. Astonishingly, he 
boldly articulated his belief that Muslims were inherently incapable of enlight-
ened thought, inherently undemocratic and unwilling to accept the superior-
ity of European religious culture. No matter how much I argued against his ill-
informed thesis, he remained steadfast in his narrow and shallow beliefs about 
a community comprised of 1.6 billion individuals. The cacophony of Muslim 
opinions, philosophies, cultural practices, etc., were all artificially harmonized 
and reduced to a single concept: the Muslim, just as the Jews had once been 
conceptualized as der Jude (the Jew). Once singularized, he could dismiss all 
the Muslims with crude generalizations and stereotypes. An echo of fascism 
hung thick in the cool Adriatic air.
In Rome, under the shadow of the Pantheon – once dedicated to “all the 
gods” and now to Saint Mary and the early Christian martyrs – I was appalled 
to witness a tourist couple from Northern Europe berate an African immigrant 
trying to sell them a knock-off luxury purse. In front of their child, they yelled 
at him, hurled insults, and brushed him away like a vexatious fly. The pain of 
being belittled and disrespected in front of a child could be seen in the weary 
face of the already broken man who was only there trying to scratch out a mea-
ger existence, most likely to send most of what he earned back home to his 
family in Africa. What was most poignant to witness was the tourists’ young 
boy, who was no more than ten years old. Without any thought, he mimicked 





ever recognizing the humanity that dwelled within him. The father clearly ap-
proved of the boy’s mimetic actions as he looked down at his son with pride. 
Unfortunately, this abusive and dehumanizing behavior ensures a cycle of an-
tagonistic relationships with the “other,” one that further entrenches already 
deeply held racist beliefs as well as their after-effect, a feeling of disrespect 
among the immigrants – especially those of Islamic faith. However, from the 
solidarist perspective of Pope Francis, it was in the suffering of that despised 
immigrant that one can find the presence of Jesus of Nazareth; he too, for Fran-
cis, was dismissed by the tourists – when history offered an opportunity to 
express Christian agape with the suffering, dejected and despised, they instead 
showed cruel and cold callousness, more typical of the bourgeoisie. These two 
footnotes of history shows us that this kind of hatred and disgust for others is 
not natural, it is not inborn, and it is not genetic; it is a learned phenomenon 
and an acquired attitude. It results in a cycle that is blindly repeated through 
the generations unless people who can think critically voice their firm oppo-
sition and begin to work against a world that devours itself based on small 
differences. Auschwitz – the inevitable outcome of pathological hatred and 
misguided metaphysics – begins with such inherited attitudes and gestures.
In his reflection on metaphysics after the horror and terror of the Shoah, 
Theodor Adorno wrote,
a new categorical imperative has been impose by Hitler upon unfree 
mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will 
not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen.4
In order to make forbidden to history that which is already forbidden in Abra-
hamic morality – pathological hatred of the other – all instances of injustice 
must be opposed by an equal commitment to justice, mercy, and solidarity. The 
mass annihilation of others, rooted in a mass disgust, contempt, and hatred for 
their existence, must be forever eradicated as a potential for human relations.
Auschwitz, which forever doomed mankind’s optimism about itself, cannot 
and must not be repeated. Yet, only decades after this great catastrophe, the 
conditions for another conflation of worldviews and peoples are already being 
produced in Europe, North America and the Middle East. In Europe, the ranks 
of anti-Immigrant political parties continue to swell while isis continues 
to call for lone wolf attacks on targets in the capitals of western nations. 
4 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics. (New York: Continuum, 1999), 365. ‘Hitler hat den Men-
schen im Stande ihrer Unfreiheit einen neuen kategorischen Imperativ aufgezwungen: ihr Denk-




The potential for fascism and fascistic-like tendencies survived the Third Reich 
and are now once again being exploited within the debate about Islam in the 
West. The mirror image is happening among the Muslims, as the growth of 
extremist and terrorists groups in the Middle East continues unabated, but 
thankfully do not represent the vast majority of believers. Fascism has many 
forms and, like a cameleon, can camouflage itself in many different cultures; 
from the far right in Europe to isis in Syria and Iraq, the human capacity for 
absolute destruction of the other is swiftly becoming a renewed reality. The 
“new imperative” of “never again,” that resulted from fascism’s cruelty and de-
struction, has gone unheard between the clamor of militaristic slogans and the 
battle cries of war between nations and religions.
Despite the rise of the often Islamophobic and neo-Randian Tea Party in 
American political life, the situation has become worse in Europe. In the 
Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, etc., political par-
ties whose platform includes anti-immigrant rhetoric have made significant 
headways into the political system. For the first fifty years after World War ii, 
or the Great Patriotic War as it is called in Russia, xenophobic far-right politi-
cal parties were unthinkable, fascistic policies and thoughts were unspeakable 
in the public sphere, but now they have been reborn with a sense of credibil-
ity. Then the target was the communists and Jews, now there is a new target: 
the Muslims. The language that Europe thought it had left behind after wwii 
has reappeared and has forcefully made its way back into political discourse. 
The critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno already foresaw the folly of 
believing Europe could resign its fascistic tendencies after the catastrophe of 
World War ii. With the proper catalyst, all of Europe was capable of the same 
authoritarian and violent tendencies that were cultivated in Nazi Germany. 
They wrote,
fascism triumphed under a crassly xenophobic, anti-cultural, collectivist 
ideology. Now that it has devastated the earth, nations must fight against 
it; there is no other way. But when all is over, a spirit of freedom need not 
spread across Europe; its nations may become as xenophobic, as hostile 
to culture, and as pseudocollectivist as the fascism against which they 
had to defend themselves. Even its defeat will not necessarily break the 
motion of the avalanche.5
5 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Frag-
ments, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. (Stanford: Stanford Uni-




Conversely, the Muslim community hasn’t always given their fellow European 
and American counterparts a sense of security, as many within the commu-
nity have often contributed to the suspicion of violence that surrounds them. 
From rallies that fanatically condemn European culture, to terrorist acts upon 
European and American cities, radical Muslims – having rejected the values 
of European society as well as traditional Islam – have often pushed their 
American, Dutch, British, German, Italian, French, etc., neighbors into the 
anti-Islamic political parties for fear that they are losing their culture, their 
nation, and their way of life.
This new and rabid Islamophobia draws upon a different legitimation than 
the neo-pagan fascism of Hitler and Mussolini; it is often clothed in the lan-
guage of “defending the Enlightenment” itself. These far-right and often neo-
fascist politicians and activists are drawing their legitimacy by appearing to 
defend what was once thought to be the universal values of the European 
Enlightenment, and they often have help in this endeavor from liberals and 
anti-religion leftists. Having traveled around Europe often in the last ten years, 
I’ve witnessed this growing trend firsthand and have noticed that it has only 
worsened as Europe has become increasingly entangled in Middle Eastern and 
North African affairs and as emigration from Muslim countries to Europe has 
increased beyond its capacity (or national will) to accommodate them. Unfor-
tunately, I see that a new dark and ominous specter is forming over Europe: 
neo-fascist Islamophobism, or what I have defined as miso-Islamism, or “patho-
logical hatred for Islam.” The hatred of Islam will spread like a virulent cancer 
unless people of good will, revolutionary faith and Socratic faithlessness, who 
are committed to the peaceful cooperation between the religious traditions 
and secular citizens – a being-with-each-other that is rooted in mutual recog-
nition, respect and shared commitments – work together for a common goal: 
a more reconciled future society. Absent a discourse movement such as this, 
both the neo-fascist nativists of Europe and the extremist Muslims who find 
no real attachment to their western societies, and who dream of an “Islamic 
Europe,” will continue to pull western society to the political and cultural mar-
gins – an unsustainable situation under any analysis. Without discourse there 
will be no true knowledge of the other; without knowledge there will be no po-
tential for reconciliation; and without reconciliation there will only be a state 
of war.
When examining Dr. Siebert’s time in Dubrovnik during Yugoslavia’s civil 
war, it’s important to note the great courage that was demonstrated as he con-
tinued to travel to the Balkans during the fighting; he never missed a year de-
spite the heavy bombardment that surrounded him; he refused to take sides 




steadfast for what he believed was morally right; he suffered with whomever 
was suffering unjustly. Dr. Siebert not only brought a penetrating philosophi-
cal analysis and critical religiology to the Balkans but also cared for the physi-
cal and material needs of the victims. Medicine was given to whoever was in 
need, regardless of their national identity and/or ethnicity, and he welcomed 
any discourse partner who was willing to offer their constructive and critical 
thoughts. Amidst the artillery shells falling on the worker owned Hotel Argen-
tina, in which the conference was being held, he had the prophetic and So-
cratic commitment to continue his lectures on Immanuel Kant’s most hopeful 
proposition for Perpetual Peace (1795). In the face of war, he embraced a revolu-
tionary yet illusive peace. It is in this light – the undiminished search for a bet-
ter world – that I offer this book as a small attempt to help find a way towards 
that more reconciled future society that Dr. Rudolf J. Siebert taught about and 
longed for since he was a soldier in World War ii, through the Yugoslav civil 




6 ‘While there is life there is hope.’
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chapter 1
Professing Islam in a Post-Secular Society
 Introduction
The post-September 11th world has brought a new concentration upon the 
nature of Islam and the Muslim world, especially in light of the millions of 
Muslims that live in the West. The turmoil in Syria and Iraq, as well as in parts 
of North and East Africa, has brought hundreds of thousands of Muslim immi-
grants and refugees to the shores of Europe. Once there, they join the millions 
of other Muslims who have already made their homes in the West. Although 
the secular democracies of Europe are seen by many as places of opportunity 
and freedom, many Muslims find their presence to be unwanted, unwelcomed 
and hated; their religious sensibilities disrespected; their culture maligned, and 
their faith positions mocked and degraded. Indeed, the post-secular society, 
in which both religious communities remain an important and powerful pres-
ence despite the continual secularization of the lifeworld, is a contentious mix 
of worldviews, cultural norms, epistemologies and moral systems. Following 
the philosophical work of Jürgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School, such 
a society can either chose to embrace the diversity and live in a dynamic de-
mocracy, or retreat into stagnant provincialism, in which the various secular 
and religious communities fail to engage in a productive discourse. As such, 
the challenge of the post-secular society can either result in a vibrant multi-
cultural and cosmopolitan democracy, where constitutional values are the ba-
sis for shared citizenship, or the various factions can continue their discourse 
avoidance and fragment into waring faction, which will inevitably lead to in-
creased social conflict.
The purpose of this study is to probe the various points in western society, 
especially Europe, where the issue of professing Islam can either be a force 
for solidarity among religious communities and secular citizens, or a force 
of division. Informed by the Frankfurt School for Social Research, especially 
Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and the 
2nd generation philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, this study will 
be attempt to shed light on the future possibilities of a more reconciled future 
society wherein Islam finds a welcoming place within the post-secular society. 
As both a critical scholar of religion as well as a citizen of a secular state, I and 
many others wish to avoid the situation in which western societies degener-
ate into rigid communities of exclusivity; we wish to arrest and reverse the 
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entrenched economic marginalization that so many experience, as well as to 
abolish the religious bigotry that plagues both the Muslim community as well 
as the post-secular – and post-Christian – West. Rather we choose to seek out 
ways to peacefully co-exist and thrive together as one community regardless of 
the other’s faith or faithlessness. In order to explore the possibilities of such a 
future reconciled society, we, like the Frankfurt School’s critical religiology, will 
turn to philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, cultural studies and even 
theology. Although some remain skeptical, I find a turn towards theology to 
be extremely insightful, as its transcendent nature can inform us of the inner-
dynamics of any given situation and help point us towards the ought, as op-
posed to simply abandoning the future to the is. Furthermore, “reconciliation,” 
which is an underlying theme throughout this work, is not simply a matter of 
eschatology, but one that we recognize as being within the realm of possibility 
in the here-and-now. Just as Karl Marx’s vision of a classless society reconciles 
the antagonism of class by the removal of that which antagonizes – oppression 
and exploitation of one class over all others; just as ‘Ali Shariati’s visions of a 
society beyond the colonial/colonized paradigm pointed to the reconciliatory 
potential of revolutionary Islam; just as Malcolm x, in his last days, saw a vision 
of the world that no longer used the yardstick of race to judge others, but rather 
judged based on the deeds of individuals; and just as Che Guevara had a radical 
vision of a society unified under the principle of equality and social justice, so 
too do we want to search for the potential for reconciliation within the context 
of our contemporary times. In order to do this, we will examine, interrogate, 
and critique both religion and secularity in a dialectical fashion, hoping to de-
terminately negate that which leads mankind into continuous cycles of ha-
tred and violence, while simultaneously preserving, augmenting, and fulfilling 
the prophetic and Socratic spirit that dissolves such irrational and destructive 
antagonisms. That being said, our aim, predicated on the permanence of the 
modern secular society in the West, wishes to see the construction of a more 
humane post-secular society; a society that values both the achievements of 
secularity as well as enlightened religion.1 In working for such a better society, 
we must turn our attention to one of the most vexing issues within western 
society today: the trouble with recalcitrant faith, especially Islamic faith, in the 
context of the post-secular West and its post-Christian society.
1 One should not confuse the ‘post-secular society’ as being a society that has returned to re-
ligion. Many religious believers, seeing the destruction that secularity has had upon their 
faith, the moral values, and the pious way of life, engage in wishful thinking when they hear 
the phrase ‘post-secular,’ thinking that secularity is finally over. This is not the notion of ‘post-
secular’ that we are discussing or attempting to advance in this study.
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 On the Contemporary Possibility of Witnessing and Professing
Professing a religious position can be a perilous proposition in a world that 
has been thoroughly secularized. It is an even greater problem when the faith 
that one professes is thought to be suspicious or threatening by the dominant 
group within one’s society, which is the case for Islam in much of Europe.2 
When a community’s deeply held beliefs, the basis of their identity, spiritu-
al life, and cultural norms, is thought to be backwards, oppressive, undemo-
cratic and unenlightened, it becomes easy for that community to internalize 
those accusations and close themselves up within their particular religious 
lifeworld (religiöse lebenswelt) and refuse to engage the broader society in a 
non- antagonistic and/or open way. When the marginalized religious identity 
is the source of social scorn, many within the faith community often cannot 
bolster the courage to engage other voices as equal members within that soci-
ety, despite the fact that the believers may be the carrier of all the same civil 
rights afforded to them via their status as equal citizens of such a society. The 
notion of “equality” through mutual recognition, as often articulated by the 
Critical Theorist Jürgen Habermas, is the precondition for democratic and 
pluralistic deliberation. When society fails to adequately internalize and/or 
practice such notions of equality, democracy becomes distorted and degener-
ates into a hollow state-ideology in service to a single class, race, creed, etc. 
Therefore, when an undemocratic and therefore unfree situation presents it-
self within a context of social hostility on the basis of religious faith, especially 
Islam, the Muslim believers are often confronted with three choices; (1) aban-
don the faith, (2) engage in “religious dissimulation” (taqīyah), or (3) retreat 
into fundamentalism – the cutting off of an individual from the symphony of 
voices within the national discourse and adopting a staunch and unyielding 
attitude towards their own beliefs. Religious fundamentalism, by its nature, 
deprives the national discourse of the authentic voices of religious communi-
ties, as the believers often refrain from the social and theological risk created 
2 I would like to note most forcefully that Islam and Muslims are not monolithic. The Muslim 
community, whether it be in the West or in the traditional Muslim world, are divided by the 
same antagonisms as westerners. Despite the unifying factor of the Islamic tradition, Mus-
lims are separated by race, gender, class, sect, political philosophy, geography, schools of law, 
sexual orientation, language, nationalities, etc. While Muslims tend to agree on the basics of 
their religion, the interpretations and orientations within the religion is as numerous as the 
stitching in the Kiswat al-Kab’ah (shroud on the Ka’bah in Mecca). Managing such diversity 
itself has become a problem for the global ummah as many fundamentalist find such di-
versity threatening. With this in mind, the diversity of faith positions, etc. should be tacitly 
understood whenever the general terms of “Islam” and “Muslim” are used in this book.
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by subjecting their beliefs to democratic deliberation. Many can no longer be-
lieve that the discourse partner in any way respects their sincere beliefs, as that 
partner seems not to find any value in what is offered. A poignant example 
of this retreat into one’s own particular community can be found in the 2005 
Muhammad cartoon affair, where Muslims experienced the Danish newspa-
per Jyllands Posten’s portrayal of Muhammad as a terrorist to be extremely of-
fensive and disrespectful of their most sacred figure. The perceived disrespect 
left many western Muslims feeling deeply alienated from the broader society 
whom they previously thought had some respect for their Islamic identity 
even if they couldn’t be reverential towards their Islamic faith. Consequently, 
the post-protest withdrawal from Danish society diminished the possibility 
of a future reconciliation between people of different faiths and those of no 
faith.3 If there is no discourse partner then there is no discourse; if there is no 
discourse then there is no real possibility for reconciliation and peace.
On the other hand, irreverent and critical thought, which is often perceived 
as insulting, is essential in the modern world, as it helps diminish the tempta-
tion of dogmas, authoritarian ideologies and political economic idolatry. Yet, 
on the other side, the tyranny of relativism, which plagues modern society, 
leaving it without any philosophical and/or ethical anchors, cannot simply go 
unchecked and unquestioned. Joseph Ratzinger, later to be named Pope Bene-
dict xvi, pointed out in a conversation with the philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
that there is a danger in the over extension of relativism, multiculturalism, and 
tolerance within a society that is rooted in the Enlightenment and the secular 
state. The danger is especially acute when that state fails to adequately inte-
grate minorities into the overall national culture.4 The national anxiety con-
cerning the non-integration and assimilation of Muslims within European 
society cannot be ignored as it is rife with future possibilities, both negative 
and positive; this anxiety can either be a source for discourse amongst Euro-
pean and Muslims or a source of continual antagonism and future violence.
3 Jyllands Posten wasn’t the only publication to experience the ire of radical Islam. The left-
wing French newspaper Charlie Hebdo, which routinely satirizes religion, especially Islam, 
Muhammad, and Muslims, was firebombed on November 2, 2011, and was later attacked by 
gunmen on January 7, 2015. In the last attack, twelve people were murdered including the 
senior editor Stéphane “Charb” Charbonnier. The killing was believed to be motivated out of 
revenge for the disrespect of the Prophet Muhammad. This subject will be taken up later in 
this work.
4 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Reli-




The modern identity crisis of Europe – the question of what does it mean 
to be European in a post-secular society – is compounded by the mass 
immigration of Muslims who often are more oriented towards their national- 
cultural-religious place of origins as opposed to the culture and politics of their 
newly settled nation. As many of the center-right continuously proclaim, this 
problem is further compounded by the fact that many Muslim immigrants 
(both legal and illegal) enjoy the social benefits that Europe provides its citi-
zens while seemingly contributing little-to-nothing of social value to their host 
countries. These “concerned” or sometimes “nativist”/“nationalist” voices view 
Muslims simply as parasites – enjoying the social benefits that Europe has cre-
ated while at the same time delivering crime, poverty, and social chaos to their 
once peaceful and orderly cities and villages.5 There is a sense that the near-
utopia of Europe has been sullied and destroyed by people of an inferior and 
alien culture. If they would only leave, it is thought, Europe could once again 
return to its happy retirement.
However, the non-integration of Muslims risks the production of the “per-
petual other” within the secular European society, which threatens the very 
stability of Europe. In terms of assimilation, the retreat into the comfort of Is-
lam, the culture of national origin, and the Muslim community’s often refusal 
to integrate within the national life of the host nation – the self-ghettoization 
of Muslims – creates a parallel society within Europe. They are not fully inte-
grated but not fully segregated either, but rather a state of limbo exists. Coupled 
with the historical suspicion of Islam being anti-democratic, authoritarian, pa-
triarchal, and violent, Muslims are seen not only as the suspicious “other” but 
also the lurking enemy within. In light of this, immigration by Muslims appears 
to many Europeans to look more like a stealth invasion, especially during the 
refugee/immigrant crisis of 2015 and 2016.6 The fact that this society within a 
5 Since September 11th, 2001, there has been a remarkable incline in anti-Muslim rhetoric, poli-
tics, and political parties in both America and Europe. These can be seen in the Netherlands, 
Germany, Switzerland, France, Greece, Italy, Ukraine, etc. Many of these parties have gained 
seats in the national legislatures but have failed to gain any substantial amount of control of 
any government body. Nevertheless, the frightening amount of silence – or lack of opposition – 
by others in the society could represent a tacit – not publicly endorsed – agreement with the 
center-right on the issue of immigrants and specifically Muslims. The silence of the majority 
is, to my thinking, the greatest threat to peace for Muslim immigrants in Europe.
6 Due to the Syrian civil war between the government of Bashar al-Assad, the Western (nato) 
coalition and their Syrian allies, Russian forces and isis, hundreds of thousands of Syrian 
refugees flooded into Europe. Amidst those refugees were also many immigrants from Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraqis who were simply looking to Europe for a better and more 
prosperous life. Such a mass migration sparked a fierce debate with the eu countries as to 
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society is rooted in a religious identity only causes more suspicion and distrust 
within the national secular cultural, which trusts neither their religiosity nor 
the content of their religion. The refusal of both sides, the native European and 
the Muslim immigrant, to engage in a robust dialogue, discourse, and debate; 
to subject their deeply held claims – both religious and secular – to democratic 
scrutiny; and the refusal to think in terms of humanistic commonalities as op-
posed to ethnos and culture, all contribute to a situation where either violence 
will continue to be inevitable because discourse – the precondition for accep-
tance and respect – has been made impossible.
 The Post-Secular Society
The Critical Theorist Jürgen Habermas is keenly aware of the antagonism be-
tween the religious and the secular, the immigrant and the native, the dem-
ocratic and the authoritarian, and the religiously devout Muslims and their 
European neighbors who are just as committed to their secular values. In order 
to look for democratic means to address the antagonism between these an-
tagonisms, Habermas, in his chapter, What is Meant by a “Post-Secular Society”? 
A Discussion on Islam in Europe revisits the sociological debate about secular-
ism and religious communities within Europe, especially the particular chal-
lenges presented by Islam. Reviewing former thought about the inevitability 
of global secularity, he points out the three basic premises of traditional secu-
larization theory; (1) that science, technology, positivism, natural causation, 
i.e. the anthropocentric vision of the world, can no longer be reconciled with a 
worldview that is rooted in a theological and/or God-centric understanding of 
ultimate reality; (2) that religion has resigned itself to the private sphere after 
the loss of its social power within the state, economy, and national institu-
tions; and (3) that the material abundance that was created with the capital-
ization and industrialization of the West, the availability of consumer goods, 
the advance of medicine resulting in the increase in the lifespan and healthy 
living, the reduction of existential and material anxiety, and the alleviation of 
ubiquitous violence, all made religion superfluous to the average individual – 
where once God provided for the people, now the markets provide; where once 
Christians prayed for their “daily bread,” now the bread factories see to it that 
it’s available. The scarcity of necessities and the uncertainty of life, which was 
what responsibility the eu has for such refugees and migrants. Not surprisingly, this influx of 
non-European Muslims became a flash point for the far-right and other liberals concerned 
about the influence of more Muslims in Europe.
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the precondition for such religious faith, no longer exist for most people living 
in advanced industrial societies. Man provides where once God did, and thus 
religion in unnecessary.7 Religion, according to many of these theories, would 
become superfluous as the roles and functions it once exclusively held were 
taken over by secular civil society and the secular state. For many of them, 
including Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Weber and many 20th century sociologists, 
religion’s long life was soon to come to an end, as it could no longer sustain 
its theological claims and traditional roles within the conditions of secular 
modernity.
Yet Habermas is aware that those who have dogmatically held onto such 
theories of secularization have become frustrated by the failure of religion to 
fully disappear in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Their claims, that reli-
gion belongs to the adolescence, or even infancy of human history, that it’s a 
gestalt des geistes as Freud believed – and thus has no place in the adulthood of 
the modern humanity – are frustrated by religion’s stubbornness to find histo-
ry’s exit door. In this sense, religion is fluctuat nec mergitur!8 Most stubbornly, 
and despite the ever-increasing secularization of the cultural, economic, and 
political realms, religion continued to infuse itself into the lifeworld of billions 
of people. The rise of religious fundamentalism, especially amongst Muslims 
both in Europe and the Middle East, the growth of conservative orthodoxy 
amongst the older denomination of Christianity, the move towards religiously 
infused governments in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, etc., and the international 
and ecumenical popularity of the Pope Francis, all point to a resurgence of re-
ligion on a global scale.9 For the secularization theorists, religion’s shelf-life has 
long expired but it is still held onto by the masses, despite that it is understood 
by the expert cultures to be a roadblock to man’s progress and an entrenched 
impediment to his survival. Religion, for the militantly secular, scientific, and 
atheistic, is man’s poison – one he is too foolishly eager to consume. Confus-
ingly, they wonder why so many continue to swallow the religion pill on a daily 
basis when they should know the pill is a placebo.
Like the religious believer who retreats into a purist way of thinking 
about the world, many secular fundamentalists also take refuge in Logical 
Positivism’s metaphysics of what-is-the-case – deeming all non-materialist, 
non- scientific, and non-causational explanations of ultimate reality to be 
7 Jürgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project (Malden, ma: Polity Press, 2009), 60.
8 ‘Tossed by the waves but does not sink.’
9 Habermas, Europe, 61–62.
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misguided, mentally deficient, and ultimately dangerous.10 They see the con-
tinual existence of sacred stories, rituals, sacred space, and sacred persons to 
be nothing more than the mad ramblings of the mentally-disturbed, obscu-
rantists, and hucksters, who may mean well, but are inevitably misguided by 
their reluctance to abandon their superstitious beliefs about God, angels, rev-
elation, miracles, etc. For the logical positivist, that which cannot be measured 
through quantitative measures cannot be real and only that which is real can 
be measured. Therefore reality is limited to physicality and/or appearances. 
Additionally, they view the religious believers’ commitments to divine revela-
tion, which they find to be devoid of reason and epistemologically unsound, 
to be a sign of man’s inability to mature and think rationally, abstractly, and 
systematically. From the perspective of positivists, religion, and all forms of 
mysticism as Ayn Rand would describe it, circumvent reason, make a mockery 
of the human intellect, and will ultimately lead human history into the ditch.11 
The worldview of the positivist has consequences. According to the German 
sociologist Max Weber, the increased rationalization of society leads to the 
inevitable disenchantment of the world. Man’s emancipation from traditional 
religious metaphysics – that once connected him to the totality of his own 
being through sacred space, sacred texts, sacred figures, rituals, and religious 
institutions – leaves him disconnected and existentially adrift. Where religion 
once provided a comprehensive interpretation of reality and orientation of 
action, the bureaucratization and rationalization of the world disconnected 
him from that holistic wholeness and left him isolated, without uncondition-
al meaning, afraid of others as well as the anonymous bureaucratic system 
he created by his own hands. This modern disenchanted man experienced 
himself locked within an “iron cage” without religious or metaphysical con-
solation. The modern world, which promised both material abundance and 
freedom from old and misguided dogmas, failed to replace the connectedness 
and sense of ontological and eschatological certainty that man once had liv-
ing in a religious world. This sense of non-belonging, non-connectedness and 
the non-sense nature of a disenchanted world left him in a state of longing for 
the innocence of prior times. This being the case, a door for religion was left 
open by the failure of modernity to adequately address man’s psychological 
and spiritual needs outside of his material necessities.
10 Clearly a retreat into positivism wasn’t the case for dialectical thinkers such as Marx and 
the Frankfurt School.
11 Dustin Byrd, A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Philosophy of Religion: The Gospel According to John 
Galt. Lanham, md: Lexington Books, 2015.
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From the perspective of the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, who 
recognized man’s spiritual bankruptcy post-Enlightenment, the inadequacies 
of religion, including its criminal and pathological history, cannot be the final 
word on religion as a human phenomenon, as religions contain within them-
selves the accumulation of human wisdom, experiences, protests, and thoughts 
which cannot be easily discarded without vacating much of human knowledge 
and abandoning the cause of those who, in their suffering, took refuge in the 
comforting arms of its absolutes.12 As Max Horkheimer wrote, ‘religion is the 
record of the wishes, desires, and accusation of countless generations.’13 For 
Horkheimer, the longing for “perfect justice” remains an integral part of reli-
gion even within the modern period, and for that reason alone the critical the-
ory of the Frankfurt School has to take seriously the human-centered claims of 
religion.14 For the Critical Theorist of religion, proleptic solidarity (solidarity 
with past victims) is a sufficient reason to preserve some forms of prophetic 
religion in the secular world, even if it is only in its distorted form (manifest 
religion) or through its transformation and migration into secular philosophy.
The continuation of religion’s existence amidst the thoroughly secularized 
world points to the fact that there is either (1) some persistent longing for some-
thing other than what-is-the-case (the world as it is) and (2) that religion still 
provides something to mankind that the secular world has yet to discover.15  
Most dialectically, it appears that the very coordinates of secularity have pro-
duced the necessary conditions for religions’ continual presence – and/or re-
juvenation – in society. In other words, secularity has produced a new form of 
religiosity: one that has become immune to secularity’s attacks, or at least has 
found the capacity within itself to deter secularity’s aggressively corrosive na-
ture – a post-secular form of religion. This is not a world in which religion has 
triumphed over secularity, as could be misunderstood by reading “post” as be-
ing simply “after” in terms of time, but one where religion remains a continual 
and persistent presence within the increasingly secular world. Indeed, like a 
elastic band that is stretched at both ends, the more secular the contemporary 
world becomes, the more it creates the conditions for this new post-secular 
form of religion. The dialectic within secularity is such: as secularity expands 
12 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978), 54.
13 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 2002), 129.
14 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, 129.
15 See Habermas’ discussion of Max Frisch’s funeral in St. Peter’s Church in Zürich. Jürgen 
Habermas, An Awareness of What’s Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age (Mal-
den, ma: Polity Press, 2011), 15–16.
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further into the lifeworld, it unintentionally produces the conditions which are 
filled by religion; as it alienates and disenchants more people, the more they 
turn to religion to fulfill their longing for transcendence; the more atheistic and 
meaningless the modern world becomes, the more it simultaneously calls for 
the messianic, i.e. the return to religion as a complete and total way-of-being.
As scholars of history, society, religion and secular philosophy, we are chal-
lenged by this paradoxical phenomenon. Surely we in the West cannot go be-
hind history and return to religion as a comprehensive worldview that deter-
mines the trajectory of the state and civil society, nor can we anachronistically 
return behind the Enlightenment without collapsing civilization into a false 
utopian dream of what society should look like now that we’ve experienced 
the horrors of secular modernity. Indeed, as Adorno has remarked in his essay 
Reason and Revelation, any attempt to return to religion post-Enlightenment is 
rooted in what we perceive as our needs and desires, not our being convinced 
of the metaphysical truth of religion’s claims.16 No, we are forced to muscle our 
way through secular modernity with one eye turned back towards history in 
proleptic solidarity with past victims and the other sternly directed towards 
the future with the object of creating a more-reconciled future society, which 
must include space for religious voices. This situation imposes an important 
question upon us: what can we as Critical Theorists do on the practical level to 
address the growing antagonism between the secular and the sacred; between 
the atheistic citizen and their religious counterpart; between the secular West 
and the dar-al-Islam (abode of Islam)?
In the realm of society, Habermas’ late writings on religion are increasingly 
sensitive to the antagonism between the sacred and the profane and how it 
manifests itself in the life of the nation-state and body politic. In light of his 
time diagnosis and prognosis, he proposes an answer to the vexing conditions 
of post-secularity – one that lays a challenging burden on both the religious and 
the secular if we are to see that the fundamental antagonism between the sa-
cred and the profane within our current transition period – that is exacerbated 
by the ever-increasing power of capitalist markets and their global expansion – 
does not bring the world to total violence, i.e. alternative future No. 2, the to-
tally militarized world capable of abc (atomic, biological and chemical) wars.
According to various critical religiologists of the Frankfurt School tradition, 
including Rudolf J. Siebert – a second generation Critical Theorist and the pio-
neer of the Frankfurt School’s systematic study of religion – the secularization 
process continues undisturbed by the “return to religion” movements that can 
16 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 137.
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be witnessed throughout the world.17 In the West, these movements are pri-
marily in response to the near complete secularization of the public sphere, 
the lifeworld, the economy, and the family. They are born from the continu-
ing infiltration of secular values, consumerism, commercialism, the neo- 
imperialism in the Muslim world, and the globalization of the secular ethos 
in other parts of the world that are desperately attempting to hold onto their 
traditional religious values and cultures. These religious people, like the fun-
damentalists, are deeply wounded by secular modernity and have become 
painfully aware of the corrosive effects it has had upon their lives. However, 
Habermas also points out that these victims of secularity rarely acknowledge 
the beneficial side of the secular Enlightenment that they themselves benefit 
from. Too often the positive side of the Enlightenment, i.e. the attempt to make 
every individual the master of their own fate; to liberate them from the bounds 
of kin, class, region, and familial expectations and traditional roles; to free 
them from magic, superstition, and nature; the advance of technology; and 
to place temporal power in the hands of the people, is often not adequately 
articulated by the proponents of secularization. Yet, much of these so-called 
positive aspects of Enlightenment are not universally experienced as being 
beneficial. Definitions of what can be considered “positive,” for example, are 
very different in the West than among the devoutly religious. Emancipation, 
which in the West is often associated with an autonomous and democratic 
lifestyle, is rarely reconciled with the religious idea of true freedom that can 
only be found through the complete submission to the will of the divine. Yet, 
for the secular West, as Horkheimer and Adorno articulated in the first lines of 
their Dialectic of Enlightenment, the Enlightenment is to be understood in the 
broadest sense as the
advance of thought,… aimed at liberating human beings from fear and 
installing them as masters… Enlightenment’s program was the disen-
chantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy 
with knowledge.18
However, even when individuals have been emancipated from their fears, 
myths and fantasies, many intrinsically feel the price has been too high for 
17 Rudolf J. Siebert, Manifesto of the Critical Theory of Society and Religion: The Wholly Other, 
Liberation, Happiness and the Rescue of the Hopeless, Vol 1–III. Boston: Brill, 2010.
18 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Frag-




such liberation. They would be much happier to retreat into a traditional 
worldview and way of life. Freedom from the strictures of traditional societies 
is too heavy of a burden, too disorienting, too confusing, and is devoid of the 
necessary metaphysical moorings that anchor the individual in a worldview 
that orders their existence and renders it meaningful. Although much of the 
anxiety felt by secularized individuals stems from the fear of being isolated, 
standing on their own two moral and intellectual feet, and appropriating the 
responsibility for their own lives, there is nevertheless a legitimate awareness 
that something is missing in the secularized lifeworld that is independent of 
individual angst and anxiety.19
Beyond the purely subjective answer, secularity has failed to answer the 
most basic questions about life, its end point, its meaning, and how to con-
sole the grieving person in their moment of inner-most despair and torment. 
Consequently, there is a pervasive feeling of nihilistic emptiness in today’s 
secularized world. It continues to create mentally, physically and spiritually 
broken and crippled individuals, who are isolated and on the margins of so-
ciety. Despite the problems, the pain of spiritual vacuousness is being global-
ized through the secularization process via aggressive forms of capitalism; 
the pain that was once limited to secular Western nations is swiftly becoming 
weltschmerz (world pain) and many are looking once again towards religion for 
anesthetic answers.
It is important to note that for Habermas, the object of the post-secular 
society can only be the society that has already been thoroughly secularized 
and not one presently struggling to become secular.20 In other words, to be 
post-secular presupposes a prior state of secularity. Therefore, post-secularity 
is limited to only those nation-states which have a secular constitution, sec-
ular polity, and a secular state; those states that have constructed a secular 
way-of-being-in-the-world through some kind of rational deliberation or non-
theistic philosophy as opposed to a traditional theocracy or any other form of 
governance that relies on revelation or divine command for its legitimation. 
Furthermore, the cultural climate of the nation-state must also be one that is 
not only open to secularity, but accepts it as a basic norm, i.e. that the desire-
ability of secularity is not a subject of disagreement and contestation (even if 
the degree of secularization and what that ultimately means can be a matter 
of debate). States in which the secular constitution and secular government is 
imposed from above upon a people who identify themselves as predominately 
19 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc.: 1994), 1–21; Haber-
mas, An Awareness of What is Missing, 15–23.
20 Habermas, Europe. 59.
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religious and in favor of some form of religiosity within the government, can-
not be describes as a secular nation per se, as they fail to reflect the general 
consensus of the people. A current example can be found in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. When given the opportunity to democratically elect their leaders, 
the majority of Egyptians elected a religious political party – the Ikhwan al-
Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) and Muhammad Morsi, who, despite being 
democratically elected, was overthrown in a coup d’etat in 2013 by the secular 
military under the direction of General Abdal-Fattah el-Sisi, who later banned 
the Ikhwan al-Muslimun under the pretext of being a “terrorist” group. Egypt, 
despite its “secular” constitution, secular military and secular-oriented ruling 
class, can hardly be considered a secular nation as the will of the people is 
thoroughly divided between those who want religion to have some influence 
on the government and those who advocate for a purely secular state. Because 
secularity itself is still bitterly contested among the people, resulting in a lack 
of consensus about the desirability of secularity, we should not regard it as a 
secular nation even if religion has been forcibly removed from governmental 
institutions. It is a formal secularity at best, and not one that has been adopted 
as a way-of-being for the vast majority of citizens.
For Habermas, if the secular West has moved into a post-secular condition, 
we then have to have a change in consciousness concerning three important 
factors.21 First, Habermas points out that citizens of secular states find them-
selves anxious at the sight of resurgent religion which ‘shakes the secularis-
tic confidence that religion is destined to disappear.’22 He believes that they 
must begin to resign themselves to the inevitability that religion will persist 
despite the growth of secularism. Second, secular citizens are becoming more 
aware that religious voices are increasingly contributing to various discourses 
within the public sphere; that they are ‘assuming the role of communities of 
interpretation’ and that they can contribute as a ‘sounding board’ for society 
when engaged in difficult moral and ethics decisions and dilemmas. Addition-
ally, the existence of other religions within the multicultural societies of the 
West confronts Christianity’s exclusivism and privileged status by presenting 
alternative interpretations of reality and moral problems, and in doing so can 
offer previously unimagined solutions.23 Habermas points out that religions 
have increasingly become sources for meaningful thought-material in a world 
that has become increasingly malcontent to accept the finality of the status 
quo or the simply given. Lastly, the influxes of religious minorities into secular 





Europe are a constant test of the Enlightenment values that Europeans have 
claimed to be universal.24 The physical presence of the foreign “other,” their al-
ternative lifestyles, and their persistent questioning of what Europe takes to be 
self-evident pushes Europeans into a self-reflexive mode – a rethinking of the 
way-of-being that was previously understood to be normative and inherently 
good and ethical. The limits of multiculturalism, the respect for diversity, and 
the belief in the universality of Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité regardless of national 
origin, are fundamentally tested by the cultural and religious “other” within 
European society. Yet, Europe must ask: can such “enlightened” values persist 
when other cultures read those same values through religious lenses? Does 
such an alternative reading of “core” values bring to light the tacit “European-
ness” of how they’ve been traditionally articulated since the Enlightenment? 
For example, can an Islamic reading of liberty, equality, and fraternity deepen 
and expand the vitality of such values in Europe or are the different readings – 
the secular European Enlightenment and the Islamic tradition – too radically 
different to be complimentary or reconcilable?
To view these questions from the standpoint of the ‘neutral observer’ is to 
take the wrong perspective. According to Habermas, we must rather ask a se-
ries of pertinent questions, ‘How should we understand ourselves as members 
of a post-secular society, and what must we expect from one another if we want 
to ensure that social relations in secular nation-states remain civil despite the 
growth of cultural and religious pluralism?’25 Indeed, how does both the re-
ligious foreigner practice their religion in a secular society and how does the 
secular citizen embody their convictions within a society in which religion 
remains an active component in the public sphere? How do these groups of 
believers, non-believers, and agnostics learn to engage in conversations that 
do not descend into crude stereotypes, crass innuendos, disrespect, and ha-
tred? Can they witness for their different religious and philosophical posi-
tions together as citizens, or is shared citizenship too deficient in providing 
them a platform by which they could discover an “overlapping consensus” on 
a variety of issues? Additionally, can secular society regain a healthy admira-
tion for religion, and can religious communities understand and appreciate 
the role and achievements of secularity within the modern world despite their 
absence of divine legitimation? How should these two work together so that 
their living together does not descend into hating and killing? Can Habermas’ 
notion of post-secular society prepare a space in which professing a religious 





be done safely and as equal citizens? Can the political, economic, and culture 
spheres of the nation-state be widened enough to allow for full integration and 
democratic participation of the “other”? Complete and meaningful integration 
through honest and universal discourse, not toleration through faux-respect, 
seems to be the current challenge in our current secular societies, but do the 
conditions of the post-secular society allow for such integration and accep-
tance? In order to answer that, we must delve into what it means to be Muslim 
in the post-secular society.
 What Does It Mean to Profess Islam?
Through their adherence to five pillars and the moral code of Islam, Muslims 
profess every day to the most basic of theological claims: tawḥīd. ‘There is no 
god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’ (La ilaha il Allah, 
wa Muhammad Rasul Allah). It is both a statement about ultimate reality, that 
the world and all it contains is a creation of a divine being that interjects its 
will into human history – a belief that is also shared by Jews and Christians – 
and a statement about how and why the divine has entered into history, not 
as an divine incarnation like Jesus of Nazareth in Christianity, but through a 
human messenger, a Prophet. For Muslims, the religion that was perfected by 
the divine is a complete and total way of life – a way of being that is meant to 
be understood as a total ‘submission’ (islam) to the will of the creator: a radi-
calization of what Jesus said in the Gospel of Luke: ‘not my will Lord, but yours 
be done.’26 For Muslims, this Christian statement has to carry through to all 
aspects of life, not just during ṣalāt al-jum`ah (congregational Friday prayers), 
the ‘eids (holy days), or in moments of crisis. Similar to the Calvinists, who find 
religious devotion in the everydayness of work, Muslims see the potential for 
ibādah (worship) in all things at all times (as long as they’re permitted activi-
ties). As such, all aspects of daily life take on a religious significance.
Profession is bearing witness through words – through the speech act – 
through language that expresses the ultimate commitments, ultimate con-
cerns, ultimate values, and core beliefs of the individual.27 It articulates the 
26 The Gospel According to Luke: 22:42.
27 This conception of profession is obviously different from the act of confession which is 
seen as a sacrament within Catholicism. For Catholics, the sacrament of confession is the 
confession of sins and transgressions to a Priest in exchange for penance and hopefully 
absolution. Outside of this particularistic ritual, Catholics share the same phenomenon 
with other religion, the confession of beliefs as a public act of religious affirmation.
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utmost concerns, the essence of being, the spiritual aspects of human exis-
tence, and it affirms the duty of the believer to embody the values expressed 
and revealed by the divine. Additionally, Islamic professing is the merging of 
both words and intentions (niyyah) so that the speech-act itself stands as a 
testament to the identical nature of the believer’s sincere intentions. Through 
their public profession, the believer offers their belief and praxis to the judg-
ment of history, their peers, their community, and their God. For the devout 
Muslim, both the public and private sphere are arenas in which they either 
succeeds or fail to incorporate the ideals, potentials, principles, and the Islamic 
social values that are expressed in both the Qur’an and the Sunnah. As such, 
the devout believe that they will be questioned on the Day of Judgment (Yawm 
al-Qiyāmah) about how they fulfilled their time on the earth, which includes 
time in both the public and private realm. Did they dedicate the time Allah 
provided by engaging in shirk (polytheism) via the devotion of the earthly idols 
of wealth, fame, status, power – living in the having mode of being – or did 
they commit themselves to the furthering of justice, compassion, and mercy – 
living in the being mode – the embodiment of tawḥīd (oneness of God) and 
taqwá (God consciousness)?28
Because of the integrated wholeness of the Islamic tradition, the bifurcation 
of the lifeworld into a religious private and secular public sphere is a problem 
for the devout Muslim; faith does not stop at the threshold of the home and 
it cannot be artificially locked within the home. The five pillars of Islam are 
to be equally confessed in the realm of the family, civil society, and the state, 
regardless of whether they reside in a secular or religious society.29 Therefore 
for most Muslims, Islam cannot be relegated and/or isolated to the home with-
out doing considerable damage to the integrated wholeness of the believer’s 
lifeworld. If the individual Muslim in praxis remains steadfast in separating 
the two spheres of life they often senses that they violate the very creed they 
professes which recognizes no such distinction, causing great difficulty, anxi-
ety, and fear of divine punishment. If Islam is the perfected religion established 
by the God of the Qur’an, and that the Prophet instituted it in such a way that 
it is a religion that regulates – and therefore liberates – all spheres of life, and 
if the individual is a modern European who only confesses his religious be-
liefs behind closed doors while living the secular life in the public sphere, then 
they effectively forsake the sunnah (the way of the Prophet) and the divine 
28 See Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976.
29 See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) §§142 – 329. Also see Rudolf J. Siebert, Hegel’s Concept of Marriage and Family: 
The Origin of Subjective Freedom. Lewiston, ny: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1979.
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command to submit to the will of Allah (at all times).30 Muslims fail to engage 
in a meaningful imitatio Muhammadi if the bifurcation of the lifeworld sepa-
rates their religious life into private and public praxis. In light of this inner- 
conflict, western Muslim are often trapped between two imperatives, (1) to faith-
fully integrate their religion in all spheres of being and be alienated – or even 
marginalized – from the society in which they live – which is often hostile 
towards outward displays of religion, or (2) to isolate the religious life to the 
private and abandon the constitutional example of the Prophet. Steadfastness 
to the first may insure salvation; steadfastness to the second may insure so-
cial survival but engender salvational anxiety. Sincere profession of faith in a 
bifurcated society often instills great pains of conscience within many Mus-
lim. For many believers, the question is: where is the balance, and is it even pos-
sible to be a good secular citizen as well as a devout Muslim? Surely one can 
be a law-abiding citizen, engage in civil affairs, and advance the interests of 
one’s nation-state and community, but can one do this while openly professing 
Islam as the motivation for such actions?
 Witnessing in Islam: On the Tradition of Radical Praxis
The practice of “witnessing” for the faith of Islam takes on two fundamen-
tal dimensions. First, when in times of peace, the propagation of the Islam 
via da’wa (invitation to Islam), or activities associated with calling others to 
Islam. Muslims are encouraged to present Islam to non-believers in the most 
peaceful, merciful, and loving way, as to interest them in an alternative and 
truthful way-of-being, learning more about the will of the divine, and ulti-
mately welcoming them into the ummat al-Islamiyah (Islamic community). 
Despite the stereotype of the Muslim that conquers by the sword, forcefully 
compelling anyone into Islam via violence or the threat of violence has been 
strongly condemned by an unequivocal verse in the Qur’an (Sūrat al-Baqarah, 
2:256): there shall be no compulsion in religion. According to Islamic fiqh (ju-
risprudence), if a non-Muslim is ever wrongly forced to accept Islam, they are 
within their rights to revert back to their original tradition (or non-tradition). 
Da’wa is meant to be an open invitation to Islam, not an attempt to incarcerate 
within Islam. In peacetime, Muslims are to stand as witnesses for the Islamic 
tradition both in word and in deed through their submission to the moral and 
ethics principles laid out in the Qur’an, the Sunnah (way of the Prophet), ahl 
30 Al-Qur’an 5:3, ‘This day, I have perfected your religion, completed my favor upon you and 
have chosen Islam as your religion.’ My translation. We will return to this issue briefly.
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al-bayt (The House of the Prophet), and the ḥadīṯh (reports of Muhammad’s 
words and deeds).31 Muslims are to stand as examples of righteousness in a 
world that is post- righteous (or even sometimes pre-righteous). Although this 
command goes beyond the clothing that one wears (which is a form of wit-
nessing), it is often the Muslima (the Muslim woman) that stand at the front-
line of this struggle in secular societies, as she is the most readily identifiable 
because of her hijab or other head-coverings. Muslim women are the ones that 
are approached most often with questions about Islam; they are the ones that 
will most often be harassed because of the faith; they are the ones most often 
pitied (in the West) because they’re seen as oppressed under their headscarf 
and behind their niqāb (face veil); and they’re the ones most often singled 
out for discrimination because of the suspicion of terrorism that surrounds 
the Muslim community. Like the women who openly wept for the executed 
Jesus on Golgotha, Muslim women are on the frontlines for the struggle for 
recognition while often the men hide behind their western clothing and prac-
tice taqīyah (religious dissimulation) to the best of their ability. Amidst those 
with anti- Islamic sentiments, it is the Muslima that are most often the bravest 
mujahideen (those who struggle for the sake of Allah).
Whereas professing is inherently concerned with the individual and the 
divine – a relationship that can easily retreat exclusively into the private 
sphere – the practice of witnessing is a public praxis that is geared primarily 
towards the individual believer and the society around them. The social aspect 
of witnessing is one that cannot be overlooked in understanding how the dy-
namic of Islamic witnessing works. It is within society that the subjectivity of 
the Muslim can transcend itself, go out to the other, and return back to them 
and complete their faith. The “other” in society is that which makes possible 
the realization of the believer’s moral commitments, social obligations, and 
divine commandments. It is with the “other” in society that the Muslim is com-
manded by his religion to practice the humanistic values of compassion, mer-
cy, solidarity, and unconditional love. Although the mystics of Islam, the Sufis, 
often stoically shy away from the world outside of themselves and seek refuge 
in a deeply personalized relationship with the divine, and therefore sometimes 
forget the social demands of the ummah (community), the non-mystic Mus-
lim, adhering to the prophetic model of religious life, is compelled to realize 
their religiosity in concert with others – whether that be in a community of 
believers or in a community of adversaries – either one of which serves as the 
31 The ahl al-bayt is especially important for Shi’i Muslims, as it is the house of the Prophet 
via ‘Ali that they take as another source moral authority.
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basis for the social dimension of the Islamic creed.32 For example, the poor 
make it possible for those who have resources to purify and therefore make 
ḥalāl (permissible) their accumulated wealth (if it wasn’t gained through illicit 
means, in which case purification does not follow charity). Without the fulfill-
ment of their obligations to the poor, the subjective religiosity of the individual 
Muslim is suspect; their commitment to the divine command is insufficient, 
diminished, and stands unfulfilled. It is through the other, especially in this 
case the poor and marginalized, which allows the individual to abide by the di-
vine laws and dictates of the Qur’an. Therefore, witnessing in Islam inherently 
means being-with-others and being-for-others. In the end, it is a freely chosen 
altruistic commitment that stresses the absolute need for social justice, social 
equity, and social harmony – where the subjective desires of the individual are 
superseded by the objective needs of the community. Without the witnessing 
of Islamic values in society, Islam retreats into a private hyper-personalized 
faith that depletes it of its social potentials, its social force, and its commit-
ment to the furthering of a future reconciled society. This same phenomenon 
can be seen in the historical privatization of Christian social values in the West. 
Only in times of great need, such as the Civil Rights struggle in the u.s., do 
these humanistic values reappear in individuals of great moral courage, such 
as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who not only called for civil rights but also for the 
“redistribution of wealth,” which was not popular among capitalists and the 
white majority of the United States. For King, it was a moral disgrace that 
the u.s. massively produces poor people like commodities, even though it is 
the richest nation on earth.33
 New Religion as Return of the Old
Islam, like Christianity, is not only a matter of a personal relationship with the 
divine, but is also a matter of active and dynamic social solidarity with the 
poor, the suffering, and the victims of nature and history, the tyrannized and 
the oppressed, and all those forced to live under unjust conditions. It was for 
these innocent victims, created by al-Qur’aysh (Muhammad’s tribe in Mecca), 
32 It is certainly not the case that all Sufis shy away from social life but it is a general orien-
tation among mystics to find a deeply personal relationship with the divine that often 
overshadows the commitment to the greater world.
33 According to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s son, mlk iii, the demand for the “redistribution 
of wealth” was the reason his father was murdered. See Martin Luther King iii’s interview 
by Rev. Al Sharpton, PoliticsNation, msnbc, 20 January 2014.
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the Roman Empire, and racist America that Muhammad, Jesus, Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr., Malcolm x and many others fought on the side of. Their reli-
gious faith led them to bind themselves to the plight and predicament of those 
who were despised, neglected, and abused: the social outcasts and those who 
found themselves the victims of systematic discrimination, oppression, and 
violence. Furthermore, the advancement of hyper-individualization, egoism, 
narcissism, and bourgeois coldness, that is characteristic of modern civil so-
ciety as advanced by global capitalism, is a great fear of the ummah and other 
religious communities, as it undermines the communicative rationality that is 
the adhesive of their community. Many Muslim scholars identify how western 
Christianity has been privatized and depleted of its social force and relevance, 
leaving civil society to be steered by corporate greed, individual competitive-
ness, and the politics of unaccountable power. They fear precisely what Ni-
etzsche accused the West of doing: turning God’s cathedrals – and possibly his 
mosques – into God’s tombs, and thus handing the keys to the earthly king-
dom over to tyranny of the markets. Requiem aeternam deo.34 The idea that 
this market-zeitgeist could migrate – and has migrated – into the dar al-Islam 
(abode of Islam) is alarming to Muslims who see Islam as the antithesis to 
the values that drive global capitalism. Summing up their stance against this 
radical social change, a devout Muslim once told me: you can keep your Gucci, 
Prada, and Mercedes-Benz, and we’ll keep our faith, traditions, and families. The 
threat of the displacement of Islam for secular capitalism, which according to 
the Critical Theorist Walter Benjamin is a new religion itself, is real and should 
be taken seriously by both Muslims and the West, as it is one of the greatest 
contributing factors in the resentment that the Muslim world has against west-
ern nations.
In order to witness the encroachment of corporate capitalism within the 
most holy of spaces within the Muslim world, one need only visit Mecca – 
the most sacred space for Muslims – where the commercialization of the sur-
rounding area continues unabated. Every western fast food chain, designer 
clothes, technological gadgets, or luxury items most associated with western 
bourgeois culture and the consumer society can be purchased within the city. 
It is a very modern city dedicated to a pre-modern religion and the modern 
cult of consumption. This phenomenon is the result of the collaboration with 
Saudi Salafism and corporate capitalism; the most poignant symbol of this al-
liance being the new Makkah Royal Hotel Clock Tower or Abraj al-Bait Tower 
that looms ominously over the great mosque of Mecca – a grotesque display of 




cheap grandeur in the city of the most humble prophet; it is symbolic of cor-
porate style capitalism awkwardly superimposed on prophetic religious faith. 
Additionally, it continues on the tradition of the Wahhabi-Salafi destruction of 
Islamic architecture that begun with the conquest of Mecca by the Wahhabi-
Salafis in 1803. Just as was done to Islamic monuments and dwellings to build 
the new petro funded Clock-Tower and the grandiose expansion of the Grand 
Mosque, Abdul Aziz, a leader of the puritan reform movement, destroyed any 
edifice that didn’t conform to his narrow and puritan interpretation of Islam, 
including tombs, shrines, and homes associated with the Sīrat Rasūl Allāh 
(biography of the Prophet). However, as the 19th century Wahhabi-Salafis de-
stroyed historically significant edifices in the name of religious reform, today’s 
Wahhabi-Salafis destroy in the name of other goals: profits.35
Critics have dubbed this commercialization of sacred space the “Las Vegas-
ization” of Mecca, as the “other-worldliness” of the sacred geography appears 
increasingly diminished in contrast to the secular and capitalist oriented cul-
ture. In the end, the “otherness” of Mecca is giving way to the “sameness” of 
every other major city in the world, as it sheds the aura of sacredness for ubiq-
uitous advertisements and the same consumer goods that are found through-
out the world. Apart from the Grand Mosque and other features of the city 
associated with Muhammad and the early Muslims, Mecca becomes indistin-
guishable from other Middle Eastern cities where the influence of corporate 
capitalism is abundant. For many Muslims, it appears that Mecca has returned 
to the market ethics of al-Qar’aysh, the primary enemies of the early Muslims, 
who also maximized profits from the pilgrims on their way to visit the holy 
Ka’ba, just as the first century money-changers did around the Jewish Temple, 
which sparked Jesus’ earthly dies irae (day of rage) against their profit making. 
For these Muslim critics, it appears that the globalizing secular force of capital-
ism has created a new jāhilīyah (age of ignorance) and its destruktiven geist (de-
structive spirit) has pierced the very heart of Islam’s most sacred space. Mecca, 
in many ways, stands today as a city divided between two religions. First, the 
religion of Islam that has always resisted its integration within the antagonistic 
spirit of capitalism, and secondly, the new “religion” of globalized capitalism – 
which has a way of quietly undermining the communicative nature of revealed 
religion, leaving behind a pitiful shadow of what religion once was. Addition-
ally, from the perspective of Walter Benjamin’s dialectical materialist historian, 
the catastrophe of elegance and luxury comes at the cost of the more than 
35 Alastair Crooke, “You Can’t Understand isis if You Don’t Know the History of Wah-




half a million foreign workers in Saudi Arabia that live in squalid conditions, 
are abused at the hands of their employers, and are denied their basic human 
rights by the Kingdom. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, these 
workers often times live in conditions reminiscent of slavery.36 Echoing Benja-
min’s Angelus Novus, who sees all of history as a singular event of barbaric trag-
edy, the dialectical materialist historian sees the new skyscrapers, shopping 
malls, and luxury office buildings as testaments to the sickness within today’s 
Saudi (and broader Muslim) society. When the Islamic command to clothe, 
house, and feed the poor, the sick, and the broken gives way to gaudy and vain-
glorious displays of unmerited wealth and undeserved luxury, then the pro-
phetic values of Islam have been overtaken by the corrosive nature of a very 
secular globalized capitalism. They have, in this sense, exchanged the religious 
morality of the Prophet Muhammad for the secular philosophies of Ayn Rand, 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. It is capitalism with an Islamic façade.
 Witnessing in the Time of War
Witnessing in the time of war is of utmost concern in the latest period of Is-
lamic history, as it has come to the forefront under European colonialism, post-
colonialism, the “War on Terror,” the Arab Spring, and the various civil wars 
that have recently plagued the Muslim world. Although the western World’s 
fascination, condemnation, and distortion of the Islamic concept of jihād has 
gone on since the rise of the first Islamic empire that displaced the crumbling 
and oppressive Byzantines and Sasanians in the Middle East, and later threat-
ened the lands of the Roman Catholic Church, it has yet to fully understand 
what jihād means from within a normative Islamic perspective. Whether this 
is intentional or through neglect is a continual topic of debate. On the other 
hand, a pervasive symptom of the nouveau-jahili-status (state of modern igno-
rance) of today’s dar al-Islam is that many Muslims aren’t able to adequately 
define or intellectually defend the notion of jihād either. When it comes under 
scrutiny, many Muslims adopt a reactionary attitude that levels the complex 
concept down to a simple slogan of “holy war,” the very same misconception 
of jihād that many uninformed westerners have. Religious illiteracy is not only 
a symptom of secularization, but of deficient religious education in supposed 
religious societies, and the Muslim majority countries are no exception. In a 
36 See Human Rights Watch, “Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers in 




classical understanding of jihād, especially in times of peace, it is a struggle 
within oneself to perfect that which is confessed and witnessed; it’s a struggle 
to be just, fair, honest, and life-affirming; it is an concerted effort to ‘enjoin 
what is right and forbid what is wrong’ (Qur’an, 3:110); it is a struggle to direct 
one’s energies, resources, and time towards realizing a society that does not 
brutalize, oppress, and make into idols the gods of the market: success, fame, 
status and wealth. In times of war, jihād bil-saif (struggle of the sword) is an 
active struggle to defend the Muslim ummah from those who wish to inflict 
harm upon it. Although the laws governing Muslims engaged in warfare are 
precise and extensive, and are therefore beyond the scope of this discussion, it 
is clear both from the Qur’an and the ḥadīṯh that Muslims are (1) not to initi-
ate hostilities with others, (2) not to attack innocent civilians, whether they 
be men, women, children, clerics, etc., (3) must cease hostilities if the enemy 
surrenders or sues for peace, (4) cannot abuse captives, (5) cannot force Islam 
upon captives, and (6) cannot poison wells (engage in biological and chemical 
warfare).37 Lastly, similar to the Augustinian Just War Theory (jus bellum ius-
tum), the war against the enemy must be proportional and must avoid civilian 
casualties at all costs.38 Of course, history demonstrates to us that the Muslim 
world is not a society of saints and often violates its own prescribed norms, 
as Muslim so often justify violence against innocent civilians by creatively in-
terpreting away certain prohibitions, by declaring them non-applicable, or by 
anachronistically making normative certain actions of past Muslims that have 
been since rejected or abandoned via ijma’ (consensus) by Islamic scholars 
over the centuries.39 Furthermore, the practice of takfīr, or declaring a Muslim 
to be a non-Muslim (a form of excommunication), and therefore mistakenly 
believing it is permissible to kill these “murtaddīn” (apostates), is also become 
a commonly held belief among some orientations, and is likewise a symptom 
of the modern condition in the Muslim world. This is most certainly not lim-
ited to the Muslim community, as all religions have a criminal history when 
we see the core of the faiths transformed into an ideology that crudely legiti-
mates and/or masks limited self-interest. From the perspective of the critical 
religiologist, the Christian religion of ‘becoming and liberation’ is distorted 
into the Crusades, witch burning, and the Inquisition; the Jewish religion of 
37 Al-Qur’an, 2:190–193; 4:84; 2:216; 2:244; 2:217; 2:246–251; 4:74–76; 8:39; 8:65; 9:5–6; 12:13–16; 
9:29; 9:123; 22:39–41; 47:4; 47:20; 48:17.
38 The Augustinian Just War Theory was a compromise between Christians and the Roman 
state that betrayed the radical pacifism of the earliest Christian communities.
39 This neglect of Qur’anic norms concerning warfare can be witnessed most poignantly in 
isis (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) repeated human rights abuses.
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‘sublimity’ is turned into an ideology of state sponsored repression and mur-
der of Palestinians as well as the denial of their most basic human rights; the 
religion of ‘imagination’ turns into Hindu nationalism and fanaticism against 
Muslim minorities; and likewise the Islamic religion of ‘law’ turns into 9/11, 
hijackings, beheadings, and suicide bombers.40 We also see this same phenom-
enon among secular states that also espouse prohibitions against exacting vio-
lence among innocent people but fail to uphold such standards precisely when 
they are most necessary. ‘The land of the free’ – predicated on the American 
Constitution – degenerates into the slaughter of Native Americas, the enslave-
ment of Africans, the internment of Japanese citizens, and the so-called “war 
on terror” which itself terrorizes innocent victims of Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Pakistan, etc.41 The nation that fights against terror has refused to close its own 
terrorist training camp in Fort Benning, Georgia, i.e. the School of the Americas, 
now known as Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, which is 
responsible for some of the most brutal and repulsive human rights abuses 
in Latin America. A nation that obsessives over abortion but finds no flaw in 
napalming pregnant Vietnamese women and their toddlers is hardly a nation 
that can claim to be rooted in the Gospel tradition of loving one’s enemy. What 
kind of enemy can the unborn and newly-born be? The already historically du-
bious claim that the United States is a “Christian” country is made even more 
unbelievable by the militaristic praxis of the “hawks” in Washington d.c. – both 
Republican and Democrat – whose instrumental rationality – which allows 
them to think strategically about the destruction of nations – outweighs any 
remnants of communicative reason which would inform them of the intrin-
sic worth of the life they will inevitably destroy. From the perspective of the 
Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory, nations are invaded, undermined, and over-
thrown for profit, not for the Orwellian notions of freedom, justice, and liberty, 
which may provide ideological justification but are rarely the true motivation 
for aggressive militarism. Millions of martyrs, both American soldiers and the 
citizens of nations that they were ordered to invade, can attest to the “aims” 
and “benefits” of neo-imperialism, which have profited the few – especially 
western corporations – while the many, including American citizens, suffer.
40 See G.W.F. Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Determinate Religion Vol. 2, ed. 
Peter C. Hodgson. New York: Clarendon Press, 2007.
41 This same country is the only western country that still exacts the death penalty upon its 
own civilians. See Gladstone, Rick. “Amnesty International Find Executions Rose in 2013.” 




For traditional Islamic fiqh, in order for a military struggle to be a legitimate 
jihād, i.e. to be justified by the Islamic tradition itself, its war aims must be 
just, honest, and in accordance with the spirit of compassion and mercy. Both 
the theory that guides the aims and the praxis that carries it out must be in 
congruence otherwise it risks its Islamic legitimacy. In Islam, the Orwellian 
functionalization of principles, whether they are purely Islamic or “universal,” 
such as freedom, justice, and liberty, etc., is condemnable, as it delegitimates 
the concepts, undermines rightful authority, and breeds cynicism concerning 
publicly stated intentions. It also has a more perverse and pervasive affect: the 
continual impoverishment of language – its impoverishment of substantive 
meaning via its functionalization as cover for ulterior motives – is a major 
problem both within the Islamic and western world. Words just do not carry 
the same credibility that they once embodied because they have been so woe-
fully distorted by various powers looking to camouflage their plans behind uni-
versally accepted values. This is true both for states as well as groups, especially 
terrorist groups such as al-Qae’da and isis.
Ultimately, all attempts to engage in a jihād bil-saif must be justified via ra-
tional discourse and legitimately rooted within the Prophetic tradition. It must 
therefore also maintain the standards, regulations, and prohibitions that were 
articulated both by Muhammad and the Qur’an, as these are the constitutional 
sources of the normative values that govern all forms of jihād.
Just as the once-revolutionary nature of Bourgeois philosophy is twisted 
into its opposite, the revolutionary and compassionate nature of jihād has also 
been transformed into the very opposite of its original emancipatory inten-
tion. Suicide bombers have not only become the fear of non-Muslims flying on 
Russian Aeroflot (Aэpoфлóт) airlines, United States and nato soldiers in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, bus riders in Britain and Israel, and trains in Spain, they are 
also feared by Muslims in historically Muslim lands who reject extremism, who 
visit Shi’a shrines, or who work for peace and reconciliation between warring 
factions. Indeed, if one was to adopt a quantitative methodology, one should 
clearly see that Muslims have been the victims at the hands of such terroristic 
activities more so than westerners.42 The Islamic ummah is targeted both by 
42 While I do not like to engage in the fashionable counting of victims in order to make a 
quantitative statement about who has suffered more, I do believe that the reality of hu-
man suffering at the hands of injustice both in the Islamic and western world can be a 
point of mutual recognition, discussion, and eventually reconciliation. This is what I call 
intersubjective-passiology. Through an honest discourse centered on the common human 
experience of suffering, different peoples can come together and hopefully overcome 
their animosity towards each other. The grieving faces of western mothers and fathers are 
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the great powers of the West and those who claim to fight for the preservation 
of Islam through its “purification.” The Muslims who find themselves within 
one of the many conflict zones in the world are doubly victimized.
Although what is deemed “radical” in today’s discussion of religion – those 
that bend religion to their extremist and often violent ideology – the real “radi-
cal” nature of Islam is in the opposite approach; the prophetic trajectory that 
Muhammad directed the early Muslim community towards was the truly radi-
cal approach, if we understand the term “radical” as being to “grasp the roots” 
of a given subject or action. In this case, the roots are in the prophetic tradi-
tion of the Biblical and Qur’anic prophets. When we examine what in Islam 
is described as the “age of ignorance” (jāhilīyah), there we see the prototype 
of those contemporary Muslims who brutalize, oppress, and murder, embody-
ing not the example set forth by Muhammad, but by his enemies: al-Qur’aysh. 
Likewise, in the example of the Roman Empire, its sociopathic Caesars, its Le-
gions, and its Praetorian guard, we see the prototype for those “Christians” who 
brutalize, oppress, and murder today; and in the example of the ancient Egyp-
tians and Babylonians we see the archetype for the Israeli Defense Force (idf) 
that deprives Palestinians of their native land, their families, and their lives. 
In the victims of al-Qur’aysh, the Roman Empire, and the ancient Egyptians 
and Babylonians, we see the model of the unjust martyr-manufacturer, whose 
spirit can be found today in the authoritarian and violent expressions of the 
religions that were once their victims.
From the perspective of the critical religiologist, the prophetic tradition, ini-
tiated by Abraham, as he accepted the call of his unseen God, laid down the 
geography for the prophetic and therefore radical tradition of love and mercy, 
justice and peace, that permeated the history of religious revolutions through 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah of the 7th century Arabia.43 Furthermore, it is the 
radical commitment to equality, equity, justice, compassion, which manifests 
itself in the care of the poor, the orphan, and the widow that was translated 
into secular language – forsaking the theological legitimation – by socialists 
and even many communists. Impatient for a heavenly manifestation of a rec-
onciled and therefore peaceful and un-alienated society, they attempted to 
construct a world in which the messiah could endorse upon his arrival (even if 
many, like Marx himself, could no longer believe in such religious figures). Re-
grettably, such lofty values in secular form are also subject to distortion, deni-
gration, and functionalization for the means of oppression and brutality, as 
the same grieving face of the Islamic mothers and fathers. That shared grief is fertile soil 
for solidarity and reconciliation.
43 In the Islamic Tradition, Abraham (‘Ibrāhīm) is call al-Khalil Allah, the “friend of God.”
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had happened under the brutal regime of Stalin and other communist despots, 
who shrouded themselves in altruistic values while systematically denying and 
destroying the humanity of millions. Nevertheless, both secular and religious 
martyrs have been created throughout the millennia while in search of more 
just and equitable social conditions. With the ongoing struggles in the Ukraine 
against the 2014 neo-fascist coup d’etat of the Right Sector and Svaboda Party 
in Kiev, the struggle between secularization and religious politics in Turkey, 
the struggle for democracy against military dictatorship in Egypt, the struggle 
for Shi’a and Sunni reconciliation in Iraq, and the struggle against both the 
‘Alawite state and isis terror in Syria, it is clear that history will continue to 
produce more of what it has always produced: martyrs.
 “Perfected Religion”: A Problematic Conception
The historic rise of Europe out of the Dark Ages has come at the expense the 
traditional Muslim territories, especially in the Middle East and North African, 
which was the principle bearer of advanced civilization in the Mediterranean 
area after the fall of the Roman Empire in the 4th century. Despite the fact 
that the early Muslims severed the southern part of the Mediterranean from its 
northern half – which was culturally integrated via the shared Greco-Roman 
culture and later Christianity – the southern Mediterranean was quickly in-
tegrated into a more progressive society than the European one: the various 
Islamic Caliphates and dynasties. Chief among the reasons for the Muslim’s 
rapid advancement, in terms of intellectual achievements and not territorial 
gain, was its insistence on education, the emergence of scholarship, and the 
unconquerable drive to absorb the knowledge of the previous civilizations into 
the growing Islamic empire.44 By the 8th century ce, the Islamic empire was 
vast, stretching from India to Western Europe, from the southernmost point 
of Arabia to deep within central Asia. In order to organize such an empire, in 
order to codify the Islamic tradition, in order to provide for the needs of the 
new Islamic territories, the Muslims had to be practical, less dogmatic, and 
learn from those who came before. They were rich in religious zeal, piety, and 
morality, but lacked the worldly experience of being rulers of empires. This re-
ality would require gaining and expanding upon knowledge received from the 
previous civilizations. From India the Muslims learned complex mathemat-
ics; from the Romans they learned about logistics of city building, from the 
44 George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.
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Chinese they learned about paper (and later gunpowder), and from the Greeks 
they learned philosophy; the latter being the most important for the advance-
ment of Islamic thought, Qur’anic exegesis, systematic theology, and the art 
of logic. Platonism and Aristotelian logic, which fertilized the earliest of Mus-
lim philosophers such as al-Kindi (801–873 ce), resulted in an unprecedented 
depth in understanding the sources of Islam. Al-Qur’an, the ḥadīṯh, and the 
Sunnah, were also supplemented by the great works of Greek philosophy, 
such as Plato’s Republic, The Dialogues, and his other works on epistemology 
and metaphysics.45 Aristotle played an important role among the intellectual 
elites in the Muslim world, to the point where some scholars claimed that his 
works were close to having near-revelation status. These texts and may oth-
ers delivered to the Muslims the categories and concepts they needed in or-
der to become a world power and to systematize their own religious tradition. 
These ancient sources of knowledge were continually developed further in the 
Bayt al-Hikma in Baghdad as well as in the great libraries and universities of 
al-‘Andalus (Islamic Iberia). The great works of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (Alphara-
bius), Ibn Rušd (Averroes), Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Ibn ʿArabī, Nasir al-din al- Tūsī, 
etc., were all steeped within the thought of both Islamic theology and Greek 
philosophy – religious revelation and autonomous reason; by way of Islamic 
Spain, this mixture would later fertilize the intellectually sterile grounds of 
Europe itself, thus laying the foundations for the European Renaissance. Phi-
losophy, no matter where it derived from, whether it be a work of ethics, meta-
physics, ontology, epistemology, or politic-economic, was not rejected by the 
Muslim intellectuals simply because it was of foreign origin or was originally 
developed by those men of different faiths or no faiths at all, but was governed 
by a different criteria: can “truth” be found in these pagan philosophies? And in 
light of the Qur’an, could these truths be reconciled with divine revelation? As 
the Islamic empire grew, so too did its rapacious desire to learn the knowledge 
of other peoples. Muslim scholars remembered two important proverbs: ‘seek 
knowledge from the cradle to the grave’ and ‘the ink of the scholar is more sa-
cred then the blood of the martyr.’46
For the early Muslim intellectuals and scholars, the truth of philosophy 
could be reconciled with the faith of Islam via reason and sound logic. No 
45 Roy Jackson, What is Islamic Philosophy? (New York: Routledge, 2014), 8–40.
46 There is some debate as to whether the former phrase is something the Prophet really 
said or if it is just a pious truism that is common within the Muslim community. The 
second phrase seems to be authentic according to the scholars of ḥadīṯh but has a weak 




one exemplified this more than al-Kindī, better known as the philosopher of 
the Arabs in the 9th century, who attempted to demonstrate that the believer 
could read the Qur’an and other sacred texts through reason. He did not be-
lieve that reason was the enemy of revelation, but rather it was a divine gift to 
humanity for the understanding of all that exists. Arguments made by Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle were no strangers to arguments concerning īman (faith), 
‘aqīda (creed), kalam (theology), fiqh (jurisprudence), etc., but were deeply en-
grained in the logic of the arguments themselves. Early Islamic philosophers, 
seeing the tremendous accomplishment gifted to the world by Greek thinkers, 
absorbed their works into Islamic thought. This syncretism rescued Islam from 
the intellectual stagnation that was already potentially there; it gave Islamic 
thought a more complex and sophistication vocabulary by which one could 
interpret the Qur’an and other sources of Islam more effectively.47 Addition-
ally, this also gave the Muslim intellectuals the philosophical and scientific cat-
egories by which they could fulfill the divine command to investigate the world 
and all it contains, without which they would have to either (1) reinvent such 
intellectual tools or (2) remain intellectual underdeveloped. By engaging the 
Greek texts and translating their wisdom into Islamic thought, philosophy was 
not only infusing the new religious tradition with the ability to comprehend it-
self in a much more precise and in-depth way, but philosophy was also pressed 
into service of the broader Muslim community.
Yet for some, the Islamic practice of interrogating non-Islamic thought 
and inviting the wisdom of others into the Islamic domain was not a virtue 
that brought about a more progressive and beneficial society, but a danger-
ous mixture of Allah’s religion and man’s fallible thought. For these believers, 
whatever comes from Allah should never be conflated or “diluted” with the 
thoughts of man, let alone those who were outside of Islam: kāfirūn (disbeliev-
ers). The preservation of the “purity” or authenticity (ṣahīh) of Islam was of 
utmost importance, and so damnant quod non intellegunt.48 This aversion to 
outside thought remains within much of the ummah of Muslims today, espe-
cially among those of a more fundamentalist trajectory.
This reactionary response to those who are unable to experience Islam as 
a dynamic religion as opposed to a stagnant one have made their objections 
to Islamic philosophy known from the beginning of the Islamic empire un-
til today, and still hold a considerable and undeserved tyranny over many Is-
lamic intellectuals who, as a consequence, isolate themselves within academia 
47 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civiliza-
tion. The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 410–443.
48 ‘They condemn what they do not understand.’
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where such thought can occur without any influence on the masses. Those 
who could help the Muslim world the most are often the ones least likely to 
enter into civil discourse within the Muslim public sphere for fear of reprisals. 
It is not because these Muslim intellectuals are not engaged in robust and pow-
erful critiques of the Muslim societies that they have little to no influence in 
the Muslim world, but it’s because of the lack of legitimacy that they have with 
the common believer. They are often seen as outsiders, those influenced by 
western ways of thinking, and insufficiently Islamic, as if being Islamic means 
to be anti-intellectual. In the end, the contribution of the Islamic philosophers, 
who learned from their teachers the Greeks, cannot be forgotten. From the 
perspective of Habermas and other critical philosophers, the Muslim world 
cannot engage in a damnatio memoriae (damnation of memory) to expunge 
the Muslim philosophers from Islamic history, but rather must return to them 
in the modern period, as such philosophy may hold the key to an Islamic form 
of modernity that is both sufficiently Islamic and also valid within the condi-
tions of an increasingly secular global society.
However, this distrust of “outsider” knowledge is not unique to the Mus-
lim world, as this bifurcated intellectual tradition, or the double truth thesis – 
which is intrinsic to the divisions of class and education – was also the case 
in the Roman empire: let the plebeians have their religion and we’ll keep our 
patrician philosophy; the western Enlightenment period: let the peasants keep 
their superstitious religion and we’ll keep our reason and rational civil/natural 
religions.49 Rational truth had to be protected from the mythologically enam-
oured and exclusivist masses, who, from the perspective of the intellectual 
elites, had not the mental capacity to understand reality for what it really was, 
but rather needed “pictorial” and/or simple representations of reality. Two 
forms of faith were thus produced: unenlightened religion for the “riff raff” 
(Ḥashwiyya), faith justified by reason for the elites.
As stated before, Sūrah al-Ma’ida (5:3) of the Qur’an states, ‘This day, I have 
perfected your religion, completed my favor upon you and have chosen Islam 
as your religion.’50 From the position of those who attempt to preserve the 
intellectual chastity of the Islamic tradition, this verse is taken to mean that 
Islam is a “closed” religious system, as if through “perfecting” Islam it has been 
made impenetrable to any other knowledge, wisdom and/or thought. Perfect-
ed is taken to mean “without lack,” “fully developed,” “already identical with 
itself,” and “complete.” Additionally, it is assumed that by ‘perfected’ any other 





form of thought that may migrate into Islam is inherently invalid due to its ori-
gins outside of Islam. If the knowledge is not sui generis to Islam, then it is not 
Islam at all. Yet this is a completely unphilosophical and non-dialectical way to 
approach the meaning of the phrase ‘perfected your religion.’
In order to understand the Qur’anic language that is used to describe the 
ontological state of Islam during the time of Muhammad, we have to think 
in terms of Islam in-and-of-itself and the believer who approaches the Islamic 
tradition from the outside (even if they are a Muslims). Islam is the object of 
study and the Muslim is the subject that studies. These are two very differ-
ent phenomenon and therefore have two very different ontological statuses: 
the Qur’an is – for lack of a better word – the incarnation (incarnationem) of 
the divine for Muslims; it is the word of Allah (Kalam Allah) made present 
in the finite and fallible world; it is Deum in libro.51 For most devout Mus-
lims, it is the uncreated but historically bound presence of the divine that is 
accessible – on the surface level – to all believers. The Qur’an as such is the 
door to the divine presence. The believer accesses this presence through reci-
tation, contemplation, and study. Furthermore, it is a record of Allah’s thought 
concerning historical (particular) and ahistorical (universal) issues, problems, 
etc., revealed to Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah in the 7th century Arabia. Being 
that the believer is a finite creature, the product of history, and bound to their 
own mortality, moral fallibility, and incomplete knowledge, they are in need 
of guidance. Therefore it is the duty of the believer to not only come to know 
the Islamic tradition from within itself but also to incorporate and embody the 
values, principles, and ideals of the Islamic tradition so that the object (Islam) 
and the subject (the believer) become identical with each other to the best of 
the believers ability. This attempt to be a believer who has incorporated the 
Qur’anic way-of-being-in-the-world requires a certain amount of intellectual 
and philosophical tools, as the Islamic tradition is not one that asks its devout 
to be “childlike” in faith, to be without education, or to mortify intelligence, but 
rather demands of its followers to be people of intellect as opposed to simply 
being people of taqlīd (imitation).
When the proponents of the “closed” theory put forth their argument con-
cerning the inability of Islam to appropriate the wisdom of others into itself 
without diluting its purity and authenticity, they cancel its entelechy, its process 
of “becoming” – the internal development of all there is beyond that which has 
already been and that which is to be. Since Aristotle, philosophers have insisted 
that nothing is what it was, and nothing is yet what it will be, all is “becoming” – 
the present is but a moment within the dialectical relationship between the 
51 ‘The divine in the book.’
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past and the future. With the cancelation of “becoming” the religious purists 
forces a stationary state upon the Islamic tradition; they imprison it within its 
own history, which inevitably impedes its ability to deliver the necessary and 
adequate moral and intellectual tools, concepts, and categories needed with-
in the 21st century for Muslims to address their very modern problems. This 
stationary state, this petrification of what is an inherently dynamic (as in it 
embraces its own inner-development) religious tradition – as all religious tra-
ditions that remain beneficial to mankind must be or they will become histori-
cally irrelevant – has unfortunately handicapped the Muslim ummah as they 
have become ill prepared for the challenges and predominate coordinates of 
life in the modern age.52 The main source of the community’s identity, their in-
terpretation of reality and orientation of action, is somehow stuck within the 
10th century (or slightly beyond) because it is not allowed to recognize its own 
development as it passes through (and creates) history. This development – 
often accompanied by social, intellectual, and politic-economic forces from 
outside of it – is condemned as bid’a (innovation) by those who fail to rec-
ognize the internal dynamics and perpetual recreation of Islam from within 
itself. For these intellectual idol makers, Islam is a fetish – having magic-like 
powers that can deliver the Muslim world from its enemies all on its own, as 
long as it is “pure.’ Contrary to the approach of the philosophers, who empha-
sized the dynamics of Islam, fundamentalism forces the religion into a state 
of stasis (στάσις – “standing still”). This “islam” is formal, without prophetic 
and revolutionary content, without internal development, and as such can-
not adequately address the problems of the modern period; it remains locked 
in an “iron cage” of history; a perpetual looking backwards without genuine 
self-propelled movement forward. This diminished form of “islam,” with its 
crippled philosophical immune system, stands completely alien in the con-
temporary world that surrounds it. This is the dead-idol that fundamentalism 
and extremism has made of Islam, and one of the primary reasons why the 
Muslim community remains bewildered within the post-secular conditions, 
stuck without the philosophical capacity to navigate the religion in a rapidly 
changing global situation.
52 Some scholars attribute this artificial arrest of the Islamic tradition to the thinking of Ibn 
Taymiyyah, a 13th/14th century Islamic scholar, theologian and logician, who was skepti-
cal of what he thought was bid’a (innovation) in the daily religious lives of Muslims. His 
thought is seen as an early attempt to exorcise the Islamic tradition from the innovations 
that Muslims had brought into it. Many of the Muslim world’s most reactionary and pur-
ist movements lay claim to Ibn Taymiyyah as their intellectual precursor.
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To the point about purity and authenticity, a historical example that may 
shed light on the present situation is available. Post-Revolutionary Iran expe-
rienced a conflict between two “forms” of Islamic intellectualism. Those who 
wished to keep Islam pure from all outside influenced argued for a Islam-i 
maktabi or “authentic Islam,” while those who saw no contradiction with Is-
lam being supplemented, or even fertilized by other philosophies – especially 
third world liberation thought inspired by Karl Marx, Che Guevara, Albert 
Camus, Franz Fanon, Jean Paul Sartre and even Nietzsche – argued for Islam-
i iltiqati or “syncretic Islam.” The later was predominately influenced by the 
works of the left-wing Shi’a intellectual ‘Ali Sharīʿati, whose legacy was claimed 
by the non-clerical raushanfikran-i mazhabi (religious intellectuals).53 These 
religious intellectuals confronted what they saw as the intellectual stagnation 
of the ‘Ulamāʾ (religious scholars), which wished to place tradition above in-
tellectual creativity and “independent reasoning” (ijtihād). They believed the 
petrified religious thought that the ulema faithfully guarded was unsuitable for 
the modern problems of Iran and the broader Shi’a community, as it had lost 
the revolutionary and socially progressive geist that early Islam embodied. Ad-
ditionally, they argued for a place among the leadership of the revolutionary 
republic partially due to the fact that their “ideology” – in the Sharīʿati sense 
of a comprehensive system of ideas – played an important role in revolution-
izing the Iranian public.54 Although he never expressly admitted it, it was the 
deep well of Islamized political-leftist language and arguments of Sharīʿati that 
Khomeini drew from in his opposition to the Shah.55 The religious intellectuals 
understood that traditional Shi’a Islam, as embodied by the political quietism 
of most of the clerics, would not sufficiently motivate the masses in their rebel-
lion against the Shah’s “White Revolution,” and therefore a spirit of revolution 
had to be provoked in Islam from outside.56 “Safavid Islam,” to their minds, 
had become stagnant, conservative, and reserved, but leftist theory and politi-
cal praxis would force the Shi’a in Iran to recover the revolutionary potentials 
that were latent within their tradition, especially in what Sharīʿati called Alavi 
53 Hamid Algar, Roots of The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oneonta, ny: Islamic Publications 
International, 2001), 99.
54 Hamid Algar, Roots, 93.
55 Dustin Byrd, Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Toward 
a Theory of Prophetic Charisma (Lanham, md: University Press of America, 2011), 98–102; 
Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 60–87; ‘Ali Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar 
(Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979), 31.
56 See Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution of Iran. Tehran: Kayhan Press, 1967.
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Shi’ism or Shi’ism before it was co-opted by the Safavids.57 Just as the working 
class, dark skinned people, and other Third World peoples were persecuted by 
the imperialist, whites, and the “First World,” so too were ‘Ali and Hussein per-
secuted by the rich and powerful, and now the people of ‘Ali and Hussein were 
being persecuted and oppressed by the new Yazid, the Shah of Iran.58 Did ‘Ali 
not fight his oppressors, the religious intellectuals asked. Did Hussein not fight 
his oppressors? Should not revolutionary Shi’a Islam, or what is sometimes 
called “Red Shi’ism,” fight its western and monarchical oppressors? Lest the 
Shi’a forget Karbala, and make the same history-changing mistake again, 
the Shi’a – with the conceptual aid of Islamized leftist language – overthrew 
the Shah in 1979 and regained their independence from foreign domination. Un-
fortunately, after the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran chose to suppress 
the thought of ‘Ali Sharīʿati as it attempted to build a nation more aligned with the 
traditionalism of the Shi’a clerics that had little space for western philosophy – 
especially of the Marxist variant – despite its important contribution to the suc-
cess of the revolution. It is possible that the philosophical basis for Sharīʿati’s 
work was too alienating for many of the more conservative ‘Ulamāʾ, which 
looked with suspicion at all his secular western (and leftist) influences. Nev-
ertheless, according to Hamid Algar, ‘many people were ready to participate 
in the Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini to a certain degree 
because of the influence upon them of Dr. Sharīʿati.’59 It is to a major degree 
that the Iranian people owe their successful revolution to the recovery of the 
philosophical heritage of Islam as it was ignited by ‘Ali Sharīʿati’s reintroduc-
tion of philosophical conceptions into Islamic thought and praxis. It was the 
revolutionary spirit of Islam-i iltiqati that broke the back of the Shah, not the 
religious conservatism of the quietist clerics.
In his June 2014 article on aljazeera.com, the author Hasan Azad asked the 
perplexing but pertinent question, Why are there no Muslim philosophers?60 
As we’ve already demonstrated, this is a highly complex question that had 
garnished a tremendous amount of attention from academics and scholars, 
both western and Muslim. From the perspective of the Critical Theory of 
57 Hamid Algar, Roots, 96–97.
58 In Islamic history, Yazid was responsible for the murder of Hussein, the Prophet Muham-
mad’s grandson. His murder and the penitence movement that it sparked was the true 
beginning of Shi’a Islam.
59 Hamid Algar, Roots, 111.





Religion, the absence of “Islamic Philosophers” – in the strictest sense of a 
“philosopher” as being the inheritor of a philosophical tradition which began 
with the Greeks – has to do with the legitimation crisis that philosophy went 
through in Islamic history. As was stated before, from the most gregarious of 
intellectuals within the Muslim world’s golden age, philosophy, regardless of 
its origin, was investigated for its truth content and much of it was translat-
ed into Arabic, debated, and infused into Islamic theology, political thought, 
and jurisprudence.61 However, as the Muslim world began to collapse upon 
itself due to outside pressures as well as internal divisions and weaknesses, a 
reactionary and defensive attitude towards Islam became increasingly com-
mon among the believers. Unfortunately, if the religion can no longer be intel-
lectually defended due to the absence of qualified “apologists” (ἀπoλoγία – to 
speak in defense), it is inevitably defended through violence. The idea that a 
“return to Islam,” i.e. the de-intellectualized fundamentalist orientation, was 
the only way to rescue Islam from a world in which the balance of power began 
to shift away from the dar al-Islam, took hold among many intellectuals and 
layman alike. It is important to remember that it was Islamic philosophy, its 
own articulation and augmentation of Greek philosophy, which laid down the 
intellectual and scientific roots of the European Renaissance. Because of this, 
Muslims inadvertently rescued Europe from perpetuating its own catastrophic 
collapse into barbarity. Yet simultaneously, it abandoned one of the more im-
portant sources of its own vitality. Europe’s philosophical gain was the Mus-
lim world’s loss; Europe recovered the wisdom of the Greeks, the mathematics 
of the Hindus, the architectural genius of the Romans, etc., while the Muslim 
world fell into decay. The suppression of philosophy and human rationality in 
favor of blind faith in revelation – that was incomprehensible to most without 
theo-philosophical categories by which to read it – led to the Muslim world’s 
intellectual decline. In the process, blame was shifted towards philosophy and 
the philosophers as being the bid’a that caused the collapse; philosophers were 
accused of being heretics, apostates, and introducers of “foreign” ideas; their 
books and the books of their Greeks predecessors were suppressed, and the 
Muslims world slid into its own “dark ages.” In the place of an Islam that thinks 
and believes came an Islam that only believes; thus abandoning the Qur’anic 
demand to think, ponder, reflect, and investigate the world and all it contains 
through reason and imagination. With the abandonment of philosophy un-
der the accusation that it imported foreign ideas into the Muslim community 
and thus made Islam corrupt and weak, came the complete de-legitimization 




of philosophy in the Muslim world. Philosophers of the Islamic faith are still 
today tepid in their thought, unwilling to antagonize those who still remain in 
Plato’s now Islamized cave.
Looking critically back into history, we see that a very serious problem oc-
curred in the 10th century. The closing of ijtihād (independent reasoning) 
among the Sunnis, in favor of what the 19th and 20th Turkish scholar Bediüzza-
man Said Nursi described as taqlīdi-Islam (Islam by imitation), had created the 
conditions for intellectual stagnation, at least in the case of Islamic jurispru-
dence.62 Scholars believed that the major questions concerning the true and 
proper Islamic way-of-being were decided among the first few centuries after 
the death of the prophet and therefore the development of Islam beyond the 
already established customs and norms of the first generations endangered Is-
lam: as the boundaries of the empire grew, more and more “foreign” influences 
crept into the ummah and threatened the orthodoxy of the “perfected” reli-
gion. In light of this, Sunni scholars moved to replace ijtihād with taqlīd, or rea-
soning with imitation/precedence – as a way of preserving their notion of the 
“perfected” religion.63 However, what such a move actually did was cancel the 
natural development of the tradition and its ability to adequately address 
the problems and challenges of the times precisely because it robbed the Mus-
lims of the dialectical tension that would have driven its development when 
confronted with thought and praxis that opposes Islam or Islamic tenets. From 
the philosophical perspective, as thought continues to become more differen-
tiated, more complex, and more dialectical, as the old answers no longer hold 
sway, new answers determinately negate the thought that proceeded them, 
and the development of thinking continues unabated. As ways-of-being and 
ways-of-thinking approach the boundaries of Islam, Muslim philosophers and 
theologians had to engage in critical evaluation of these alien philosophies 
and were therefore motivated to engage in a higher degree of critical analysis. 
When the reactionaries forced Islam to retreat behind its own dogmatic and 
un-reflexive precedents, it consequently cut itself off from its own capacity for 
creativity and dialectical imagination concerning religion, philosophy, culture, 
and polity, and thus it became stale, inflexible, and enslaved to its own past. 
Being systems of thought that are naturally self-reflective and self-critical, re-
ligious traditions must be able to continue to engage in a constant rethinking 
62 Colin Turner and Hasan Horkuc, Said Nursi (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 47. Also see 
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Lectures of 1827, ed. Peter C. Hodg-
son (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Pt. 2.
63 One should note that the Shi’a tradition, for the most part, continued with the practice of 
ijtihad and did not follow the Sunnis into their stagnation.
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and reexamination of their own creeds, dogmas, and principles as not to be-
come stationary and intellectually obsolete. If a religion fails to articulate itself 
within language adequate to the difficulty of the contemporary task at hand, 
then it inevitably dies. History, as Hegel has reminded us, is full of dead reli-
gions that could no longer speak to the needs and intellectual challenges pre-
sented to them.64 As of yet, none on the major world religion have died, but 
even the smaller ones that have died did so amidst massive amounts of hu-
man suffering and violence. How much greater would it be if one of the world 
religion were to descend rapidly into extinction? If the future historian does 
an autopsy of the Islamic world, he will see that it was the rejection of philo-
sophical thought that partially led to the Muslims’ inability to remain relevant, 
vital, and dynamic in modernity. It was also the primary cause of much of the 
descent into violent barbarity that unfortunately can be witnessed in much of 
the Islamic world today.
Yet the contemporary situation in which the Muslim world finds itself is 
forcing many scholars and jurists to rethink the wisdom of closing ijtihād; they 
see that this self-inflicted wound is partially responsible for the abysmal state 
of the Islamic community. Not only has the Muslim world lost its place as a 
world leader, but the most dynamic developments within the Muslim commu-
nity tend to be some of the most violent and reactionary, this being the result 
of the forced de-hellenization of Islam. The life of the mind, and not just the 
study of the West’s instrumental rationality – numerate thought: engineering, 
computers, chemistry, etc. – but also the communicative rationality imbedded 
in the arts, in literature, and especially in philosophy, must also be once again 
revived if the Muslim world is to have its own humanistic renaissance.
From the perspective of the critical religiologist, for Islam to survive the on-
slaught of secular modernity, it must come into contact, recover, and integrate 
into itself its own philosophical and intellectual heritage and history. Although 
the heritage is deep, it is currently neglected in the dar al-Islam. The language 
and conceptual material that was determinately negated from earlier philo-
sophical thought by the early Muslim empire, which allowed the Muslim world 
to advance far beyond those cultures that preceded it, must be rediscovered 
and re-imagined within the Islamic context: an Islamization of philosophy and 
its critical-analytical-dialectical potentials. This process not only means re-
turning to al-Kindī, al- Fārābī, Ibn Rušd, Ibn-Sīnā, and other Islamic intellectu-
als, etc., to uncover that which was buried by the heap of intellectual ashes that 
64 See G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol 1: The Lectures of 1827, ed. Peter 




smothered its potentials, but also to critically examine the heirs to their Greco-
Islamic philosophy: “occidental” philosophy. Regardless if Muslims scholars, 
intellectuals, and common believers think that philosophy’s importance is 
limited because it lacks theological legitimation, unlike theology, western 
philosophical thought predominates throughout the global economy as well 
as international institutions, international law, and global culture. At the mo-
ment, some Muslim intellectuals can speak the language of liberalism, social-
ism, and cosmopolitanism, but the intellectual concepts that steer the majority 
of Muslims – which are bound to a religious way of life – remain irrelevant 
to world affairs, as the world has already moved into a secular epoch that re-
mains entirely hostile – or at least alien – to prophetic religion. Not only would 
the works of the classical liberal philosophers, Locke, Hume, Smith, Rous-
seau, Voltaire, etc., reignite certain revolutionary qualities within the Islamic 
tradition, but the much more radical philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Marx-Engels, 
Sartre, Nietzsche, and the Frankfurt School could aid in the articulation of a vision 
of society that remains buried deep within the hidden recesses of the Islamic 
tradition; a vision of more reconciled society of freedom, justice, mercy, and 
compassion, free from irrational compulsion and oppression. To uncover and 
incorporate, transplant and translate such philosophical material could once 
again give life to the Muslim world and help release it from its self-imposed 
isolation, self-ghettoization, and metaphysical nihilism; for it is in the secular 
language of philosophy that the revolutionary potentials reside in the modern 
epoch. It is no longer the theological that motivates mankind in his praxis in 
an increasingly secular and capitalist world, but rather the philosophical senti-
ments that have already migrated from the religious into the secular; values 
like freedom, liberty, justice, democracy, equality, and fraternity, whether those 
values are articulated in their bourgeois, Freudian or Marxian formulations. 
Philosophy, pressed into the service of Islam, coupled with the spirit of inquis-
itiveness about the world, life, truth, and thought, could help liberate Islam 
from those who’ve disfigured it into a deformed lifeless “whitened sepulcher,” 
and resurrect that which once made it the envy of the “known world.”
From the perspective of Islam, the religion itself is “perfected,” which means 
that it understand and accepts its own internal development, its own increas-
ing differentiation within the context of the times, and the unending strive to 
be identical with itself (to embody its own constitutional values, principles, and 
beliefs). Nevertheless, the active agent that can allow Islam to do such things 
is the Muslim ummah itself, as it is the only entity through which Islam can be 
made manifest. Yes, it is true that Muslims can say (or repeat) that Islam is per-
fected, but no they cannot allow the concept of perfection to become a barrier 
to the attempted “perfection” of society (if that is even possible). The Qur’an 
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does not state that the Muslims are perfected, and therefore every articulation 
of Islam’s tenets from the mind of an imperfect interpreter must be assumed 
to be fallible, and therefore subject to robust scrutiny and criticism. Yet the 
perfectability of the believer is not a given, and therefore it must continually 
be realized through the realization of the perfect nature of the Qur’an – which 
can only be comprehended via categories worked out by generations of phi-
losophers, theologians, and scholars. Therefore, it is an absolute necessity that 
Muslims rejuvenate and resurrect their own philosophical heritage as well as 
engaging in an honest and robust discourse with modern philosophy.
 Fear of Philosophical Blasphemy
In light of the antagonistic conditions fostered by secular globalization as well 
as the post-secular society, one can imagine the uproar that would happen if a 
Muslim philosopher were to reenact Nietzsche’s insightful tale of the madman 
exclaiming the death of God in a devout Muslim country. The self-proclaimed 
anti-Christ wrote about the murder of God as such,
We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we 
done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge 
to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this 
earth from its sun?… Do we not hear the noise of the gravediggers who 
are burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction? For even Gods 
putrefy! God is Dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!65
What would happen to such a “madman” had he articulated this thesis in the 
presence of those de-Hellenized fundamentalist believers who fail to see the 
deeper point and more philosophical point of Nietzsche’s rhetorical claim? On 
the surface level, this appears to mock those who continue to believe in a living 
divine being. However, beyond the surface is a deeply philosophical statement 
that expressed absolutely nothing about the ontology of God but rather the 
conditions of the possibility for believing in the divine in our secular- scientific 
and industrial age.66 Would this madman spark outrage? Would there be an 
international riot, burning of the philosopher in effigy, attacks on western 
65 Friederich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (New York: The Barnes & Noble Library of Essential 
Reading, 2008), 103. We will return to Nietzsche’s Death of God latter in this volume.
66 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton, nj: Princ-
eton University Press, 1974), 96–118.
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embassies, would it be ignored by the masses as the insane rambling of a man 
whose lost touch with his sanity, or would it be considered an invitation to dis-
course about state of the world and its alternative futures? The recent history 
may shed light on what may occur in this hypothetical situation.
Delivering an addresses in 2006 entitled Glaube, Vernunft und Universität – 
Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Faith, Reason and the University – Memories 
and Reflections), then Pope Benedict xvi warned about the dangers of “de-
Hellenizing” religion, i.e. the separation of the faith and reason. In his speech in 
Regensburg, Germany, he quoted the Byzantine emperor Manuell ii Palaiolo-
gos, who said ‘Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new and there 
you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by 
the sword the faith he preached.’ This speech emphasized the theological claim 
that God limits himself within his own dictates, his own rationality, his own 
self-imposed limitations, and does not transcend or violate himself through an 
absolute will; he limits his will as not to become unrestrained, or, as it can be 
conceptualized, God is not pure will over logos. The discussion about the use 
of reason within religious faith was an attempt to ignite a discourse between 
religions concerning the importance of maintaining rationality as an integral 
and necessary component of religion. However, the language that the Pope 
was using was steeped in philosophical concepts and not theological protocol-
sentences that religious fundamentalism is typically expressed through. As a 
result, many outraged believers, both within the intellectual elites as well as 
the laymen, took to the streets to condemn the Pope for offending Islam and 
disrespecting the Prophet. On the other hand, many fundamentalist Christians, 
instead of expressing solidarity with their co-religionists, condemned the Mus-
lims for being wantonly violent in the face of the Pope’s statements, despite 
the fact that secularist and atheists would accuse those same Christians of the 
same religious obscurantism as they do the Islamic community. Additionally, 
while post-religious Europe found itself in a strange position of defending the 
very Pope that many had often deemed “our Taliban,” they emphasizing that if 
the Pope’s speech had been considered in its entirety, one could easily see that 
it was an invitation to discourse about the nature of faith and reason – which 
is not a foreign subject in history of Islam, even if it is foreign to modern funda-
mentalism. However, many within the Muslim community reacted violently, 
while being misinformed of the particulars of the Pope’s speech and the sub-
ject it was addressing. One need not question the sincerity of the protests – for 
many thought the Pope and not an emperor of a bygone age said such disparag-
ing words against Islam. However, some Muslims critically studied the entire 
document, such as Tariq Ramadan, while others abandoned any attempt for 
dialogue in favor of an emotional outrage, despite the fact that the subject is 
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an important theological issue for both Christianity and Islam. This was not a 
failure to communicate, but a failure to think.
Discourse on difficult matters such as this simply can’t happen when one 
side no longer possess the philosophical language that is the precondition for 
such a discourse, while the other can no longer put themselves into the per-
spective of the religious believer, and therefore garnished little sympathy for 
their wounded sensibilities. While the use of the emperor’s speech may have 
been unfortunate, the Pope’s intentions were neither to antagonize nor to cast 
aspersions on Islam and Muslims per se, but rather to warn his listeners of 
the dangers when reason is excommunicated from religion. Had there been a 
discourse partner within the Muslim community who could speak the philo-
sophical and theological language required for such an intricate discussion, 
such as Ibn Rušd and/or his Catholic student Saint Thomas Aquinas, then the 
tensions would have a greater potential for reconciliation. Until the Muslim 
community can once again recover its own philosophical heritage and once 
again bring it to the foreground of thought, it will continue to be needlessly an-
tagonized by critical-philosophical thought emanating from the secular West, 
even when it isn’t motivated out of ill will or hatred. From the perspective of 
the critical theory of religion, invitations to discourse about uncomfortable 
matters should not be taken as signs of disrespect, but as an opportunity for 
mutual-understanding and potentially future reconciliation. A “perfected” re-
ligion remains open to discourse as it has confidence in its own claims while 
at the same time is prepared to re-examine itself based on better and more 
differentiated categories and arguments. It does not shy away from debate but 
rather invites it and invests itself in it. This episode demonstrates the depth 
to which much of the Muslim world has suppressed its own philosophical re-
sources that were once the envy of Europe. Therefore philosophy is desper-
ately needed in order to avoid the predictions of the neo-Conservatives’ clash 
of civilizations: the democratic secular rational West vs. the authoritarian reli-
gious irrational East.67
Clearly, from a theological perspective, the perfection of Islam fears no 
critique of itself. The question is rather, can modern believers enter into a 
meaningful discourse with those who can no longer believe, or speak a philo-
sophical language to express a more differentiated way of engaging the world? 
67 I do not ascribe to the clash of civilization thesis. It is ultimately too simplistic to think of 
the Muslim world as being monolithic, just as it is a mistake to think of the West as being 
equally monolithic. The reader should not mistake my use of the words “Muslim,” “Islam,” 
and the “West” as somehow endorsing such a thesis, but rather these words are being used 
in a general way to avoid the necessity of excessive qualifiers.
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Can the Muslim community, not just individual intellectuals, find within its 
own resources the necessary tools to engage in such a conversation without 
truly mining its own philosophical heritage – the language that both the West 
and the Muslim world once shared? Can the ummah adopt the attitude of the 
Muslim philosophers who cared little if wisdom of older philosophers came 
from non-Muslims, but were rather solely concerned with the truth claims of 
their statements? If it cannot, and the tyranny of the fundamentalist position – 
which cares little about the nuances of theology or philosophy – continues to 
suppress dialectical, analytical, and critical thought, all in the name of purity 
of creed, we may not see any new Muslim philosophers and the Islamic philo-
sophical tradition may remain with one foot in the crypt of history. However, 
the appearance of the crypt is but a warning signpost for all religions that 
fail to adequately development within themselves through history, for if they 
don’t, they will become the next victim of history: another dead religion within 
an already crowded cemetery of religions.
<UN>
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chapter 2
Adversity in Post-Secular Europe
 The Dialectics of Martyrdom: Death as Witnessing and Professing
Like Judaism and Christianity before, Islam has a long history of martyrs 
(μάρτυς – “blood witnesses” or “witnesses by death”). Yet unlike in Christian-
ity, where Jesus of Nazareth himself was martyred at the hands of the Roman 
Empire, Pontius Pilate (the Prefect of Judea), and those Jewish authorities 
who collaborated with Rome, Muhammad escaped all assassination attempts 
and eventually died peacefully with his family in the city of al-Madīnah al-
Munawwarah.1 Although his adversaries attempted to kill him on more than 
one occasion, the zeitgeist of barbarism they wished to perpetuate was broken 
by the establishment of Islam in Arabia, which brought relative peace to the 
Arabian Peninsula. For the believer, Muhammad’s long life attests to Allah’s 
mercy and protection, especially in considering that Muhammad was fully pre-
pared to be a martyr for his cause. For twenty-three years he lived under and 
accepted the very real threat of violence. There is no doubt in the Islamic tradi-
tion that he was entirely prepared to be sacrificed for his message, but his mar-
tyrdom was not the purpose of his life and message. When the Qur’aysh tribe 
asked his Uncle Abū Ṭālib ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib to intercede on their behalf 
hoping to persuade him to abandon his call, Muhammad said ‘even if they put 
the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left, I will not give up this mission 
until either Allah is victorious or I die in the attempt.’2 Even non-Muslim biog-
raphers praise his resolve to see his message through to the end.3 Not even the 
promise of great wealth and pleasure could dislodge his determination to con-
struct a society of tawḥīd (oneness of God) and taqwá  (God-consciousness) 
based on the Qur’an. Muhammad’s message was essentially what the psycholo-
gist Erich Fromm describes as biophilic (love of life), as opposed to necrophilic 
1 It should be noted that the Muslims do not blame “the Jews” for the execution of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Indeed, since the Qur’an states, ‘they slew him not,’ ‘the Jews’ cannot be made 
responsible for what did not happen. (Qur’an 4:157).
2 My translation.




(love of death or inanimate objects), as it promoted a society predicated on 
equality, justice and mercy.4
Nevertheless, the earliest Muslim community, those who risk their lives 
pledging their allegiance to the prophet and witnessing their faith in his mes-
sage, felt the wrath of the Qur’aysh tribe, the wealthiest and most brutal op-
ponents of Islam. Before Muhammad ultimately triumphed over his pagan 
adversaries in 630 ce, the pagans had sent hundreds of Muslims to Jannah 
(paradise) as šuhadāʾ (martyrs).
Yet the historical record demonstrates that Muhammad refused to make 
martyrs out of his adversaries when a just peace could be established. For exam-
ple, when conquering Mecca from the pagans, Muhammad forbade any of his 
followers from engaging in any form of revenge, despite the fact that there were 
legitimate reasons to do so.5 Qiṣāṣ, or the right of retaliation, was suspended by 
the command of Muhammad, as he believed it would only perpetuate violence 
and vendettas, and would therefore close the door to reconciliation between 
the Muslims and the pagan inhabitants of Mecca. If the Meccans, who spent 
the last two decades oppressing and murdering Muslims, would lay down their 
arms and live in peace, Muhammad could not allow his followers to retaliate, 
despite the fact that they had an abundance of legitimate reasons to seek re-
venge. The Qur’an states, ‘fight for the cause of Allah those who fight you, but 
do not violate the limits; Allah does not love those who transgress.’6 By this ayat 
(verse) alone, Muhammad was obliged to offer peace to the Meccans as long as 
they were willing to live peacefully with their Muslim neighbors. This situation 
has been pointed out by many scholars as being an example of the capabil-
ity of Muslims to live peacefully with those who do not share their faith, as 
the ṣaḥābah (companions) of the Prophet could even live with their former 
enemies who did not convert to Islam and had previously oppressed them, 
confiscated their properties, and murdered their kinsman.7
4 See Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? New York: Continuum, 2000.
5 Yahiya Emerick, Muhammad (Indianapolis: Alpha Books, 2002.), 227–248.
6 Qur’an. 2:190. My Translation and my emphasis.
7 Another paradigmatic example of an inter-faith community of early Muslims is when many 
Muslims escaped persecution at the hands of the pagan Arabs by traveling to Abyssinia, in 
East Africa. There, King Negus, a Christian, overrode the objections of the pagan Meccans 
and offered these Muslims sanctuary. The King was impressed by their reverence of Jesus and 
Mary and in kind protected them from their enemies. According to Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Vol. 5, 
Number 218, Jabir bin ‘Abdallah Al-Ansari related that the Prophet even held a funeral service 
for King Negus when he later died, despite the fact that Negus did not convert to Islam. Re-
gardless, the Prophet was impressed by Negus’ ecumenical spirit and willingness to embody 
the Christian value of charity and mercy.
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According to Asma Afsaruddin, the earliest conceptions of Islamic mar-
tyrdom were not limited to military activities, but were just as applicable to 
scholars who died in their pursuit of knowledge and other pious believers. She 
notes that in contradiction to our current conceptions, early exegetical works 
on the Qur’an did not privilege military or fighting-martyrs above the pious, 
the scholars, and the suffering believer; they were all given the same reward for 
the devotion to the divine and his religion.8 However, as Islam expanded into 
increasingly hostile territories outside of the Arabian Peninsula, and as Islam 
split between the Sunni and the Shi’i, the concept of martyrdom took on an 
increasingly martial meaning. Today, at least in the public sphere in both the 
West and the Muslim world, martyrdom has almost become synonymous with 
those who either fight or die fisibillah (for the sake of Allah), whilst those who 
live for Allah and his religion are no longer understood to be martyrs at death. 
This martial definition of martyrdom is more akin to the Christian conception 
martyrdom that was conceived under the conditions of the Roman Empire 
where Christianity was brutally persecuted until Emperor Constantine’s Edict 
of Milan in 313 ce, which legalized the faith. To the consternation of the Roman 
authorities, the more the early Christians were suppressed, the more the re-
ligion grew. The same phenomenon can be witnessed among Muhammad’s 
ṣaḥābah, many of which were persecuted for not only being slaves, women, 
orphans, or for just simply being weak, but also for following Muhammad’s 
“new” religion. Being a Muslim denied the “inferiority” claim that the society 
imposed on slaves, women, orphans, and the weak, and thus provoked a back-
lash from the socially “superior.” However, the more the unjust power structure 
manufactured martyrs, the more their suffering created new converts.
From a historical and theological perspective, the production of mar-
tyrs is only called upon when the bonds of brotherhood, as expressed in the 
Abrahamic traditions, are broken and violent conflict ensues. For many non- 
fundamentalist schools of thought, it is one of the primary goals of Islam to 
retire the concept of martyrdom by bringing into existence a society that no 
longer produces the conditions for which martial martyrs are needed – a rec-
onciled society rooted in justice, peace, and friendly living together.9 It light 
8 Asma Afsaruddin, ‘Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and Praxis’ in Martyrdom and Terrorism: 
Pre-Modern to Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Dominic Janes and Alex Houen (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 40–58.
9 A “reconciled society” is a society that has resolved its antagonisms, i.e. its class antagonisms, 
its gender antagonisms, it racial antagonisms, etc. Although prototypically belonging to the-
ology, this term, via the Frankfurt School and others has been brought down from metaphys-
ics and into sociology and philosophy.
chapter 246
<UN>
of this, it is the height of irony that martial martyrs are praised in the modern 
day struggles in the Muslim world when Islam itself is an attempt to eman-
cipate mankind from the conditions that produce these sorts of martyrs. In 
other words, the fact that Muslim martyrs are still being created is evidence 
that Islam itself has not been fully realized; its “perfection” is not perfectly im-
minent. Unfortunately, a society free from the need of warrior martyrs has yet 
to be achieved as humanity has not yet resolved the conditions that stirs the 
hatred for the other; it has yet to live within a sane balance of autonomy and 
solidarity; it has yet to value each individual as an ends and not as a means; and 
it has not learned how to identify and embrace the humanistic points of com-
monality which transcend cultural differences. Neither the secular western nor 
the Islamic worlds have been able to adequately overcome the antagonistic 
tendencies dwelling deeply within mankind’s nature and psyche (Thanatos), 
despite the lofty ideals of peace, love, and reconciliation, which are found both 
in religious and secular thought. Although various world religions and philoso-
phies, and various political and economic theories, have made such a recon-
ciled society an aim to be achieved, history testifies that such goals remain 
elusive. The utopian vision – the messianic realm of peaceful existence – is 
an intangible dream of the prophets, philosophers, mystics, and activists. As 
to the present, these ideals belong to the metaphysics of hope, but not to the 
metaphysics of the really existing world.
Yet despite the despair that history creates, humanity has not yet abandoned 
this longing for messianic reconciliation. For many it cannot be forgotten; to do 
so would be to deliver the world entirely to the “given,” to forfeit any possibility 
that the world could be other than what it is. In this sense, the utopian ideal 
remains preserved in both prophetic religion and critical philosophy, as the 
“longing for the totally other,” and in some occasions such a longing has called 
for martyrs: Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Malcolm x (al-hajj 
Malik al-Shabazz), Che Guevara, ‘Ali Sharīʿati, Thomas Müntzer, Fra Dolcino, 
John Brown, Archbishop Óscar Romero, Sophie and Hans Scholl, Dietrich Bon-
hoeffer, Kwame Nkrumah, Steve Biko, Hussein ibn ‘Ali, and Jesus of Nazareth.
In the Islamic tradition, the martyrs, who have either been killed fighting 
or have been unjustly murdered for their faith (fisibillah), stand as testaments 
to what they believed to be ultimate reality concerning this world and the 
next. From the ḥadīṯh (reports of the Prophet Muhammad) literature, it is said 
that the martyr’s blood-soaked clothes, in which they are buried, stand as si-
lent but powerful witnesses to their dedication to Allah and his religion. Like 
Michelangelo’s Pietà, which stands as a silent witness to the suffering of the in-
nocent in St. Peter’s Basilica, the blood of the martyr need no words to convey 
the injustice of this world; its presence both before the divine and mankind 
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invoke an endless well of desire to erase the suffering within the human condi-
tion: to overcome man’s hatred and violence towards himself and others. In 
other words, the blood of the martyrs is meant to send a message not only 
to the masses but also to the divine; the blood itself testifies on behalf of the 
martyr – it reveals their willingness to accept the ultimate price for their beliefs 
and testifies to their devotion on judgment day (yawm al-Qiyāmah). Converse-
ly, the blood of the martyrs also bears witness against the unjust, heartless, and 
soulless conditions of this world; it is a protest against the cruel and barbarous 
life that mankind continuously creates for itself. However, mankind may not 
be the only one responsible for such barbarity.
From the perspective of the critical religiologist – steeped in the reality of 
the theodicy problem – martyrdom is understood as a dialectical phenome-
non; the blood of the martyrs is not only a sign of the believers’ commitment 
to his dīn (religion), but also can be understood as an active protest against 
the divine, as it is the divine’s world in which the barbaric conditions call for 
the blood of martyrs.10 According to the critical religiologist Rudolf J. Siebert, 
it is the social, political, and economic conditions that the divine is ultimately 
responsible for that lead to the necessity of martyrdom, which viewed dialec-
tically, is an indictment leveled by the believer against their creator.11 Every 
televised suicide confession of an Islamic terrorist can be read not only as a 
profession of faith – evidence of their willingness to be sacrificed – but also a 
tacit denunciation of God’s world that creates the need for brutal self-sacrifice. 
Indeed, behind the bravado, the courage, and the strength (or cowardice) of 
the suicidal confession, lies the odious resentment that the life of the indi-
vidual has to be scarified in order to fix that which the divine has allowed to 
be broken. It is quietly recognized, but painfully felt, that it is the family of the 
martyred who have to suffer the loss of their beloved while the one responsible 
for the situation remains absconditus (absent), or worse yet, reveals itself as 
the author of man’s misery (as in the book of Job). The world-as-it-is, so often 
absent of the values that the divine claims as its essential characteristics  – 
mercy, compassion, empathy, and love – compels the believer to protest this 
godless and soulless situation with an act of supreme sacrifice. Out of love 
of family, companions, and/or nation, whom the divine seems to show no 
mercy, the martyr shows mercy, compassion, empathy, and love. Although the 
Islamic tradition does not openly encourage dissension within the discourse 
between the believer and Allah – there is no substantive tradition of “protest 
10 See Rudolf J. Siebert, From Critical Theory to Critical Political Theology: Personal Autonomy 
and Universal Solidarity (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 153–269.
11 Siebert, From Critical Theory, 153–269.
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theology” – as in the case of Judaism. For many Jewish believers, the martyr’s 
death is a historical signpost that marks his frustration with God’s creation and 
ultimately with the composer of such disharmony. Therefore, whether openly 
admitted or not, every martyr is not only obedient to the divine but also pro-
tests against him through the act of self-sacrifice. In this view, redemption for 
the suffering of this world is brought about through the martyrizing act of the 
humanity – its sacrifice for the living – not though an act of the divine. In a 
perverse dialectic: the more self-seeking and self-sacrificing martyrs, especially 
the “suicide-martyrs” – whose aim is to kill others – the more rebellion there is 
against the divine.
To continue this dialectical approach to martyrdom, we must examine the 
martyr’s protest against the divine further: what is its function and who is its 
prototypical protest-actor in the Abrahamic traditions?
In Judaism, the adversary of God is Ha-Satan (Satan) who stands in opposi-
tion to the will of the divine as an “adversary.” Etymologically, “satan” is the 
noun deriving from the verb “to oppose.”12 Satan’s opposition to the will of the 
divine becomes acute in the book of Job, where he not only remains steadfast 
against God’s commands, but also accuses him of wrongdoing. He wants to 
demonstrate that the divine is deliberately provided a false consciousness – he 
veils Job’s potential faithlessness by giving him everything he needs. Of course 
Job is “blameless and upright” and “fear[s] God” because no calamity has ev-
ery struck him.13 If God’s divine protection and blessings were withdrawn 
from him, and he had to experience the world in all its misery, pain, and suf-
fering, this same saintly Job would curse his creator for his unfortunate fate. 
Although Job remains faithful to the divine, even after experiencing the loss 
of everything he holds dear, including his family, the act of accusing God of 
lying about the reality of his creation – that if it was not for his active interven-
tion human life would be absolutely cruel and barbaric – is the essential role 
of Satan in his text. Satan, having knowledge of human frailty because he is 
‘going to and fro on the earth, and from walking up and down on it,’ believes 
God to be duplicitous, an author of chaos, and the creator of the conditions 
by which man will suffer, murder each other in war, and curse the absence of 
God’s mercy.14 Whereas Satan walks were men walk, God remains seemingly 
absconditus, separate from his creation by nature and design. From a Chris-
tian reading, where the Holy Spirit should be, the unholy pervades. Does not 
Satan, in his accusative moment, speak in the name of his fellow – seemingly 
12 Numbers 22:22, Samuel 29:4 and Psalms 109:6.
13 Job 1:1.
14 Job 1:7.
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abandoned – creations? In the context of theodicy, is not the devil as advocate 
the advocate for a suffering humanity in God’s cruel world? Continuing with 
this biblical story, is it not the case that the modern suicide-martyr (jihādist) 
also takes upon themselves an element of Ha-Satan through the act of self-
sacrifice, especially when that martyrdom itself is a sign of protest against 
the divine? If we can legitimately claim that the martyr both witnesses and 
professes for their faith while simultaneously protests against the author who 
creates the history that creates martyrs, is not the “satanic” element a signifi-
cant component within the ontological being of martyrs? Can the martyr act 
exclusively through obedient faith without the satanic act of accusing God of 
neglect and sadism, or are we forced to say that the martyr died not only for 
the sake of God, but also died accusing God in the same way that Satan accuses 
God? The dialectic tension within martial martyrdom – the antagonism be-
tween obedient faith and accusation – pierces through the ideology of death 
that has become prevalent in the modern period. Martyrdom is not a pure act 
of faith when it is wedded to the violent act of self-sacrifice – especially when 
it intends to kill the innocent other; it appropriates within itself the diabolical 
and blasphemous nature of the satanic, the bloody accusation against God and 
his seemingly “Godless” creation.
If we carefully read the history of martyrs within the Abrahamic faiths, we 
can see that the theodicy problem, the question of the divine’s justice, is at 
the core of the concept of martyrdom for all of them. The history of warrior- 
martyrs, whether they be in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, reveals that the 
good, the just, and the faithful have to sacrifice themselves on the altar of 
history while the bad, the unjust, and the infidelious (unfaithful) prosper in 
this world, live rich lives, and reside in safety and comfort. No other martyr 
is more expressive of this point than Jesus of Nazareth when he was brutally 
executed on the Roman’s most humiliating execution device: the cross. While 
dying in excruciating agony, he voiced the words of Psalm 22:1, ‘Eli, Eli, Lama 
Sabachtani?’ (My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?).15 Had the Gospel 
writer recorded all of Rabbi Jesus’ lamentation, if he was capable of continuing 
his recitation, he may have heard the rest of King David’s Psalm.
My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?
Why art thou so far from helping me, from the words of my groaning?
O my God, I cry by day, but thou dost not answer;
and by night, but find no rest.16
15 Matthew 27:46.




This honest moment of human frailty, these words of despair written by the 
very earthly King David, briefly allow us to witness the humanity of Rabbi 
Jesus in all his human anguish, far from the sanitized Jesus of the later Church 
which had a tendency to over-emphasize his divine nature (μoνoφυσιτισμός – 
monophysitism) at the expense of frailty of his human reality, a heresy that 
today’s church still suffers from often in praxis if not in doctrine.17 On the ten-
dency to de-emphasize the humanity of great religious figures, the biographer 
of St. Francis of Assisi, Donald Spoto, claims that,
The lives of saints are often composed by those who offer them and us 
a grave distortion when they fashion literary halos over their lives, effec-
tively diminishing or even erasing the humanity God assumed and has 
given us, and which He uses to bring us to Himself. Sanitized stories of 
holy men and women too often describe them as essentially perfect, al-
ways pious, suffering without complaint, ever clear about their commit-
ment and their destiny. In no way would such a description suit the life 
and character of Jesus of Nazareth, who fully shared our frail humanity.18
Like so many other historical martyrs, in which the plan of the creator is ques-
tioned, Rabbi Jesus briefly defies his willingness to become a martyr; the price 
may have been too high, and the pain too deep, for him in that moment of 
hopeless despair. Sharing in his agony, his mother Mary – the stabat mater 
dolorosa (the standing suffering mother) – and his disciple Mary Magdalene 
prepared themselves for his unjust death. Surely, one can imagine so many oth-
er soon-to-be martyrs having such agonizing moments of doubt, where they 
question the mercy of the divine as well as their own convictions in the face 
of impending execution. Thus, the religiously obedient “event” of martyrdom 
produces its antithesis – doubt, despair, and often misotheism (hatred of god), 
for how could a loving and just God allow such evil.19
The Critical Theorist remembers the trial of God that the Rabbis engaged 
in while awaiting their deaths in Auschwitz; so deep was their agony that God 
17 It is interesting to note that from the Christian perspective, God, via Jesus, quotes the 
lamentation of a human King. In this case, human words express the pain that is being 
suffered by a divine figure. The fact that “God” quotes man to express his suffering on the 
cross cannot be overlooked in an attempt to understand the theodicy problem.
18 Donald Spoto, Reluctant Saint: The Life of Francis of Assisi (New York: Viking Press, 
2002), 183.
19 Bernard Schweizer, Hating God: The Untold Story of Misotheism. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011.
51Adversity In Post-secular Europe
<UN>
himself was emphatically indicted for what he allowed to happen (or had 
authored).20 God’s perceived indifference to the suffering of his “chosen peo-
ple” led many Rabbis to believe he had broken the covenant with Israel, that he 
may have even made a new covenant with another people – maybe even the 
Germans, or that the Germans were the “hand of God” – smiting the Jews for 
their disloyalty and abandonment of their faith.21 Many Jews, although they 
could not abandon their belief in God, chose to rather hate him for his pur-
poseful indifference to their suffering, his cruelty, and his evilness. Neverthe-
less, as Jesus witnessed the barbarity of the Roman soldiers, the scorn of their 
commanding officers, the rancor of the wealthy among the Jewish authorities 
who collaborated with Rome, the irrepressible spirit of protest in the name of 
the victims of history – those viciously executed on Golgotha and throughout 
what Hegel describes as the slaughterbench of history – is coupled with the 
protest against the world that the divine has designed and engineered. Their 
suffering indicts the divine and its absconditus (absence) or otiosus (idleness) 
in the history of mankind’s existence.
In light of the modern barbarity of war, cannibalistic civil society, and 
the international exploitation of humanity, the pessimistic philosopher, like 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, can easily come to the conclusion that the world 
is forsaken, for it is under God’s dominion that all the suffering, catastrophe, 
and destruction occur. Indeed, Deism, the 17th and 18th century Enlighten-
ment answer to the theodicy problem, could only postulate that the divine 
bars itself from entering into history as the only logical reason for his appar-
ent absence. As such, God leaves the problem of suffering for man to resolve. 
Martyrs may call out to God, according to the Deists, but they should expect 
no answer; he has taken leave and refuses to reenter into human history. The 
suffering masses can transcend their misery through prayer, fasting, and other 
vain rituals, but they should expect no countermovement from the divine. De-
ism fails to provide a consolating God.
In a Nietzschian world post-death-of-god, what came from the prayers of 
the suffering Jews in Auschwitz were only the Schutzstaffel (ss) and their sado-
masochistic brutality. Yet, where God failed to deliver, the Bourgeois Enlight-
enment in the form of the United States Army, and the Marxist Enlightenment 
in the form of the Soviet Red Army, liberated what in the vernichtungslager 
20 Schweizer, Hating God, 161–165; Jenni Frazer, “Wiesel: Yes, We Really did put God on Trial,” 
September 19, 2008. http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/wiesel-yes-we-really-did-put 
-god-trial (Accessed 8/14/2014).
21 See Elie Wiesel, The Trial of God (as it was held on February 25, 1649 in Shamgorod), trans. 
Marion Wiesel New York: Random House, 1979.
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(extermination camp) was called the muselmänner – the dead-not-yet-dead, 
or the walking corpses of the Holocaust. The longing for the intercession of 
the divine was rooted in a time where believing in the divine was still a true 
possibility, but in Auschwitz no god seemed to exist. The liberal and Marxian 
Enlightenment liberated the Jews while the God of Judaism remained silent 
and seemingly absent.
However, the preponderance of death at the hands of the unjust is not the 
last word on religious faith. Regardless of God’s seeming absence and like 
the ardent faith that the author of the Psalms expressed, the martyr remains 
semper fidelis (always faithful) to his creator, and to his mission, despite his 
moments of doubt and fear. From the view of the critical religiologist, the dia-
lectics of martyrdom demonstrate the internal antagonism between faith and 
doubt, suffering and joy, transcendence and destruction, which is manifest-
ed through the martyrdom of the finite believer for the cause of the infinite. 
Because the dialectic persists regardless of history, such suffering and misery 
cannot be the final nail in god’s coffin nor can it be the final word on religion. 
Because religion points in the direction of another possibility, an abandon-
ment of metaphysics or theology in the face of earthly despair can only deliver 
the world over to the already given, the status quo, the despairing world-as-it-
is, and thus forsake a world that could be – that which the martyr died for.22 
However, metaphysical thought that brings a positive meaning to the suffering 
of the martyr may also be dangerous and unacceptable.
In Hegel’s optimistic philosophy of history, the dialectical movement 
through time is predicated on the negation of that which came before; the 
determinate negation of the negative gives birth most painfully to the positive. 
However, as Adorno discovered in his Negative Dialectics, Hegel’s optimism did 
not always prove to be true, as no positive was born from the near complete 
destruction of the Jews in Europe.23 For Adorno and the Frankfurt School, not 
even the birth of Israel can justify such inhumanity as displayed in the “final 
22 John Abromeit. Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 362–366.
23 Many Israeli Rabbis have articulated the idea that the Jews of Europe were the sacrificial 
lambs for the rebirth of Israel as a modern nation-state: a returning of the chosen people 
to the land that God delivered to them in the Jewish Bible. From the perspective of the 
Critical Theorist, this argument lends a positive metaphysics to history, positing that it 
has a telos that is discernible and therefore meaningful; history, by way of providence, 
made those Jews into victims and therefore their suffering should be accepted as a nec-
essary but painful good. Consequently, Hitler himself becomes the agent of providence 
in service to the creation of the Jewish state. For these reasons, and in agreement with 
Adorno, such arguments must be rejected for they revictimize the already victimized.
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solution of the Jewish question” (die Endlösung der Judenfrage). Such positive 
metaphysics which give objective meaning to the purely negative within the 
dialect of history, i.e. Auschwitz, was to engage in ideology – false but consol-
ing consciousness – that results in the double victimization of the victims, as 
it not only recognizes their suffering and murder as tragedy, but violently im-
pinges upon it a farcical metaphysics.24 In the face of such absurdity, Adorno 
says that our feeling ‘balk at squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached, 
out of the victim’s fate.’25 Without collapsing into a positivistic maxim, Aus-
chwitz simply remains what it is: objective meaninglessness, history without 
purpose, and a pure event that signifies nothing beyond the barbaric given. It 
can only be falsely imbued with distorted meaning; such meaning arises from a 
subjective dissatisfaction with its inherent meaninglessness. Such a disturbed 
subjectivity reveals itself as the source of the Holocaust as distorted ideology.
The senselessness invoked in Adorno’s Negative dialectics plays an impor-
tant role in the history of Islamic and Christian martyrdom. Many individu-
als who had sacrificed their lives for their faiths, their values, and their core 
principles, have found, like Rabbi Jesus, not the “rose within the cross,” the ra-
tional within the real, but only the inadequate consolation of newly formed 
institutions – the Church in the case of Christianity and the state of Israel in 
the case of Judaism – that can neither fully reconcile the individual to their 
agonizing fates nor can they negate the conditions that led the individual to 
sacrifice themselves. Despite the piling up of martyred corpses, the world re-
mains the same: an ever-destroying mechanism manifested in the cruelty of 
nature and history. No matter how many martyrs are honored with Islamic 
panegyrics (πανηγυριkός – “speeches praising martyrs”) in the West Bank and 
Gaza, no matter the number of rousing jihadi khuṭbah (sermons), the condi-
tions which call for the production of martyrs continues; no matter how many 
Shi’a, Christian, and Yazidi martyrs accumulate at the hands of isis (Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria), the conditions that perpetuate martyrdom continues; 
no matter how many poor, weak, and suffering homeless and stateless immi-
grants die in the streets of Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas, the coordi-
nates that create such human catastrophes continues unabated. The negation 
of their suffering brought about no objective alleviation of suffering within 
the world, even if it was thought to have done so subjectively. Martyrdom has 
often failed to overcome that which creates martyrs, and so, despite Hegel’s 
24 We will return once again to Adorno’s discussion of metaphysics post-Auschwitz in a later 
chapter.




optimistic diagnosis and prognosis about history and its so-called “progress” 
towards absolute freedom i.e. the concrete transcendence of the world-as-it-is, 
such freedom fails to arrive.26 Due to the lack of concrete negation, humanity 
stubbornly continues to abide by the self-perpetuating dictum: si vis pacem 
para bellum, which in itself cancels out the possibility of a true peace; it rather 
expresses a vortex of violence that man seems incapable of escaping.27 In this 
case, the negative only gives way to a new form of negativity: the negativity-of-
the-now-time (negativität der jetztzeit), which resembles that of the past and 
already determines the future. Ironically, and at the risk of sounding like a 
devotee of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism, martyrdom may well be 
the only way out of sorrow-inducing cycle of perpetual return solely through 
anamnestic solidarity; remembrance that the victim’s sacrifice may have made 
but a small crack in the edifice of history as barbarity.28
 Witnessing against Islam: The Case of Theo van Gogh
Although western protests against Islam have a long history, since September 
11, 2001, an awareness of the “other” within the western midst has led to a whole 
new wave of protests against Islam that have been aided by the ubiquity of 
modern media and the 24 hour news cycle. This constant awareness of the 
other has been a net negative for Muslims. In the Middle Ages, and even dur-
ing the Enlightenment period, Islam was consistently represented as a form 
of Christian heresy, Muhammad was a fraud, and the Qur’an was the work 
of the Devil. Thousands of books, tracts, and treatises were written to prove 
the fraudulent nature of Islam and to convince Christendom of the evil inten-
tion of the Muslims.29 For example, Dante Alighieri places Mohammad in the 
realm of hell with the schismatics. Another example can be found in France, 
where, although criticizing the Catholic Church was his main objective, the 
26 As has been noted by many critical scholars, the notion of “progress” has often been 
made into the ideology of bourgeois societies. All technological, social, economic, and 
political changes in favor of the ruling class have been designated progress, while all that 
resists and/or challenges bourgeois interests are dubbed retrogressive, obscurantist, or 
degenerate.
27 ‘If you want peace prepare for war.’ “True peace” is predicated not on the threat of war, but 
in a state of being that requires both war and the threat of war to be absent.
28 Rudolf J. Siebert, Manifesto of the Critical Theory of Society and Religion: The Wholly Other, 
Liberation, Happiness and the Rescue of the Hopeless. Vol ii. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 465–466.
29 Minou Reeves, Muhammad in Europe: A Thousand Years of Western Myth-Making. New 
York: New York University Press, 2000.
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Enlightenment philosopher Voltaire’s 1736 play Le fanatisme, ou Mahomet le 
Prophete (dubbed Mohomet the Imposter in English), tacitly disguised such crit-
icism of the church behind the manifest images of Islam, which was perceived 
to be the universal enemy, as it was perceived to be both pre-Enlightenment 
and “other.” For the unenlightened audience, the message was clear; Muham-
mad was considered diabolical and was both a spiritual imposter and a pur-
veyor of religious violence.30 For the Protestant or secular audience member, 
it was understood that “Mahomet” not only represented the evil of Islam, but 
was simultaneously symbolically representing “religion” all together, including 
the Catholic Church. Voltaire had systematically merged the two in his popu-
lar play, manipulating his audience’s distrust for both the turban and the mi-
ter. Nevertheless, the illiterate population of Europe was hardly interested in 
inter-faith polemics, and was more preoccupied with base issues such as the 
challenges of poverty, disease, feeding and caring for their families, as well as 
the state of their immortal soul. Therefore the literary crusade against Islam 
had limited consequences on the vast majority of Europeans who may have 
only been exposed to anti-Islamic sentiments through the occasional sermon 
and other religious exhortations. Unless one resided on the border regions of 
Christendom, Islam remained abstract and foreign. However, the modern era 
proved that this would not always be the case.
Two important advances in human history have determined the modern 
form of “Islamophobia.” First, the material abundance and acquisition of 
wealth within the western world have given opportunities to its people in edu-
cation, liberation from agricultural toil, urbanization, and industrialization. 
All these developments have made it possible for people to gain the minimum 
education necessary to both read and engage in religious discussions within 
the public sphere. However, the same modernity that expanded basic literacy, 
failed to deliver to the masses the ability to think critically, systematically or 
dialectically, thus leaving them, in the thought of many, with an incomplete 
education. This “half-education” remains detrimental to the future of the 
West. First, it makes the masses increasingly susceptible to sophistic propa-
ganda. Second, and in additional to the incomplete education, technology has 
brought the expanses of geography and culture into the home. Either via tele-
vision or internet, the outside world, that which was never to be witnessed by 
the majority of westerners in the pre-modern periods, can now be witnessed 
by the touch of a bottom. In terms of its relationship with the West, this ac-
cessibility of information has been both of equal benefit to Islam as well as a 




hindrance. Because modern communication technologies in-and-of-itself are 
neutral as to its content, it allows Muslims to speak directly to non-Muslims, 
but it also allows their adversaries to speak directly to the masses as well.31 
Post-9/11, the western world was flooded with images of civil airliners crashing 
into the World Trade Center; Muslims beheading Americans who “only came 
to help” in Iraq and Syria; the video-confessions of suicide bombers in Pales-
tine; mobs of Pakistanis burning American flags; Afghani “mujahideen” killing 
Marines via ieds; and various “irrational” outbursts of Muslims due to Qur’an 
burnings; irreverent and derisive cartoons; and a YouTube video depicting Mu-
hammad as a pedophile and fanatic.32 Consequently, according to the fbi, the 
growth in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United States jumped 1600% from 
pre-9/11 levels.33 In addition, there were other incidents of violence that greatly 
contributed to the idea that Islam is an inherently violent religion and that 
Muslims are all willing to kill for their faith. All of these incidents led to both 
a growing trend in Islamophobia, which is strictly a “fear of Islam,” as well as 
miso-islamism, which is the “hatred of Islam.” Although the United States has 
often been seen to be in the center of the conflagration between the West and 
the Muslim world, most of the day-to-day conflicts have happened in Europe.
In August of 2004, Dutch public television aired an eleven-minute film en-
titled Submission (translated from the Arabic word “Islam”) that was made 
by the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the Somali apostate Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali.34 The film was critical of what they saw as the violent nature of Islam, its 
31 Here I make the claim that although the content that technology advances, i.e. tv shows, 
music, blogs, etc., are bound to given subjective tastes, opinions, etc., technology itself 
remains neutral. However, this is only a surface observation, as technology itself advances 
a certain form of thinking, a certain way-of-being-in-the-world that determines human 
interaction and relations. Technology is predicated on instrumental reason, the reason of 
work and tool, manipulation of the physical world, and the reduction of all that cannot be 
subject to scientific scrutiny down to the physical. In this sense, even where communica-
tive reason is still a powerful force in society, instrumental reason undermines its ability 
to serve as the basis for a healthy and cooperative society.
32 Richard Esposito et al., “Anti-Islam Film Producer Wrote Script in Prison: Authorities,” 
September 13, 2012. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/anti-islam-film-producer-wrote-script 
-prisonauthorities/story?id=17230609#.UFLmFK4dWVk (Accessed 3/30/2014).
33 Muslim Public Affairs Council, “What you Need to Know,” http://www.mpac.org/programs/ 
hate-crime-prevention/statistics.php#.UzixcChDx94 (Accessed 3/30/2014).
34 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel (New York: Free Press, 2007), 311–335. Ali refers to Van Gogh as a 
“Lord of Misrule,” invoking the Renaissance tradition of appointing an individual to direct 
the “Feast of Fools” for Christmas. She says ‘his house was a shambles, but he focused 
intensely on his work. He was a mess of contradictions, an impossible man, a genius in 
some ways.’ Ali, Infidel, 312.
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misogyny, and its supposed theological legitimation of patriarchy. Telling the 
story of four young Muslim women who were abused in various ways by their 
fathers and husbands – who together symbolically represent Islam – the short 
film’s main critique was that Muslims (especially women) are not free to follow 
their own individualistic paths towards happiness, but are bound by archaic 
laws that limit their subjective autonomy and enslaves them to religiously in-
spired violence and oppression. According to Ali, the film was meant to show 
that “submission to Islam causes many other kinds of sufferings” and that “we 
should be free to interpret it [the Qur’an]; we should be permitted to apply 
it to the modern era in a different way, instead of performing painful contor-
tions to try to recreate the circumstances of a horrible distant past.”35 In their 
attempt to provoke a reaction from the Muslim community – and thus dem-
onstrate that Islam is irreconcilable with western values – the makers filmed a 
naked woman’s battered and bruised body with Qur’anic verses written on her. 
The symbolic merger of the Qur’an and the abuse of the weak, in this case of 
young women, was very offensive for Muslims living in the Netherlands who 
(1) rejected the claim that Islam condones violence upon women, and (2) who 
previously thought that their adopted home was a bastion of European multi-
culturalism and tolerance. In making the film, knowing that it would provoke a 
vocal and potentially violent protest, Van Gogh and Ali wanted to get across to 
the Dutch population that Europe has a foreign faction within its midst who do 
not, and cannot, share their same political (secular democratic) and cultural 
(enlightened and multicultural) values precisely because of their religious be-
liefs. In the minds of the filmmakers, this foreign group is a latent threat to 
the existence of liberal freedom within the Netherlands and by extension all 
of Europe. The message of the film was very clear and well received by some, 
as Ian Buruma states in his book Murder in Amsterdam, ‘this was a disturbing 
message in a society used to public figures preaching multicultural tolerance, 
but it was something many people wished to hear.’36 From the perspective of 
the critical theorist of religion, we must ask why so many people wished to 
hear that Islam is violent, that the Qur’an encourages and legitimates violence 
against women, and that the Muslim community is a threat to European free-
dom? What were people thinking that they felt they could not express in pub-
lic, although they had the desire and right to? What did they want to say about 
their Muslim neighbors and what forces stopped them from doing so?
35 Ibid., Infidel, 314.
36 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and the Limits of Tolerance (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 5.
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For the far-right nationalists, the Somali apostate Ayaan Hirsi Ali was a god-
send, for it allowed them to openly proclaim the end of what they hated the 
most in modern Europe: multiculturalism and the idea of tolerance. It was 
only a “bonus” that the warning came from a former Muslim woman who had 
publicly renounced and denounced her former faith as being barbaric and 
backward, as it lent credibility to their attacks, thus shielding them from the 
accusation of xenophobia and/or racism. For many liberals as well as those on 
the political-right, Ayaan’s voice of dissent was overdue and was subsequent-
ly championed by other prominent individuals. For too long, they believed, 
the native Dutch population begrudgingly lived with the peculiarities of their 
Muslim neighbors. Their rituals, their languages, their religious sensibilities, 
and their cultural baggage hardly seemed to fit with liberal Dutch society. They 
believed these Muslims, mainly from North Africa, ruined their schools, took 
away thier jobs, brought violent crime and took advantage of the Dutch wel-
fare state. Finally, with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, they had a voice from within the Is-
lamic world that would trumpet the threat these immigrants posed to Europe.
One such personality that captured the attention of the Dutch population 
was Geert Wilders, a parliamentarian whose rise to fame was predicated on his 
anti-Islam and anti-immigration stance. Like Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch populist 
politician who also had anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant views, but was later 
assassinated in 2002, Geert Wilders saw Islam as a cultural and political threat 
to Dutch society. For him, immigration had allowed too many Muslim in; mul-
ticulturalism had welcomed in the most “backward” elements of Islamic, and 
tolerance of such backwardness has proven to be the Achilles heel of Europe. 
Europe was slowly being Islamicized. Speaking in 2007 for the anti-immigrant 
movement in the Netherlands, Wilders forcefully stated,
… the Islamic incursion must be stopped. Islam is the Trojan Horse in 
Europe. If we do not stop Islamification now, Eurabia and Netherabia will 
just be a matter of time. One century ago, there were approximately 50 
Muslims in the Netherlands. Today, there are about 1 million Muslims in 
this country. Where will it end? We are heading for the end of European 
and Dutch civilization as we know it. Where is our Prime Minister in all 
this? In reply to my questions in the House he said, without batting an 
eyelid, that there is no question of our country being Islamified.
Now, this reply constituted a historical error as soon as it was uttered. 
Very many Dutch citizens… experience the presence of Islam around 
them. And I can report that they have had enough of burkas, heads-
carves, the ritual slaughter of animals, so called honor revenge, blaring 
minarets, female circumcision, hymen restoration operations, abuse of 
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homosexuals, Turkish and Arabic on the buses and trains as well as on 
town hall leaflets, halal meat at grocery shops and department stores, 
Sharia exams, the Finance Minister’s Sharia mortgages, and the enor-
mous overrepresentation of Muslims in the area of crime, including Mo-
roccan street terrorists.37
Witnessed from his statement that ‘I don’t hate Muslims, I hate Islam,’ Wilders 
believes that all things Islamic are foreign to Europe and are therefore not rec-
oncilable with liberal Dutch values.38 For all intents and purposes, this state-
ment, often repeated by many who disdain all things Islamic but do not want 
to appear to be xenophobic, is a distinction without a difference; to hate Islam 
is to hate Muslims, for without Muslims there is no Islam, and without Islam 
there are no Muslims.
Wilders took to the habit of likening the Qur’an to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, 
but pointed out that he wasn’t the first to do so; Winston Churchill also made 
this erroneous connection.39 To the dismay of the Netherland’s Muslim faith-
ful, Wilders aggressively advocated the banning of the Qur’an as a “threat to our 
society” just as Mein Kampf was banned in the Netherlands.40 The filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh couldn’t have agreed more, as he shared many of the same Is-
lamophobic sentiments.41 Nevertheless, Van Gogh never had the opportunity 
to work closely with Wilders. On November 2, 2004, a Dutch-Moroccan named 
Mohammed Bouyeri murdered Van Gogh. Van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s dis-
respect of Islam, Muhammad, and the Muslim community outraged Bouyeri, 
and he was determined to send a message to Ayaan Hirsi Ali for her insolence 
and Van Gogh’s mockery.
37 Geert Wilders, “Mr Wilders’ Contribution to the Debate on Islamic Activism,” Septem-
ber 29, 2007. http://web.archive.org/web/20080614074737/http://www.groepwilders.com/
website/details.aspx?ID=44 (Accessed 3/30/2014).
38 Ian Traynor, “‘I Don’t Hate Muslims, I Hate Islam’ says Holland’s Rising Political Star,” Feb-
ruary 16, 2008. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam (Ac-
cessed 3/30/2014).
39 Geert Wilders, Marked For Death: Islam’s War Against the West and Me (Washington d.c.: 
Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012), 121.
40 Wilders, Marked For Death, 122.
41 Although they agreed on the threat of Islam, Geert Wilders and Theo van Gogh never 
worked together. Wilders thought Van Gogh to be too outlandish and anti-religious. 
Whereas Wilders was solely critical of Islam, Van Gogh was equally hostile to Christian-
ity and Judaism. Whereas Van Gogh was an equal opportunity hater of religion, Wilders 
emphasized the Judeo-Christian legacy of Europe as a source for its rejuvenation. See 
Wilders, Marked For Death, 8–9.
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In light of the tensions between the Muslim community and their secular 
counterparts in the post-secular society, seeing that both sides claim to de-
fend the higher principle, we must ask the question, can we consider Theo van 
Gogh a martyr for secular society? Within a context of acute social antago-
nisms, especially between the religious and the secular, can someone be mar-
tyred whiled witnessing against something, or was Van Gogh’s death a death 
for something? If his death and his film were acts of witnessing for something, 
what would it have been precisely? Ultimately, can we regard him as the first 
post-9/11 martyr for miso-Islamism?
From the perspective of the critical theory of religion, it is certainly possible 
for the secular-humanist individual to be a martyr for their cause. Max Hork-
heimer, in his Critique of Instrumental Rationality, reminds us that ‘both of 
them [religion and atheism] have been responsible for good and evil through-
out history… and both of them have had their tyrants and their martyrs.’42 Che 
Guevara, an atheist Marxist and physician who dedicated himself to the revo-
lutionary advancement of the working and poor classes in Latin America was 
brutally executed by the Bolivian military with the aid of the cia in 1967. Che 
was religiously unmusical, but he remained sensitive to the important role re-
ligion played in the lives of the many poor people he fought for. For Che, when 
religious praxis was identical with its core social values, then it naturally took 
the side of revolutionary love, justice, and solidarity, and as such he had no 
qualms with those members of his revolutionary movement who remained 
religious. However, when it sanctified the existing status quo of oppression, 
he vehemently attacked religion as a tool of the ruling class. With Fidel Cas-
tro, Che supported the removal of the Catholic Church from Cuba after the 
revolution precisely because it had supported the ruthless dictator Fulgencio 
Batista against the interests of the Cuban population.43 Che, like many other 
revolutionary Marxists, would attempt to make an alliance with religion if it 
was possible; where it was not, it had to be fought as a reactionary and counter-
revolutionary ideology. For his work on behalf of the poor, for his fight against 
dictatorship, and for his ultimate martyrdom for a Latin American revolution, 
Che was thought by many to have been a secular alter Christus (other Christ).44 
According to Fidel Castro, ‘if Che had been a Catholic, if Che had belonged 
42 Max Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), 49.
43 Fidel Castro and Frei Betto, Fidel and Religion: Conversations with Frei Bretto on Marxism 
& Liberation Theology. New York: Ocean Press, 2014.
44 Candida R. Moss, The Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Mar-
tyrdom. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010; Michael Casey, Che’s Afterlife: The Legacy 
of an Image. New York: Vintage Books, 2009.
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to the church, he would probably have been made a saint, for he had all the 
virtues.’45
Patrice Lamumba, the secular revolutionary leader of the Mouvement 
National Congolaise, who fought and defeated colonial Belgium to gain in-
dependence in 1960, was assassinated by Belgium forces and their Congolese 
collaborators.46 Both the cia and the MI6 bear responsibility for his murder. 
Lamumba is remembered as a martyr for African independence for colonial 
powers. The atheist Leon Trotsky, murdered on the orders of Josef Stalin, is 
seen by many followers as a martyr for the cause of working class liberation 
and worldwide revolution. Fred Hampton, the deputy-chairman of the Illinois 
branch of the Black Panther Party, was executed while sleeping in his apart-
ment by the Chicago Police Department in 1969 and today is still seen as a 
martyr for the cause of Black emancipation in America. These and many other 
non-religious, militantly secular or atheistic activists have be brutalized, op-
pressed, and murdered along side of their explicitly religious comrades. As 
such, martyrdom has no exclusive sectarian or religious/secular preference. It 
is not bound to one religion or to any religion at all, but manifests itself in times 
of crisis. Consequently, a martyr is one that is murdered unjustly while stand-
ing up for what they believe to be the truth and refusing to bend their knees in 
proskynesis (πρoσkύνησις – “prostration”) to those who unjustly set themselves 
above others. The 27 million Soviets communists that were murdered in the 
“Great Patriotic War” (World War ii) must be remembered as martyrs against 
fascism and for the communist ideal of equality.47 However, by that broad defi-
nition, can we classify fascists like Benito Mussolini and Hitler as martyrs? Do 
we want to lend the term “martyr” to individuals who are nearly universally 
despised for their destructive activities and philosophies? Were they unjustly 
murdered or was their demise indeed just? Mussolini certainly died for his 
45 Castro and Betto, Fidel and Religion, 289.
46 Although Lumumba was born into a Catholic family and was educated in a Protestant 
school, he nevertheless believed in the separation of church and state that would end the 
legitimization of government policies by clerical authorities.
47 I make a point to remember the 27 million Soviet communists who were killed fighting 
the Third Reich for the expressed point that they are so easily forgotten in the West. With 
all our emphasis on the D-Day invasion, the Holocaust, and the Western Front, we hardly 
remember that the Communists were the first and primary enemy of the Fascists. For 
that the Soviet Union lost 27 millions citizens – the highest loss of one country in the en-
tire war. This observation in no way diminishes the commitment and loss of Americans, 
British, French, Canadians, and the partisan forces in occupied Europe. Additionally, it 
may be the case that anti-fascism was a stronger motivational force in the war against the 
Germans that was their dedication to Communism.
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unwavering belief in fascist ideals, what he often called “corporatism.”48 Can 
those who are responsible for the death and destruction of hundreds, thou-
sands, or even millions in the case of the Nazis, be considered martyrs for their 
causes, or should the aims and goals of the movements be taken into account 
when determining whether or not they are martyrs? In other words, is the 
definition of martyrdom constitutionally bound to goals and aims associated 
with a certain political, economic and cultural trajectory, i.e. the expansion of 
substantive freedom, the cancelation of the alienated life and towards a soci-
ety beyond the realm of necessity? Can an unpopular “martyr” be legitimately 
stripped of that designation because they represent the authoritarian, the xe-
nophobic, the misogynistic, the racist, and the romantic – who sees the ideal 
future only in the idealistic past?
From the perspective of the critical religiologists who are concerned with 
the translation of the revolutionary potential of religious semantic and se-
miotic material into secular philosophy, the aims of the murdered matter in 
whether or not they can be legitimately classified as a martyr. The modern 
notion of martyrdom, rooted in the Abrahamic faiths that gave birth to the 
West, as well as in the “post-metaphysical” thought of Greek philosophy, cul-
tural, and political life of Athens, Sparta, and other Greek city-states, takes se-
riously the claims that martyrs not only die witnessing for a faith, but also die 
witnessing for specific and substantive political-economic and cultural values 
such as freedom, justice, equality, and liberty even when they’re emancipated 
from their religious legitimation and motivation. Revolutionary values, which 
are rooted in communicative rationality, and therefore resist the colonization 
of instrumental rationality and the functionalization of language via empty 
and manipulative slogans, attempt to broaden the scope of human emancipa-
tion, human actualization, and human reconciliation, not further the trend 
towards barbarism or the totally administered society. When human energy, 
resources, and life are directed towards creating a society that does not exploit 
one side of the human family by the other, that works in cooperation for so-
cial flourishing instead of petty competitiveness and aggression, that resists 
48 See Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Corporat-
ism is a structural-functionalist theory of social organization that is rooted in St. Paul’s 
letter to the Corinthians (12:12–31), where the community is understood to be structured 
like a body, with certain parts playing various but necessary functionalist roles. All parts 
work together to create a single organic whole. For Italian fascists, including Mussolini, all 
segments of society work as a whole for the benefit of the nation-race. For Marxists, this 
social theory fundamentally sanitizes the class divisions within a given nation and serves 
the ideological function to suppress class-consciousness and therefore revolution of the 
working class against their masters.
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the society of the fascist übermensch in preference for a society that is based 
in mutual-recognition and respect, compassion for the poor, elderly, sick, and 
abused (the untermensch), and sees a social imperative to create a society of 
biophilia as opposed to one permeated with necrophilia, then that movement 
has legitimate claim to the “revolutionary” title.49 From the perspective of the 
critical religiologist, it is the revolutionary or prophetic nature of the unjustly 
murdered that makes them a martyr, not the simple fact that they were killed 
for a cause. If by “revolutionary” we mean the furthering of human emancipa-
tion in this world, revolutions serve as movements that increase the realiza-
tion of human freedom within the context of space and time. In this sense, 
counter-revolutionaries, those authorities, groups or movements that attempt 
to limit the freedom, rights, and liberties of individuals; those who attempt to 
re-enslave those formerly emancipated from the drudges of oppression, ex-
ploitation, irrational authority and alienated existence; those who attempt to 
establish the conditions by which the surplus value of the those who toil end-
lessly is wrongfully appropriated by one group of people for their own benefit, 
can never fall on the battlefield of history as revolutionary martyrs. They are, 
in the view of the critical historian who sees history through the eyes of the 
victim, fallen tyrants.50 Spartacus, who led the slaves in their rebellion against 
the slave masters in Rome, was a martyr, as he attempted to liberate his fellow 
slaves from their tyrannical masters. John Brown was a Christian martyr, as 
he attempted to liberate the slaves of America from their sadistic and cruel 
masters. Malcolm x was a Muslim martyr, as he attempted to liberate Afro-
Americans from the tyranny of American racism and white supremacy. ‘Ali 
Sharīʿati was a Shi’i Muslim martyr, as he attempted to liberate the minds of 
the Iranian masses from their enslavement to the quietist orthodoxy of the 
clerics as well as the counter-revolutionary policies of the u.s. imposed Shah. 
These and many other freedom fighters attempted to expand the geography of 
freedom, respect, self-reliance, and inter-subjectivity based on the principles 
of justice and equality. For their efforts they were murdered by the forces of 
oppression, tyranny, and the necrophilic disdain for those whom the powerful 
felt were beneath them. It is with this in mind that the critical theorist believes 
49 Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1973), 325–368. See Dustin Byrd, Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran: Toward a Theory of Prophetic Charisma. Lanham, md: Univer-
sity Press of America, 2011. I use these terms, übermensch and untermensch, more in the 
spirit of the Third Reich and not Nietzsche’s philosophy, which the Nazis distorted.




the “martyr” should be reserved for the fallen revolutionary, not the unjust 
counter-revolutionaries, whose death was in service to those who diminish 
human emancipation, functionalized humanity for the benefit of the few, and 
exploit, neglect, and oppress the weak.
In light of this analysis, we must again ask ourselves what exactly it was that 
Theo van Gogh died for? What did he stand for? What were his philosophi-
cal, political, and cultural commitments? In whose tradition did he stand for? 
Did the conditions of post-secularity, in which he lived and worked, produce a 
new kind of martyr – one that is based on a contested definition of freedom? 
Was Van Gogh the first to be martyred in the struggle against the conditions of 
post-secularity?
It is clear that the murder of Theo van Gogh was unjust, unwarranted, and 
criminal (both legally and morally). Although some outspoken clerics among 
the Salafis were in support of an interpretation of religious law (sharīʿah) that 
exacts the death penalty against those who blaspheme or disrespect the Proph-
et, the Qur’an, or Islam in general, the concept of freedom of speech, a value 
that Theo van Gogh embraced, is an important concept within Islam itself, as it 
was this freedom that was denied the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca at the be-
ginning of his prophethood. Additionally, Muhammad himself never executed 
someone simply for freely denying his prophethood – not even when they did 
so directly in front of him. He often opposed those of his followers that want-
ed to exact punishment on those who denied his prophethood.51 Freedom of 
speech, even if it was speech against the Muslims, was an Islamic ideal that 
needed to be protected both for Muslims and non-Muslims. For Muhammad, 
the Islamic value of free speech, which has been too often eclipsed in many 
Muslim countries by leaders who they didn’t elect, was extended even to those 
who used it to attack Muslims.
Since 9/11, the conflict between the West and the Muslim world has been 
constructed in a symbolic binary form: the narrative is one between the free-
dom of speech and the respect for religious figures. In other words, the core 
antagonism is between the secular “free” values of the West and the religious 
“authoritarian” values of Islam.52 Upon a critical analysis, it becomes clear that 
51 During the signing of the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah, the Meccans refused to recognize 
Muhammad’s title “Messenger of God,” but would instead sign it if he wrote the “son of 
‘Abdallah” by his name. Muhammad agreed to this despite the fact that it was explicitly 
denying his prophethood. Nevertheless, he did not retaliate against them for it, nor did he 
seek revenge for their disrespect.
52 Asad et al, Is Critique Secular: Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech (New York: Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 14–57. This conflict wasn’t necessarily new. One should remember the 
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not all Muslims deny the right of citizens to speak their minds freely, nor does it 
mean that all Europeans lack respect for religion and religious figures. What is 
the case is that shared values inherent within the western Enlightenment and 
Islam are weighted differently. Within the Islamic tradition itself, respect for 
sacred figures, especially Prophets, is of the highest value, whereas in the West, 
the freedom of the individual to critique religion or sacred figures – being a 
form of freedom of speech – is equally of the highest value. A critical stance, 
or sometimes even crass irreverence towards religion, whether it is healthy or 
not, has been at the core of the modern Enlightenment since its early struggles 
with the church. In other words, freedom of speech in the West brought with 
it the right to blaspheme without the fear of a violent reprisal by institutional 
power, be it the church or the state, which was a tremendous step towards 
freeing the population from the tyranny of the authoritarian church and the 
corrupt state. Henceforth, this ideal has become normative in the West and a 
constitutional part of democracy.
Beyond politics, many Enlighteners were motivated out of their distrust and 
disagreement with the church’s pronunciations on morality, epistemology, 
ontology, and metaphysics, especially concerning the natural world and the 
priority of revelation and tradition over reason, as well as the church’s abuse 
of power. Out of this conflict with the church and the ultimate triumph of the 
Enlightenment, the modern West was born. Blasphemy won its right to exist 
in the public sphere.53 As the secular Enlightenment progressed, it would in 
time emancipate itself from the religious elements of mundane life as well as 
its dominating religious institutions.54
Since Luther broke open the doors to individualism through his “priesthood 
of all believers,” or what Alister E. McGrath dubbed the “dangerous idea” of 
Christianity, Rome struggled to dictate the morality of the West. Under the in-
fluence of Protestantism, each individual would be guided by their own rea-
son and conscience – and that reason and conscious has increasingly become 
1988–1989 Salman Rushdie controversy when his novel Satanic Verses was released. The 
debate between freedom of speech and respect for sacred figures erupted then as well.
53 See Talal Assad’s chapter in Is Critique Secular: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, 14–57.
54 Historically, the process of secularization pertained to the state’s appropriation of church 
property, i.e. monasteries, convents, monastic lands, priories, and other church edifices, 
which occurred under King Henry viii’s dissolution of monasteries, having occurred after 
the Act of Supremacy was passed by Parliament in 1534, thus making the British King the 
supreme head (royal supremacy) of the Church of England. This seizure of properties – 
which transformed religious property into secular property – continued during the 
French Revolution and well into the 18th and 19th century by various European countries.
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more secular.55 In many ways this turn away from dogmatic obscurantism and 
unquestioned metaphysics towards the conscious of the individual was lib-
erational in the West, while at the same time we can see that some of the re-
ligious values, principles, and beliefs that were beneficial in pre-Reformation 
Christendom – especially the sense of community and shared fates – have been 
lost in our now secular and thoroughly atomized society. Despite the obvious 
gains from western modernity, especially on the level of the individual, Haber-
mas and Pope Benedict xvi believe the West has paid a high price for such a 
radical dissolution.56 Nevertheless, the constitutional protection of speech is 
one of the uncompromisable benefits of the Bourgeois Enlightenment and the 
West is not willing to relinquish such a hard earned right for the protection 
against being offended.
From the perspective of the critical religiologist, the modern Muslim world 
could benefit much from a greater understanding of those same values associ-
ated with the western Enlightenment – secularity of the state, democracy, indi-
vidual rights, etc. Just as equally true, the West could benefit from an increased 
understanding of those Muslim voices that harbor legitimate fear of secular-
ization, democratization, and capitalization. For Habermas, the West should 
cultivate a greater understanding of such fears and apprehensions, while the 
Muslim world should come to appreciate the benefits of secular western val-
ues while simultaneously maintaining their Islamic identity?57 Discussions 
like these have undoubtedly lead many Muslims and non-Muslims scholars 
to ask can there be an Islamic movement that determinately negates western 
modernity and creates an Islamic modernity; one that could fully integrate it-
self into the modern world without abandoning the Islamic identity? This type 
of move would include a categorical rejection of a simplistic and blind emu-
lation of the West, which the Iranian Marxist scholar Jalal Al-i Ahmad aptly 
diagnosed as “Occidentosis” (gharbzadegi), as well as a simplistic retreat into 
a reactionary Islamic fundamentalism.58 As Hans Küng as noted, the failure to 
engage in a meaningful discourse, to gather together the unlimited discourse 
community – which can enter into a robust discussion on what it means to be 
55 Alister E. McGrath, Christianity’s Dangerous Idea: The Protestant Revolution – A History 
from the Sixteenth Century to the Twenty First (New York: Harper One, 2007), 2–3, 57–58.
56 See Jürgen Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-
Secular Age, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden, ma: Polity Press, 2011), 15–23; Jürgen Haber-
mas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion. San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006.
57 Habermas, Europe, 59–77.
58 See Jalal Al-i Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague from the West, ed. Hamid Algar and trans. 
R. Campbell. Berkeley: Mizan Press Berkeley, 1984.
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Muslim, what it means to be European, what it means to be modern, cosmo-
politan, accepting, and enlightened – too often leads to senseless violence.59 
Mohammed Bouyeri and Theo van Gogh most likely would not have come to 
some kind of agreement on “ultimate truth,” but discourse is a practice of the 
philosophically and religiously brave; such brave discourse has the potential 
to lead to the diminishment of tensions and future reconciliation. It demon-
strates one’s willingness to risk one’s own beliefs, entertain a change in think-
ing, critically reflect on one’s own deeply held convictions, and defend them 
via publicly accessible reasoning.60 Theo van Gogh’s defense of the Nether-
lands’ notoriously liberal culture, with its legalized drug use, legal prostitution, 
pornography, unlimited sex partners, gay-rights, consumerism, i.e. its post- 
religious ethos, etc., which is rooted in the secular idea of individual happiness, 
freedom of choice, and the autonomy of the individual to direct their life in the 
way one sees fit, can hardly be reconciled with a religion that places a premium 
on the collective over the individual, the obedience to divine command, and/
or a religion that condemns the objectification of the body, and sexual licen-
tiousness. Islamic morality cannot be reconciled with the individualistic geist 
of the ethical-egoism that animates modern secular society, a society in which 
each individual devises their own ethical and moral norms autonomously as 
opposed to following that which was divinely revealed in scripture and tra-
dition. Nevertheless, in a democratic society, all members of the discourse 
community – no matter if they are religious or secular – not only have the right 
but the duty (some believe) to engage in a discussion about the values that will 
be considered normative within the society. As Habermas insists, all those af-
fected by the decisions made by the discourse community must be included in 
such a process in order for it to bear any democratic legitimacy.61 A consensus 
among the governed has to be found and that can only be done via discourse.
However, this line of thinking presupposes that there is already a universal 
consensus concerning the validity of governance via the “will of the people” 
as opposed to the “will of the divine.” For some like Usama bin Laden, it is 
the “will of the people” that is precisely the problem with modern democra-
cies, because the people’s will stands in direct contradiction to the will of the 
59 Hans Küng, Islam: Past, Present & Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
xxiii-xxx, 3–24.
60 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, ma: 
The mit Press, 1998), 49–74.
61 One should also bear in mind the symbolic language of silence. Silence is often a way of 
registering one’s refusal to engage in a discourse, and thus through the silence one en-
gages in the discourse.
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divine as expressed in sacred scripture and tradition. In other words, the in-
dependence of the human will is a problem when that independence fails to 
reconcile itself with the rule of God, and therefore stands in rebellion against 
the divine. Seeing this dynamic as one of the most fundamental disagreements 
between Islam and democracy, in October of 2002, Usama bin Laden stated,
You [the United States and Europe] are a nation who, rather than ruling 
by the sharia (way) of God in its Constitution and Laws, choose to in-
vent your own laws as you will and desire. You separate religion from your 
politics, contradicting the pure nature which affirms Absolute Authority 
to the Lord and your Creator. You flee from the embarrassing question 
posed to you: How is it possible for God the Almighty to fashion His cre-
ation, grant men power over all creatures and land, grant them all the 
amenities of life, and then deny them that which they are most in need 
of: knowledge of the laws which govern their lives?62
A society in which divine guidance is separated from the masses, where the 
masses are allowed to follow their nafs (instincts and desires) over and above 
divine revelation was anathema to his conception of a just and righteous soci-
ety, as it would inevitably lead man into error and barbarism. In essence, man’s 
animalic nature could never lead mankind into a society that is truly free, but 
would only enslave him to his animality, i.e. his “first nature.” A second nature, 
one rooted in and governed by divine revelation, was the only way to create 
such a desirable nation, and that second nature, according to bin Laden, could 
only be crafted through divine guidance. Secular democracy not only ignored 
such divine guidance, but let loose man’s destructiveness and gave that ani-
malistic destructiveness the power of the state. If Plato thought democracy to 
be a failed form of government because it gave power to those who do not 
have the mental capacity to wield such power – the demos – then bin Laden 
believed it was because of their moral deficiency and their incapacity to justly 
guide themselves that democracy was faulty. He believed that by democratic 
consensus, a nation legitimizes the blindness of the first nature – thus alle-
viating the populace of it hatred of the superego in the form of the religious 
civilization. Democracy, in the name of civilization, unleashes civilization’s 
nemesis: animality.
Usama bin Laden was not the only person who determined democracy to be 
a retreat from man’s higher self and an affront to divine sovereignty. In his book 
62 Osama Bin Laden, Message to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, ed. Bruce 
Lawrence (New York: Verso, 2005), 167.
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The Bitter Harvest: The Muslim Brotherhood in Sixty Years, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 
critique takes on a theological tone; he condemns democracy for its ‘deifica-
tion of man,’ stating,
Know that democracy, that is, ‘rule of the people,’ is a new religion that 
deifies the masses by giving them the right to legislate without being 
shackled down to any other authority. For sovereignty, as has been shown 
earlier, is absolute authority; nothing supersedes it. Regarding this, Abu 
al-Ali al-Mawdudi said: ‘Democracy is the deification of man… and rule 
of the masses.’ In other words, democracy is a man-made infidel religion, 
devised to give the right to legislate to the masses – as opposed to Islam, 
where all legislative rights belong to Allah Most High… In democracies, 
however, those legislators from the masses become partners worshipped 
in place of Allah. Whoever obeys their laws worships them.63
Both bin Laden and Zawahiri are partially correct in their critique; a Muslim 
may be a democrat, but Islam is not democracy – the Muslim masses are not to 
create for themselves divine law: that is the sole prerogative of the divine in the 
Islamic tradition. As such, Islamic law – as crafted by the absolute sovereign – 
is difficult to reconcile with a political system that takes as its authority the 
popular sovereignty and will of its citizens. In other words, reconciling two 
very different forms of legitimation and two very different worldviews within 
one culture, especially when they’re as divergent as the libertine culture of 
the Netherlands and the traditional conservative religious culture of the im-
migrants would never be an easy endeavor. The social trauma created by men 
like Theo van Gogh, with his anti-Semitism, miso-Islamism, and anti-Christian 
provocations, and men like Mohammed Bouyeri, who was willing to murder 
to protect the dignity of his beliefs, makes sure that the multitudes of citizens 
who see both the importance of respect for the beliefs of the other as well as 
the imperative to maintain the freedom of the individual, never enter into a 
meaningful dialogue.64
Again, we return to the original question: what did Theo van Gogh die for 
and is he a martyr? A look at a conversation soon after Theo’s death may give 
us a better understanding of how Van Gogh thought of himself and his work, 
which may provide an answer to our question. Upon seeing Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
blaming herself for his death, Van Gogh’s best friend stated,
63 Ayman al-Zawahiri, The Al Qaeda Reader, ed. and trans. Raymond Ibrahim (New York: 
Broadway Books, 2007), 130.
64 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 90–91.
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No, Ayaan. If he were alive Theo would be hurt, hearing you say that. He 
wouldn’t have wanted to die in his bed. He felt like a knight on horseback 
about Submission. He died in a battle for free expression, and that’s what 
he lived for… This was a meaningful death.65
Although we may credibly state that Theo van Gogh was murdered for the 
freedom of speech, he was not however a committed revolutionary who want-
ed to expand the bounds of freedom beyond what they already were. What 
Theo van Gogh did profess to was his desire to conserve the liberal freedoms 
already established by Dutch democracy. As stated before, Theo van Gogh was 
a Dutch nationalist who believed that the presence of Muslim immigrants in 
the Netherlands was a threat to the secular liberal values of the open society. 
For him, Muslims represented an attack from the religious-right – a force that 
traditionally wanted to confine the autonomy of the individual within the 
strictures of religion. Thus, he believed the Muslims represented a religiously 
“conservative” threat to such secular liberal values; that they would attempt 
to impose an oppressive and restrictive sharīʿah law upon the non-believing 
Dutch population; that they represented an aggressively backwards and un-
enlightened weltanschauung (worldview); that they were a threat to the rights 
of homosexuals, and that they were a threat to the rights of blasphemers. 
Theo van Gogh believed that Islam would attempt to reestablish a religious 
morality on a population that had previously emancipated themselves from 
the burdensome moral codes of religion. Against all statistical data available, 
he believed Muslims represented a population that receives benefits from the 
state but only contributes to society via petty crime, sexual assault, religiously 
inspired misogyny, and terroristic condemnation of their host society. In other 
words, echoing Geert Wilders, the Muslims wanted to Islamize Europe starting 
with its most tolerant nation, The Netherlands, thus delivering it to what he 
believed was a barbaric and unenlightened way of life. For Theo van Gogh, no 
matter if the Muslim immigrants were Dutch “citizens,” they were not cultur-
ally Dutch unless they abandoned Islam and their native culture and adopted 
a secular-liberal worldview and lifestyle. They were Dutch by citizenship, but 
not by culture, and in Europe’s post-racial and post-nationalist society, cul-
ture was more important that ethnicity.66 Unexpectedly, Van Gogh’s objection 
65 Ali, Infidel, 323.
66 I do not say that ethnicity is not important at all in Europe for indeed it is. The different 
ethnos of most of the Muslim population remains a problem for many within Europe. 
However, it is the culture of Islam that most European critics of Islam object to; this sepa-
rates them from the demos of any given nation more radically than their ethnos.
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was not the “race” of the immigrants, but their beliefs and cultural practices. 
He accepted Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Dutch citizenship (and her right to become a 
member of the Dutch parliament) despite her African heritage. He would have 
seemingly been accepting of a Moroccan prostitute but not a Moroccan Imam, 
not because of their North African ethnicity, but because of their values and 
lifestyle.67 The values of the Enlightenment, which shuns the judgment of in-
dividuals based on the “accidentals” that they had no control over, i.e. race, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, etc., was thoroughly entrenched in 
Van Gogh’s psyche, but he could not avail himself of those characteristics that 
were not accidental, especially the deliberate binding of oneself to unenlight-
ened religious systems and worldviews. In a free Dutch society, Muslims had 
the choice to continue with their “backwards” religious positions or join the 
forward-thinking enlightened European society as Ayaan Hirsi Ali had done. In 
accordance with his liberal views, those who chose the former earned his scorn 
and condemnation and those who chose the latter he accepted as his own.
Although Van Gogh’s position may not be the most progressive stance to 
take, especially in terms of tolerance and multi-culturalism, it is however an ex-
ample of a growing movement within European thought: the Enlightenment is 
under attack by conservative Muslim immigrants and it needs to be defended 
by the real Europeans who are not afraid to stand against the growing Mus-
lim population in Europe. For Van Gogh and others, the demographic growth 
of the Muslim community represents a serious challenge to the secular ethos 
of Europe. Their fears are fueled by the high birth rate of Muslims, the seem-
ingly never-ending flow of immigrants (both legal and illegal) into Europe via 
Greece and the Mediterranean, and the fact that Muslims often fail to “assimi-
late” (or integrate) fully into European society.68 This antagonism has brought 
a shift in thinking towards the Enlightenment: where once the Enlighteners 
67 Theo van Gogh’s attitude towards immigrant women who embrace the sexual ethics of 
Europe is not unique among European leaders. For example, despite his anti-immigration 
politics, which were congruent with Italy’s Northern League (a right-wing anti-immigrant 
group), Silvio Berlusconi, the former Prime Minister of Italy, demonstrated his hypocriti-
cal stance towards foreigners by proclaiming that they have no place in his country, unless 
they’re “bringing over beautiful girls.” See Nick Squires, “Silvio Berlusconi says immi-
grants not welcome but beautiful girls’ can stay.” February 13, 2010. http://www.telegraph 
.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/7223365/Silvio-Berlusconi-says-immigrants-not-
welcome-but-beautiful-girls-can-stay.html (Accessed 11/11/2014). We should also bear in 
mind the Berlusconi was put on trial for his sexual relationship with a Moroccan teenager 
named Karima El Mahroug, a.k.a “Ruby the Heart stealer.”
68 According to the Instituut voor Multiculturele Vraagstukken (Utrecht, Netherlands), the 
Muslim population in the Netherlands is 6% of the total population, just over a million 
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saw the values of the Enlightenment to be “universal,” because they were based 
in autonomous reason which all of humanity has access to regardless of reli-
gion, race, age, etc., these new defenders of the Enlightenment take a more 
“relative” stance; they now see those values as being particularly “European,” as 
they, and not any other religion or political philosophy, are solely responsible 
for the creation of the most modern, free and democratic society in human 
history.69 Ian Buruma explained this new development within Enlightenment 
thought stating that,
The conservative call for Enlightenment values is partly a revolt against 
a revolt. Tolerance has gone too far for many conservatives. They believe, 
like some former leftists, that multiculturalism was a mistake; our fun-
damental values must be reclaimed. Because secularism has gone too 
far to bring back the authority of the churches, conservatives and neo-
conservatives have latched onto the Enlightenment as a badge of nation-
al or cultural identity. The Enlightenment, in other words, has become 
the name for the new conservative order, and its enemies are the aliens, 
whose values we don’t share.70
The German Chancellor Angela Merkel echoed the feeling that multicultural-
ism had failed in Europe in October of 2010. In light of Germany’s inability to 
cope with the problems associated with Muslim immigrants, she stated decried 
that ‘this [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed.’71 However, in the 
summer of 2015, Germany was the main destination for half a million Muslim 
refugees and immigrants fleeing war and instability in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and ironically, she was the public face of the policy to let them 
into Germany. In Britain, Prime Minister David Cameron echoed Merkel’s as-
sessment of multiculturalism in February of 2011; believing the state had not 
adequately addressed the root cause for radicalization within his country, he 
denounced “state multiculturalism” as a failure. Promising greater scrutiny of 
Muslim organizations that profess views outside of the mainstream, Cameron 
declared,
Muslims in a total population of 16.8 million. http://www.forum.nl/Portals/Res/res-pdf/
Moslims-in-Nederland-2010.pdf (Accessed 11/29/2014).
69 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 27–29.
70 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 27–29.
71 Matthew Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism has ‘Utterly Failed,’” October 
17, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multi 
culturalism-failed (Accessed 11/30/2014).
73Adversity In Post-secular Europe
<UN>
Let’s properly judge these organizations: Do they believe in universal hu-
man rights – including for women and people of other faiths? Do they 
believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy 
and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encour-
age integration or separatism?72
In light of the growing ghettoization of disaffected Muslim youths in Britain, 
who do not view Britain as the object of their loyalty, Cameron suggested a 
stronger commitment to a “British identity,” one that is rooted in the values 
of the Enlightenment. Although these values were tacitly juxtaposed to the 
“backward” values of Islam, the point of Cameron’s speech was not missed by 
the Muslim community, who understood that their worldview and way-of-life 
had become even more suspect in light of a Europe attempting to sort out its 
own fractured identity.
Echoing Buruma’s previous point, the Critical Theorist Jürgen Haber-
mas speaks of “interlocking processes” in his discussion of the contesta-
tion between conservative stances of the Enlightenment – its particular 
“European-ness” – and those who defend multiculturalism as an integral part 
of the Enlightenment.73 He says,
The multiculturalist party appeals to the protection of collective identi-
ties and accuses the other side of ‘Enlightenment fundamentalism’; the 
secularist, by contrast, insist on the uncompromising inclusion of mi-
norities in the existing political culture and accuse their opponents of a 
‘multiculturalist betrayal’ of the core values of the Enlightenment.74
Theo van Gogh undoubtedly understood his position to be within the camp 
of the Enlightenment fundamentalists, which he believed created the free-
doms that allowed him to live the life that he lived within a secular nation 
unencumbered by religious dogmas and restrictions. Knowing the history 
of religious Europe, Theo van Gogh understood that he could not have lived 
in pre- Enlightenment the Netherlands and and survived being who he was 
and how he lived – he would have been subject to attack by the church or 
other conservative forces for his libertinism. Van Gogh therefore saw the rap-
idly growing Muslim community as an ominous threat to those same liberal 
72 Laura Kuenssberg, “State Multiculturalism has Failed, Says David Cameron,” February 5, 
2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12371994 (Accessed 11/30/2014).




values that made him free. It was personal for him. Consequently he accused 
the multiculturalists of the Netherlands of aiding in the future destruction of 
enlightened European values, a position taken up by many Europeans on the 
anti-religious left and the xenophobic right, including Anders Behring Breivik, 
the anti-Muslim and anti-left mass terrorist of Oslo and Utøya island (2011).
The case of Theo van Gogh’s possible status as a martyr, as has been demon-
strated, is extremely complex. If Theo van Gogh is determined to be a martyr, 
then he is a martyr for what he believed to be the defense of the secular En-
lightenment; he was a secular Enlightenment-fundamentalist, who wished to 
conserve the progressive political and cultural values of the Netherlands and 
European society from a religiously conservative minority population. But, like 
many of his critics suspected, did he functionalize the values of the Enlighten-
ment to justify his xenophobia and miso-Islamism? Like Geert Wilders, Van 
Gogh was not prepared to surrender Europe to what he believed was an inva-
sion of a foreign people and hostile religion, but does that alone make him 
a bigot? Although he wasn’t attempting to augment freedom through revolu-
tionary praxis, he was a defender of liberal freedoms; in the face of religious 
fanaticism, he wished to preserve and conserve such freedoms as a peculiarly 
European way-of-being-in-the-world against what he believed were forces that 
were attempting to diminish the freedom that distinguished the West from 
many other parts of the world. In a post-nationalist Europe, such Enlighten-
ment values became the basis for a new European identity, one more fully in-
tegrated: the United States of Europe. He may have ultimately been mistaken 
concerning the intentions of the majority of Muslims in Europe, but his sincer-
ity, even to his harshest critics, seemed genuine and was not simply for fame 
or profit. Unfortunately his intentions were clouded by an irrational miso- 
Islamism – especially exemplified by Ayaan Hirsi Ali – that prevented him 
from engaging the broader Muslim community in meaningful discourse. It is 
ironic that the immense freedom within Dutch society was not taken advan-
tage of by Van Gogh and the Muslim community to engage in a self-critical and 
inter-subjective discourse with the other, as the Netherlands is particularity 
unique in providing a venue for such a discourse. In this sense, the freedoms 
he wished to defend were sorely underutilized.
Yet, on the other side, the disrespect that Muslims felt when viewing the 
movie Submission was authentic and painful, and it did not contribute to fu-
ture reconciliation between differing communities. For the Muslims, this at-
tack on what they held most sacred was a rejection of them as a people; a 
denunciation of their core values; and was done in complete disregard for their 
sensibilities and out of ignorance of Islam’s core values of social justice and 
ecumenism. Clearly, in democratic societies, such offensive language is toler-
ated and even promoted in some ways, but for the majority of the Muslims, it 
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was the height of disrespect, the opposite of recognition – the basis from which 
dialogue can occur.75 For many Muslims, Van Gogh’s movie was a poignant ex-
ample of secular extremism and had to be rejected and fought against, as noth-
ing seemed sacred to it. Likewise, the majority of the Muslim community also 
rejected the murderous nature of Bouyeri’s religious extremism; it was a trans-
valuation of Islamic values that could not be justified via the Qur’an and Sun-
nah. For the believers, it is a radical distortion of the character of Muhammad 
to say he was a terrorist, violent, and misogynist, as the 2005 Danish cartoons 
of Jyllands-Posten depicted him.76 Although Bouyeri’s murder of Van Gogh 
did nothing to legitimate the claim, many Muslims in the Netherlands, seem-
ingly to no avail, continued to maintain that Islam was a religion of peace, just 
as Prophet Muhammad himself was a man of peace. As many Muslims pro-
claimed, whether it be a Muslim or a non-Muslim that distorts the image of the 
Prophet to justify their own purposes, it is the responsibility of the Muslims, 
and especially Islamic authorities, to denounce and teach against it, but not to 
murder the critical voice, as that only legitimates their bigotry. It furthermore 
suppresses that which could be a legitimate critique of Islam and the Muslim 
community.77 Many Muslim scholars, including the Turkish Imam Bediüzza-
man Said Nursi (1887–1960), believe that violence in the name of Islam dem-
onstrates not the perpetrators sincere belief, but their lack of belief; because 
their faith in Islam is weak, they tacitly believe it is incapable of defending 
itself with its own theological, moral, and philosophical resources. When it is 
attacked, the Muslim of weak faith feels the need to extinguish the attacking 
voice as the dissent threatens their faith. For Nursi, strong faith fears no cri-
tique, but rather welcomes it. It is not authoritarian, but is open to opposing 
voices. In this way, Bouyeri should not be viewed as a champion of Islam, but a 
misguided Muslim who killed for what he did not truly believe in.
 Je ne suis pas Charlie et je ne suis pas avec les terroristes78
In Europe, France is the nation where the extremes of secularism arrive at 
their clearest apex, where secular culture and secular politics converge most 
75 Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. Malden, ma: 
Polity Press, 2007.
76 Klausen, Jytte. The Cartoons that Shook the World. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
77 It is clear from both Islam and Islamic history that Muslims are not above critique; the 
Prophet often told his followers that to “help their brother” when he is doing wrong is to 
stop him from doing wrong. Critique then is an integral part of becoming a more faithful 
Muslim.
78 “I am not Charlie and I am not with the Terrorists.”
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forcefully. It also has the highest percentage of Muslims per capita in Europe. 
Being mainly from former North and West African colonies of the French 
Empire, Muslims now make up nearly 10% of the overall French population. 
A majority of Muslims reside in impoverished neighborhoods on the outskirts 
of the major cities (banlieue) and constitute an overwhelming majority of the 
inmates in French prisons. French secularity, while often being a haven for ref-
ugees and immigrants, has failed to adequately integrate the sons and daugh-
ters of those refugees and immigrants.79 Exacerbated by the systemic poverty 
of their French ghettos, so many young Muslims have been left in cultural-
limbo, not knowing where they belong – the religious world of Islam or the 
secular European culture of France. It is no wonder then it is also the country 
in Europe where the antagonism between religion and secularity is at its deep-
est. The reality of this situation was painfully neglected until it came to ahead 
in the first days of 2015.
In the face of the terroristic attacks on the “satirical newspaper” Charlie 
Hebdo on January 7th, 2015, in which twelve people in total were killed, in-
cluding a Muslim police officer, many Parisians took to the streets with signs 
reading “Je suis Charlie” (I am Charlie). Expressing their solidarity with the vic-
tims of the terrorists of al-Qae’da in the Arabian Penninsula (aqap), Saïd and 
Chérif Kouachi, and the isis inspired Amedi Coulibaly and Hayat Boumed-
diene, the French symbolically made their nation synonymous with the racist, 
Islamophobic, and anti-religious bigotry of Charlie Hebdo, a small magazine 
that often derided and mocked religious groups, especially Muslims, Catholics 
and Jews. Consequently, many French Muslims, who also wanted to express 
their solidarity with the victims and affirm their belief in free speech, could not 
join their fellow citizens in exclaiming “Je suis Charlie,” as they could not en-
dorse Charlie Hebdo’s ridicule of sacred religious figures such as Muhammad, 
Jesus, the Trinity, etc. In a time when a traumatized society wanted to lionize 
the martyrs of “free speech,” despite the fact that their satirical “journalism” 
was devoid of intellectual seriousness, but served only to enflame the antago-
nism between ethnic and religious communities, the false choice of making 
one group of people ethically pure and the other an absolute evil had to be re-
jected. And so many Muslims who were appalled by the murder of the Charlie 
Hebdo workers stayed home and did not join their fellow French in their rallies 
for the magazine.
79 Robert S. Leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3–58; Emmanuel Todd, Who is Charlie? Xenophobia and the 
New Middle Class, trans. Andrew Brown (Malden, ma: Polity Press, 2015), 15–49.
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It is of course ethically defensible to affirm the right to free speech without 
affirming the bigotry of a particular publication, and so many did so by criticiz-
ing the content of Charlie Hebdo while simultaneously respecting the right of 
the magazine to publish whatever it sees fit to publish. However, in the midst 
of national grief, those rational and ecumenical voices remained painfully 
muted. In addition, the right of the citizens (not all of whom were Muslims) to 
be offended by the bigotry of Charlie Hebdo had also to be respected, while at 
the same time they wished to criticize and reject the turn to violent terrorism 
in response to such Islamophobic bigotry.
Yet, from the perspective of Islamic inner-criticism and inner-reflexivity, 
instead of critically examining where the believers themselves “mock” the 
prophet by their own questionable actions in their daily life, which is a much 
more offensive in the Islamic view, they chose rather to focus their attention on 
those outside the faith who mock the prophet – seeking to pull the speck out of 
the other’s eye before they pulled the beam out of their own. The degree to which 
the Muslim fundamentalists refuse to self-critically analyze their own failure 
ultimately impedes the ummah from pulling itself out of the ditch of history. 
This is not to exonerate the West for its destructive dealings within the Muslim 
world, but to exclusively lay blame at the feet of the West when the ummah it-
self suffers immensely from self-inflicted wounds must be taken into account. 
From a traditional Islamic position, attacks on Islam and Muslims initiated 
self-reflectiveness and inner-critique, which can give birth to better answers to 
the problems at hand. As Tariq Ramadan once publically argued, without such 
a radical reflection on those self-inflicted wounds, the Muslims will continue 
to be colonized (or neo-colonized) because they continue to be colonizable.
Unfortunately, instead of examining the real cause of the terrorist attack, i.e. 
the provocative content of Charlie Hebdo’s derisive cartoons within the context 
of a marginalized Muslim community, the dominant narrative became one 
about the right of free speech, which, like in the Murder of Theo van Gogh, was 
never really in question. From the statements of the attackers, Charlie Hebdo 
was not attacked because its authors bore the right to blaspheme; it was be-
cause of the blasphemous content of what they chose to publish. The terror-
ists that murdered the cartoonists and others also bore that same right to free 
speech and they did not attack themselves or others for having it. Additionally, 
some remembered that according to French laws, free speech is not an abso-
lute right, as there are many reasons why speech in France is eclipsed or can 
end in prosecution, including the vocal or written support for terrorism. France 
is also one of many Western European countries that severely restrict the right 
of its citizens to deny the Holocaust. Passed in July of 1990, the Gayssot Act, 
also known as the Law No. 90-615, to repress acts of racism, anti-Semitism and 
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xenophobia, administers severe penalties for those who question the histori-
cal reality of the Holocaust.80 Those who do so may be imprisoned up to five 
years. The point here should not be missed; it is not that the Holocaust/Shoah 
did not occur, for surely it did, or that the memory of the murdered Jews have a 
protected status in Europe, as they do (and should), but rather that French so-
ciety has a breaking point in terms of what can be said and what cannot, what 
can be published and what cannot. If this breakpoint is transgressed, the French 
state is willing to deprive the transgressor with up to five years of their lives. 
In other words, they are willing to take action against those who they disagree with 
simply because they write something outside of the accepted norm or domi-
nant narrative. But this is not the case for those who mock the Prophet or Islam. 
They are not protected in the same way. For many, this duplicity is hypocritical.
Unfortunately, this “breaking point” is too close to the logic of the terrorists 
who attacked Charlie Hebdo; they too had their breaking point and were ready 
to take action against those whom they disagreed and mocked the memory 
of the Prophet, although, unlike the state, they do not possess access to the 
legitimate “monopoly of violence” (Gewaltmonopol des Staates). France was 
willing to take the issue of the Holocaust out of the public arena by passing the 
Gayssot Act, so that the memory of the victims of fascism could not be mocked 
by pseudo-scholarship. Although the Gayssot Act was meant to diminish the 
possibility of ‘racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia,’ it failed to regulate the 
mockingly crude material emanating from Charlie Hebdo that increasingly 
heightened racist and xenophobic sentiments and actions.81 Unfortunately, 
and despite the law being able to remedy this, the insensitivity towards the 
religious sensibilities of the French Muslim community led to tragedy. Where 
once in the West satire was used to mock the powerful, in this case satire was 
used as a weapon of derision against the most maligned and vulnerable seg-
ment of the French population, the Muslims, who are mainly of North African 
descent – the sons and daughters of the formerly colonized.
The January of 2015, terrorists were willing to seek revenge for those who 
they believed mocked the most sacred symbol of Islam: Muhammad – a man 
whose honor millions are ready to defend, albeit in a variety of ways. As there 
80 See the story of Robert Faurisson, a Holocaust-denier/academic who was prosecuted un-
der the Gayssot Act in 1991. He was later (2012) given an award for “courage” by Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, then president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ahmadinejad cited his fight 
against censorship as proof that Europe does not have true “freedom of speech.”
81 The issue of anti-Semitism in Charlie Hebdo has a history. In a couple different instances, 
the accusation that they were engaged in anti-Semitism resulted in the firing of individu-
al employees. The magazine was sensitive towards these particular accusations. However, 
the idea that it was “Islamophobic” – because Islamophobism is swiftly become normal-
ized in Europe – was of no concern for the editors.
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was no discourse between the Charlie Hebdo community, who saw no compel-
ling reason to “reason” with people they thought to be backwards and worthy 
of derision, and certain Muslims saw no reason to “reason” with those who 
disrespected their religion, a violent conflict was inevitable. Because the gulf 
that separates the two positions couldn’t find a common point of agreement, 
violence was not limited to Paris. Despite the attempts of the President Fran-
cois Hollande to disassociate Islam from terrorism, reprisal attacks on Muslims 
and mosques occurred throughout the French Republic. ‘Next time it will be 
one of your heads’ read a note left with a pig’s head on an Islamic prayer center 
in Corsica, as grenades and bullets flew at mosques and Muslim establish-
ments.82 Had Kant’s categorical imperative been operative – which universal-
izes the acts of the particular – and therefore the Gayssot Act’s ban on inciting 
xenophobia and racism had been extended to encompass the woeful provo-
cation of Muslims, as it was extended to the memory of the deceased Jewish 
community, this form of violence may not have found enthusiastic support in 
Europe. However, because mutual-respect and mutual-perspective taking did 
not occur, the possibility of a peaceful rapprochment remained elusive.
From the very roots of the Bourgeois revolution, which established the po-
litical right of free speech of the individual in the West, no individual should 
be murdered due to their ideas regardless of how controversial and bigoted 
they are. No individual should be forced to shutter in fear because they voice 
opinions that are heterodox or heretical, as even once the bourgeois’ political 
philosophy was criminal in the eyes of the feudal lords. In this sense, the mur-
der of the Charlie Hebdo workers was not only a legal crime but also a crime 
against the values rooted within the Enlightenment itself. It was an attack 
on the West’s civil “sacred symbol,” its political and social freedom. However, 
post-event, the well-meaning French population claiming to be Charlie Hebdo 
overtly identified themselves with the most lowbrow forms of “journalistic” 
terrorism – the most vigorous forms of hates speech that emanated from the 
magazine of mockery and derision. They too have betrayed the values of the 
Enlightenment when adopting the phrase “Je suis Charlie,” as if the revolu-
tionary qualities of the French Republic can be reduced down to crude and 
xenophobic characters of many of its own citizens. Such mockery of a mar-
ginalized population only serves the purpose of dividing the Republic. In a 
time when political, religious, and ethnic reconciliation is desperately needed, 
as the post-secular conditions can either devolve into inter-community vio-
lence or create inter-community cooperation, the lampooning of a group of 
82 Max Fisher, “This Map Shows Every Attack on French Muslims since Charlie Hebdo,” 




people’s most sacred symbols – Muhammad – only widens the gulf between 
non-Muslim and Muslim French and thus creates more distrust, suspicion, 
and gentrification in an already fractured and mutually-suspicious society. Ad-
ditionally, if France and other western nations want to defeat Islamic extrem-
ism, it can only do so with the help of the Muslim community within the West. 
However, the West cannot expect to receive that assistance if powerful voices 
perpetually mock the deeply held beliefs of those it needs. As Habermas has 
pointed out, ‘the basis of recognition is not esteem for this or that quality or 
achievement, but an awareness of belonging to an inclusive community of 
citizens with equal right in which each is accountable to everybody else for 
her political utterances and actions.’83 “Je suis Charlie” is a small but power-
ful symbol of that continual mockery; it is an absence of recognition and an 
edifice of disrespect, which fails to recognize the inclusive community of equal 
citizens bearing equal rights.
Yet mockery has become the sign of an “enlightened” civilization that is 
moving into its retirement. As the British poet William Butler Yeats once wrote,
Come let us mock at the great
That had such burdens on the mind
And toiled so hard and late
To leave some monument behind,
Nor thought of the levelling wind.
Come let us mock at the wise;
With all those calendars whereon
They fixed old aching eyes,
They never saw how seasons run,
And now but gape at the sun.
Come let us mock at the good
That fancied goodness might be gay,
And sick of solitude
Might proclaim a holiday:
Wind shrieked – and where are they?
Mock mockers after that
That would not lift a hand maybe
To help good, wise or great
83 Habermas, Europe, 69.
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To bar that foul storm out, for we
Traffic in mockery.84
We should bear in mind that after the terrorist attack, Charlie Hebdo could 
have portrayed Muhammad, Islam, and the Muslim community based on the 
actions of Ahmed Merabat, the Muslim police officer who was killed by the 
Paris terrorists, or by Lassana Bathily, the Parisian-Malian Muslim who saved 
the shoppers in the Kosher supermarket, but instead they chose to lampoon 
Muhammad through the lenses of terrorists, who represent a small fraction of 
the Muslim community.85 Furthermore, those same terrorists attack Muslims 
in far greater numbers than they do non-Muslims. In the weeks just prior to 
the attack in Paris, Boko Haram, a Nigerian ‘Islamist’ terror group massacred 
approximately 2,000 Muslims in Baga, Nigeria; 61 Muslims were murdered in 
Yemen by al-Qae’da, and the Taliban executed 164 Muslim school children in 
their classrooms. Do these Muslims, who are also innocent victims of religious 
fanaticism, deserve to have their most sacred symbol comedically vandalized 
for the entertainment of those who live in relative peace and prosperity, who 
do not know what it is like to live without security, where religion is the only 
force that gives meaning and solace to one’s endangered life?
In addition, the principle of political equality, also rooted in the Enlight-
enment, has been questioned by the French version of secularity: laïcité. 
84 I have to thank Shaykh Hamza Yusuf of Zaytuna College for bringing this poignant poem 
to light during this time of crisis in the French society.
85 After the January attack in Paris, Lassana Bathily, the French-Malian Muslim man, who 
saved the lives of many Jewish customers in the Hyper Cacher (Kosher) supermarket by 
hiding them in the freezer, was hailed by many as a hero. However, Charlie Hebdo ac-
knowledged his actions, which represented the ecumenical spirit of his Islamic faith, by 
again mocking the Prophet Muhammad in their next edition. Additionally, one of the 
three French police officers that were killed during the three-day ordeal was also a Mus-
lim, Ahmed Merabat. Despite his heroism, Charlie Hebdo also mocked his faith. This has 
an additional effect: too often the dominant narrative chooses to define Islam by the ac-
tions of its misguided followers and not by those believers who embody Islam’s ecumeni-
cal and merciful geist as displayed by these two men. When after the attempted assas-
sination of the cartoonist Lars Vilks in February, 2015 in Copenhagen, Denmark, which 
was followed up by an attack on a Jewish synagogue, more than one thousand Muslims in 
Oslo stood shoulder to shoulder and created a ‘protective human ring’ around the Jewish 
center, shouting ‘no to anti-Semitism, no to Islamophobia.’ Unfortunately, this meaning-
ful gesture of inter-religious solidarity garnished no major media coverage in the United 
States. Episodes like this, which can counter the prevailing stereotypes regarding the faith 
of Muslims, are routinely ignored, downplayed or dismissed. Again, its miscreants and 
not its most devout believers too often define Islam.
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Although it presupposes the separation of church and state, this form of secu-
larity extends the role of the government in civil society even further; it tasks 
the government with protecting its citizenry from the influence of religion.86 
This ideal takes on a particular object: Islam. In doing so, it restricts the free-
dom of religion of Muslims in France, as it sociologically and psychological-
ly denies the legitimacy of their citizenship due to their religious identity, if 
not legally. In other words, in an attempt to rescue secularity from the threat 
of religion, it eclipses the right of expression of its own religious citizens. In 
the private sphere all forms of religion are allowed. But in the public sphere, 
citizens must submit around secular ideals, values, and identities – outward 
traces of religion have to be thoroughly regulated if not abolished in certain 
areas. As such, since 2004, headscarves, i.e. hijabs and other forms of religious 
head-coverings, have been banned in government-operated facilities, includ-
ing public schools.87 In 2010, France enacted Loi interdisant la dissimulation du 
visage dans l’espace public (Act prohibiting concealment of the face in public 
space), which bans all Muslim women from wearing the niqab, the face-veil 
that leaves only the eyes exposed. As there was estimated to be less than a 
thousand Muslim women throughout the whole of France that wore the niqab, 
this act was widely regarded as a form of discrimination against the religious 
rights of French Muslim women to live their faith in public.88 In the name of 
secularity and security, France chose to selectively diminish the free right of 
expression. Those claiming to defend secularity from religion do not woefully 
ignore equality in matters of individual rights, i.e. “free speech” and “freedom 
of expression.” However, in the name of such secularity they mutilate the secu-
lar value of the government’s neutrality in matters of religion. In this way, the 
right of free speech is made nearly absolute for those who use it to antagonize 
religious communities, to defame all that is still sacred in this secular world 
and to unnecessarily widen the growing gap between religious voices and their 
secular counterparts. While at the same time those who wish to be modest, 
express their deeply held religious beliefs while still being an integral entity 
in French society, to utilize their equal rights, and who have no sympathies for 
terrorists, are forced to accept that their right to express themselves is worth 
86 John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space 
(Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2007), 11–33.
87 In 2004, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom issued criti-
cal remarks regarding this law, believing it would be in fundamental disagreement with 
France’s human rights commitments.
88 This law was condemned by Amnesty International and widely criticized in Europe, the 
Americas, and in International governing bodies as being inherently discriminatory to-
wards Muslims.
83Adversity In Post-secular Europe
<UN>
less that the right of the cartoonist. In modern France, an infintile cartoonist 
has more rights than a religious citizen.
However, the often cited issue concerning whether or not an image of the 
Prophet can be drawn, painted, etc., is missing the point. Following a similar 
bilderverbot (image ban) of the Jews, images of Allah are expressly forbidden 
in Islam and have never been produced in Islamic history. However, Muslims 
have drawn images of the Prophet for centuries, and in some Muslims coun-
tries, especially those that are dominated by the Shi’a, one can still find images 
of the Prophet and other members of his family. Some of the most famous of 
depiction of Muhammad came from the Mongol and Ottoman Empires, albeit 
with Muhammad’s face obscured behind a veil. However, most Islamic schol-
ars believe the practice of depicting Muhammad to be misguided and a viola-
tion of Islamic law, even if these images were created out of devotion to – but 
not worship of – the Prophet. These are essentially devotional objects that are 
created out of the deepest reverence for the Prophet, and as such are generally 
uncontroversial (even if not recommended). Most Muslims prefer not to have 
them but will not react violently to seeing them. If they wish to “see” Shamā’il 
Muhammadiyyah (Muhammad’s appearance), it must come through the 
“mind’s eye.” Rooted in the physical and spiritual description of Muhammad 
found within various ḥadīṯh, the hilya is an Ottoman form of literature and 
art that describes the Prophet through Arabic calligraphy without graphically 
depicting him through an image. The most famous hilya is the one narrated by 
Muhammad’s cousin, ‘Ali ibn Abū Ṭālib. It states,
He was not too tall nor was he too short. He was of medium build. His 
hair was neither short nor curly, nor was it straight but somewhere in 
between. His face was not narrow, nor was it really round, but it had 
some roundness in it. His skin was white. His eyes were black. He had 
long eyelashes. He had a big frame and had broad shoulders. He had no 
body hair except on his chest. He had large hands and feet. When he 
walked, he walked at an angle, as if descending a slope. When he looked 
at someone, he looked at them directly in their face. Between his shoul-
ders was the seal of prophecy, the sign that he was the last prophet. He 
was the most giving of men, the most truthful, the most mild-tempered, 
and the noblest of men in lineage. Whoever unexpectedly saw him was 
in awe. And whoever knew him intimately loved him. Anyone who ever 
described him would say, ‘I never saw, before him or after him, the like of 




For the majority of Muslims, this linguistic depiction of Muhammad has suf-
ficed to satisfy their curiosity concerning his appearance. So why is this impor-
tant for Charlie Hebdo?
The satirical magazine’s depiction of the Prophet is not done out of rever-
ence, but out of derision. It is not a misguided form of devotion, but an attempt 
to mock, dishonor and ridicule the sacred in Islam. The intention of the creator 
of the image is the deciding factor as to whether the image is a misguided at-
tempt at devotion or a mean-spirited attempt to provoke religious sentiments 
by slandering the sacred. It was this form of free speech that Pope Francis 
spoke about when he said, ‘You cannot provoke. You cannot insult the faith of 
others. You cannot make fun of the faith of others. There is a limit.’90 Although 
many rejected the Pope’s appeal for respect of religious beliefs, believing that 
he underhandedly legitimated the attack on Charlie Hebdo – which he actu-
ally condemned but gave an explanation why religious people would attack – 
his comments betray his clear understanding of the post-secular conditions 
of Europe. Through his speeches, actions, and discourses, he had shed light 
on a very real phenomenon; there are two forms of being that are occupying 
the same space: one secular and one religious.91 There is no option other than 
coexistence at this time, and that must be mediated through forms of mutual 
perspective taking. Both Charlie Hebdo and the terrorist attack against it con-
tribute to the retreat into pure identity, and as Adorno warned in his Negative 
Dialectics, pure identity is pure death, as it allows for nothing outside of the 
totalizing concept.
As religion is fully privatized in the French Republic, it can play no mean-
ingful role in the national will formation, i.e. it rarely gets a public platform 
by which it can express itself. However, the secular citizens right to free ex-
pression is not eclipsed, thus the secular atheist and libertarian persuasion 
of Charlie Hebdo was free to “blaspheme” without legal repercussions, while 
young Muslim girls are excluded from public education because they wish to 
express their religiosity (and modesty) by wearing a ḥijāb to school. As such, 
witnessing and professing a religion in the public is limited, while blasphem-
ing and provoking are protected speech. These laws, and many other regula-
tions to curb the influence of Islam in France, have only increased the Muslims 
community’s alienation from mainstream French society. They are often left 
feeling unwelcome in their own country – a country that they often adopted 
90 bbc News Europe, “Paris Attack: Pope Francis Say Freedom of Speech has Limits,” January 
15, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30835625 (Accessed 1/15/2015).
91 We do have to bear in mind that not all Muslims are religious and that not all westerners 
are secular. However, in general this distinction holds some weight.
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by choice. Without any legitimate avenue to express one’s identity, and achieve 
genuine recognition in doing so, the fundamental need for human recognition 
turns against itself and society; it becomes aggressive, demanding and often 
violent. Recognition through violence routinely comes through acts of terror-
ism. If one cannot feel respected in one’s society, then one forces respect – or 
at least recognition – through the act of destruction. It is no wonder that ter-
rorism has recently taken on the aura of “spectacle”; with the mass media’s 
24 hour news cycle, where every aspect of the terrorists’ life and ideology are 
analyzed, where the apocalyptic feel of a rather small and unimportant event 
is manufactured and augmented by dramatic and ominous light and sound 
productions within news studios, the terrorists receives precisely what they’re 
denied in life: recognition.
The growing tension between the Muslim and non-Muslim French popula-
tion bolsters the claims of al-Qae’da and isis, who peddle the narrative that 
the West is fundamentally anti-Islam; even when Muslims integrate into west-
ern society, they are still unwelcome because of their faith, they say. Fitnah (di-
visions) within the European community – especially between Muslims and 
non-Muslims – plays into the hands of those who are the purveyors of “civiliza-
tional” conflict, both in Europe and in the dar al-Islam. Because Charlie Hebdo 
chose to print another cartoon of Muhammad less than a week after the Janu-
ary 7th Paris attacks, demonstrations and riots throughout the Muslim world 
were launched. Disgusted with the publication’s unrelenting attack on the 
most sacred figure in Islam, which further diminished the potential for recon-
ciliation and unity against post-secular barbarity, many of the protesters held 
signs saying, ‘You are Charlie, I am Muhammad.’92 For the radical clerics and 
Islamists who wish to further the hatred between communities, Charlie Hebdo 
had become their most effective publication, more effective than al-Qae’da’s 
Inspire magazine and isis’s Dabiq.
However, all did not join in the manufactured consent; many critical 
Europeans were uneasy with the phrase “Je suis Charlie,” as they were already 
aware that Charlie Hebdo was a publication that echoed a questionable history. 
Albeit satirically, Charlie Hebdo’s mockery of the Muslims resembled the Nazi 
newspaper Der Stürmer, the anti-Semitic publication produced by the rapa-
cious Nazi Julius Streicher, whose love for the Fuhrer was only eclipsed by his 
92 Simon Tomlinson, “#noapology: Muslims stage angry protests over Charlie Hebdo’s 






hatred for the Jews.93 Cartoons of the Jews were often depicted as being greedy, 
untrustworthy, genetically poisonous, destructive to German culture, and un-
der the suspicion of blood libel. As was the method of Der Stürmer, Charlie 
Hebdo constantly published the most crude and stereotypical depictions of 
Muslims, ones that prepare the conditions for systemic bigotry, prejudices, and 
discrimination, as they helped cement all stereotypes about the “backward-
ness” of Muslims. As stated before, they “satirically” attacked the most mar-
ginalized and vulnerable segment of the French population, one that had very 
little political and social power to defend itself. This controversial but lucra-
tive modus operandi increased after the magazine began to go bankrupt in late 
2014. Inciting scorn and mockery of Muslims and their religious beliefs was 
a profit generating activity for the magazine. Unfortunately, it contributed to 
the growing normalization of Islamophobia in the French public sphere. As 
history shows us, such mockery and derision is the precondition for hatred, 
especially when it is already coupled with pervasive suspicion of the “other.” 
As such, Islamophobia is the necessary precondition for miso-Islamism – the 
pathological hatred for Islam and Muslims.
As the far-right continues to gain popularity among the populace, these 
terrorist counterattacks against secular French society likewise prepares the 
conditions for the mainstreaming of the once marginal anti-immigrant right, 
especially the French National Front led by Marine Le Pen, the daughter of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, a neo-fascist politician who made his career by taking an 
ultra-conservative stance against immigration, the European Union, and other 
kulturkampf issues. Those who would be at the forefront of a new conflagration 
between Muslims and the West have much to gain politically by the continual 
polarization of French society, as their poll numbers continue to rise as so-
cial strains become worse. Ironically, Charlie Hebdo was published by a group 
of people who identify themselves as left-leaning atheists, who frequently 
attacked the French National Front party, but their work helped solidify the 
miso-Islamism of the political right wing in France. Unfortunately, as many 
French move farther to the right, following a general trend throughout Europe, 
they run the risk of cementing the view among the Muslim population, includ-
ing their own, that France had taken the lead, not against terrorism, but against 
Islam itself.
93 Julius Streicher was later tried and executed at the Nuremberg Trials. I do not claim that 
Charlie Hebdo advocated the extermination of Muslims or other crimes against Muslims 
that Der Stürmer did against the Jews, only that it contributes to the stereotyping of a 
minority community.
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It would be a misreading of Charlie Hebdo to think it was only critical of 
“Islamic terrorism”; it was not. It was staunchly against Islam itself (as well as 
many other religions), but did so behind the disarming veil of crude humor. 
Multiculturalism, despite all its failures in Europe, is its current reality, and 
this context should not be forgotten when discussing the issue of “free speech.” 
The last time the conditions were created by which the pluralism of Europe 
was challenged led to genocide, the likes of which had not been experienced 
before in western history. If European society wishes to forestall any possibility 
of returning to the barbarity of the Second World War, in which many French 
died to preserve the freedoms established by the Enlightenment, including 
French-Algerian Muslims, they cannot so willfully identify with the new form 
of anti-Semitism: miso-Islamism.
Despite all the misguided attempts to show solidarity, there was one ex-
tremely meaningful gesture to come out of the aftermath of the attacks. Led by 
the French socialist President Francois Hollande, who also ordered the French 
attack against al-Qae’da in the Maghrib in 2013, the “unity” rally of January 11, 
2015 demonstrated to the world that France, in all its diversity, would stand 
as one people against those who chose to attack it through violent means. 
Although walking behind Francois Hollande were many other world lead-
ers, some of whom are also responsible for heinous crimes perpetrated by the 
states under their control, the people’s show of unity in the face of terrorism 
was an important expression of national solidarity, even if it was incomplete.94 
This is precisely because the masses at the rally were comprised not only of 
native and/or ethnic French (Français de souche), but they were also Muslims, 
both French citizens and not, from all over the world. No doubt those particu-
lar Muslims did not agree with the content of Charlie Hebdo’s publication, but 
nevertheless they refused to allow their religious beliefs to be reinterpreted 
through the lenses of al-Qae’da and isis terror. The most devout of French 
94 The fact that many of the Presidents and Prime Ministers who were in Paris for this rally 
were themselves perpetrators of violence, demonstrates the very hypocrisy of countries 
that is so often pointed out by jihadists. While individual and group terrorism, such as 
that perpetrated against Charlie Hebdo, are universally condemned, the terrorism per-
petrated by states, such as by Israel, is tolerated and their representatives are honored 
guests of the state. The presence of Benjamin Netanyahu, whose 2014 “Operation Protec-
tive Edge” killed over 2,200 Palestinians (around 70% of which were civilians according to 
the u.n.), forced many French Muslims to stay home from the rally. They could not bring 
themselves to rally alongside someone who denies the fundamental right of existence to 
Palestinian men, women and children. Even Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian President 
who ordered the attacks on hundreds of thousands of innocent ethnic Russians in eastern 
Ukraine in 2014, joined the “unity” rally against terrorism.
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Muslims stood with their fellow secular French citizens in a display of inter-
religious, inter-denominational, inter-national, inter-ethnic, and inter-cultural 
unity. If from this historical tragedy can come forth a meaningful and lasting 
national will, united against barbarity, which values the beliefs of all its citi-
zens, is yet to be determined. However, what was demonstrated most clearly 
through the rally is the revolutionary potential for the secular state if and when 
religions can find a meaningful place within the equal tapestry of voices. In 
other words, the unity rally briefly demonstrated to the world what is possible 
if the conditions of post-secularity are acknowledged and if the citizens are 
allowed to freely express themselves equally (both religious and secular) but 
within the framework of mutual-respect. It may be the case that the attack on 
Charlie Hebdo increases the awareness of Islamophobia’s systemic violence ex-
perienced by French Muslims, and that the sensitivity towards the plight and 
predicament of Muslims living in a post-secular society comes to the forefront 
of the discussion. By embracing French Muslims as being an integral part of 
modern French culture and society, as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
did when she boldly stated, ‘Islam belongs to Germany,’ the French may be 
able to undermine the intellectual and spiritual drift towards religious extrem-
ism that Islamophobia inevitably creates. It was also an encouraging sign that 
there was a clear attempt by many left-wing and liberal voices warning against 
“amalgame” – or the conflation of the Muslim community entire with the ac-
tions of the few terrorists, nor were the personalities that usually peddle the 
inflammatory and Islamophobic line, such as philosopher Alain Finkielkraut 
and writer Eric Zemmour, allowed a public voice – a form of national self- 
censorship post-hoc, or “repressive tolerance” as theorized by Herbert Mar-
cuse. What is clear is that the problems of post-secularity, of which modern 
terrorism is a symptom, cannot be repaired through the dogmatization of old 
and defunct forms of secularity. France today has an old form of secularity (la-
ïcité) imposed upon the new reality of post-secularity, and no true solutions 
will come unless this is understood and worked through in a truly democratic 
and inclusive manner. This must include the free expression – the witnessing 
and professing – of one’s faith, just as much as it must include the critique of 
the faith that is witnessed and confessed. Both blasphemy and public expres-
sion of religion are vital components in the post-secular condition.95
Yet the prognosis in Europe – and the West in general – is grim.96 At the mo-
ment there may not be an adequate resolution to the problems of post-secular 
95 Habermas, Europe, 66–70.
96 Since the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the 13 November 2015 attacks on Paris in gen-
eral, physical violence and discrimination against Muslims in the United States has risen 
89Adversity In Post-secular Europe
<UN>
multiculturalism within the West today, especially in Europe where the Mus-
lim community has a much harder time to integrate than in the United States 
and Canada. On the contrary, I expect relations between Muslims and Europe-
ans to grow worse within the coming years due to (1) the social-political pres-
sures felt by the European states to curb mass immigration, (2) the increasing 
alienation Muslims feel in secular, and seemingly anti-Islamic, Europe, and (3) 
the potential polarization that can be initiated through acts of terror, such as 
the attack on Charlie Hebdo, the “Je suis Charlie” aftermath, and the 13 Novem-
ber 2015 attacks on Paris by isis. However, there are invaluable historic epi-
sodes of Muslims and Christians peacefully breaking bread together that may 
serve as a template for a different future. As we’ll see, the highly improbable 
encounter between a Christian saint and an Enlightened Muslim ruler amidst 
the vicious violence of the Crusades makes clear that discourse between the 
Muslims and westerners is not impossible, but requires and immense amount 
of bravery, fortitude, and a commitment to peaceful living together through 
mutual-recognition and respect.
sharply, culminating in the Presidential candidancy of Donald Trump, who has repeat-
edly stoked the fire of Islamophobia in the American electorate. Trump has publically 
called for a ban on Muslims coming into the United States, greater monitoring of Muslim 
communities, mosques and gatherings. He made headlines again in March of 2016 by 
emphatically stating, ‘Islam hates us.’
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chapter 3
Finding a Common Language
In today’s post-secular society, the struggle to find a common language by 
which peoples of Islamic faith and secular citizens of the West can enter into a 
discourse remains frustrated. The post-metaphysical language through which 
democratic deliberation realizes itself fails to penetrate the theologically satu-
rated language of Islam. The de-legitimization of religious language, especially 
its appeal to, and rootedness in, divine revelation, bars language that is cement-
ed in autonomous reason from interacting on an equal footing. However, if we 
look in the distant past, in an age where religious violence was much greater than 
it is today, when the antagonisms between Christendom and the dar al-Islam 
were at their zenith, we find not only potential for inter-religious discourse, but 
an unlikely and therefore powerful example of what inter-religious discourse 
can entail. Yet, we cannot be satisfied to triumphantly cite the example of the 
interactions of the Catholic St. Francis of Assisi and the Muslim Sultan Malik al-
Kamil as if the example itself mysteriously provides a way for discourse between 
civilizations and cultures. We must ask, what are the conditions under which such 
a fruitful discourse is made possible. What did St. Francis of Assisi and the Sultan 
Malik al-Kamil share that served as the basis for their inter-faith discourse?
 13th Century Witnessing: Saint Francis of Assisi and  
Sultan Malik al-Kamil
In light of the present condition, where western powers remain deaf to the 
Muslim world’s concerns, and where fear of the “other” is a stronger impulse 
than the willingness to engage in a friendly discussion, we can look to the past 
in a future orientated remembrance of a historical event that occurred in the 
13th century between a living Catholic saint and an enlightened Islamic ruler: 
the Italian St. Francis of Assisi and the Ayyubid Sultan and nephew of the fa-
mous Muslim Amir Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb (Saladin), Malik al-Kamil. 
The example that this encounter has provided is one that has been thoroughly 
neglected, systematically written out of history (by the church), and/or con-
veniently forgotten by those whose interest it was to forget the ecumenical 
nature of Christianity and Islam.1 However, in our age, where the religious 
1 Paul Moses, The Saint and the Sultan: The Crusades, Islam, and Francis of Assisi’s Mission of 
Peace (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 197–217. Out of the numerous biographies of St. Francis 
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passion of one of the discourse partners (the West) has abated, and the other 
is still open for discussions but is leery about the sincerity of their partner, we 
need clear precedents of individuals of courage, individuals of moral clarity, 
and individuals of deep faith to engage in an intense and respectful discourse.
Although most of the history of the West and the Muslim world has been 
antagonistic, every now and then a small breakthrough occurs. In the year 1219 
ce, in the midst of the Fifth Crusade, which was taking place in the northern 
Egyptian city of Damietta, Francis of Assisi arrived in the Crusader camp to 
preach the love and peace of God. However, he was resoundingly rejected by 
his co-religionists, who saw no use for Francis. They were motivated out of 
greed and lust for war, not the weakness of peace and prayer.2 After pleading 
with the Crusader Cardinal for permission, Francis and his companion Illumi-
nato eventually crossed the battle lines that separated the Crusaders from the 
Muslims and with the prayerfulness of a living saint, walked into the camp of 
the adversary.3 One would assume that he’d be met with complete hostility 
considering that his fellow Christians had invaded Muslim lands and where 
slaughtering the inhabitants mercilessly; a practice that had been going one 
for over two hundred years when Saint Francis arrived in Egypt. Indeed, Fran-
cis himself witnessed some of the most appalling acts that harkened back to 
the trauma of his days as a young soldier: the Crusaders mutilated captured 
Muslim soldiers. According to his biographer, the Crusaders ‘cut off the hapless 
Muslim’s noses, lips and ears and then gouged out one of each man’s eyes. Thus 
hideously mutilated, the victims were sent back to their own side.’4 In light 
of such brutality, the behavior of the Muslim army was surprising to Francis 
and his companion. After a brief moment of suspicion, the soldiers of Islam 
(mujahideen) were most welcoming, hospitable, and eager to hear from what 
they surmised to be a holy man from Christendom.5 Without shrinking away 
from his Christian faith, Francis explained to the Muslim soldiers that he was 
a “follower of Jesus” and requested that he be taken to the Sultan.6 This was 
an act of tremendous courage and faith, as the Sultan had been thoroughly 
demonized by the Christians authorities for years. In Europe, his image was 
one of systematic violence, a devilish Saracen, a living anti-Christ, who would 
available, this one is the most comprehensive when discussing St. Francis’ experience with 
the Sultan.
2 Augustine Thompson, Francis of Assisi: A New Biography (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2012), 67.
3 Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 79–196; Thompson, Francis of Assisi, 68.
4 Spoto, Reluctant Saint, 158.
5 Ibid., 160.
6 Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 128.
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have to be defeated on the battlefield, not talked to in a tent. Up to that point, 
Francis had no reason to believe that the accusations weren’t true, as he had 
already witnessed firsthand the devastating cost of war between the Christians 
and Muslims. However, he soon found this description of the Sultan to not 
only be misguided, but to be devoid of any truth, for the Sultan not only failed 
to exact revenge on this poor pilgrim, but had showered him with praise and 
brotherliness and showered him with quintessential Arab/Islamic hospitality. 
In doing so, the Sultan also ignored the advice of his advisors who encouraged 
the Sultan to decapitate Francis and Illuminato for attempted to convert them 
to Christianity.7 But the Sultan recognized the sincerity of Francis and afford-
ed him prophetic mercy and compassion, saying ‘I will never condemn you to 
death – for that would indeed be an evil reward to bestow on you, who con-
scientiously risked death in order to save my life before God, as you believe.’8 
Additionally, what Francis may have not been aware of, and what the Sultan’s 
advisors may have forgotten in their passion for war, is that: it is forbidden 
by the Qur’an for Muslims to attack clerics, monks, and other holy religious 
figures. Rather, Muslims are enjoined to respect them for their dedication to 
learning and faith. It says in the Qur’an, sūrah 5:82,
Worst among men in hatred for the believers you will find Jews and 
Pagan; and those with the most love for the believers you will find those 
who say ‘we are Christians’: Because among them there are those dedi-
cated to learning (priests and monks) and they are not arrogant.9
Indeed, it was Waraqa ibn Nawfal, the Christian monk and cousin of Khadīja, 
Muhammad’s first wife, who embraced Muhammad as the long awaited 
Prophet who would descend from Abraham’s oldest son Ishmael (Ism’ail). 
Muhammad’s respect for holy men of the Abrahamic faiths would never leave 
him and he passed this on to his nascent followers. This stance would later be 
codified in Islamic law (sharīʿah).
Not only was the Sultan familiar with the Christians living in the Muslim 
world and their theology, their devotion to Jesus’ message of “loving your en-
emies” and the holiness of their saints, he was also a dedicated follower of 
Islam, which privileges the “learned” amongst the Christians, especially monks, 
with special admiration. Although the Muslims believe monks and priests (es-
pecially in their celibacy) have gone too far in what God has called his faithful 
7 Spoto, Reluctant Saint, 161.
8 Ibid., 161.
9 My translation.
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to do, they nevertheless appreciate the extensive devotion these monks main-
tain in their lives. On the day St. Francis arrived in Damietta to speak with the 
Sultan, the Muslims recognized Francis as being one of the “learned” among 
the Christians and no harm was done to him.10 On the other hand, according 
to St. Francis’ biographer, Paul Moses, Francis himself was especially moved by 
the dedication that the average Muslims had towards their faith and their God 
and wished to see the same kind of commitment in the Christian lands.11
Similar to the Islamic greeting of As Salaam ‘alaikum (peace be upon you), 
Francis would have greeted the Sultan in the way he greeted everyone: ‘May the 
Lord give you peace.’12 Francis did not reserve this greeting only for Christians, 
nor only for those he believed were holy, but rather he sincerely wished that all 
would be given the peace of his lord, especially those Muslims whom he now 
wished to speak to. Again, according to Paul Moses, Francis’ words and de-
meanor with the Sultan demonstrated his disagreement with the Pope’s Cru-
sade against the Muslims. Francis wished a friendly-being-with type of relation-
ship with the followers of Muhammad, one that would be anchored in peaceful 
recognition and not Crusades and jihāds.13 Although he first left Italy expect-
ing and hoping for martyrdom, Francis later saw himself as “God’s ambassa-
dor” of peace and not the ambassador of the very earthly Popes (Innocent iii 
and Honorius iii) who initiated and advanced the hostilities against the Mus-
lims in Egypt and other parts of the Muslim world.14 The Sultan was impressed 
by Francis’ sincerity, even when Francis was explaining to the Sultan that if he 
were to die as a Muslim he would be lost to eternal damnation; the Sultan right-
fully understood this not to be a threat, nor even a vengeful warning, but as an 
invitation to salvation by one who was genuinely concerned about the fate of 
the Sultan’s soul. Despite his commitment to the Qur’anic injunction banning 
violence against innocents, there was nothing in the political-military context 
that surrounded the Sultan that would have stopped him from murdering the 
one that just questioned the veracity of his faith, a faith that is very clear on the 
role (as prophet) and status (only a human) of Jesus. Nevertheless, the Sultan 
found the little ragged monk to be engaging, friendly, and committed to the 
10 Certainly we can think of Francis as being “learned” in spiritual matters; indeed he was a 
master in this field. However, he was not a learned man in matters outside of the spiritual 
realm and was suspicious about his followers acquiring too much earthly knowledge.






one thing that was completely lacking among the Crusaders: a commitment to 
peace through discourse, understanding, and respect.
Amidst bloody battles, where thousands of Muslims and Christians were 
engaged in the most barbaric forms of butchery, the Sultan and the Saint broke 
bread and talked to each other about theology, morality, and Adamic fraternity.15 
Instead of inflaming the situation by verbally defacing the most cherished be-
liefs of the other, the two attempted to search for truth as brothers, as kindred 
spirits, as friends. The enmity that was displayed by the Pope against the Mus-
lims, and the hatred for the barbaric Christians from Europe that spirited the 
tongues of many Muslim poets, ceased to drive the conversation between the 
two; theirs was a mission of peace and reconciliation. From the example of 
Francis the Sultan came to understand a substantive meaning of the imitatio 
Christi (imitation of Christ), as Francis would later be frequently called an alter 
Christus (other Christ). From the Sultan Francis learned that Islam wasn’t a 
religion of violence, depravity, and hatred, but was a religion of spiritual reflec-
tion, intellectual curiosity, and sincere devotion to the creator. Via their open 
and honest discourse, by setting aside the preconceptions and totalizing con-
ceptions that hindered the rest of their communities from looking upon the 
other without judgmental eyes, and from their courage to be with the “threat-
ening” other, they came to understand each other and their religions, thus gift-
ing later generations an example of the potential for peace that resides in an 
open, honest, and equal discourse.
But the real danger may not have been with the “other.” Both Saint Francis 
and the Sultan risked offending their own peoples by talking to the enemy. 
Their contravening actions exposed themselves to the accusation of being a 
traitor to their communities and to their religions. Treason against one’s re-
ligion, for both the Muslims and the Christians, at this time was viewed as a 
capital offense, yet both defied the possibility of death in the name of inter-
religious peace. The Muslims could have easily seen the Sultan’s welcoming 
of the “Crusader monk” as an insult towards all the mujahideen who had been 
killed defending the dar al-Islam from Christian aggression, while those on the 
Christian side could have accused Francis of being a Judas to the holy cause 
and of consorting with the devil’s Saracen. The threat of retaliatory violence 
against Francis, and therefore his achieving martyrdom at the hands of his 
15 Both the Judeo-Christian and the Islamic traditions believe in a mono-Genesis, that all 
humans have descended from Adam and Eve, and thus all humans are connected as an-
cestors of the first humans created by the divine.
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own fellow Catholics, was a risk he willfully undertook.16 Francis understood 
the danger; he knew the Muslims could have killed him immediately or the 
less-enlightened Christians could have upon his return to the Crusader camp. 
His brave attempts to live the Gospel command to “love your enemies” and to 
be a “peacemaker” meant he must risk his life for his ideals. Although the pos-
sibility of violence against the Sultan from his own men was less than the risk 
Francis was subject to, it was nevertheless a real possibility for him as well. Any 
sense of weakness among the Sultan could have been cause for his removal; 
although the Qur’an instructs Muslims to obey they authority put over them, 
there is no “divine right” in the Islamic tradition and so the removal of a Sultan 
is not necessarily a direct act against God, but maybe one of historical neces-
sity or ethical demand.17
The Saint and the Sultan engaged each other by witnessing to and profess-
ing their faith in a friendly discourse with the practical goal of ending the war 
(which would have been against the wishes of the Pope), and in doing so cre-
ated a precedent for Christian-Muslim dialogue that has only recently been 
reinvigorated in light of the wars of the 20th and 21st century.18 After days of 
penetrating discourse concerning the nature of religion, belief, reconciliation, 
and peace, both men returned to their respected camps, moved by the depth 
of faith of the other and with a new-found understanding of our common hu-
manity and spiritual brotherliness.
As often happens when the fate of individuals of great spiritual and reli-
gious importance collide, the impact of this encounter with the Sultan wore 
on the mind of Francis for the rest of his life. According to Paul Moses, Francis 
was especially ‘taken by the adhan,’ the Islamic call to prayer, which is heard 
five times a day throughout the Muslim world.19 After hearing it, devout Mus-
lims pause their daily activities and direct their attention to their rab (Lord). 
Integrated within the everydayness of the lifeworld (lebenswelt) is religious 
16 Although some have argued that Francis went to Egypt seeking martyrdom, Paul Mo-
ses’ biography discounts that tradition based on literary evidence and Saint Francis’ own 
words against intentionally seeking martyrdom. See Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 
162–163.
17 The Qur’an states in Sūrat Al-Nisa, (4:59): ‘O believers, obey Allah and his messenger 
(Muhammad) and those who are in authority.’ My translation.
18 Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 218–242. It’s interesting to ponder whether Francis un-
derstood clearly that he was engaged in an activity that contradicted the will of the Pope, 
especially considering that the Pope’s will was understood to be identical with the will 
of the divine, being that the Pope was, and still is, believed to be the “Vicar of Christ” on 




devotion and the remembrance the divine, and for the purpose of beseeching 
the divine for peace, blessings, and mercy. According to many biographers of 
Francis, he may have even attempted to incorporate such a “herald” (muez-
zin) into his own community, which would call the faithful to prayer, as public 
and routine prayers would have been a great blessing for a society that had 
already drifted far away from their Christian ideals.20 Later, in 1224, as the call 
for yet another Crusade emanated from Rome, in despair St. Francis retired to 
his mountain heritage in La Verna for forty days of fasting. During those days 
of spiritual and physical isolation, St. Francis received his first stigmata: the 
wounds of Christ. Was it out of grief and despair for the coming bloodbath that 
the wounds of his savior inflicted Francis? According to Roman Catholic Priest 
Michael Cusato, Professor of Franciscan Studies as St. Bonaventure University,
Given the news [of Crusade preparations], I am convinced that Francis 
went with a few of his closest companions to the hermitage of La Verna 
profoundly discouraged, perhaps even depressed, over the events about 
to unfold. Once again, unable or unwilling to resolve human problems 
peacefully and fraternally through dialogue and mutual respect, the lead-
ers of the Christian world were mobilizing their military might to engage 
in actions which would inexorably lead to yet more bloodshed and death. 
More personally still, Francis stood in danger of seeing the death of a 
man he had come to view as an amicus [friend] and, even more impor-
tantly, as his frater [brother]: someone he had come to know and appar-
ently respect during that famous encounter with him under the tent of 
Damietta.21
After Francis received the stigmata, seemingly through divina inspiratio (divine 
inspiration) he penned a prayer that resembles the traditional Islamic medita-
tion on the Ninety-Nine Names of God. Commonly known as the “parchment 
given to Brother Leo,” He wrote,
You are holy, Lord, the only God, You do wonders.
You are strong, You are great, You are the most high,
You are the almighty King.
You, Holy Father, the King of heaven and earth.
You are Three and One, Lord God of gods;
You are good, all good, the highest good,
20 Spoto, Reluctant Saint, 156.
21 Michael Cusato, as quoted in Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 180–181.
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Lord, God, living and true.
You are love, charity.
You are wisdom; You are humility; You are patience;
You are beauty; You are meekness; You are security;
You are justice; You are moderation, You are all our riches
[You are enough for us]
You are beauty, You are meekness;
You are the protector,
You are our guardian and defender;
You are strength; You are refreshment.
You are our hope, You are our faith, You are our charity,
You are all our sweetness,
You are our eternal life:
Great and wonderful Lord,
God almighty, Merciful Savior.22
According to Father Cusato, after writing his Islamic-inspired prayer, St. Francis 
drew a picture of the Sultan underneath his favorite sign: the tau – signifying 
God’s protection (Book of Ezekiel 9:4).23 Francis’ concern for the suffering of 
the finite individual in a world that despises weakness and glorifies strength, 
that resorts to violence before peaceful discourse is given an opportunity to be 
realized, extended to those whom Christendom considered to be less than de-
serving of mercy, compassion, and brotherly love: the Muslims. In an ecumeni-
cal way, his “Christ-like” love for others included the despised Muslims, who to-
day, still look upon Francis as being the best (ihsan) of the Christian tradition.
In the later repressed Earlier Rule, written by Francis in 1221 ce, which was 
meant to guide his fledgling community in communal life – including a life of 
radical poverty – Francis used some “startling” language about the Muslims.24 
Chapter xvi of the Earlier Rule, entitled ‘Those who are going among the Sara-
cens and other nonbelievers,’ states,
The Lord says: Behold, I am sending you as lambs in the midst of wolves. 
2. Therefore, be prudent as serpents and simple as doves (Mt 10:16). 3. 
Therefore, any brother who, by divine inspiration, desires to go among 
the Saracens and other nonbelievers should go with the permission of 
22 St. Francis and St. Claire, Francis and Claire: The Complete Works, trans. Regis J. Armstrong 
and Ignatius C. Brady (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 99–100.




his minister and servant. 4. And the minister should give permission and 
not oppose them, if he shall see that they are fit to be sent; for he shall 
be bound to give an account to the Lord (cf. Lk 16:2) if he has proceed-
ed without discretion in this or in other matters. 5. As for the brothers 
who go, they can live spiritually among [them] in two ways. 6. One way 
is not to engage in arguments or disputes, but to be subject to every hu-
man creature for God’s sake (1 Pet 2:13) and to acknowledge that they are 
Christians. 7. Another way is to proclaim the world of God when they see 
that it pleases the Lord, so that they believe in the all-powerful God  – 
Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit – the Creator of all, in the Son who is 
the Redeemer and Savior, and that they be baptized and become Chris-
tians… 10. And all the brothers, wherever they may be, should remember 
that they gave themselves and abandoned their bodies to the Lord Jesus 
Christ. 11. And for love of Him, they must make themselves vulnerable to 
their enemies, both visible and invisible…25
Francis did not believe that provoking Muslims or offending their faith was a 
prudent way of gaining their trust and friendship. In fact, this type of behav-
ior, displayed by some in his religious order, ended in their martyrdom and 
hardened the hearts of some Muslims. Additionally, Francis rejected the use of 
force against Muslims because (1) violence was against Jesus’ message of peace 
and pacifism, and (2) it failed to convert anyone to Christianity; it only made 
life as a Christian in Muslim lands more difficult as it closed down the door 
to peaceful discourse. Instead, Francis wanted his Christian brethren to “be 
subject” to Muslims, live amongst them peacefully, engage them with kindness 
and to ‘avoid quarrels or disputes’ with them.26 In the end, Francis wanted his 
brothers to be Christ-like towards Muslims; to be an example of what Christ’s 
followers are meant to be – not war-mongering monarchs, Popes, and Knights, 
but men of gentle spirits, concerned for the poor, the weak, the suffering, and 
the excluded, regardless of their confessional commitments. This meant the 
Christians had to respect the Islamic tradition itself, for within Islam the bibli-
cal patriarchs, the Prophets, Jesus and his mother Mary, are all revered, and 
in this reverence common ground could be found. Francis knew this and was 
aware that Muslims cannot speak ill of Jesus and continue to remain within 
the fold of Islam, as the Islamic tradition regards all prophets as equals and 
their followers as ‘Ahl al-Kitāb (people of the revealed scriptures).
25 Saint Francis, Francis and Clare: The Complete Works, 121–122. My emphasis on “be subject.” 
Other emphases are from the original document.
26 Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 162–163.
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The outrage against the 2005–2006 Danish Cartoons printed by the small 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which depicted Muhammad as a terrorist, pedo-
phile, misogynist, and imbecile, as well as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, was 
often explained by Muslims to be a reaction to the West’s disrespect for their 
sacred figures, a practice that all Muslims are forbidden by Islamic law to en-
gage in.27 By the command of Muhammad via the the Qur’an, Muslims are 
required to show respect to those “holy” figures of Judaism and Christianity, 
but that same respect for Muhammad has rarely been reciprocated. Francis 
understood that offending Muslims by denouncing their deeply held beliefs 
could not establish the conditions for peaceful discourse, but would rather 
make it impossible, as the Crusades had already nearly done. Therefore, in his 
Earlier Rule he wished his community to ‘be subject to every human creature 
for God’s sake, so bearing witness to the fact that they are Christians.’28 For 
Francis, to be Christian was to be humbly subject to every human including the 
“enemy.” Because of this position of humility, Francis opened up the geography 
necessarily for honest discourse, which may be why St. Francis is still remem-
bered with fondness in the Muslim world today. Unlike the western powers of 
today, which project their influence into the Muslim world with blind arro-
gance, Francis’ insistence on subjecting oneself to others and being humble in 
their presence, as well as honoring their religious beliefs, is an embodiment of 
sincere Christian belief that is easy for devout Muslims to recognize. It also lays 
the foundation for reconciliation, a space wherein peoples of different faith 
can find common ground.
Following Bonaventure’s official biography, St. Francis’ contemporary biog-
rapher Donald Spoto sees his mission to the Muslims in 1219 to be a complete 
failure; he had failed to convert the Sultan; he failed to make peace between 
the Muslims and Christians; and he had not become a martyr for Christ.29 The 
Fifth Crusade would end in a disaster for Christendom and would remain just 
a footnote in the history of medieval Islam. Nevertheless, from the perspec-
tive of critical religiology, this episode established the possibility of inter-
religious discourse in the face of overwhelming hatred and war. What Fran-
cis and the Sultan accomplished was not realized within their lives, but the 
painful ecumenical “learning process” between religions was set in motion. 
Additionally, the Muslims gained a new understanding of their traditional re-
ligious rivals; the embodiment of Christ on earth can be achieved – as seen in 
27 See Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009.
28 Ibid., 2009.
29 Spoto, Reluctant Saint, 161–162.
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St. Francis – and in its achievement there exists a discourse partner. In the em-
bodiment of the prophetic model of Jesus, who is recognized by Islam as such, 
reciprocity demands Muslims embody the prophetic model of Muhammad, 
who never denied the opportunity to enter into a substantive discourse with 
the other. In other words, when Muslim and Christians sincerely embrace the 
ecumenical and humanistic spirit of both traditions, the traditions themselves 
demand discourse.30
According to Father Donal O’Mahony, an Irish Capuchin friar who has 
worked with Muslims in Africa for decades, Muslims ‘relate to Franciscans 
more closely than to the Catholic Church’ for this very reason.31 If we were to 
explain this phenomenon, we would point to the idea that deep within the 
Islamic tradition resides the respect for all things sacred and holy, especially 
when they are identical to themselves: they embody the humble and pious val-
ues they publicly and personally commit themselves to. In the case of Francis 
and the Franciscans, many Muslims see a person and/or religious order at-
tempting to live the gospel of Jesus himself, which includes “being subject” 
to others who do not share the same religion, but are of similar faith. Being 
subject to others disarms the others, sets them at ease, and lays out the space 
for mutual respect and brotherhood/sisterhood. Because Islam already posits 
a concrete idea of who Jesus was, and Muslims recognize him as being funda-
mentally holy and good, those who are sincere in their attempts to live as a 
true imitatio Christi are seen also as holy and good. From the Islamic perspec-
tive, it is because Franciscans embody the ecumenical and humanistic spirit 
of both Francis and Jesus that they are most appreciated among the Muslim 
community, who often sees the West as being deficient in humility and open-
ness towards the religious “other.” Francis’ courageous example can serve as a 
model for nations in our modern age to also live closer to the suspicious others, 
learn from others, and break bread with others. Additionally, his example of 
loving the outcasts – the lepers of his time – can serve as a catalyst to bring the 
Abrahamic faith traditions together as they are all tasked with taking care of 
those who are less fortunate in this world’s means.
Another powerful example of being-with-others can be found in Francis’ at-
titude towards lepers. The assumption that Francis, being a saintly character, 
found it easy to be with those stricken with lepracy is entirely wrong. It was 
precisely because he was appalled and horrified by the lepers that he forced 
himself to follow the imitatio Christi into a close being-with relationship with 
the outcasts. In other words, Francis’ spontaneous attitude towards the hated 
30 Al-Qur’an 3:64.
31 Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 225.
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other had to be overcome by a radical turning away from his own inclination; 
he had to embrace that which he feared: the social outcast, the existential en-
emy, and the seemingly entirely “other.” Again, in his “overcoming” the stigma 
of otherness we can identify a model for social and political discourse among 
nations and religions. Although we may despise the other for their perceived 
inequities, nevertheless we embrace them as part of the human family and as 
subjects worthy of recognition.
Returning to our original question; what makes the discourse between 
St. Francis of Assisi and the Sultan Malik al-Kamil possible? First, the pre- 
condition is mutual respect and mutual recognition.32 Both sides of the dis-
course allow the other to be who and what they are, accept their differences as 
being invitations to enter into a relationship, and are sincerely open to recon-
ciliation. This was demonstrated both by St. Francis and the Sultan when they 
met and spent the days together in discussions while war between their peo-
ples raged around them; they did not hurl insults and condemnations at each 
other for all their perceived faults, their perceived mistakes in theology, but 
rather appealed to both reason and faith in their attempts to come to an un-
derstanding of each others’ position. Additionally, they both were humble in 
the sight of the other and therefore did not engage in a strategic communica-
tion, which is an attempt to win the other over to one’s side through manipula-
tive discourse, but rather they conversed in a way that expressed their solidar-
ity, their honesty, their openness, and their eagerness to learn from the other. 
Secondly, both St. Francis and the Sultan spoke a similar language. Obviously 
we are not talking about Francis’s Italian or French (which he spoke) and the 
Sultan’s Arabic; the idiom (ἰδίωμα) by which meaning within a given religion 
is expressed can be overcome by appropriate translations. The language that 
they shared was not the explicit languages of Europe and the Middle East, but 
the common language of a religious worldview, especially ones that share simi-
lar backgrounds and therefore theological presuppositions, i.e. the monothe-
istic faith of Abraham. Both St. Francis and the Sultan Malik al-Kamil shared a 
worldview that was permeated by religiosity, a certain divine-centered meta-
physics that provided shared concepts such as the veracity of divine revela-
tion, the nature of revelation, the necessity of theologically guided reason, the 
spiritual importance of prayer, fasting and pilgrimage, the central notions of 
sacred time, sacred space and sacred figures, and the utmost importance of 
religiously-inspired ethics and moral codes that are predicated on both heav-
enly and earthly justice and compassion. In other words, a shared spiritual 
32 See Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts 
(Cambridge, ma: The mit Press, 1995), 92–139.
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reality served as an incubator for their friendly discourse. Although they ex-
pressed these religious concepts within difference languages and within differ-
ing religious systems, the broader similarities and shared intellectual ancestry 
still provided a basis by which they could speak to each other in a way that was 
intelligible and recognized as being legitimate even if they differed on how 
such concepts are articulated in dogma, law, and spiritual practices. As such, a 
metaphysical worldview that included the centricity of the divine, revelation, 
and the possibility of the divine’s interjection into history, served as the fertile 
soil for inter-religious discourse. What St. Francis and the Sultan discovered 
in their brave discourse was that the differences between Christianity, espe-
cially as it is practiced by saints like Francis, and Islam, when practiced by men 
and women who embody the sunnah (way) of the Prophet, diminished in the 
face of their common humanity, their common concerns, and their common 
religious and worldly goals. The reconciliatory geography that was created by 
St. Francis and the Sultan bore a small piece of fruit in the 20th century, when 
the Trappist monk Thomas Merton engaged in a robust study of Islam and Su-
fism, its mystical side. In a letter written in the spirit of St. Francis to a Pakistani 
Sufi name Abdul-Aziz, Merton wrote,
Personally, in matters where dogmatic beliefs differ, I think that contro-
versy is of little value because it takes us away from the spiritual realities 
into the realm of words and ideas. In the realm of realities we may have 
a great deal in common, whereas in words there are apt to be infinite 
complexities and subtleties which are beyond resolution. It is, however, 
important, I think, to try to understand the beliefs of other religions. But 
much more important is the sharing of the experience of divine light, 
and first of all of the light that God gives us even as the Creator and Ruler 
of the Universe. It is here that the area of fruitful dialogue exists between 
Christianity and Islam.33
Merton believed that by de-emphasizing the particulars within each reli-
gious tradition, and focused rather on the spiritual reality that each tradition 
attempts to articulate through its own language, that which is divisive can be 
overcome by that which unites. Dwelling within that which unites paves the 
way for the discovery of commonalities. These commonalities may set the 
stage for inter-religious discourse.
33 Rob Baker and Gray Henry, eds., Merton and Sufism: The Untold Story – A Complete Com-
pendium (Louisville, ky: Fons Vitae, 2005), 1.
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But does the inter-religious discourse of Francis and Sultan Malik al-Kamil 
adequately address the post-secular condition that we find ourselves in today? 
The post-secular condition in the West and a growing secular condition in the 
Muslim world pose new challenges for all religious voices: whether or not they 
are divided amongst themselves or in communion. Although they are out of 
step with secular modernity, some contemporary religious voices, as we will 
see, still speak a language that is steeped in religious semantics and semiotics, 
and continue to employ such language when discussing modern and some-
times very secular issues. Pope Francis is the most poignant western example 
of this form of recalcitrant faith. In an age of increasing secularity, where even 
the Vatican is surrounded by all the trapping of Roman modernity, with its 
jungle of capitalist consumerism, he addresses not only his faithful via the lan-
guage of the saints, popes, and prophets, but also speak to, with, and for the 
Muslims who look to him as a new St. Francis with whom they can talk. This 
change in tone from the Roman Pontiff has itself opened up productive and 
warm relations between Christianity’s largest denomination and the second 
largest religion in the world: Islam.
 Different Francis, Same Mission: Witnessing with and for Muslims
On July 10, 2013, the recently elected Pope Francis released a letter to the Mus-
lims in celebration of the end of Ramadan (‘Īd al-Fiṭr). In it, the Pope of the poor 
and the disenfranchised, who adopted his papal name from the Catholic Saint 
most associated with poverty – the aforementioned Saint Francis of Assisi – 
reflected on the need for Christians and Muslims to engage in “mutual re-
spect” as a way of building bridges between communities. Defining “respect” 
as an ‘attitude of kindness towards people for whom we have consideration 
and esteem,’ Pope Francis emphasizes that it must be “mutual,” a relationship 
where both peoples, regardless of their religious differences, ‘share [in the] 
joy’ of the other.34 The Pope, remembering the love that Saint Francis showed 
when he journeyed to the Islamic lands to share the Gospel with his Islamic 
brothers, wished to avoid augmenting the growing antagonism between Mus-
lim immigrants in Europe and their secular (and religious) native counter-
parts, a dynamic one can daily witness firsthand just outside the walls of the 
34 Pope Francis. “Message from Pope Francis to Muslims Throughout the World for the End of 





Vatican, where Muslim immigrants line up to sell their wares and the Cara-
binieri (Italian military police) chase them off.35 Through education, the Pope 
states, we must ‘bring up our young people to think and speak respectfully of 
other religions and their followers, and to avoid ridiculing or denigrating their 
convictions and practices.’36 Pope Francis reiterated this sentiment after the 
attacks on Charlie Hebdo, which continually mocked and ridiculed religious 
believers, including the Pope and his predecessor Pope Benedict xvi. Disre-
spect, again, the opposite of recognition, is a deep source for conflict and vio-
lence, the growth of which can lead to future catastrophes between peoples.37
Despite the growing hatred for illegal immigrants from Northern Africa, 
whose gateway into Europe is often through the small Mediterranean island of 
Lampedusa, the Pope prophetically challenged Catholics to recognize the pain 
and suffering of the immigrants who flee from brutal conflicts, entrenched 
poverty, and the rampant devastation of their homelands, and to see them not 
as a threat to European culture, but as “neighbors” in search of a helping hand 
and a better future for their children, whom the Pope often reminds are also 
God’s children. In accordance with these sentiments, the new Pope’s first trip 
outside of Rome was to the island of Lampedusa, where he honored those who 
had died attempting to seek a better future in Europe.38 The Pope’s sensitivi-
ties for the suffering other, who finds themself in a foreign land, has its roots 
not only in his own biography (as a son of immigrants), but the experience of 
exile within the furtile soil from which Christianity sprang: Judaism. The book 
of Leviticus 19:33–34 states,
When a stranger sojourns with you in your land, you shall not do him 
wrong. The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native 
among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in 
the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God.39
For Pope Francis, who has demonstrated repeatedly that his solidarity with 
others transcends confessional boundaries, referenced the 2013 “Lampedusa 
35 Moses, The Saint and the Sultan, 2009.
36 Pope Francis. Message from Pope Francis to Muslims Throughout the World for the End of 
Ramadan.
37 Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Malden, ma: Pol-
ity Press, 2007), 99–194.
38 Austen Ivereigh, The Great Reformer: Francis and the Making of a Radical Pope (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 2014), 1–3.
39 Holy Bible, (New York: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1972), 105.
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Tragedy” – where hundreds of refugees from Eritrea and Somalia drowned in 
a fire at sea while attempting to reach the safe shores of Europe – as being the 
result of the ‘inhuman global economic crisis, a serious symptom of a lack of 
respect for the human person.’40 In his empathy for the suffering of those in-
volved in the Lampedusa tragedy, Pope Francis instructed the Vatican Almoner 
to give away 1,600 phone cards so the survivors of the tragedy and other im-
migrants who’d been cut off from their families could call home to their loved 
ones.41 This was only a small gesture – but a meaningful one – towards what 
Pope Francis has repeatedly called for: the transformation of the church into a 
‘field hospital.’42 This field hospital church, Pope Francis has iterated, bandages 
the wounds of all humanity, not just faithful Catholics. It is an ecumenical hos-
pital, which sees its mission as one that must ‘heal the wounds’ of society, the 
broken, the abused, the neglected, and the excluded, and not just focuses all of 
its attention to doctrinal and catechismal obedience.43
Pope Francis also remembered the importance of the teachings about Mus-
lims in Nostra Aetate (In our time), the 1965 Declaration on the Relation of the 
Church to Non-Christian Religions by Pope Paul vi. In this modernizing and 
ecumenical document, Pope Paul vi declares,
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one 
God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the 
Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to 
submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, 
with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to 
God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a 
prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call 
on her with devotion. In addition, they await the Day of Judgment when 
God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from 
the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially 
through prayer, almsgiving and fasting.44
40 Catholic Herald. “Pope Francis Offers Prayers for the Victims of Lampedusa Boat Sinking,” 
October 3, 2013. http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2013/10/03/pope-francis-offers 
-prayers-for-victims-of-lampedusa-boat-sinking/ (Accessed 3/22/2014).
41 Howard Chua-Eoan and Elizabeth Dias, “The People’s Pope,” TIME, 23 December 2013, 54.
42 Pope Francis, A Big Heart Open to God: A Conversation with Pope Francis (New York: 
HarperOne, 2013), 30.
43 Ibid., 31.
44 Pope Paul vi, “Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: 




Looking towards a more-reconciled future relationship between the Catholics 
and Muslims, Nostra Aetate states,
Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have 
arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to 
forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to 
preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind 
social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom.45
Yet, despite the embracing and compassionate tone of the declaration, the rela-
tionship between the church and the Muslim world has grown more estranged 
within the conditions of modernity. As he is most troubled by the suffering 
of the weak, vulnerable, and broken, the Pope tearfully witnesses the way in 
which Muslim refugees in Europe are often met with indifference or derision; 
they are un-welcomed, unwanted, and greeted with hostility and suspicion. 
For the Pope, all human life is sacred, and Christian morality, according to Pope 
Francis – which is only one articulation of human morality – must reclaim its 
sense of solidarity, especially with those who are most vulnerable, most cast-
aside, and most victimized. In his first exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium (The Joy 
of the Gospel), he wrote ecumenically that,
Our relationship with the followers of Islam has taken on great impor-
tance, since they are now significantly present in many traditionally 
Christian countries, where they can freely worship and become fully a 
part of society. We must never forget that they ‘profess to hold the faith 
of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one, merciful God, who 
will judge humanity on the last day.’46
Against those who claim that Islam’s divine being is fundamentally different 
than that of Judaism’s and Christianity’s, and whose sense of ethical life (sit-
tlichkeit) cannot be reconciled with Judeo-Christian ethical norms, he writes,
The sacred writings of Islam have retained some Christian teachings: Je-
sus and Mary received profound veneration and it is admirable to see 
how Muslims both young and old, men and women, make time for daily 
prayer and faithfully take part in religious services. Many of them also 
have a deep conviction that their life, in its entirety, is from God and for 
45 Ibid.
46 Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium, 121.
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God. They also acknowledge the need to respond to God with an ethical 
commitment and with mercy toward those most in need… We Christians 
should embrace with affection and respect Muslim immigrants… in the 
same way that we hope and ask to be received and respected in countries 
of Islamic tradition.47
For those who are most opposed to the immigration of Muslims into Europe, 
Pope Francis proposes a more Christian and hopeful way of looking at their 
presence, one that emphasizes the universality of human experience and the 
potential for creating new and more vibrant pluralistic culture. He writes,
Migrants present a particular challenge for me, since I am the pastor of 
a church without frontiers, a Church which considers herself mother to 
all. For this reason, I exhort all countries to a generous openness which, 
rather than fearing the loss of local identity, will prove capable of creat-
ing new forms of cultural synthesis. How beautiful are those cities which 
overcome paralyzing mistrust, integrate those who are different and 
make this very integration a new factor of development! How attractive 
are those cities which, even in their architectural design, are full of spaces 
which connect, relation and favor the recognition of others!48
The Pope’s statements and actions are controversial for many who do not see 
these Muslim immigrants as victims but as a lingering threat: a dangerous Tro-
jan horse in the midst of Europe. Many on the political-right, both religious and 
secular, accuse the Pope of contributing to the destruction of Europe via his 
soft hearted “Americano” stance towards immigrants, pointing out that there 
are already millions of Muslims residing in Europe, which is too many in their 
opinion. For groups such as the German based Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamization of the West (pegida), the National Front in France, or the Lega 
Nord (Northern League) in Italy, Muslim immigration is not an issue of soli-
darity, Christian compassion, or respect, but the survival of Europe as Europe. 
The threat of “Eurabia,” they believe, is real, and the Pope, with his “solidarist” 
positions, puts Europe in great danger by calling for an acceptance of even 
more immigrants, especially after isis threatened to conquer Rome and the 





of twenty-one Coptic Christians in Libya.49 Unlike the Pope, they emphasize le 
piège de la société pluriculturelle (the trap of the multicultural society), not its 
potentiels positifs (positive potentials). This sentiment has only been exasper-
ated by the knowledge that isis (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) are smuggling 
their operatives into Europe as immigrants, and those immigrants have at-
tacked Paris and Brussels.50 However, Pope Francis, echoing Pope Gregory the 
Great’s Letters on the Treatment of Jews, (591 and 598 ce) which barred Chris-
tians from harming Jews while affirming their responsibility to protect the 
Jews, disagrees vehemently with those who view Muslims simply as an inher-
ent threat. For him, they are fellow believers whose presence in Europe war-
rant Christian agape (ἀγάπη – “unconditional love”) and should not be abused 
by the citizens of Europe nor individual states, regardless of whether some in 
the immigrant communities commit crimes or are attracted to radical Islam. 
In this sense, the Pope courageously attempts to maintain the “humanity” of 
those who are “dehumanized” simply because of their religion.51
From the beginning of Pope’s Francis’ tenure as Pope, he has continuously 
rejected the material privileges of being the Vicar of Christ and has embraced 
a more humble attitude towards the world. On one such occasion, March 28, 
2013, on Holy Thursday (a.k.a. Maundy Thursday) – the day Christians remem-
ber Jesus’ last supper – Pope Francis forsook the tradition of washing the feet 
of fellow clerics and instead washed the feet of twelve detained juveniles, 
among them were women and Muslims.52 Although the media coverage of his 
49 Dabiq, No. 4, 1435 Dhul-Hijjah; Ahmed Tolba and Michael Georgy, “Sisi Warns of Response 
after Islamic State Kills 21 Egyptians in Libya,” February 15, 2015. htttp://www.reuters 
.com/article/2015/02/15/us-mideast-crisis-libya-egypt-idUSKBN0LJ10D20150215. 
(Accessed 2/16/2015).
50 After the Charlie Hebdo attack in January of 2015, the problem of radicalized immigrants 
became even more pronounced, especially concerning the second generations, who have 
an intimate knowledge of European society and travel on European passports. Mike 
Giglio and Munzer al-Awad, “Smuggler: I Sent isis Fighters to Europe,” November 11, 2014. 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/smuggler-i-sent-isis-fighters-to-europe?utm_term 
=4ldqpia (Accessed 11/12/2014).
51 David Livingstone Smith, Less than Human: Why we Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate 
Others. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011.
52 nbc News, “Pope Washes Feet of Detainees in Holy Thursday Ritual,” March 28, 2013. 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/28/17502522-pope-washes-feet-of-young 
-detainees-in-holy-thursday-ritual?lite (Accessed 3/23/2014). “Maundy” Thursday is a 
most appropriate word to describe what Pope Francis was trying to accomplish. “Maundy” 
derives from the Latin “Mandatum” (“mandate” in English), the first word in the phrase 
‘Mandatum novum do vobis ut diligatis invicem sicut dilexi vos’ or ‘I give to you a new 
commandment, that you love one another; as I have loved you’ (John 13:34).
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deeply symbolic departure from papal protocol was extensive, it nevertheless 
failed to adequately articulate the radical importance of this singular act. In 
one person, Francis honored (1) women, (2) Muslims, and (3) immigrants. The 
Vicar of Christ, the successor to St. Peter, the Bishop of Rome, the bearer of pa-
pal supremacy, and heir to the many popes that came before him that ordered 
Muslims to be massacred in Crusades, Inquisitions, and through the burning 
of women thought to be in league with Satan, who had a 1,400 year conflict 
with Islam, this Pope lowered himself, washed her skin, and kissed her feet in 
an act of humble atonement which recognized the pain and suffering of the 
poor, the immigrants, and women. This gesture of humility symbolized Pope 
Francis’ desire to reconcile the church – without dissolving the church – to 
those it has previously thought to be heretical, outside the bounds of Christian 
love, and destined for an afterlife of hellish torment. Humanistic compassion 
outweighed eschatological judgment if only for a brief moment. Just as Francis 
of Assisi had done, the Pope’s actions once again demonstrated to the world 
the ecumenical vitality of embodied Christian ethics; that not all of Europe 
was anti-Muslim, and that the very center of the Christian world was hold-
ing open the doors to an inter-subjective dialogue with the Muslim world. The 
common humanity of both the Pope and this one young Muslim woman was 
enough motivation for him to honor her, recognize her hardship, and pray for 
her. Through that simple gesture, the Pope demonstrated the church’s potential 
to reconcile itself to its own ethical commitments.
In many ways, Pope Francis has been a unifying figure among the world re-
ligions, so much so that the immigrants of Rome, who are often socially ma-
ligned in the streets while peddling plastic trinkets, laser lights, purses, etc., 
turned to him when they felt they were being abused by the Italian state in 
their detention centers for illegal and undocumented workers. In a letter plead-
ing for intervention by the Pope, they wrote, ‘we came to seek a better life, but 
we’ve only found the bars of a jail cell… Holy Father, we are the new poor, 
but we’re not meat for a butcher shop.’53 After hearing the Pope’s challenge to 
never let a “Lampedusa Tragedy” happen again, watching him embrace the dis-
possessed, the poor, the sick and the marginalized in society, these detainees, 
exclusively Muslims from countries such as Tunisia and Morocco, saw hope 
within the Pope’s turn towards social justice and compassion and away from 
ecclesiastical dogmatism, sectarianism, and Roman elitism. Just as Muslims 
sought refuge with the Christian King Negus in Abyssinia in the year 615 ce, 
53 John L. Allen Jr., “Mad at Everyone Else, Muslim Immigrants in Rome Trust the Pope,” 




knowing he was a man of Christian compassion, Muslims now sought inter-
vention from the highest of Christian authorities, the same seat of power that 
once called for their destruction. Pope Francis demonstrated that he was the 
antithesis of his predecessor, Pope Urban ii, the initiator of the Crusaders 
in 1095 ce. Francis wished to win over the Muslims with love and compas-
sion instead of the sword and mace; he had no active agenda to “convert” the 
Muslims but rather “respected” the dignity of their religious beliefs. This kind 
of cooperation with and for the benefit of Muslims, let alone immigrants in 
Europe, would have made martyrs out of many before him at the hands of the 
Inquisition. The Pope’s actions, echoing the views of the martyred “heretic” 
Menocchio, a.k.a. Domenico Scandella (1532–1599 ce), who read the biblical 
passage to “love one’s neighbors” as meaning to also love his Islamic neighbors, 
have opened up a door towards healing the deep-seated wounds that exist be-
tween the dar al-Islam and Christendom.54 Indeed, the fact that Pope Francis 
seems sincere in his faith and in his attempt to live the life of a humble servant 
of the poor – as Jesus himself commanded his followers to do – have led many 
to recommit themselves to their Catholic faith and others to convert, despite 
the ever-increasing secularity of society. This phenomenon has been dubbed 
the “Francis effect,” and it is easily witnessed whenever he has a public en-
gagement in Rome or abroad.55 It should be noted that even non-Catholics, 
54 Spellberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an, 41–47; also see Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the 
Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller. Baltimore, md: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1992.
55 John Gehring, The Francis Effect: A Radical Pope’s Challenge to the American Catholic 
Church. Landham, md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015; Tracy Connor, “Francis Effect? Popular 
Pope has Catholics Praying More, Polls Find,” March 6, 2014. http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/religion/francis-effect-popular-pope-has-catholics-praying-more-poll-finds-n43451 
(Accessed 3/26/2014). However, according the Pew Research Center, there has been no 
meaningful “Francis effect” among u.s. Catholics. Those who identify themselves as 
Catholics have not increased nor has attendance in mass increased. It appears that the 
American population is immune to the charismatic leadership of the new Pope in Rome. 
See Conrad Hackett. “No Clear ‘Pope Francis Effect’ Among u.s. Catholics,” http://www 
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/25/no-clear-pope-francis-effect-among-u-s-catholics/ 
(Accessed 3/26/2014). It can be argued that the Protestant inspired and capitalist nur-
tured individualism has rooted itself so deep in the American consciousness that Francis’ 
calls for solidarity with the poor falls upon deaf ears in the United States where there 
is little sympathy for the poor. While some parishes report a slight rise in mass atten-
dance, other wealthy Catholics have made it known their displeasure with the Pope’s 
condemnation of ‘unbridled capitalism.’ For example, Ken Langone, the co-founder of 
Home Depot and Republican party supporter, announced to Cardinal Dolan of New York 
that the ‘multi-million dollar restoration of St. Patrick’s Cathedral might run into funding 
111Finding A Common Language
<UN>
including many Muslims, can be spotted in the St. Peter’s square whenever 
the Pope is in general audience; this is a powerful reminder of the ecumenical 
spirit that he embodies, especially in contrast to his predecessor who, unin-
tentionally, antagonized Muslims worldwide through his 2006 Regensburg Ad-
dress and other mismanaged moments.
From a critical sociological perspective, one can see the growing thirst 
for real, prophetic, and humanistic religiosity – authentic professing and 
witnessing – in our secular age that has, since the Enlightenment, industrial-
ization, urbanization, and materialization, been depleted of its spiritual val-
ues and optimism about the future. Because the void is so vast – to the extent 
that it cannot be filled by consumerism, materialism, sex-car-and-career – any 
genuine return to the religious values that still linger within small moments 
of authentic morality in the secular public sphere – those values that we pro-
fessed but rarely practiced – reminds many that religion is not entirely worth-
less, out-of-date, and socially irrelevant. It reminds many critics that religion 
may still play a positive role in society. Therefore, if the right religious values 
are rescued, emphasized, practiced, and fulfilled, religion may still have a 
positive future (especially in the West). Indeed, the faith and actions of Pope 
Francis have done a lot to make religion “respectable” once again in the post-
metaphysical society.
Because of the Pope’s new ecumenical orientation, which has become the 
cornerstone of his papacy along with his emphasis on poverty, he has been 
able to work with the Anglican Church and the Islamic authorities in al-Azhar 
University – the foremost authority in Sunni Islam – on a project to rid the 
world of modern-day slavery and human trafficking.56 Historically, European 
Christians as well as African and Arab Muslims cooperated within the slave 
trade.57 Now, cooperation against the slave trade among some of the world 
most powerful religious authorities may prove to be a radically transformative 
force for good in today’s society. About human trafficking, The Pope says,
difficulties if wealthy Catholics keep getting their feeling hurt by ‘exclusionary’ papal re-
marks.’ See Mark Binelli, “Pope Francis: The Times They Are a-Changing,” Rolling Stone. 
13 February 2014, 41.
56 Reuters, “Christians and Muslims Join Forces to Combat Modern Slavery,” March 17, 2014. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/us-religion-slavery-idUSBREA2G19N20140317 
(Accessed 3/24/2014); Reuters, “Pope, World Religious Leaders, Pledge to Fight Modern 
Slavery,” December 2, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/02/us-pope-slavery 
-idUSKCN0JG1KM20141202 (Accessed 12/3/2014).




Where is your brother or sister who is enslaved? Where is the brother 
and sister whom you are killing each day in clandestine warehouses, in 
rights of prostitution, in children used for begging, in exploiting undocu-
mented labor. Let us not look the other way. There is greater complicity 
than we think. The issue involves everyone!58
Indeed, Pope Francis’ ecumenical faith and call to prophetic action does the 
opposite of the war of words articulated by Islamophobes such as Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali, Theo van Gogh, Geert Wilders, etc. His words do not embolden Muslims to 
think of Europe as the next frontier to “Islamize” but rather as a potential space 
to build the preconditions for reconciliation, understanding, and peace. The 
potential for ecumenisms is not alien to Islam either. The Pope’s faith echoes 
the Qur’anic statement found in Sūrat al-Hujurat, 49:13,
O mankind, We have created you from a male and a female and made you 
nations and tribes so that you may know one another. Indeed, the most 
noble of you in the sight of Allah is the one most righteous. Indeed, Allah 
is all-Knowing and acquainted with all.59
For Pope Francis, like the Qur’an, the differences within mankind are not rea-
sons to hate each other, but invitations to enter into a discourse and learn 
about each other, and work towards a more reconciled future society. We can 
only wait and see if the Roman Curia will finally appear from behind the tall 
walls of the Vatican and embrace their immigrant Muslims brothers just on 
the other side of those imposing edifices. Will the church take seriously Pope 
Francis’ call to poverty – to make the church a “church of the poor” and a “field 
hospital” for the victims of history? Will the church take seriously his call for 
reconciliation with other religions, or, like so many other calls for a better 
more humane and dignified world, will his voice go unheard by the rank-and-
file believers?60 This is the challenge that the Pope has given all of mankind 
but most especially the Christians that remain recalcitrant within the post- 
secularity countries.
As the Pope begins to travel more frequently outside of the Vatican, he fre-
quently returns to the issue of inter-religious discourse, respect, and recogni-
tion. In a speech to Albanian civil authorities in September, 2014, the Pope 
praised the nation for being one that can peacefully live together despite their 
58 Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium, 105.
59 My translation.
60 Ibid., 100; Pope Francis and Antonio Spadaro, A Big Heart Open to God, 30–35.
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mixed religious heritage while also warning the world against any religious 
communities’ fortifying themselves with the “armour of God.” He stated,
There is a rather beautiful characteristic of Albania, one which is given 
great care and attention, and which gives me great joy: I am referring to 
the peaceful coexistence and collaboration that exists among followers 
of different religions. The climate of respect and mutual trust between 
Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims is a precious gift to the country. This 
is especially the case in these times where an authentic religious spirit is 
being perverted and where religious differences are being distorted and 
instrumentalized by extremist groups. This creates dangerous circum-
stances which lead to conflict and violence, rather than being an occa-
sion for open and respectful dialogue, and for a collective reflection on 
what it means to believe in God and to follow his laws.
Let no one consider themselves to be the ‘armour’ of God while plan-
ning and carrying out acts of violence and oppression! May no one use 
religion as a pretext for actions against human dignity and against the 
fundamental rights of every man and woman, above all, the right to life 
and the right of everyone to religious freedom!61
For many Catholics and non-Christians, Pope Francis represents the hope that 
what remains of religion within the ever-increasing secularity of our age is a 
form of religion that embodies peaceful cooperation, transcendence of histori-
cal enmities, and a religion that faithfully commits itself to the possibility of 
a more-reconciled future society. If religion in the post-secular society limits 
itself to its reactionary-potentials, as opposed to its prophetic, Socratic and lib-
erational potentials, then that which is left of religion will soon be a matter of 
history; rejected as a force for evil and division. Religion, if it is to be a force 
for human flourishing – the realization of humanity in-and-for-itself – then it 
must actualize its potential to aid in the creation of the conditions by which 
humanity thrives on the basis of cooperation, unconditional love, recognition, 
and reconciliation. The future of religion depends on the religious; it can either 
be forgotten because it cannot be realized, or it can be remembered because 
it’s too destructive to be forgotten.
61 Pope Francis, “Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Tirana (Albania): Meeting 





 Translation Proviso: Can We Witness and Confess in the  
Same Language?
For the critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, the Muslim community, and reli-
gious communities in secular societies in general, have a two-fold problem. 
First, religions are understood to be comprehensive worldviews that often lo-
cate themselves within “semantically closed universes” which do not allow for 
a free and undistorted communication with others outside of that semantic 
universe.62 Since religious vocabulary is saturated with theological presuppo-
sitions it inadvertently stifles the necessary shared vocabulary and epistemol-
ogy that is needed to enter into a discourse with their secular counterparts. 
Thus, citizens that do not have access to such religious language find it difficult 
to reason with those that cannot reason without an appeal to revelation or di-
vine authority. Their vocabularies are rooted in two different authorities; one 
finds its arguments based in revelation and the other in autonomous reason – 
one heavenly and the other earthly. A solution to this entrenched problem is 
needed in a post-secular pluralist society if it wants to be both (1) inclusive, and 
(2) democratic. The answer to this problem cannot be to disregard religious 
voices; they must be considered within the democratic processes of secular 
societies. Additionally, despite the immense problem of semantics and reason-
ing, Habermas is insistent that religious communities not be forced to abandon 
their religious beliefs or be integrated into the discourse community through a 
coercion, but rather should express their autonomy in the way they see most fit 
and congruent with their religious sentiments. Habermas does not agree with 
those critics of religion that insist that religious voices must retreat into the pri-
vate domain because their faith is an obsolete Gestalt des Geistes.63 The forced 
privatization of religion only stifles the legitimate contributions that religious 
voices can offer in the public discourse and contributes to reactionary forms of 
religiosity that disassociate it from the broader community altogether. On the 
contrary, speaking explicitly about Muslims, he says ‘Muslim immigrants can-
not be integrated into a western society in defiance of their religion, but only 
together with it.’64 Islam and Islamic values have to be enlisted into the dis-
course if devout Muslims are going to engage in national discussions as equals 
who have a unique perspective to offer the broader community. In this way, 
Islam itself is a motivational factor for Muslims participating in the unlimited 
discourse community; their religious beliefs provide sufficient reason to enter 
62 Habermas, Europe, 72.
63 Ibid., 73.
64 Ibid., 71.
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into the broader discourse community and it spares them the need to justify 
their action via reasoning that is alien to their worldview. According to his dis-
course theory, religious communities, in this case Muslim immigrant commu-
nities, are (1) able to both preserve their religious views in the public sphere, 
but (2) they equally must find some way of translating those same religious 
views into secular language so that they are made accessible to all participants 
via discursive reasoning. In this way, religious voices are not excluded from the 
democratic deliberation process, but are included, albeit via the translation of 
their thoughts and ideas into democratically accessible language. This process 
will open up the closed semantic system to the public. If religious communi-
ties living in secular societies can achieve such a translation proviso, then their 
principles, values, and ideals can be fully included in the national discourse, 
they can be debated, and if they gain democratic consensus, they can even 
be enacted (in secular form). In a world that has become deaf to religious and 
metaphysical thought, translation presents itself as the key to the locked door 
of religiously garbed semantic potentials.
If religious communities do not find such a translation proviso acceptable, 
then they risk their ideas being blocked from consideration in the democratic 
process in secular states. This would ultimately diminish both the democra-
cy and the ability of the particular religious communities to contribute their 
unique perspectives to their particular societies. This self-ghettoization also 
has the consequences of creating a “parallel society” within a nation, one that 
is often perceived to be suspicious due to its failure to integrate, cooperate, 
and contribute to the health and wealth of the nation.65 The status of the per-
petual “other” can be imposed by the religious communities themselves if they 
cannot find a way of making their religious claims publicly accessible to those 
who do not belong to the same religious community but are of the same state/
nation. Again, this self-imposed ghettoization through semantic and cultural 
isolation is a real threat to the survival of Islam and other minority religions in 
the secular West, as it bars them from politically, economically, and culturally 
integrating into their societies. Yet in the case of the Muslim communities in 
Europe, this often occurs by the actions of many conservative Muslims who 
fear that integration will lead to assimilation and a loss of their Islamic iden-
tity. This fear is not entirely irrational, as there is a certain measure of truth to 
the claim that immigrant communities tend to eventually assimilate the values 
and cultures of their adopted societies the longer they remain a part of that 
society. However, the consequence of self-imposed isolation is that if they can-




will be made for them without their input. This is a very precarious state to 
impose on one’s religious community while living in a society that has yet to 
accept the identity, values, and religious beliefs of the particular religious im-
migrants. If those values cannot be expressed in such a way that the society 
can understand – in a language that is comprehensible to all – then such a 
society can easily adopt the age-old stereotypes of the religious community as 
they lack the first-hand experiences to overcome such historical biases. This 
is especially true for Muslims in Europe, whose religion has been demonized 
by European writers, Protestant preachers, and the Catholic Church for over 
a millennium with few exceptions. If Muslims fail to demonstrate the pro-
gressive nature of the Islamic tradition – the same progressive nature that 
made Islam so appealing in the first place – then a sizeable number of Euro-
peans will maintain their already negative views of Islam and Muslims. The 
Muslim community will not be able to blame the West for their failure to 
make their religion understood and respected within the post-secular society 
when they fail to actively contribute to changing those views through discourse 
and the prophetic example that is sensitive to the concerns of the broader so-
ciety. As they did in the past, Muslims should always seek to contribute their 
talents to the care and betterment of society, no matter which one it happens 
to be.
Yet, if Habermas insists we translate religious potentials into secular lan-
guage, we have to ask him precisely what aspects of religion are to be trans-
lated and is there a specific form or content that he suggests be translated?
 Cognitive-Instrumental Reason, Moral-Practical Reason and 
Aesthetic-Expressive Reason in Religion
According to the Critical Theory of Religion, religion has three specific compo-
nents. They are (1) cognitive-Instrumental, which is religion’s language, theory, 
theology, and values, (2) its moral-practical component, which both explains 
the motivational aspect of the religious life and constructs a collection of mor-
al norms and a system of thought that legitimates and justifics them. (3) The 
aesthetic-expressive: this aspect of religion articulates itself in ritual, sacred 
music, architecture and fine art. These three components are integrated within 
traditional, i.e. religious worldviews, and thus create a substantive wholeness. 
But according to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, they are artifi-
cially separated under the conditions of modernity, which compartmentalizes 
and neutralizes the capacity for integrative wholeness that they once embod-
ied. Nevertheless, he returns to these categories in his thoughts on translating 
aspects of religion into secular philosophy.
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Habermas’ analysis of religion in the post-secular society is not specific as 
to what would have value in a secular society if religion were to be thoroughly 
translated into publically accessible reasoning. Clearly an understanding of all 
three aspects by the broader society would be a benefit to all, but that would 
burden the citizen beyond what is reasonable for each individual to know 
about every religion. While the Critical Theory of religion would like to see all 
aspects of religion translated into secular semantics, it is also aware that some 
are simply not translatable. What is translatable above others is the moral-
practical reasoning of any given religion. It is also the most useful to a multi-
cultural and multi-religious society to be able to harmonize moral sentiments 
with other communities’ moral values and principles. Therefore this element, 
which provides the believer with an interpretation of reality and therefore 
their orientation of action, would be the most pregnant with possibilities if it 
were to enter into public discourse with the non-religious citizenry.
The expressive aspect of religion is hardly taken seriously in secular society 
where devotional works of art, whether they are paintings, status, architecture, 
which were originally meant to provoke devotion, prayer, and contemplation, 
are experienced today as autonomous art: art for art’s sake.66 According to 
their own notion, such pieces of religious art are not autonomous, but rather 
serve a purpose beyond itself: the worship and contemplation of the divine. 
In today’s Rome, the tourists meandering through the many beautiful cathe-
drals are more likely to hear a lecture on the various artists’ biography than 
the devotional purpose of the art itself or the religious meaning it expresses. 
Or worse, they’ll experience the art de-contextualized, i.e. in coffin-like muse-
ums, where the sacred art’s natural connection to the given architecture, the 
smell of incense, and the sound of sacred music is absent, thus leaving the 
sacred art without its natural home. For Muslims, Islamic art is meant to in-
voke wonder at the world that the divine created, not itself to be the object of 
wonder. Nevertheless, within the modern secular world, the secularization of 
the expressive side of Islam will occur in the West as it is inclined to appreci-
ate the culture “artifacts” of various peoples. However, such appreciation will 
not lead to Islamic devotion, just as viewing Michelangelo doesn’t necessary 
lead to greater Catholic faith. As such, the sacred art of Islam will go the way 
of sacred art in Christianity: it will become detached from its original purpose, 
66 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication Action: Reason and the Rationalization 
of Society. trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 160–161. This experienc-
ing of devotional art as autonomous art is due to the rationalization process that has 
developed within the western world. Even though such devotional art is securely tied to 
the church through its history and intent, it is experienced by the secular citizen as being 
detached from its own history and purpose.
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i.e. devotion, and will become a profane (desacralized) thing of beauty in a gal-
lery or museum, enjoyed by nullifidians.
As for the cognitive-instrumental component of religion – the rational-
ity of work and tool, calculative thought and mathematics, functionalizing 
logic, technology and the cold rationality of strenge ordnung (strict order/
discipline) – it doesn’t have a substantive export for philosophical theory, i.e. it 
fails to supply adequate concepts and notions that can be properly appropri-
ated within a secular system. As praxis or a way/attitude towards life within a 
faith, it is beneficial, but this attitude towards a faithful life is not what Haber-
mas is interested in.
In the end, the moral-practical element of religion is the element most 
suited for translation; for it provides the moral and ethical categories out of 
which translation can occur most affectively. These categories are the most 
saturated with social-ethical potentials and therefore are the most likely to be 
found fruitful to discuss via public debate as most citizens can easily engage 
in discussion about morality and the demands of goodness on various social 
issues. Translating concepts such as piety, virtue, compassion, mercy, love, and 
justice from their religious contexts to a secular context is one that can be done 
both on the level of the intellectual as well as the general public, if we can as-
sume that they would have at least a cursory knowledge of both secular and 
religious values and the philosophical imagination to do so. It is true that the 
particular coloring of the Islamic articulation of common or “universal” values 
may make the discourse partner (the westerner) unsure as to whether they 
are speaking about the same concept. However, the universal or humanistic 
component – that is deeply imbedded within the common human condition 
and human experiences – should reveal itself through the dense particular-
ity of the language and thus establish itself as the subject of discourse. If the 
Roman playwright Terrance is correct in saying homo sum, humani nihil a me 
alienum puto’ (I am human, nothing human is alien to me), and this statement 
is universally true, then all are capable of discerning the humanistic universals 
within their religious traditions that can serve as the basis for discourse and 
friendly relations. In this sense, the universal has to be parsed out of the partic-
ular by both the religious and the secular so that it can emerge as the neutral – 
and therefore debatable – common value.
 Translation Dangers
The attempt to translate religious semantic and semiotic materials into secu-
lar language is not without its potential perils. In effect, it is asking a lot of 
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a religious community to risk entering their values into democratic delibera-
tion. Such open and free deliberation is often brutal, odious, and dismissive 
of religious sensitivities. Religious values can expect no reverential treatment 
once they’ve entered into this combative arena. However, the translation of 
the sacred into the profane – if not anxiety inducing already – may prove to 
be even more disastrous if the religious voices are casually discredited and/or 
perceived disrespected on the part of the discourse partner. One does not will-
fully offer the sacred to secular slaughter, which is precisely what Habermas’ 
proposal asks religious communities to do. Despite the fact that most claims 
are given no special treatment due to their origin, care must be taken that the 
sacredness of the values that are being expressed, even within the secular lan-
guage, are seriously considered and extended respect. Muslims especially are 
sensitive to disrespectful attitudes towards their sacred figures and beliefs. It is 
often understood that the value of “freedom of speech” does not give one the 
right to insult the prophets; somethings are simply more sacred than others. In 
light of the continual attack on religion in our recent history and the system-
atic undermining of religion in our contemporary secular society, the Haber-
masian argument insists that recognition of the risk taken by the religious 
communities should be honored by secular voices if a place for discourse is 
to be established where all feel comfortable and safe to put forward their own 
contributions. If religious voices do not feel secure offering their positions via 
secular language, they inevitably will retreat into dogmatism, obscurantism, 
and reactionary orthodoxy – all religious “defense mechanisms” that protect 
the sacred from the rapacious onslaught of the secular.
If we assume that we are not going to return to a religious state any time 
soon, that secular society is permanent in the West, while also recognizing the 
continued existence of religious communities despite the ever-expanding sec-
ularization process, then a solution to this vexing problem must be found, one 
in which both the religious and secular are secure and respected in their val-
ues. Habermas’ suggestion – his translation proviso – is one possibility. It may 
be the only viable possibility at this time in history. Nevertheless, the obliga-
tion of the religious communities to translate their theologically saturated se-
mantics into the secular language is not the only obligation Habermas assigns; 
he believes that secular voices have a substantive burden to perform as well.
Being-with-others who are in opposition to one’s own worldview, such as 
the case between many secular and religious citizens in any given country, is a 
difficult matter when it comes to democratic deliberation on the future of one’s 
nation. If we accept the idea that democracies intrinsically have to make diffi-
cult compromises between competing factions, and that this is done under the 
conditions of post-secularity, then both the religious and the secular will have 
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to carry a specific burden in order for democracy to be both inclusive and rep-
resentative of the will of the people[s]. For Habermas, the translation proviso 
that the religious communities have to burden is balanced by the burden that 
the secular citizens have to carry; they have to go through a learning process 
similar to the religious voices.67 For Habermas, secular citizens must (1) learn 
to allow religious voices to participate within the ‘political will formation’ even 
if they cannot separate their ‘moral convictions and vocabulary into profane 
and religious strands.’68 This religious participation in the political will forma-
tion is inevitably done within the public sphere where ideas can be contested 
by the citizenry before or simultaneously with the political discussions within 
the governmental institutions. Although such religious vocabulary cannot be 
a part of the institutional discussion of a political matter, due to the neutrality 
of the state towards religion, it can however be part of the overall discussion 
within civil society and the public sphere. Therefore secular citizens must al-
low for the articulation of religious sentiments within the public sphere, even 
if those sentiments remain stubbornly rooted within a sacred text or tradition. 
Although the secular state cannot introduce such religious language into its 
legislation, it nevertheless cannot bar such voices from expressing themselves, 
their concerns, and their values within the public sphere, which remains the 
open arena for information and idea exchange. (2) As a part of allowing the 
freedom of expression with the public sphere, the state, according to Haber-
mas, should not ‘over-hastily reduce the polyphonic complexity of the range of 
public voices, for it cannot be sure whether in doing so it would not cut society 
off from scarce resources for generating meanings and shaping identities.’69 
This is a curious statement by Habermas for those who fall within the secular-
fundamentalist camp, for they often believe that an expansive notion of free-
dom of speech within a secular society provides the protection for those who 
wish to ultimately reduce and or destroy the very freedoms they invoke while 
expressing their displeasure with such broad freedoms. An expansive concept 
of “freedom of speech” allows too much space for those who would denounce 
“freedom of speech,” as Islamic fundamentalist are often accused of when 
they articulate their disgust for the West’s irreverence of religion and religious 
figures – which is speech protected by the freedom of speech. Nevertheless, 
Habermas is not attempting to diminish the ability for citizens to contest cer-
tain ideas in the public sphere, he is concerned with the state’s attempts to ‘over 
hastily reduce the polyphonic complexity of the range of public voices’ precisely 
67 Habermas, Europe, 73–77.
68 Ibid., 76.
69 Ibid., 76.
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because he believes that religions still have the capacity to ‘provide convincing 
articulations of moral sensitivities and solidaristic intuitions’ that could be of 
great benefit to a secularized society that has been depleted of unconditional 
meaning, motivation for solidarity, and moral legitimation for revolutionary 
and progressive values.70 In the end, secular citizens, despite their weariness 
and unbehagen (uneasiness) with their religious counterparts, must accept the 
fact that shared citizenship is not predicated on adjustment to and acceptance 
of a secular worldview, but on shared commitments to a constitution, a shared 
quest for national health and well-being, and the ability for secular and reli-
gious citizens to encounter each other ‘face to face as equals.’71 Both religious 
voices and the secular voices can learn from one another and together advance 
causes that would benefit all citizens within society.
The translation proviso and the burden of accepting the right of religious 
voices to express themselves in the public sphere are both challenges that have 
to be met for the benefit of our post-secular society if the perpetuation of the 
status quo, the non-discourse and non-recognition between the secular and 
the religious, which only distorts and diminishes the polyphonic nature of our 
modern and pluralistic democracies, is to be transcended. Habermas explains 
in the last paragraph of his essay,
Secular citizens who encountered their fellow citizens with the reserva-
tion that the latter cannot be taken seriously as modern contemporaries 
because of their religious mindset would regress to the level of a mere 
modus vivendi and abandon the basis of mutual recognition constitutive 
for shared citizenship. Secular citizens should not exclude a fortiori that 
even religious utterances may have semantic contents and convert per-
sonal intuitions capable of being translated and introduced into secular 
discourse. Thus, if all is to go well, each side must accept an interpretation 
of the relation between faith and knowledge from its own perspective, which 
enables them to live together in a self-reflective manner.72
Although I find myself in agreement with Habermas concerning the comple-
mentary learning processes that each community has to undergo in order for 
a post-secular society to remain stable, free, and democratic, there are some 
important problems that his analysis does not fully consider in this particular 
essay. From the religious side, especially as it pertains to Islam and the Muslim 
70 Ibid., 77.
71 Ibid., 77.
72 Ibid., 77. My emphasis.
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community, substantial problems with the translation proviso can be seen in 
(1) the legitimacy of the “translated Islam,” (2) the problem of who represents 
this translated Islam, and (3) who has the authority to enforce democratically 
agreed upon decisions within the Islamic community.
As was stated before, the Islamic tradition understands itself to be a “per-
fected religion” (Sūrat al-Ma’idah 5:3). With this in mind, any addition and or 
subtraction from the religion is often accused of being bid’a, or “innovation.” 
All ‘innovation,’ it is said, is ‘misguidance, and all misguidance leads to the 
hellfire.’73 For traditionally devout Muslims, to interject an innovated thought, 
idea, or practice into a religion that the divine “perfected” during the time of 
Muhammad is an existential threat, for it threatens the believer with a very 
unpleasant afterlife – a possibility that devout Muslims take seriously.74 The 
Qur’an’s Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:42 reminds the believer not to ‘mix the truth with 
falsehood,’ which for many Muslims, is a prohibition against incorporating 
any kind of novel ideas and practices into Islam. Therefore, to take an Islamic 
ideal, divorce it from its prophetic, Qur’anic, and religious vocabulary, and ar-
ticulate it within secular language, as a secular idea or secular value, for many 
Muslims, would be to deplete its legitimacy as “truth,” as it would then be pre-
sented in a false way, which is devoid of the Allah’s legitimation. It would no 
longer be a divinely commanded absolute value, but only a humanly preferred 
value. Habermas himself rejects this kind of religious abandonment – for the 
religious voices have to come to an agreement with their secular counterparts 
‘under the premises of their own faith’ and therefore cannot be impelled by the 
secular state or society to violate their most basic religious convictions for po-
litical expediency.75 Yet it is with the secularized value that Habermas believes 
the Muslims should enter into the national discourse. Is Habermas asking reli-
gious communities to offer up arguments that are in essence still religious but 
only appear to be secular for the sake of their non-religious discourse partners? 
Is that not deception, and is not an agreement made on the foundation of de-
ception an invalid agreement?
Complicating the issue is the reality that “fact” and “value” are not often sepa-
rated within the Islamic tradition as they have been since the secular-scientific 
73 This was reported to have been said by the Prophet Muhammad by Abu Dawud and 
al-Tirmidhi.
74 It is often shocking for westerners to think that Muslims genuinely still believe in and fear 
punishment in the afterlife. There is very little securi adversus Deum (indifference towards 
God) in the Muslim world, whom, despite the growing secularization of the ummah, re-
tains a good deal of taqwá (God consciousness or “fear of god”).
75 Ibid., 75.
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Enlightenment in the West. Therefore, the value of the ideal is predicated upon 
it truthfulness (not correctness) – as being approved of by the divine and not 
from whether it is democratically decided upon by an elected committee.76 
The fact that the consent of the governed and the agreed upon results of dem-
ocratic deliberation does not decide the legitimacy of an Islamic value; only 
Allah and the sunnah of Prophet Muhammad have the legitimate and absolute 
authority to do that within the Islamic tradition. Whether a democratic institu-
tion chooses to approve of a value – translated into secular language – does not 
affect whether or not it is a moral fact, imperative, or truth for Muslims. Again, 
only the divine has the legitimate and absolute authority to justify and sanc-
tify an absolute value of a given ideal, principle or law. If a democratic society 
chooses to enact and enforce a piece of legislation that is not in accordance 
with the Islamic tradition, the Islamic tradition itself does not alter its claims 
because a plurality of voices decided it was socially desirable to do so. This can 
be said of all religious traditions that are not rooted in democratic consensus, 
but upon divine revelation, sacred example, and ongoing revelation/religious 
experience. Thus the problem is this: how can one translate an Islamic argu-
ment into secular form if that secular form consequently de- legitimates the 
Islamic argument – in the eyes of Muslims – because it is divorced from its 
Qur’anic basis which is its sole true legitimation? Is it a matter of what I’ve 
called the “two perceptions theory,” that the non-religious citizens who are 
considering the secularized Islamic argument perceive it to be secular while 
the religious voices secretly know it’s still religious? It is secular in name only – 
religious in intent and origin? Or is this problem deeper than Habermas antici-
pated? Can Islam be translated into secular language at all without threatening 
the arguments legitimacy among the ones who would be making the secular-
ized Islamic argument? If the answer is no, then the translation proviso may be 
dead on arrival from the Muslim perspective. If the answer is yes, then it may 
only be a matter of political pragmatism by which the two perceptions theory 
in concealed.
The second problem may be even more intractable then the first, being 
that it has a long history within the Muslim community. Representation – 
who speaks for Islam – has been a divisive issue since the death of Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 ce. Indeed, the question of who is the rightful representa-
tive of the Islamic tradition, who is authorized to lead the ummah in temporal 
76 I make a philosophical distinction here between truthfulness and correctness. For Islam, 
correctness is mundane, a matter of protocol sentences, as in a theory of correspondence. 




and religious matters, led to the first great schism within Islam – the division 
between the Shi’at al-‘Ali (Shi’a) and the ahl as-sunnah wa l-jamāʻah (Sunni) – 
an antagonism that has yet to be reconciled and has only grown more deep and 
complex with today’s geo-political issues in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and 
Lebanon. Additionally, the Islamic tradition, despite the many western per-
ceptions about it, is hardly monolithic. It is a dynamic religious tradition that 
holds within its ranks conservatives, progressives, liberals, Islamists, extremists, 
pacifists, mystics, secularists, intellectuals, Imams, Ayatollahs, lay believers, 
revolutionaries, capitalists, socialists, Marxists, etc. Who then should speak for 
the Muslim community: the Imams (they may have trouble secularizing their 
thoughts), the westernized Muslim Intellectuals (they may have a hard time 
finding legitimacy in the Islamic tradition itself), the Muslim masses (they may 
not be able to come to any kind of meaningful consensus due to their diversity 
and lack of theological and philosophical education)? On top of the already in-
tractable problem of representational leadership, who would take the lead for 
a “secularized” Islam? Which scholars would want to be the ones responsible 
for introducing what many are sure to proclaim as being bid’a? Does anyone 
want to speak for the “virtues of bid’a”? The Muslim community may be stifled 
by the idea that Islam is a perfected religion if in its perfection it doesn’t allow 
the Muslim community to adjust itself adequately to life within a post-secular 
and democratic society.
Furthermore, this problem is complicated by Islam’s lack of hierarchi-
cal authority akin to the Catholic or Orthodox Church. Although the Shi’a 
community has an established religious hierarchy, the Sunni world, which 
comprises approximately 80% of the world’s Muslims, has been without tem-
poral authority since the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate post-wwi, which 
has left the community in an anomic situation by which the nation-state has 
practically replaced the Caliph as the source of practical authority. The supra-
nationalism of the Ottoman Empire has been replaced by petit-nationalism 
that undermines the Islamic notion of the organic wholeness of the ummat al-
Islamiyah (Islamic community). Furthermore, although many Sunni scholars’ 
opinions on matters of fiqh (jurisprudence), ihsan (religious perfection), ʿIlm 
al-Kalām (systematic theology), and ‘ibādah (forms of worship), etc., can be 
considered authoritative, they are only binding on those who choose to bind 
those rulings to their own personal religiosity and ethical life. Not all Muslims 
will accept the validity of any given cleric, religious authority, or scholar, nor 
does the Islamic tradition force them to do so. Unlike Catholicism, there is 
no infallible authority such as the Pope in Islam. However, what is univer-
sally agreed upon, minus the few “heretical” outliers such as the ‘Alawites and 
Ahmadiyya, is that Allah is the only God and that Prophet Muhammad was 
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his last and final messenger. Although the remaining four pillars of ṣalāh 
(prayer), zakāt (almsgiving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), 
have an overwhelming consensus among all variants of Muslims and schools 
of law (maḏāhib), even these “agreed upon” practices have substantial varia-
tions and interpretations among different sects. The diversity of thought, 
practice, and political-economic orientation among the Muslims make it al-
most untenable to reach some form of consensus as to who would represent 
Islam when making a secularized-Islamic argument – the kind that Habermas 
calls for if Muslims are to fully enter into the discourse community of the post- 
secular society. In order to avoid sectarian disputes, the same kind that plagued 
Europe throughout its religious history, the Muslim representatives would 
have to be the bearers of near “universal consensus” – even if only within one 
nation-state – and that would have to be legitimated through agreed upon 
Islamic authorities. If the so-called representative could not obtain such “uni-
versal consensus,” then whatever resulted from the discussion within a secular 
constitutional democratic discourse, even if it was perceived to be in favor 
of the Muslim community, would maintain little to no legitimacy and could 
not be made binding on the community unless it was binding in the laws of 
the given nation state, in which case it is a matter of state and not religion. In 
other words, it is not the governing nature of the religion that would bind the 
adherents to the value or principle that was enacted into law, but the secular 
state. Being such, many Muslims could simply return to the bi-furcated posi-
tion of “man’s law is not God’s law,” and therefore has no real authority over 
the believer.
The only way to make such an agreement binding would be to take the 
discussion back to the Islamic community, having a universal discourse that 
excludes no one that would be affected by the decision, and entering into a 
robust dialogue, discourse, and debate, with the expressed intent to win a “uni-
versal consensus” ex-post facto. To by-pass the debate about who should be the 
legitimate representative of the Muslims ummah within a given nation state, 
engage the secular society in a discourse concerning a secularized-Islamic ide-
al, then return to the community to garnish its blessing, maybe the only way 
to avoid the inevitable entanglement concerning Islamic authority. However, 
what this process would not do is necessary import the legitimation of the Is-
lamic tradition itself, but it may import the consent of the Muslim community. 
Yet, it is possible that the appeal of having a Muslim voice within the process 
of democratic deliberation may be enough of a motivation for many to over-
look the question of representation and therefore take a more intra-religious 




An additional factor that must be considered is the complexity of the Mus-
lim communities within the West. There you find an even more dense concen-
tration of diversity than in the traditional Muslim world itself. In one mosque, 
one may find the community divided between country of origin, ethnicity, 
immigrant and native believers, and those who’ve assimilated and those who 
haven’t, those who are devout and those who attend the mosque only on the 
‘Eids (holy days), etc. On the other hand, Muslims often belong to “ethnic” 
mosques; those mosques that cater exclusively to a given ethnic or national 
community and therefore tend to be more socially and politically homoge-
neous and isolated from the broader Muslim community. Furthermore, at least 
in America, there is an underlying tension between African Americans, who 
came to Islam precisely because it was liberating from their experiences with 
American racism, and immigrants, who came to America because they want-
ed to take part in the “American dream,” which is predominately associated 
with white America. Where African Americans have often embraced the more 
militant and revolutionary aspects of Islam, their immigrant counterparts are 
often likely to compromise those same revolutionary ideals in the process of 
assimilation. In order to become more “mainstream,” Muslim immigrants, es-
pecially “middle class” Arabs, are more likely not to engage in a radical critique 
of American culture and political policy as not to elicit suspicion concerning 
their loyalties. Sociologists have dubbed this later phenomenon the “whitening 
of Arabs/Muslims.” This is often a serious source of tension between immi-
grants and their African American co-believers, the later tending to be poorer, 
less educated, and having a more militant belief attitude in their practice of 
Islam. For them the “American dream” has always been what Malcolm x often 
said it was: an “American nightmare.” Consequently, an attempt to find one 
universally accepted representative within the polyphonic nature of Islam in 
the West might prove to be extremely difficult given the historical develop-
ment and demographics of the Muslim communities.
The third problem I identified is the problem of enforcement. A consen-
sus that is established by the discourse between the secular citizens and their 
Muslim counterparts may both garnish (1) democratic legitimacy, and even (2) 
Islamic legitimacy (via its own traditions), but who should enforce such a deci-
sion among the Muslims themselves? Through a democratically elected consti-
tutional state, the citizenry recognizes the legitimacy of a piece of legislation 
even if they do not agree with its particular stance; the “democratic process” 
by which the legislation came to pass – if it is enacted without corruption – 
is not in question even if the goals and outcomes of a particular piece of leg-
islation may be. The state, being neutral towards religion, but accepting the 
legitimacy of the democratically agreed upon value that was devised by the 
universal discourse community, has the sole legitimate function of enforcing 
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the law upon its citizens; the administration of justice cannot be in the hands 
of private citizens themselves, but must reside within the apparatus of the 
state which represents all citizens, or the “common good,” via constitutional 
norms. Nevertheless, those democratic consensuses that would have been ar-
gued for by the Muslims via secularized Islamic language would inevitably be 
once again understood through the lens of Islam in order to garnish broader 
Muslim support. In other words, in order to prove the legitimacy of the agreed 
upon decision to the average Muslim – those affected by the decision itself – 
those arguing for the decision would inevitably do so in Islamic language. Thus 
the ideal, value, or belief would migrate first from Islamic language, then to 
secular language for the purpose of democratic discourse, and then back to 
Islamic language for the consensus of the Muslim community. However, one 
cannot expect the average believer to be able to master the political-economic-
philosophic language that is necessary to translate religious ideals into secular 
political thought. Therefore the ideal must once again clothe itself in religious 
semantics in order to engender the desired consent of the Muslim community.
Once the law is established, are we now asking the secular state to enforce 
upon its citizens a religious value dressed in secular garb, or does the “overlap-
ping consensus” between the secular and religious voices generate its own le-
gitimacy in terms of enforcement? Or are we asking the secular state to enforce 
a secularized religious value on other religious communities that may not have 
lent their support to the decision? This may seem like we are splitting hairs – 
fussing over hypotheticals that do not yet exist. However, the suspicion that 
religion lurks behind certain social programs, or that secular-humanism is 
thinly veiled behind social legislation, is enough to make different religious 
communities – as well as the secular – withdraw their support from the leg-
islation, as it can be viewed as an underhanded attack on the secularity and 
neutrality of the state. If this is done on a national scale, the bitter divisions 
that are already entrenched within the multicultural society can widen even 
further, as both sides of the divide accuse the other of ulterior motives for their 
political decisions. In this way, enforcement of the decision can lead to ani-
mosity, distrust, and suspicion of the other’s motives. These feelings can derail 
the whole intent of the democratic discourse and lead to a situation worse 
than the modus vivendi that is already the defacto reality.
 Secular Entrenchment
Yet, for all the problems that must be surmounted for the post-secular society 
to come to any promising reconciliation between the religious and the secular, 
we must recognize that the most intractable objection of Habermas’ attempt 
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to establish the conditions for the post-secular society may not be found with 
the Muslims at all, but rather with their more militantly secular counterparts. 
Among the professional Islamophobes in Europe and America, such as Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali, Robert Spencer, the neo-Randian Pamela Geller, Glenn Beck, Geert 
Wilders, Bat Ye’or (Gisèle Littman), and Marine Le Pen, there is a common ar-
gument that expresses the fears of many in the West: that the immigration of 
Muslims represents an “Islamic Trojan Horse.” They believe that lax immigra-
tion and asylum policies of liberal America and Europe are the camouflage 
under which the “silent” invasion of the West is taking place. They believe 
that because of the “bleeding-heart” nature of cultural liberals, multicultural-
ists, and progressives, radical Islam has snuck into the back door of the West; 
where the invading forces of the Ottomans and Moors once failed to conquer 
all of Europe, contemporary Europeans have let open the doors to their suc-
cessors, who are just as committed to conquering “Christian” Europe as their 
predacessors. Although the relationship between Europeans, Americans and 
their Islamic immigrant communities haven’t always been peaceful – witness 
the French riots of 2005 – the integration process has been relatively peaceful. 
It has yet to devolve into an apocalyptic Crusade vs. Jihad scenario that the 
professional Islamophobes have suggested as being inevitable. When conflicts 
have broken out, it has often followed the anti-Muslim factions having made 
“controversial” something that would not be controversial if it involved any 
other religious community.
Remember the unfortunate 2009–2012 mosque debacle in Murfreesboro, 
Tennessee, where a group of concerned citizens – nearly all working class 
Caucasians – filed a lawsuit to halt the building of a mosque in their city, even 
to the point of arguing in an American court that Islam was not a religion and 
therefore did not warrant the protections that religious communities are af-
forded under the u.s. Constitution, in particular the prohibition clause of the 
1st Amendment: Congress shall make no law… prohibiting the free exercise [of re-
ligion] thereof. Although a federal judge disagreed with their ridiculous claim, 
and allowed the Muslim community to continue to build their new mosque 
and community center, the Muslims were continually harassed, subjected 
to violent threats, their construction equipment set ablaze, and they were 
shot at from the adjacent woods. Led by members of the Tennessee Tea 
Party, many irate citizens of Murfreesboro feared the mosque would serve as 
a terrorism-training center, a recruitment station for jihādists, and believed 
it was ultimately designed to infect middle Tennessee with extremist beliefs. 
Ironically, it was some of the most secular voices that demonstrated in fa-
vor of the mosque. They viewed the entire issue as one of equal rights for all 
citizens – the right of Muslims to build a mosque was no less than the right of 
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an Evangelical Christian to build a church, or a Jewish community to build a 
synagogue. What was important was citizenship, not the pre-political founda-
tion of religion.77
Another example of a manufactured “crisis” concerning Islam in the West 
was the Park51 or Cordoba House debacle.78 Here, Muslims of Manhattan 
wished to build a ymca-like community center just two blocks away from the 
site of the World Trade Center. As well as having a space for prayer (to be used 
by members of any faith), much of the building would have been dedicated 
to inter-faith dialogue – an attempt to heal the wounds cause by the 9/11 at-
tacks on New York City. However, many “Tea Party Patriots” objected to this 
plan, referring to it as the Ground Zero Mosque, which, in their minds, repre-
sented Islam’s victory over the United States on September 11th, 2001. Stirred by 
conservative fox News and other right-wing media outlets, the Park51 project 
became the object of protest as thousands of ill-informed citizens believed it 
was to be a terrorist recruitment center and victory monument.79 Although 
the building of the community centered was motivated out of the idea of rec-
onciliation, it quickly became a flashpoint between the Muslim community, 
their liberal supporters, and the Islamophobic and miso-Islamist right. Spear-
headed by the Sufi leader Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, who was also an fbi asset 
(according to Wikileaks), the idea of the center became so politically toxic for 
the Muslims that the project was eventually abandoned, the prayer center and 
community halls were never built, and reconciliation remained a dream of the 
ecumenically inclined. Those forces that saw no reason to peacefully commu-
nicate with their Islamic neighbors skillfully avoided such a discourse between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. For many, healing the wounds of 9/11 can only 
77 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, ma: The mit Press, 1996), 
494–495.
78 By naming the mosque Cordoba House, the planners were intentionally invoking the lega-
cy of Cordoba, Spain, where in the 8th to 11th century Muslims lived peacefully with their 
fellow Christians and Jews. However, for critics such as Newt Gingrich, the name Cordoba 
invoked the Muslim conquest of Spain, a formerly Catholic territory.
79 During this “scandal,” the anchors of fox News regularly attacked the planned com-
munity center as being funded by Saudi Arabia, specifically Prince Waleed bin Talal, the 
billionaire Saudi prince, who shares the same nationality and Wahhabi orientation as 
the nineteen highjackers who attacked the United States on 9/11. This fact was used to 
show that the proposed community center was indeed funded by terrorist sympathizers 
like the prince. However, to the surprise of many of the fox anchors, it was publically 
disclosed that the prince was the second largest stockholder in News Corp., the parent 
company of fox News. When this information was made public, those same fox News 
anchors quickly fell silent as they were in effect accusing their boss of funding terrorism.
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come from the dropping of bombs on more Muslims; it does not come from 
entering into a conversation with the other, understanding the vulnerabilities 
and concerns of the other, or even engaging in a friendly dialogue with others, 
even if those others are citizens of the same country.
Nevertheless, this anti-Islamic sentiment, although only articulated in the 
public sphere by those generally of the right-wing nationalist persuasion, is 
uneasily felt by many more regular individuals who lack the courage and/or 
fortitude to state their concerns in public because they fear being ostracized 
as bigots, racists, anti-immigrants, and/or neo-Nazis both in the United States 
and Europe.80 Their fear is often real and should not be easily dismissed, es-
pecially not in a post-secular democratic society. Yet one should remain vigi-
lant in the detection of manufactured fear, which occurs often with right-wing 
demagogues. On the other hand, if Habermas’ program of secularizing Islamic 
values for purposes of national discourse is recognized by those that are already 
weary of the influence of religious minorities within their secular country, a 
backlash is more than likely to occur. Again, the “Islamic Trojan Horse” appears 
to them to be not only a theory, but also a reality that is slowly undermining 
the western way of life. Indeed, in the Murfreesboro case, it became a constant 
refrain to ‘look to Europe’ when discussion the encroachment of Islam upon a 
secular and/or Christian population; ‘they are about 20 years ahead of us,’ said 
Bill French, a local anti-mosque critic.81 The fear of Islamization may be real 
for many, even if those who profit off such fear have ulterior motives.
Although he seems unaware of it, the nationalist-right views the real Trojan 
horse in Habermas’ theory as being the secular language itself. It is the vehicle 
by which Islam roots itself in the state via its carefully camouflaged secularized-
Islamic language. The fear is rooted in the idea that Europe and the West can 
be Islamized via secular language instead of Islam being neutralized via secu-
larism. The end result, they fear, is that they will be living in a nation that has 
been thoroughly transformed by the imposition of religious values that only 
“appear” to be secular in nature, but are in fact born out of “foreign” and anti-
thetical religion. This Habermasian approach, if adopted by the political-Left 
80 The 2015–2016 Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, who openly gave voice 
to the fears and anxieties that many within the American electorate were feeling, allevi-
ated this fear in the United States. However, his blatant demagoguery, race baiting, anti-
immigration and nationalistic rants exposed the widespread miso-Islamism that infected 
much of the American populace.
81 Bob Smietana, “Religious Conflict isn’t New to Murfreesboro: Catholic Immigrants Plan 
Fueled Protests in Murfreesboro in 1929,” October 24, 2010. www.tennessean.com/article/ 
20101024/NEWS01/10240382 (Accessed 10/7/2014).
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of Europe (which doesn’t have a counterpart in the u.s.), could also lead to 
a backlash against the multiculturalist Left as being the accomplices of the 
“Eurabianization” of Europe, as it’s their insistence on a compassionate im-
migration policy, multiculturalism, and tolerance that leads to the influx of 
Muslims in Europe.82
This may seem farfetched, even conspiratorial to some, but we must be will-
ing to read the present trends. The 2011 attack on Oslo and Utøya island in 
Norway by the right-wing miso-Islamist, Anders Behring Breivik, stands as a 
testament to the idea that the political-Left, i.e. socialists and communists, are 
the gatekeepers for the Islamic takeover of Europe, of which they have been 
accused of swinging the door wide open.83 According to this theory, because of 
their ill-informed philosophical universalism and misguided compassion for 
third-world peoples, the Left is willing to destroy its own civilization by wel-
coming in an unending number of foreigners, whom they see as the historical 
“victims” of western colonialism, imperialism, neo-imperialism, and now to-
day expansionist capitalism (globalization).84 Additionally, the political-right 
sees the influx of Muslims as being the product of “cultural Marxism,” a result 
of the Frankfurt School and other leftist theoreticians who wish to undermine 
the indigenous culture and national values through multiculturalism, political 
correctness, and class struggle. The ideology of multiculturalism – born out 
of a traditional universalist interpretation of Enlightenment values – in the 
estimation of Breivik and others, is the ideology that dumbs down the masses, 
makes them complacent in seeing their nation-state overrun with foreigners, 
and will eventually hand the once racially homogenous nations over to the 
uncivilized multi-ethnic Muslims. It is also the ideology that is espoused by 
the multiculturalist Left, in the political-right’s view, which cares little for its 
own national culture and heritage. This is a familiar argument; it is the same 
accusations leveled at the communists decades ago when they expressed 
82 The role of capitalism’s need for cheap labor, and therefore immigrant labor, is often for-
gotten within the discussion as to why there are so many immigrants in Europe.
83 See Aage Borchegrevink, Aage. A Norwegian Tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Mas-
sacre on Utøya, trans. Guy Puzey. Malden, ma: Polity Press, 2013; Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone 
Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat (Amherst, ny: Prometheus Books, 
2013), 49–53.
84 This is a very ironical sentiment that the right-wing has concerning the political-Left and 
Islam, especially considering that Hitler himself believed that the history of Europe would 
have been better had the Muslims conquered it. See Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: 
Memoirs by Albert Speer, trans. Richard & Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan Compa-
ny, 1969), 114–115; Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941–1944, trans. Norman Cameron and 
R.H. Stevens. New York: Enigma Books, 2000.
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their solidarity for the working class regardless of what nation they found 
themselves in. National solidarity, favored by the political- and cultural-right 
because it preserves the class order and the “purity” of the race/culture, was re-
jected in favor of international solidarity, which cut across national boarders by 
emphasizing the co-fraternity of workers regardless of what nation they origi-
nated from. Communists, emphasizing international solidarity, argued that 
workers in all countries had more in common with each other than with the 
ruling class of their own nations, and therefore should band together in one 
“internationale.” Therefore international solidarity was a threat to national co-
hesion. Here again this plays a role in Breivik’s thinking; the political-Left of 
Europe cares more for the working class, the poor, and the immigrants of other 
nations and religions than they do their own pre-political ethnos/demos/nation, 
and are willing to sacrifice the later for their liberal, overly-compassionate and 
universalist interpretation of the Enlightenment. Breivik and others have no 
intention of participating willingly in what they viewed as national-suicide at 
the hands of misguided immigration and multiculturalist policies. In his at-
tempt to arrest and/or abate the influx of Muslims into Norway, Breivik mur-
dered 77 innocent individuals, most of which were the sons and daughters of 
Leftist members of the Norwegian parliament.85 Fortunately, he was in a Nor-
wegian prison during the summer months of 2015, when the war in Syria and 
Iraq brought millions of Muslim refugees to the doors of Europe, especially to 
Germany and Scandanavia, where they were promised better living conditions 
than in the poorer southern European states. Nevertheless, after the numerous 
incidents of rape and harassment by refugees and asylum seekers in Cologne, 
Germany, on New Years Eve, 2015, many Europeans who would normally not 
have followed Breivik’s line of thinking, reconsidered his anti-immigrant and 
anti-Muslim stance. Although they continued to reject violence as an answer 
to the problem of immigration, they recognized that Breivik might have had 
a legitimate point, even if it was hidden under a mountain of racist ideology.
As stated before, the “Islamic Trojan Horse” theory may be far-fetched at 
the moment, but the perceptions among the populations in Europe, espe-
cially Western and Southern Europe, is growing at an ever-increasing pace 
with every Muslim attack on the West. Recall the backlash against Muslims 
in Britain after the brutal murder of Lee Rigby, an off-duty soldier in the Brit-
ish army. Rigby was killed in the city of Woolwich by Michael Adebolajo and 
Michael Adebowale, two British Muslim converts of Nigerian decent – sons of 
immigrants – who were protesting Britain’s treatment of Muslims in Muslim 
lands. Not only did these two men run Rigby over with their car, they then 
85 Like Geert Wilders, Anders Behring Breivik also harbored far-right Zionist views.
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proceeded to stab him repeatedly and barbarically dismember him with a meat 
cleaver; this appalling site was witnessed by numerous pedestrians in the mid-
dle of the day. The murderers then proceeded to give invective lectures to the 
bystanders about the Islamic victims of Britain’s policies in Muslim countries. 
These impromptu speeches were recorded and later broadcasted that evening 
through national and international news outlets to the disgust of the British 
public (and later the world audience). Without pause, the Islamic Society of 
Britain expressed their sincere sympathy for the victim and his family and ve-
hemently condemned the action of the two men. A spokesman said ‘This is a 
truly barbaric act that has no basis in Islam and we condemn this unreservedly… 
Muslims have long served in this country’s Armed Forces, proudly and with 
honour. This attack on a member of the Armed Forces is dishonourable, and 
no cause justifies this murder.’ However, the English Defense League, a right-
wing nativist organization – sometimes labeled a neo-fascist group – attacked 
mosques and Muslims in various neighborhoods in Britain. They saw no dis-
tinction between the two assailants and the Muslim community at large.86 
Neither did they see this as an isolated act of individuals, but rather it was an 
act perpetrated by Islam itself; to be a Muslim was to be guilty of this crime. It 
is certainly possible to claim that the English Defense League is a fringe group 
on the edges of British society, but how long will that charge hold when aver-
age British citizens continue to see such acts of pure barbaric violence on their 
streets?87 Can the average British citizen of Muslim faith, who patriotically 
holds his country dear to his heart, overcome the increasing suspicion that 
Muslims in Britain, and Europe in general, are not there with only peaceful 
intentions, but are rather a “forward operating base” for the future takeover of 
Europe by Muslims? Or will the acts of small minorities of Muslims and their 
86 Ross Lydall. “Woolwich Killing: A Plea for Calm as Mosques are Targeted and English De-
fense Leagues Clash with Police,” May 23, 2013. http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/
woolwich-killing-plea-for-calm-as-mosques-are-targeted-and-english-defence-league 
-clash-with-police-8628387.html (Accessed 3/26/2014).
87 From a Muslim perspective, the question is slightly different: when will those who are 
responsible for the mass killings of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim coun-
tries ever be brought to justice? When will Bush and Blair find themselves in the Hague 
for their crimes against humanity? The barbarity of watching innocent men, women, and 
children die at the hands of “smart bombs,” drones, and Marines is too much for many 
Muslims to bear. Indeed, the inability of the West to confess its own sins, seek forgiveness, 
and mourn the loss of the dead other, motivates extremist Muslims to seek revenge for 
the suffering imposed on the ummah. Lex Talionis, or the “law of retaliation,” becomes the 
normative tool of communication when peaceful discourse is non-existent.
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right-wing nativist counterparts push the center of European society towards 
the politics of hate and divisiveness?
In light of the anti-immigrant/anti-Muslim attitude arising throughout 
Europe, in May of 2014, the Europeans elected an unprecedented number of 
anti-immigrant parties and candidates to the European parliament, including 
in France where Marine Le Pen’s ultra-right-wing anti-immigrant Nationalist 
party took a record 25% of the vote, an ominous turn-of-events for Muslims 
in Europe.88
Yet the other side of the coin is equally violent (if only more mechanized). 
From the perspective of many war-weary Muslims, they ask how long can the 
Muslim community watch the nations of the West attack their countries, bomb 
their people from fighter-planes and drones, ravage their lands, leave behind 
legacies of broken promises, broken bodies, exploited markets and workers, 
and history of environmental destruction? For the purposes of our study, we 
must ask whether or not Habermas’ theory of the mutual learning process, the 
secularization of Islam, and the acceptance of religious voices within secular 
society, alleviate the turn towards cultural dysfunction, cultural antagonism, 
and violence? That question is still open. At the present moment, it appears 
that history is plunging the world closer to confrontation rather than recon-
ciliation, despite the example of St. Francis of Assisi and the Sultan Malik al-
Kamil, and the recent ecumenical work of Pope Francis.
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chapter 4
Witnessing and Professing in Prophetic and 
Positive Religions
In light of the dominant trend to condemn all forms of religion within “vul-
gar” Marxism, as well as liberalism’s thorough attempts to privatize and/
or functionalize religion in the post-secular society, the Critical Theorists 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, as well as the Frankfurt School in 
general, have made an important distinction between prophetic – or critical/
negative/humanistic – religion and what they define as affirmative-positive 
and/or authoritarian religion. The prior form of religion, through its nega-
tivity, escapes positivism’s semantic deflation of religious potentials and its 
priestly upholding of the world-as-it-is found in the positive religious tradi-
tions. The act of witnessing and professing by way of a negative theology, a 
negative religion that roots itself within the prophetic and Socratic soil, is 
qualitatively different than it is within positive religions. In order to under-
stand these competing trends within the Abrahamic religious traditions in 
the context of the post-secular society, we must first return to Marx, who 
represents the second push towards secularization after the ascendance of 
the Bourgeoisie.
 Affirmation and Negativity: Marx
Marx’s analysis toward religion was dialectical in nature; while he understood, 
following Voltaire, that religion often allied itself to those who had the big-
gest battalions, i.e. those who held temporal power, he also understood that 
religion preserves within itself the genuine hopes, desires, and longings of the 
oppressed, exploited, and denigrated masses; it was at once the record of suf-
fering and at the same time the illusion that anesthetized of such suffering. 
This dialectical understanding can be witnessed in Marx’s most famous defini-
tion of religion, found in his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right,
Religious suffering is at the same time an express of real suffering and 
a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
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creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless con-
ditions. It is the opium of the people.1
If one refuses to translate Marx’s philosophy of religion into a simple anti- 
religion slogan, one can read within this passage the true nature of Marx’s ob-
servation; religion is both a protest against an oppressive and violent world and 
a source of affirmation (or at least a subjective acquiescence) of that world. 
For Marx, it is the distorted and oppressive conditions of the world that create 
the need for a religion that dulls the consciousness, to make life bearable, to 
anesthetize the wound of a damaged life, but those conditions simultaneously 
produce the need for resistance to that damaging and crippling world. What 
Marx observed was that religion has within itself certain potentials that can 
either aid in the liberation of mankind or can reconcile mankind to his oppres-
sion, although he believed the later to more accurate in terms of the history of 
religion.
Marx was not the first to reject a form of religion that would dull the con-
science in favor of one that would sharpen it. Following the great enlightener 
Immanuel Kant, he applied such a critique to the realm of political economy, 
whereas Kant confined it to personal morality. In his book Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant writes,
The aim of those who have clergyman summoned to them at the end of 
life is normally to find in him a comforter, not on account of their physi-
cal suffering brought on by the last illness or even by the natural fear in 
the face of death (for on this score death itself, which puts an end to life, 
can be the comforter) but because of the moral sufferings, the reproaches 
of their conscience. At such time, however, conscience ought rather to 
be stirred up and sharpened, in order that whatever good yet to be done, 
or whatever consequences of past evil still left to be undone (repaired 
for), will not be neglected, in accordance with the warning, ‘Agree with 
thine adversary’ (with him who has a legal right against you) ‘quickly, 
while thou art in the way with him’ (i.e. so long as you still live), ‘lest he 
deliver thee to the judge’ (after death), etc. But to administer opium to 
conscience instead, as it were, is to be guilty of a crime against the human 
being himself and against those who survive him, and is totally contrary 
1 Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction” in The 
Marx & Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1978), 54.
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to the purpose for which such support given to conscience at life’s end 
can be held necessary.2
Despite the bifurcated conception of religion, which Marx accepted, it does 
not mean that Marx himself believed in the metaphysical claims of religious 
traditions. Indeed, he believed that Feuerbach’s “projection” thesis had already 
answered the question of the origins of religion, which were entirely within 
the psychological and material conditions of man himself. He states, ‘the basis 
of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion; religion does not make man. 
Religion is indeed man’s self-consciousness and self-awareness so long as he 
has not found himself or has lost himself again.’3 For Marx, man creates god in 
his own image and not the other way around, but that consciousness is itself 
a creation of the material world; a world in which suffering and oppression is 
created and/or exasperated by the condition imposed on humanity by modern 
capitalism and other historical forms of oppression.4 Nevertheless, religion, 
as a social phenomenon created by the unjust conditions of society, not only 
expresses a protesting voice of man, but also has the potential to impel him to-
wards action against the very conditions that oppress him. The inherent – but 
often neglected – negativity within religion, especially the Abrahamic tradi-
tions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, stresses the “fallenness” – the “it is not 
as it should be” – of this world. It is not a world that manifests justice, equality, 
and fairness, but a world that is driven by lust, greed, wickedness, and unwar-
ranted violence, and therefore it is a world that demands its own negation via a 
conditions-changing nemesis: a messianic figure, group, or movement.
Yet for Marx, the negativity of Judaism and Christianity (he wasn’t too famil-
iar with Islam) was negated when religion reconciled itself to the world, when it 
became “of the world,” thus it legitimates the world and the unjust powers that 
ruled the world. In this sense, religion, as it is reconciled to the world as it is, 
became the ideological mask that veiled the class interests of the ruling elites; 
it legitimated their rule, it sanctioned their actions, and it absolved the sins of 
their transgressions. That is why he believed that ‘the criticism of religion is 
the premise of all criticism,’ as one must first tear asunder religious legitima-
tion from the terror of history’s oppressors that it often sanctifies.5 Temporal 
power must be evacuated of its divine legitimation as to liberate mankind from 
the religio-existential anxiety and fears about social and political rebellion. In 
2 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di 
Giovanni (Cambridge, ma: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 93.





order to move towards universal emancipation, the equation of state and the 
divine had to be broken to unleash the liberational potential of the masses. 
Additionally, the identification of religion with power – as opposed to the pow-
erless in Abrahamic thought – inevitably repressed religion’s emancipatory 
potentials in the cage of conformity, as it shifts the divine’s blessing from the 
victims of nature and history to the victors within nature and history. For Marx, 
in order for human emancipation to be achieved, religion had to be transcend-
ed as it had been perversely transfigured into a positive-affirming force in the 
world, i.e. it affirms and upholds the torturous status quo and rejects any radi-
cal attempt to overthrown the world as it is. Positive religion is religion that has 
abandoned its essential negativity, i.e. its ability to determinately negate the 
world of suffering, the world of antagonisms, and the world of oppression. For 
Marx, religion’s insistence on suffering peacefully the injustices of the world, 
and not radically transforming them, is a powerful tool in the hands of those 
who do not want political-economic and cultural opposition, whose fortunes 
are tied to the status quo, and whose existence are affixed to the ruling elites. 
Therefore, mankind must be unshackled from its religious chains if it is to once 
again become acquainted with its true human nature, which is free. Marx says,
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for 
their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their con-
dition is a call to abandon a condition that requires illusions. The criti-
cism of religion is, therefore, the embryonic criticism of this vale of tears 
of which religion is the halo…
The criticism of religion disillusions man so that he will think, act and 
fashion his reality as a man who has lost his illusions and regained his 
reason; so that he will revolve about himself as his own true sun. Religion 
is only the illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does not 
revolve about himself.6
This sense of religion’s abandonment of his its own humanistic and liberation-
al potentials is also echoed in the writings of Max Horkheimer, the intellectual 
initiator of the Frankfurt School for Social Research. He writes in his Thoughts 
on Religion, which is his reformulation of Marx’s “opiate of the masses” pas-
sage, that,
The concept of God was for a long time the place where the idea was 
kept alive that there are other norms besides those to which nature and 
6 Ibid., 54.
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society give expression in their operation. Dissatisfaction with earthly 
destiny is the strongest motive for acceptance of a transcendental being. 
If justice resides with God, then it is not to be found in the same measure 
in the world. Religion is the record of the wishes, desires, and accusation 
of countless generations.
But the more Christianity brought God’s rule into harmony with events 
in the world, the more the meaning of religion became perverted. In Ca-
tholicism God was already regarded as in certain aspects the creator of 
the earthly order, while Protestantism attributed the world’s course di-
rectly to the will of the Almighty. Not only was the state of affairs on earth 
at any given moment transfigured with the radiance of divine justice, but 
the latter was itself brought down to the level of the corrupt relations 
which mark earthly life. Christianity lost its function of expressing the 
ideal, to the extent that it became the bedfellow of the state.7
For Horkheimer, learning from Marx, the ‘image of a perfect justice’ that early 
Christians embraced – and so often died for as martyrs – in the face of the injus-
tice of the Roman Empire and nature itself, evaporated when it was legalized 
by Emperor Constantine via the Edict of Milan (313 ce), and later transformed 
into the official ideology of the state by the Roman Emperor Theodosius in 
his imperial decree Cunctos Populos, also known as the Edict of Thessalonica 
(380 ce). Constantinian Christianity – the strange reconciliation of Christ 
and Roman (state) power – depleted Christianity’s potential for revolutionary 
change as well as its ability to substantively express the real possibility of a fu-
ture reconciled world.8 What came from this marriage of religion and state was 
not the long-awaited messiah and the messianic age, but only the institution of 
the Roman Catholic Church – the priestly administration of a once revolution-
ary but now politically conservative message. For the first generation of Chris-
tians, the Kingdom of God was not the Empire of Rome, but for later Christians, 
7 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 2002), 188.
8 See James A. Reimer, “Constantine: From Religious Pluralism to Christian Hegemony” in The 
Future of Religion: Toward a Reconciled Society, ed. Michael R. Ott. Leiden: Brill Publishers, 
2007. One should remember that even in Constantine’s time, Christianity was still marginal-
ized if not oppressed within the Roman Empire. By merging their religion with the power of 
the state, Christians gained not only gain a legal status but also the protection of the state. 
The more corrupting moment of Christian history is when Emperor Theodosius made Nicene 
Christianity the official religion of the state, in the year 395 ce. At this moment Christianity 
downed the power of the state and therefore betrayed its critical-prophetic role. After this, 
Christian authorities, including the Emperor, set about the systematic destruction of pre-
Christian religions as well “heretical” forms of Christianity.
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Augustine’s “City of God” became the consolation for the parousia-delay (“God 
with us” delay) – the fact that Jesus had not yet returned.9 The church as an 
institution of worldly power, for Marx and other critical religiologists, has 
the been primary purveyor of positive religion, as it itself became the object 
of faith, the crafter of dogma, the teacher who extolls the values of passive- 
suffering, and the final source of legitimation for the status quo. In his simple 
Christology, Marx accused the church of abandoning the ‘carpenter whom the 
rich men killed’ and thus perverting the revolutionary potential of Christian-
ity’s essential negativity towards the world.10 Yet, such disappointment with 
the church was not his final word on religion. Marx could still see something 
of value within the church even if it was a flawed and corrupt remembrance 
of the revolutionary Rabbi Jesus. Marx, most sympathetically, taught his chil-
dren ‘we can forgive Christianity much, because it taught us the worship of 
the child.’11 We can ruminate on the many things that the “child” may symbol-
ize, but it seems for Marx to represent something within religion that must 
be preserved, emancipated from its dogmatic shackles, and be fulfilled within 
secular praxis. The “child” cannot be abandoned by revolutionary praxis even 
if religion has historically done so. The symbol of the child – the potential 
for goodness, innocence, and arguably even reason – is the very potential for 
Hegel’s notion of reconciliation: the ‘rose in the cross of the present.’12 Negative 
religion refuses to abandon this potential but rather preserves it at the core of 
its thought and praxis.
 Affirmation and Negativity: Lenin
Marx’s Russian heir, Vladimir Lenin, also understood religion – in his case 
Russian Orthodoxy – to have abandoned its ‘image of perfect justice’ and had 
9 Saint Augustine. The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods. Peabody, ma: Hendrickson Publish-
ers Marketing, llc, 2014.
10 Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1981), 
252–253.
11 Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, 252–253.
12 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), 22. Hegel states that ‘to recognize reason as the rose in the 
cross of the present and thereby delight in the present – this rational insight is the recon-
ciliation with actuality which philosophy grants to those who have received the inner call 
to comprehend, to preserve their subjective freedom in the realm of the substantial, and 
at the same time to stand with their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent 
situation, but in what has being in and for itself.’
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hence reconciled itself to this world’s injustice, represented by the corrupt op-
pression of the Russian Czars. Echoing Feuerbach’s “projection” thesis, as well 
as Marx’s identification of positive religion’s function within society, Lenin un-
derstood religion to be recalcitrant obstacle in the path of human liberation. 
In his 1905 Socialism and Religion essay he wrote,
Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression, which everywhere 
weighs heavily upon the popular masses, crushed by their perpetual work 
for others, by want and loneliness. The impotence of the exploited classes 
in their struggle with the exploiters inevitably gives rise to the belief in 
a better hereafter, just as the impotence of the savage in his battle with 
nature gives rise to the belief in gods, devils, miracles, and the like. Those 
who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be sub-
missive and patient while here on earth and take comfort in the hope of 
being rewarded in heaven. But those who live by the labour of others are 
taught by religion to practice charity while on earth, and thus religion of-
fers them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploit-
ers and sells them at a moderate price tickets to heavenly bliss. Religion is 
opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual home-brew [sivukha] 
in which the slaves of capital drown the image of man and their demand 
for a life more or less worthy of human beings.13
Lenin did not dedicate much time to religion, as he believed it was a subject 
matter that was already resolved in the works of the Young Hegelians Feuer-
bach and Marx. Yet Lenin’s 1905 article expressed an important distinction: the 
two different messages religion sends to the two competing classes, i.e. bour-
geois and proletariat. First, the proletariat was to be ‘submissive and patient’ in 
dealing with the absurdity of class domination and they were to ‘take comfort 
in the hope’ of heavenly reward for their complacency with the status quo. In 
other words, they were to be passive in the face of human suffering and retreat 
into metaphysical ‘illusions’ and ‘delusions’ to numb the pain of human exis-
tence, especially the pain exacted by class exploitation. Secondly, for the rul-
ing elites, the only demand placed upon them was to practice “charity” – not 
solidarity – with those suffering beneath them. They were not to recognize the 
exploitative nature of their rule, on which they lived, to recognize it as an is-
sue of morality, but rather as an opportunity to appear beneficent, i.e. to give 
13 As quoted in Lenin and Religion by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw. Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The 
Leader: A Reappraisal, ed. Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1967), 108–109.
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charity. This ‘cheap way of justifying their existence as exploiters’ offers them 
a way of gain absolution for their “tainted” wealth; it offered them a way to 
ease the guilt that they may have had for their exploitation of the poor, the 
workers, and peasants. Additionally, this peculiar bourgeois form of “charity” 
is a functionalization of poverty. It is crassly utilized for their own purposes 
but contributes nothing to its systematic alleviation. As such, it buys them the 
opportunity to appear pious in front of their peers (although secretly they all 
know it’s only for appearances). For Lenin, this guilt removing “charity” allows 
them to have what Hegel calls a “happy conscience” (glückliche Bewußtsein) – a 
conscience reconciled to the state of the world despite the destruction, vio-
lence, and misery it imposes.14 This happy conscience delivers an untroubled 
psyche to the ruling class in this life and allows them to purchase a ticket to 
“heavenly bliss” in the next. Even Pope Francis, who is deeply critical of glo-
balized capitalism, in agreement with Marx and Lenin, deemed this form of 
charitable giving as fraudulent, it offers money but no real solidarity or love.15 
Peaceful endurance of unnecessary pain is the avenue for the poor and work-
ers to obtain salvation; cheap bourgeois charity is the course by which the ex-
ploiters gain salvation. For Lenin, this was essence of bourgeois religion and it 
was a fraud for its victims.
Unlike Marx, who believed religion would disappear with the revolutionary 
transformation of the material conditions, for Lenin, this dichotomy had to be 
first removed before a revolution could occur.16 Religion, and its removal from 
the social consciousness, had to be a primary concern for the communists if 
they ever wanted to steer society towards the ideal classless society. Unlike oth-
er leftist intellectuals, and even reformist clerics like Gregory Gapon (Гeópгий 
Aпoллóнoвич Гaпóн) – the Orthodox Priest that led the 1905 Bloody Sunday 
uprising against Czar Nickolas ii – religion had no part to play in the mod-
ern emancipation of humanity for Lenin; it’s positive nature, and therefore its 
obstructionism, was absolute.17 The liberational potentials of the Abrahamic 
faiths could no longer be rescued, as he believed that history has terminally 
negated them through their institutionalization and total identification with 
14 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 104–138.
15 Jorge Mario Bergoglio (Pope Francis i) and Abraham Skorka, On Heaven and Earth: Pope 
Francis on Faith, Family, and the Church in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Image, 
2013), 170–1. Also see Andrea Tornielli and Giacomo Galeazzi, This Economy Kills: Pope 
Francis on Capitalism and Social Justice. Collegeville, mn: Liturgical Press, 2015.
16 Bociurkiw, Lenin, 110.
17 Ibid., 115–116. Also see Roland Boer, Lenin, Religion, and Theology (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013), 60–63.
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the ruling class, as well as through modern science. The only thing that could 
be done with religion was its complete negation from the minds of men. In 
the place of their formerly held religious beliefs, Lenin – following Marx and 
Engels’ dialectical materialism – advanced the notion that a scientific form 
of socialism, not a utopian or religious version, had to be inculcated into the 
working classes’ consciousness.18 Socialism had to be rooted in reason and sci-
ence and not in passé revelation. There could no longer be a religious consola-
tion in the face of human despair, rather science and reason had to propel the 
working class towards its utopian future. As such, religion’s ability to provide 
motivations for revolutionary change was exhausted; it was now time for sci-
ence and rational thought to provide such motivations.
 Affirmation and Negativity: Horkheimer and Adorno
The critical theorist Theodor Adorno expands on Marx, Horkheimer, and Len-
in’s suspicion about religion’s incapacity to serve the liberation of mankind 
because of its own self-imposed class constraints. For Adorno, modern religion – 
especially since the Enlightenment period, with its subsequent industrializa-
tion and secularization – suffers from an inherent problem that cripples its 
emancipatory potentials; it is no longer socially necessary as a motivation for 
revolutionary change; rather it persists because of man’s psychological needs. It 
is only because man turns toward religion to comfort him within his damaged 
life, that it remains an active component in modern society. The post-secular 
society, in which religion remains a social force despite the advancement of 
the secular society, is the product of man’s need to ease his mind in the face of 
suffering. In his essay Reason and Revelation, he states,
In the best case, that is, where it is not just a question of imitation and 
conformity, it is desire that produces such an attitude: it is not the truth 
and authenticity of the revelation that are decisive but rather the need for 
guidance, the confirmation of what is already firmly established, and also 
the hope that by means of a resolute decision alone one could breathe 
back that meaning into the disenchanted world under whose absence we 
have been suffering so long, as though we were mere spectators staring at 
18 Bociurkiw, Lenin, 118; Also see Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. New 
York: International Publishers, 1989.
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something meaningless. It seems to me that the religious renaissances of 
today are philosophy of religion, not religion.19
Adorno points us in a very important direction: we see that since the “death 
of god,” heralded by Friedrich Nietzsche – as an observation of the zeitgeist in 
which he lived and not as god’s assassin – the core content of religion, its theo-
logical premises, have become untenable in our post-metaphysical age. Sci-
ence, technology, and autonomous reason all contributed to the destruction 
of the veritas of religious claims, and because of this the truth-element within 
religion has become superfluous. Despite this, secularity, as Habermas has ar-
ticulated, has failed to adequately address those existential questions that re-
ligion once answered and as such leaves unattended an open flank by which 
religion either stubbornly remains with humanity, or returns after secularity’s 
deficiency is made abundantly clear.20 The current rise of religious fundamen-
talism, despite secularity’s colonization of the lifeworld via globalization, at-
tests to the fact that secularity has failed to answer many of humanity’s most 
recalcitrant questions, and therefore has provided the opportunity for man to 
once again returned to sacred texts, traditions, and personalities for guidance, 
answers, and comfort, often in defiance – not just simple rejection – of science 
and reason. In the Muslim world, globalization has caused a supra-territorial 
communicative consciousness to occur – a thinking that emphasizes a return 
to a primordial community, the ummah, as a way of escaping the enclosed jaws 
of secularity. To little avail, this consciousness is both defensive and utopian 
in nature as it attempts to arrest or reverse the secularization and westerniza-
tion process. Because of the social, cultural and psychological chaos that has 
occurred with the process of globalization, an intense longing for the ideal-
ized days when the dar al-Islam was ruled by the khalīfah (successor) has de-
veloped, thus contributing to the appeal of isis and other jihādi groups, who 
promise to restore the now defunct Caliphate. However, and despite the failure 
of religion to disappear in the modern age, as Adorno stated, it is not the truth 
content of religion that has convinced many to “return” to religion, but man’s 
subjective needs, which have become all the more entrenched as the secular 
world’s meaninglessness and anomic conditions. In other words, Adorno does 
not claim that the return of religion is motivated by a newly acceptance of 
religion’s truth claims – as if secularism’s defeat somehow proved the truth 
content of religion all along. No, Adorno states the opposite,
19 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 137. (My emphasis added).
20 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, 15–23.
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If religion is accepted for the sake of something other than its own truth 
content, then it undermines itself. The fact that recently the positive re-
ligions have so willingly engaged in this and at times compete with other 
public institutions testifies only to the desperation that latently inheres 
in their own positivity… As soon as religion abandons its factual content, 
it threatens to vanish into mere symbolism and that imperils the very 
existence of its truth claim.21
Adorno became aware that the contemporary retreat into sacred tradition is 
connected to the failure of secular reason to provide for the essential spiritual, 
existential, and transcendental needs of humanity. Nevertheless, he is skeptical 
that a post-Enlightenment and post-secular form of religion truly believes in 
its own claims, believing that it had mistakenly become intellectually ataraxic 
with its post-Enlightenment remainder. Since the scientific revolution and the 
Enlightenment, it had already capitulated its most fundamental truth claims 
about ultimate reality to the triumph of autonomous ratio. Consequently, when 
it attempts to defend itself, it is forced to do so via autonomous reason, and as 
such its very defense proves the triumph of such reason over mere revelation. 
That being so, the modern turn towards religion – as a system of thought that 
provides sophistic answers and artificially comforts the alienated and suffering 
man – is a return to a phenomenon that is ultimately pragmatic in praxis and 
symbolic in meaning.22 For example, the existential anxiety that was produced 
during the atomic standoff between two competing ideologies, two competing 
empires, and two competing nuclear powers, motivated many rational people 
to seek solace within the comforting arms of religion. Adorno states,
The real determining model of this behavior is the division of the world 
into two colossal blocs that rigidly oppose and reciprocally threaten one 
another, and every individual, with destruction. The extreme innerworld-
ly fear of this situation, because there is nothing discernible that might 
lead beyond it, is hypostatized as an existential or indeed a transcenden-
tal anxiety. The victories that revealed religion gains in the name of such 
anxiety are Pyrrhic.23
For Adorno, if any other motive other than the truth claims of a given revealed 
religion is the core reason as to why an individual or nation turns toward 





religion, then it undermines itself, as truth can be easily divorced from need. 
Human needs are not dependent upon ultimate truth and knowledge; as such, 
veritas can be liquidated as an essential component of religion.24 Ultimately, 
religion need not be true to provide comfort to suffering man, just believable 
based on whether or not it pragmatically slays the chaos and/or anxiety within. 
But this comforting religion can be replaced by other phenomena, i.e. patrio-
tism, nationalism, cult of personality, or whatever else works. The kind of reli-
gion that has a function and not a truth – as a “pattern maintenance system,” 
and not as a way-of-being-in-the-world that expresses some universal truth 
claims – is a religion that has been hollowed out of it truth, as its foundational 
principles lack a theologically grounded objectivity. They have become relativ-
ized: mere conjecture, opinions, individual preferences and tastes that corre-
spond to individual needs. As such, they are completely unjustifiable within 
themselves and outside of those particular needs.25 Nevertheless, according 
to Adorno, that hasn’t stopped contemporary religion from capitalizing on the 
anxiety of modern man. He says, ‘the fact that recently the positive religions 
have so willingly engaged in this and at times compete with other public in-
stitutions testifies only to the desperation that latently inheres in their own 
positivity.’26
For Adorno, both religion and the secular modern world find themselves in 
a precarious position. To abandon all religion is to abandon another avenue by 
which the possibility of another reality beyond the world-as-it-is is made pos-
sible. In other words, abandoning religion shuts the believer off from the very 
real thought that another existence beyond the given is a real possibility, thus 
resigning the believer to the status quo. That not only undermines religion, 
but would undermine a strictly philosophical project for a utopian situation as 
well. Horkheimer saw the danger in the complete defrocking of religion, as it 
undermined the possibility of philosophical metaphysics. He stated,
The philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked religion in the name of 
reason; in the end what they killed was not the church but metaphysics 





27 Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 2004), 12–13.
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For the critical religiologist, we cannot return to a subjectively rooted religios-
ity as an objective way of comprehending or engaging the world; autonomous 
reason, and not revelation must guide our existence in the modern world. But, 
as Horkheimer and Adorno intuitively understood, instrumental reason cares 
little for the real suffering of people which the Abrahamic religions in their 
original impulses have committed themselves to arresting, abating and ne-
gating, and thus as long as reason cannot adequately address the existential 
anxieties and fears of humanity, religion will continue to find a place in secular 
societies.28
In light of this situation – between a ruthless world of instrumental ra-
tionality and an irrational world of religious subjectivity – how do we infuse 
reason with the concern for the suffering of the finite individual and at the 
same time imbue religion with autonomous reason? For Adorno, the answer 
lies in an imageless negative dialectical philosophy: the ‘extreme loyalty to the 
prohibition of images, far beyond what this once originally meant.’29 Religion, 
especially Judaism and Christianity, for Adorno and the Frankfurt School, calls 
to be determinately negated; the emancipatory and liberational aspects of re-
ligion must be rescued through their translation into secular philosophy and 
praxis.30 If, he says, religion is to survive, it must invoke Walter Benjamin’s The-
ses on the Philosophy of History and ‘wizen up’ and must ‘keep out of sight.’31 In 
other words, it must be translated into historical materialism, or at least make 
allies with it. In the conjunctions with historical materialism it can fulfill its 
this-worldly prophetic mission, albeit from within or with secular language and 
praxis. As stated early, in a post-secular world, one that no longer speaks the 
language of religion, the only way certain semantic and semiotic meaning and 
moral material can enter into the public discourse is through its translation 
into a secular idiom.
 Confronting the Post-Secular Condition
Clearly what Adorno has argued in this essay is more applicable to the western 
post-secular situation than it is in other parts of the world that still embrace 
their religious traditions and worldviews. The radical separation of church and 
28 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, 142.
29 Ibid., 142.
30 Ibid., 136.
31 Ibid., 135–136; Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: Schoken 
Books, 2007), 253. I will return to this theme later in the book.
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state – which began with the Bourgeois revolutions, culminating in the estab-
lishment of secular political constitutions as opposed to divinely sanctioned 
monarchies – liberated the West from its outdated, irrational, and dogmatic 
religious authorities that had crippled the minds, spirit, and freedom of men 
and women alike. Although it ultimately depleted the West of any sense of un-
conditional meaning, the demythologization process was an emancipatory de-
velopment that attempted to make mankind the masters of their own lives.32 
With the rationalization and consequent demythologization of man’s rela-
tionship with nature came the disenchantment of the world; the metaphysical 
heritage of Christianity was no longer privileged as ultimate reality.33 Science, 
technology, and autonomous reason, especially instrumental reason, replaced 
revelation as the core sources of knowledge of the world, mankind, and the 
cosmos. However, this secularization of the lifeworld never took place in any 
meaningful measure in much of the Muslim world, nor did the antagonism 
between faith and science, reason and revelation, ever develop to the degree to 
which it did in the West. For the Muslim world – outside of those fundamental-
ists whose understanding of religion was often limited to the literal or casual 
– science and reason were tools for the understanding and discovery of the 
divine and his cosmic architecture. As such, the same “return to religion” for 
the placation of humanity’s needs never really occurred in the Muslim world, 
although there has been some “return to religion” as a form of defiance of west-
ernization.34 Nevertheless, Muslims by-and-large have remained faithful to the 
truth content of the Qur’an, ḥadīṯh, and Sunnah, even if, to a smaller degree, 
their religiosity mirrors some of the same pragmatic traits as western religios-
ity, i.e. the functionalization of religion for what it can do for human needs, or 
what Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, an important 20th century Islamic intellectual, 
describes as taqlīdī-Islam (Islam as imitation of forbearers, or Islam without 
investigation).35 In other words, there was no civilizational shift towards demy-
thologizing the world within the Muslim community, and therefore religion 
and metaphysics remained a core component in the life of the ummah, even 
after the loss of the Caliphate in Istanbul.
32 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Frag-
ments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 1–34.
33 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 69–70.; Max Weber, From 
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), 155.
34 Weber, Essays in Sociology, 155.
35 Colin Turner and Hasan Horkuc, Said Nursi (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 47.
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Yet this seems to contradict common thinking, as one of the most important 
phenomena the modern individual witnesses in the contemporary situation 
is the fundamentalist “return of religion.” But this apparent contradiction may 
not be so simple. If Adorno thinks the West is once again rediscovering the 
ability of religion to address human needs, and that explains its reemergence 
in the western world, it is not necessarily identical to why religion within the 
Muslim world has so often dressed in the cloak of a resurgent fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism, according to Jürgen Habermas, is a ‘peculiar mindset, a stub-
born attitude that insists on the political imposition of its own convictions and 
reasons, even when they are far from being rationally acceptable,’ and as such 
constitutes a belief attitude that is independent of the content of the beliefs.36 
Although this can be equally applied to various secular philosophies and po-
litical movements, it ‘holds especially for religious beliefs,’ were the legitima-
tion of belief through rational – as opposed to revelational – argumentation 
can be problematic.37 When a religious believer, group, or even nation, refuses 
to separate the political and religious, autonomous reason and divine revela-
tion, they are perceived in the West as being essentially fundamentalistic, a 
mindset that insists on the implementation of their dogmas without demo-
cratic and/or reasoned deliberation. For Habermas, fundamentalism is the re-
sult of the ‘repression of striking cognitive dissonances’ that come about in a 
multicultural world – a world that approaches the religious believer with the 
attitude that their particular faith is no more valid or privileged than another.38 
Furthermore, in the Muslim world in particular, there is a political-cultural-
economic component to the advancement of fundamentalism; in light of the 
overwhelming power of secular modernity, capitalism, and cultural liberalism, 
there is a ‘defensive reaction against the fear of a violent uprooting of tradi-
tional ways of life.’39 There is a sense of humiliation, disrespect, and dishonor, 
which must be remedied through a retreat into a fundamentalist mind-frame, 
which not only reinforces the perceptions of being wronged, but also provides 
an abundance of thought and praxis material by which the fundamentalist 
can oppose his supposed oppressor. Restorative conservatism is understood as 
a vehicle to once again regain the lost honor of the dar al-Islam, because only 
a strict adherence to Islam can save the Muslim world from the moral chaos 
of secular modernity and bring about its own civilizational renaissance. These 
two contemporary phenomena – the relativism of the modern multiculturalist 






world and the attack of secular modernity on the traditional religious world – 
have become the fuel for the fire of Islamic fundamentalism.
As stated above, the Muslim world has not gone through the advanced stag-
es of the secularization process, even if there are isolated pockets of secular-
ity within the Muslim world, i.e. intellectuals, states, political parties, etc. For 
the West, the painful awareness of what’s missing, as Habermas has described 
the state of secular emptiness in the face of human existence, has motivated 
many to once again come into contact with the Judeo-Christian tradition, as 
well as eastern forms of mysticism. They search for the answers that secularity 
has failed to provide. Although secular modernity has adequately answered 
many of the material problems that have afflicted mankind for millennia, it 
has not been able to adequately address the spiritual and existential issues that 
continually preoccupy mankind. In many Muslim societies, the answers that 
Islam provides to those questions are still relatively operational, accepted, and 
faithfully believed in. Thus, the appearance of fundamentalism – what appears 
to many as a violent return to religion – has a different genesis. Where funda-
mentalism in the West is often the result of the damaged life created by secular 
modernity, in the Muslim world, fundamentalism is an attempt to safeguard 
the Islamic society from having to go through that same form of damaged life 
created by that secular modernity. Or, it is to arrest the modernizing and secu-
larizing processes that have already begun in the Muslims world. Either way, 
it is defensive in nature. Many Muslims see the social chaos, deficient and/or 
distorted morality, the “leveling down” of the human to base animal desires 
and instincts (nafs), and the rise of al-jāhilīyah al-jadīd (the new age of igno-
rance) values that come with commodification, marketization, corporatiza-
tion and commercialization of the consumer society, and are horrified by it. 
These Muslims want to stay clear of the zeitgeist of the secular “having” life of 
homo consumens that they witness predominately in the West. In wanting to 
avoid this fate, many Muslims retreat into a reactionary stance that makes Is-
lam impenetrable to the positive aspects of modernity, reform, and/or western 
culture. This retreat into itself poses a difficult problem for many Muslims; to 
retreat inward is to find safety, but it is at the expense of the overall health of 
the ummah. To confront the world through fundamentalism is equally as de-
structive, for it depletes the communicative core of Islam by becoming as cold-
hearted and calculative as the western ruling class: the Bourgeoisie – those 
who brought secular modernity to the Muslim world. This is hardly acceptable 
for most Muslims. With this in mind, we must ask what kind (or orientation) 
of Islam is most adequate to engage the modern post-secular world, enter into 
a discourse with its representatives, learn from it, but also retain the Muslim 
communities’ Islamic identity?
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 Prophetic and Priestly Religion
If we accept the claim that religion is either ascending within the framework of 
the post-secular society, or has simply failed to dissolve into history, we should 
determine what sort of religion is being produced through this religious resur-
gence in the West as well as in the fundamentalization of Islam in the Muslim 
world? In order to answer this problem, we turn to the social-psychologist and 
early member of the Frankfurt School, Erich Fromm, to help us understand 
the nature of two important forms of religion, both of which appear in today’s 
world just as they have been in the past, but take on a new meaning and signifi-
cance within the context of the modern post-secular society.
In Fromm’s 1967 essay Prophets and Priests, he develops two sociological/po-
litical categories of authority, both of which are historically important for the 
evolution of mankind. Although both concepts are inspired by religion and are 
derived from religious vocabulary, they are not exclusively religious concepts, 
but can be applied to all forms of authority, both religious and secular.40
Citing the modern dilemma of the theory/praxis disconnect, where those 
with knowledge and truth fail to live a life guided by such knowledge and truth, 
and those devoid of such intellectual and moral proclivities, set themselves 
up as the masters of intellect and morality, Fromm states that ‘those who an-
nounce ideas – and not necessarily new ones – and at the same time live them 
we may call prophets.’41 From Fromm’s secular-philosophical perspective, it is 
clear that he does not believe such people are necessarily “commissioned” by 
the divine to deliver revelation to the people as one has in Judaism, Christian-
ity, and Islam, but rather believes those voices that ‘announce’ ideas that stand 
within the social, political, economic, cultural, and philosophical lineage of 
those biblical and Qur’anic prophets, even if their message is now secular, can 
be considered a “prophet.” However, we have to realize that he is using this 
term in a purely secular way. His “prophet” can be either secular or religious, 
which is a wholesale departure from the strict religious understanding of what 
a prophet is in the Abrahamic traditions. Indeed, he cites Buddha, Christ, 
Socrates, and Spinoza as being historical representatives of the prophetic.42 
40 See my book Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Toward 
a Theory of Prophetic Charism. Lanham, md: University Press of America, 2011. Also see 
my article “Fromm’s Notion of Prophets and Priests: Ancient Antagonism, Modern Mani-
festations” in Reclaiming the Sane Society: Essays in Erich Fromm’s Thought, ed. Miri, Lake 
and Kress. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014.




Yet for the religious believer, it is a necessary condition that an individual be 
commissioned by the divine in order to be considered a prophet, anything less 
than a divine commission disqualifies their claim. Yet for Fromm, our secular 
age is devoid of directly commissioned prophets, but can, and sometimes still 
does, have prophetic voices who lead people in the direction of the prophetic 
life. Fromm states that,
The Old Testament prophets… announced the idea that man had to 
find an answer to his existence, and that this answer was the develop-
ment of his reason, of his love; and they taught that humility and justice 
were inseparably connected with love and reason. They lived what they 
preached. They did not seek power, but avoided it. Not even the power of 
being a prophet. They were not impressed by might, and they spoke the 
truth even if this led them to imprisonment, ostracism or death.43
He continues,
They were not men who set themselves apart and waited to see what 
would happen. They responded to their fellow man because they felt re-
sponsible. What happened to others happened to them. Humanity was 
not outside, but within them. Precisely because they saw the truth they 
felt the responsibility to tell it; they did not threaten, but they showed the 
alternatives with which man was confronted.44
We can see from this passage in Fromm’s essay a few constitutional categories 
of his understanding of prophets. First, the prophet’s message is one with lib-
erational intent; the prophet guides and encourages the development of man’s 
reason and love in order to emancipate his from the smallness of irrationality 
and hatred; the prophet’s message is meant to liberate him from the irratio-
nal fears that bind him to violence, animosity towards others, and competitive 
greed; it is meant to emancipate him from self-destructive nihilism, crippling 
pessimism, and hopelessness; and is meant to cultivate a way-of-being-in-the-
world that is rooted in humility, solidarity, compassion, and love for oneself 
and others as one seeks perfect justice in this unjust world. Secondly, Fromm’s 
prophet takes a principled stance against oppression, injustice, and those who 
impose needless suffering on the innocent. It is not without fear that they 
take on this task, but the prophets accept the possibility of their own painful 
43 Ibid., 42.
44 Ibid., 42.
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demise by the hands of the opposition. The prophet’s role in this world is to ad-
vance the cause of justice without the demonization of the unjust, without los-
ing track of the humanity of the oppressor, without dehumanizing the already 
dehumanized victims and victimizers. The prophets are aware of what Hegel 
would later describe as the Master–slave Dialectic – that in various ways both 
are victims, and therefore both are in need of liberation.45 Thirdly, the prophet 
claims no temporal authority, does not wish for temporal authority, and would 
not accept temporal authority if it were offered to him. The prophets are given 
authority based on the perceptions of those the prophet leads. By the force of 
their argument, the legitimacy of their cause, and the altruistic core of their 
mission, spiritual authority is granted to them by the people. Although this au-
thority bestows upon them immense power, the prophets willfully relinquish 
it when it is no longer needed. It is not a possession but only a temporary trust 
from their followers. Their power therefore is not autonomous, but contingent 
on the will of their community. As such, he cannot take for himself power, nor 
give it to another, as it can only be given and taken by and through the consent 
of the masses.
Fourthly, Fromm’s notion of the prophet is one that rooted in self- 
identification with the suffering of finite humanity; they are of the masses and 
sympathizes (συμπάθεια: “feeling together”) with the other because they share 
a common humanity. Differences in class, race, gender, etc., do not block the 
prophet’s being-with others. The prophet has radically transcended such sourc-
es of historic animosity while at the same time does not pretend that such 
differences do not matter or are not continual sources of social animosity. As 
Fromm implies, the prophet feels responsible for those around them and out 
of that responsibility, is impelled to engage the world in a prophetic manner, to 
lend their talents and abilities towards the cause of their emancipation, and to 
risk their life for their emancipation. The prophet, unlike the tyrant, is martyr 
material. They are people of being and not having; therefore if all their posses-
sions are taken from them, if their material wealth evaporates, if their status 
in life diminishes, their reason for being remains. For the tyrant, who lives for 
the “world and all it contains,” the temporal stuff of wealth, the necrophilia 
(νεkρoφιλία: “love of what is dead”) of the market society, then their reason for 
being – rooted in his having – is gone; without it they are nothing and live for 
nothing.
Finally, the most important mission of the prophet – in Fromm’s analysis – 
is that they clearly present the alternatives to the already existing society. A vi-
sion of the way society ought to be is their most powerful contribution towards 
45 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 111–119.
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the emancipation of society from the chains that bind it. They, in a way that 
is most uncharacteristic of temporal politics, offer up a utopian expression of 
society. Utopia (oυτoπία), although by definition is “that which has no place,” is 
the philosophical sum of all that ought to be, and thus provides a powerful con-
ceptual critique of all that is the case, i.e. present day antagonistic society. The 
prophet’s mission is to present what humanity could be, how society should 
be, how relations between communities should be, and to guide humanity as 
close to that ought as possible, knowing full well that it may never materialize 
to its fullest extent. For Fromm, the prophet’s showing of the clear alternatives 
confronts mankind with a decision; no longer can they hide behind a veil of 
ignorance and willful blindness, they must abandon their automaton lifestyle 
and decide their fate. Fromm writes, ‘it is his [the prophet’s] function to call 
loudly, to awake man from his customary half-slumber,’ and in doing so forces 
man to choose either to live prophetically, priestly, or apathetically.46 It is pre-
cisely the negativity of both the prophet and their utopian vision for society 
that makes their critique powerful. Their critical stance towards the world-
as-it-is expresses their disobedience towards the current system of domina-
tion. Their negativity refuses to confuse that which is with that which can and 
should be; the conceptual ought remains non-identical to what is. Between the 
“ought and what is” is the space for revolutionary thought and praxis; its very 
non-identity creates the coordinates from within which prophetic contesta-
tion can occur. Therefore, the prophets and their vision is the opposite of posi-
tive religion, which recognizes, embraces, and upholds the current status quo. 
Positive religion inherently lends its power and prestige to the already existing 
relations and systems of domination; it sanctifies and often times reifies the 
power differential between the classes, the oppressed and the oppressors, the 
exploited and the exploiters, making that which is a product of history – and 
therefore can be historically undone – into a the “natural” state of relations, 
and therefore presenting the status quo as being inalterable. For the proph-
ets, the concrete negation of such power relations is an essential goal of their 
prophethood. Their recalcitrant disobedience, as Fromm states, ironically ex-
pressed their complete obedience towards a higher value, principle, and ideal: 
a dialectical commitment to what ought to be the case through the determinate 
negation of what is the case. Their ‘disobedience, then, in the sense in which 
we use it here, is an act of affirmation of reason and will. It is not primarily an 
attitude directed against something, but for something.’47 Ultimately, every act 
of disobedience is an act of obedience to a higher demand, and no demand 
46 Erich Fromm, On Disobedience, 43.
47 Ibid., 48.
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remains higher for the prophets than that of human emancipation, liberation, 
and realization of mankind’s full capacitiy for good and justice.
One simply cannot claim to be a prophet. According to Fromm, the histori-
cal situation ‘makes prophets,’ and thus they only appear when the times call 
for a prophetic voice.48 In times of social tensions, economic collapse, war, 
civil strife, international aggression, or even within the banality of the afflu-
ent society – where everything is managed and regulated by corporations, pr 
firms, and liberal politics – the prophetic voices emerge to offer a more rational 
and sane alternative.
After the prophet makes their mark on society, it is the priest that is left 
to represent the voice of the prophet, which he often does in the most un-
prophetic way. Fromm states,
Prophets appear only at intervals in the history of humanity. They die and 
leave their message. The message is accepted by millions, it becomes dear 
to them. This is precisely the reason why the idea becomes exploitable 
for others who can make use of the attachment of the people to these 
ideas, for their own purposes – those of ruling and controlling. Let us 
call the men who make use of the idea the prophets have announced the 
priests.49
While exploring the function of the priest, Fromm delivers a pessimistic analy-
sis of the role of priests in society. He states,
The prophets live their ideas. The priests administer them to the people 
who are attached to the idea. The idea has lost its vitality. It has become 
a formula. The priests declare that it is very important how the idea is 
formulated; naturally the formulation becomes always important after 
the experience is dead; how else could one control people by controlling 
their thoughts, unless there is the ‘correct’ formulation? The priest use 
the idea to organize men, to control them through controlling the proper 
expression of the idea, and when they have anesthetized man enough 
they declare that man is not capable of being awake and of directing his 
own life, and that they, the priests, act out of duty, or even compassion, 





are afraid of freedom. It is true not all priests have acted that way, but 
most of them have, especially those who wield power.50
The conceptual model of “the priest” that Fromm constructs is one that, as 
he himself recognized, cannot be universalized, as there have been many ac-
tual priests that have acted prophetically in their opposition to irrational and 
oppressive authority; priests like the American brothers Daniel and Jerry Ber-
rigan, the Franciscan priests and monks that helped the Italian cyclist Gino 
Bartali save Jews during wwii, the Protestant Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the 
Orthodox Priest Gregory Gapon, El Salvadorian Archbishop Óscar Romero, the 
Nicaraguan Priest and poet Ernesto Cardenal, the American civil rights leader 
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, the German Protestant revolutionary Thomas 
Müntzer, the Muslim Malcolm x, and many other nameless and anonymous 
clerics that chose to side with the victims of history, believing that the divine 
was on the side of the oppressed, the exploited, and the murdered, and not 
on the side of those who oppressed, exploited, and murdered. These clerics – 
most prophetically – chose to side themselves with the innocent victims, those 
who had been left in the ditch of society, crucified on world-Golgotha, and 
were massacred on the slaughterbench of history. For Fromm, these “priests” 
are prophetic, regardless of their institutional title.
What Fromm conceptualized when he constructed the priestly model was 
any form of authority that speaks in the name of a once-revolutionary indi-
vidual (or movement), who codified the revolutionary thought, transformed it 
into a dogma, and proceeded to functionalize the teaching of the revolutionary 
as a means of manipulating and controlling the people and or gaining power, 
prestige, wealth, etc. For these particular clerics, the ‘priestly’ model would not 
have appealed to them as all of them in different ways committed themselves 
not to controlling the masses, but rather to liberating them; nurturing their 
sense of reason and capacity for love; building up their ability to be for them-
selves and others and removing the obstacles that oppressed and exploited 
them. Nevertheless, history is full of these kind of non-prophetic “priests” – 
whether they be religious or secular, economic or political – who have killed 
off the dynamic nature of revolutionary religion and philosophy and replaced 
it with an stagnant edifice of cold dogmas and platitudes that are devoid of the 
liberational spirit that once gave them life. Fromm reminds his readers that,
the priests usually confuse the people because they claim that they are 
the successors of the prophet, and that they live what they preach. Yet, 
50 Ibid., 43–44.
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while a child could see that they live precisely the opposite of what they 
teach, the great mass of the people are brainwashed effectively, and even-
tually they come to believe that if the priests live in splendor they do so 
as a sacrifice, because they have to represent the great idea; or if they kill 
ruthlessly they only do so out of revolutionary faith.51
This kind of priest is satisfied to gain converts based on what Adorno claimed 
was humanity’s need for religion; the revolutionary and prophetic priest wants 
his followers to be convinced of the truth behind his claims; the truth behind 
his praxis, and the truth behind his mission. The prophetic priest truly does 
speak in the name of the prophet, often times against his own religious tra-
dition or authorities, as was the case for the liberation theologians in Latin 
America who found themselves in opposition to the Vatican’s official neutral-
ity (or sometimes complicity) with the political right’s attacks on socialists, 
peasants, and left-wing priests during the 1980’s, which were supported – or 
simply ignored – by the church in the name of anti-communism. The priestly 
authorities in Rome, despite their theological differences with the liberation 
theologians, abandoned the prophetic liberational intent of the message of Je-
sus of Nazareth, which included a very earthly liberation, for a quietist policy 
that would allow the church to remain on the fence or in the good graces of 
the powerful. In this case, the prophetic was transfigured into the priestly once 
again while fascism created more victims for the benefit of North American 
capitalism.
If we look strictly at religion, the model of the priest that Fromm constructs 
is the model of the cleric within positive religion. Echoing Marx’s definition of 
religion – the opiate of the masses – we see that Fromm’s priest is one that con-
firms, justifies, and sanctifies the very conditions that call for opium religion. 
In this way, the priestly cleric is the opium-dealer, anesthetizing the masses 
from the pain of their condition, making them complacent, content, and ac-
cepting of their oppression. He may give lip-service to the language of the pro-
phetic and revolutionary, but ultimately he is the one that blesses the existing 
world-as-it; implores the oppressed to “bear their cross” silently and patiently; 
and weaves a vision of the good life to be obtained only in the afterlife, while 
this life is abandoned to unnecessary socially-induced suffering. Through the 
enforcement of dogma, he bends the words of the original prophetic stance 
towards the preservation of the unjust class and power relations. As Kant 
pointed out, his form of religiosity is the religion that’s called in to comfort 




half-slumber, their hypnotic automaton state, and their complacency with the 
“fallen” and corrupt world that oppresses them.52 His priestly religion recon-
ciles the victims to the victimizers, thus liquidating their inherent potential to 
revolt, to make a revolution, and to emancipate themselves from their oppres-
sors. For Fromm, Marx, and Horkheimer, his religion is the adhesive that binds 
the masses to their chains, as it no longer ‘expresses the ideal’ of the prophetic/
utopian vision, but rather convinces them that such chains are either the prod-
uct of nature or their supernatural ‘fate.’53 However, the prophet takes seri-
ously the ‘sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, 
and the soul of soulless conditions,’ and demonstrates to the masses that this 
is not the natural state of man; this is not Deus Volt; and this is not the way of 
the biblical and Qur’anic prophets, no matter how much the priest insists.54
As we can see in history, professing a negative religious and secular way-of-
being in an unjust world is dangerous; it calls for sacrifice and the risking of 
one’s life, resources, and wellbeing, but for the prophetic there is no other op-
tion. Unlike what many anti-Marxists believe, Marx and the Frankfurt School 
never directly criticized Rabbi Jesus of Nazareth, but only the positivity that 
lurks within religion, most especially Emperor Constantine’s form of Christi-
anity that betrayed its original revolutionary nature. Both Marx and the Frank-
furt School recognized within Jesus’ mission a revolutionary moment – one 
that they saw fit to be translated into secular revolutionary politics in the 20th 
century. Indeed, they were not anti-religious at all, but wished to rescue reli-
gion from the cage of positivity and allow that which still remains prophetic to 
migrate from the depth of the mythos into secular revolutionary thought and 
praxis. Unlike those intellectuals, such as Ayn Rand, who wish to relieve the 
world entirely of religion, the critical theorists, who learned from the philoso-
phies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, attempted to exorcise the Abrahamic religions 
of their criminal histories and tendencies and preserve their negativity in criti-
cal philosophy and praxis. Religion, even in the modern period, may still find a 
role in revolutionary movements.
52 Immanuel Kant, Religion, 93.
53 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, 188.
54 Marx, Contribution, 54.
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chapter 5
After Auschwitz: Islam in Europe
The mass immigration of Muslims into post-secular Europe has caused many 
to reflect on the state of religion in a society that once believed in the Christi-
anity, moved through the Age of Enlightenment and now finds itself in a mixed 
society where religious and secular citizens cohabitate. This rapid change in 
demographics has been a destabilizing factor in a culture that sees itself as 
thoroughly secular, both politically and culturally.
There are two important factors that have contributed to the West’s idea of 
itself as being without religion, which in turn make the transition to a post-
secular society, in which the Muslim community is a dominant factor on the 
religious side, very difficult. The first can be found within the works of three 
philosophers, Freud, Nietzsche and Marx. The biological claim of Freud, that 
religion belongs to the infancy of the human species and that religion is an 
interpretative way of understanding humanity without possessing empirical 
truth, remains operative in many quarters of the secular society. Just as the 
natural sciences had already begun to do, Freud’s psychological reductionism 
attempted to demonstrate that religion was a product to man’s mind and/or 
biology, which furthered the separation of religion from metaphysical truth. 
Following this, I argue that the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who heralded 
the death of God and the metaphysical reality that was associated with it, plays 
an abiding factor. According to him, a life beyond good and evil, beyond the 
slave ethics of Christianity, would give rise to nihilism and the age of the über-
mensch, which came to fruition in the modern period with the ideologies of 
nationalism and fascism. Nihilism was the future of Europe, and with all of its 
inherent meaninglessness, nihilism is what Europe received. For many, Marx 
devastating critique of religion would hammer the last nail in its coffin, a coffin 
that his contemporary Feuerbach had already begun to build by demonstrat-
ing the anthropological genesis of God.
In light of the modern western world’s move away from religion, the most 
traumatic event that has affected the overall worldview of European society 
originates from the horrific unfolding of fascism in Europe and the absolute 
destructiveness of Auschwitz. The post-secular society is a society in which 
most of the population find it impossible to seek solace or comfort in a divine 
being that allowed for the systematic destruction of the Jews, the mass mur-
der of twenty-seven communists, and millions of western soldiers, without 
any attempt by such a divine being to intervene into history. Theodicy, in this 
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case, makes religion unintelligible for many, and therefore loses its place in the 
modern secular society. Following this catastrophe of the mid-twnetieth cen-
tury, many ask how can Europe return to their Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox 
prayers after the barbarism of World War ii? If Adorno once believed poetry af-
ter Auschwitz was no longer possible, how then is prayer? Already recognizign 
the difficulty for Christians, we must ask: how can Jews return to their prayers 
after Auschwitz?
Like the biblical Job, many Jews still pray today precisely because the vic-
tims of fascism continued to pray despite the nonappearance of the divine in 
Auschwitz. This recalcitrant devotion to God after the god of history, religion, 
and theology is dead, and the hope for the Messiah, animated the late religio-
philosophical work of the critical theorist Walter Benjamin, who found a way 
to rescue certain semantic and semiotic material from the depth of Judaism 
by caccooning it in historical materialism. His work, in the face of the “single 
catastrophe” that is history, points in a poignant direction that the Muslims of 
Europe may read as a way of rescuing Islam from the snares of the post-secular 
society. Can Muslims follow Walter Benjamin and translate their messianic, 
prophetic and revolutionary ideals, rooted in religion, into secular philosophy, 
and thus rescuing it from the onslaught of neo-pagan secular society, or will 
Islam share the same evaporative fate as Christianity?
 Violence and the Post-Secular
According to the Harvard psychology professor Steven Pinker, the abundance 
of violence that permeated the life of the pre-modern man has drastically sub-
sided in the modern period.1 With the advancement of civilization, which in-
cludes the rationalization of the lifeworld, the divorce of revelation from law, 
the separation of church and state, the advancement of human rights, interna-
tional institutions of law, the creation of war crimes legislation, the integration 
of economies, etc., civilization has been able to create the conditions by which 
violence would no longer dictate the parameters of the lifeworld. Daily life, 
which was once permeated with a low-level of direct violence against the indi-
vidual and the family, has been lessened to a major degree in the modern West, 
where nearly all forms of direct violence contravene positive law and most 
people live in relative safety. Yet when we look into the world-as-it-is  today, 
we seen a increasing amount of barbarity; whether it comes from western 
1 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking, 
2011.
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countries’ continual attacks on smaller, weaker, and darker skinned nations, 
especially when they fail to submit to the conditions of global capitalism, or 
when Muslim extremists attack innocent civilians both in the dar-al-Islam or in 
the West, the increasing callousness towards human life leaves many in a state 
of fearful paralysis, unable to comprehend the descent into the chaos of vio-
lence, hatred, and death-friendliness. In order to understand the barbarity that 
continues within the relatively peaceful modern world, and especially the an-
tagonism between the West and the Muslim world, we have to return to the 
beginning of modernity and the emergence of the modern state. In it lies the 
key to understanding the pathology of post-modern violence which plagues 
not only the West but the Islamic world as well. This violence, as often cited, 
culminated in the systematic destruction of the Jews of Europe: die Endlösung 
der Judenfrage (The Final Solution to the Jewish Question). This, I argue, has an 
important effect on the issue of Islam and Muslims in post-Holocaust Europe.
 Violence and the State
The philosopher Thomas Hobbes pointed out in his book Leviathan the civiliz-
ing affect that a maturing and increasingly differentiated culture can have on a 
society. In order to prove his basic thesis, the necessity of the state, he engages 
in a thought experiment that wipes away the existence of a governing power 
thus leaving man in an anomic state of nature. He conceives of this ungoverned 
situation in his famous paragraph on the ‘incommodities of such a war.’ He 
states,
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious 
building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require 
much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no 
arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and 
danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short.2
Without the state, Hobbes theorized that man would descend into chaos 
and war. Bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all) was the natural 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts i and ii, ed. Herbert W. Schneider (New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1958), 107.
chapter 5162
<UN>
 outcome of such an anomic condition, as the absolute right to everything and 
anything is only limited by one’s ability to take it from another by force and 
violence. But Hobbes does not stop at calling only direct violence “war,” but 
rather extends the conditions of war into the lifeworld, the everydayness of 
being – the common disposition within which humanity would live. He writes,
Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consists 
not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein 
the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the no-
tion of time is to be considered in the nature of foul weather lies not in a 
shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together, 
so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the known dis-
position thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 
All other time is peace.3
Contemporary fascination which such an imaged state can be witnessed in the 
popularity of television shows and movies that take place within a situation 
of complete civilizational collapse, such as The Walking Dead, The Colony, The 
Road and The Book of Eli. The post-apocalyptic situation is the absolutization 
of the aristocratic law of nature, where the strongest, most clever, and most 
prepared, and often times most ruthless and merciless individuals, survive the 
totalen krieg (total war) of all against all due to their unencumbered ability to 
do whatever it takes to survive, including the mass killing of others. Unlike oth-
ers, Hobbes did not believe the situation of complete lawlessness would lead 
to a state of anarcho-bliss, that the masses would bind together in an altruistic 
solidarity, but would rather use the situation to their own personal benefit to 
the extent that they could – a seriously pessimistic idea about human nature 
indeed, but one that seems to be fairly accurate so far if we examine history. 
 Today, the popularity of the shows that take place within such anomic situa-
tions betrays the unspoken yet perverse desire to return to such a state, thus 
giving credence to Freud’s position that man harbors a deep resentment to-
wards the normative imperatives of civilization – the social “superego” that 
limits our instincts, our freedoms, our natural inclinations towards aggression 
and the desire to impose our will on others.
Nevertheless, the lawlessness of a life within a context of continual fear and 
anxiety about one’s survival would penetrate even into the most religious of 
3 Hobbes, Leviathan, 106–107.
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individuals. Their altruistic concern for the other would often surrender to sus-
picion about everyone that they are unfamiliar with for fear of the threat they 
may pose. In such a society the masses become totally atomized – in a state 
of absolute concern for oneself. This is similar to the ideal state idolized by 
Ayn Rand and other advocates of hyper-individualization (albeit within the 
content of modernity with a modern state and police force). An atmosphere of 
paranoia, which would be most appropriate for survival, would drown any reli-
gious sense of solidarity with victims, as one’s primary concern is making sure 
that they and their family are not the next victims. Social bonds, the adhesive 
that binds communities together in common projects and concerns, dissolves 
before the power of individualistic survival: the absolute reduction of man to 
his most basic animality.
In order to remedy this situation, Hobbes believes that society enters into 
social contracts, which is the process by which every individual relinquishes 
some “natural rights” that they would otherwise have within the state of na-
ture, and by relinquishing those rights they gain certain guarantees to protec-
tion, safety, security, and the rule of law. This creates a situation where absolute 
rights are limited, whereas political rights – rooted in the social contract – 
create a space for substantive and subjective freedom. For Hobbes, one cannot 
live a human life in an absolute state of freedom, as each person’s freedom to 
engage in behavior harmful to others is a concrete eclipse of another’s freedoms 
to exist without such impingement. The political boundaries of subjective 
freedom have to be positively constructed as to allow for the free development 
of society unencumbered by the absolute violence of nature – which destroys 
subjective freedom as much as it allows for objective freedom.
In modern society we do not live in a complete lawless situation, but are 
rather governed by a minimum level of law, social contracts, and reciprocal 
norms.4 The growing complexity of culture and civilization, especially in the 
realm of law and government, has continued to sublimate the instinctual 
drives that would otherwise be necessarily utilized to survive within the state 
of nature. Marx, following a Rousseau-like line of thought, takes this line of 
argument a step further. He optimistically believed that if we could overcome 
the class structure, we could not only overcome our instinctual inclinations 
towards violence and destruction, but we could also create a utopic society of 
equality. Marx posits a vision of a post-capitalist society that is classless and 
stateless, with common ownership of the means of production – a society 
4 There are instances of complete breakdown of otherwise universal governing norms. The 
systematic destruction of Europe’s unwanted, i.e. Jews, homosexuals, communists, etc., dur-
ing wwii, opened up the floodgates to the most perverse spectacles of violence.
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beyond the realm of necessity – where each gives according to their abilities 
and receives according to their needs.5 This just society is a free association of 
individuals that expresses solidarity with all, have been liberated from labor 
exploitation, and have overcome the problem of alienation. Marx theorized 
that the revolutionary working class, itself a product of, and response to, the 
Bourgeoisie, would serve as the agent of historical change – transforming a 
society that is rooted in exploitation, injustice, imperialism, and the private 
accumulation of collective surplus value, into one that would be governed by 
the interests of the universal. Nevertheless, Marx’s vision of the just society, 
which ends the exploitation of one part of humanity by another, is not with-
out criticism. From a Freudian psychological analysis, Marx’s vision of a just 
society may be predicated upon an overly optimistic understanding of human 
nature that cannot be reconciled with Freud’s idea of the death-drive (Todes-
trieb), often referred to as the Thanatos (θάνατoς).6 Taken from the daemon of 
death in Greek mythology, the drive towards death within mankind was seen 
by Freud to be a major impediment to the peaceful and utopic dreams of social 
philosophers, artists, and religious believers. Utopia would always be stunted 
by man’s inner-daemon.
 Freud’s Unbehagen mit Marx
To say the least, Freud is pessimistic about the chances for the kind of civiliza-
tion that Marx wishes to bring about. In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud 
proposes a theory that attempts to explain the continual aggressiveness and 
destructiveness that he sees throughout history. This instinct towards death 
directly contravenes his prior belief in man only having an instinctual will 
to life (Eros), a realization that he was initially unwilling to accept. He wrote, 
‘I remember my own defensive attitude when the idea of an instinct of destruc-
tion first emerged in psycho-analytic literature, and how long it took before 
I became receptive to it.’7 Nevertheless, his study of history and his clinical 
work with neurotics compelled Freud to adopt the idea that ‘the inclination to 
5 Some scholars of Marx, especially Liberation Theologians, believe Marx’s notion of a society 
that gives according to needs and receives according to abilities is mirrored after the early 
Christian community, as described in the book of Acts 4:32–35.
6 Freud did not use the word Thanatos to describe the death instinct, but later Freudians titled 
it as such.
7 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, ed. and trans. James Strachey (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962), 67.
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aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man…’8 For 
Freud, man’s tendency to destroy that which he has built, his continual antago-
nistic attitude and behavior towards others is rooted not necessarily in socially 
constructed edifices of civilization, i.e. class antagonisms, religious antagonisms, 
national antagonisms, as phenomenon like these are just the manifestations 
of a more primal cause. For Freud, the drive towards death and destruction 
is an instinct that is within mankind regardless of their social, political, and 
economic situation (although some social conditions are more conducive for 
their manifestation). Freudian theory rejects the idea that if only we had the 
proper education, laws, rituals, philosophy, social construction, etc., mankind 
could invent the totally reconciled society – a society where aggression, war, 
competition, etc., would cease to be part of man’s existence. Man’s inherent 
instinct towards death (Thanatos), is co-determinate with his inherent instinct 
towards life, and this inclination for aggressiveness is the ‘greatest impediment 
to civilization’ in Freud’s view.9 Even if we could resolve the problem of alien-
ation, as articulated in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
in which man is estranged from other men, Freud believes man would remain 
hostile to others due to his instinctual drives, and no amount of social changes 
could empty man of such a disposition.10 One is a social construction created 
within history, which can be transcended. The other is nature and is a perma-
nent aspect of mankind’s psyche.11
Freud defines the “death drive” as the particular instinct that’s ‘aim is to 
lead what is living into an inorganic state,’ to return the animated to the in-
animate.12 This internal drive often operates tacitly within the organism in 
routine daily life but manifests itself in destruction and aggression when it’s 
directed outward. Although Freud believed that the death instinct could in 
some cases be put in the service of Eros – destroying things as not to destroy 
the self (eating, sexual activity, etc.) – it nevertheless opposes the work of Eros 
most vehemently in the world. He believed that ‘civilization is a process in 
the service of Eros,’ that civilization ‘combine[s] single human individuals, and 
after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the 
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the 
Communist Manifesto, trans. Martin Milligan (Amherst, ny: Prometheus Books, 1988), 78.
11 The idea that man’s nature is also a product of history and therefore can be modified via 
historical changes, thus disproving the idea of man’s “fixed” nature, is not an issue Freud 
addresses adequately.
12 Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, trans. James Strachey (New York: w.w. 
Norton & Co., 1989), 18; Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 65–66.
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unity of mankind.’13 If Eros is meant to bring together that which is disparate, 
the death instinct’s work is to do the opposite – it opposes all forms of solidar-
ity. It is the ‘hostility of each against all and of all against each,’ which inhibits 
the ‘programme of civilization.’14 Marx, who has a more pacific view of human 
nature (when it’s not distorted by the conditions of capitalism), still believes 
man is capable of wanton destructiveness, especially when it is pressed into 
the service of the Bourgeoisie, either through war, nationalism, imperialism, 
or the reproduction of capitalist economy. For example, capitalism continu-
ously falls into crises situations, where there is an ‘enforced destruction of a 
mass of productive forces’ a ‘conquest of new markets,’ and a ‘more thorough 
exploitation of the old one.’15 This continuous destruction of the status quo in 
favor of an ever expansion of the capitalist production keeps man’s destructive 
capacities employed as it destroys the old to usher in the new for the increas-
ing benefit of the few. Where Freud saw the expansion of civilization, even 
within a Bourgeois society, as being in service to Eros, Marx saw it in service of 
the ruling class.
Marx’s underdeveloped psychological analysis of the working class doesn’t 
take into account the psychological insights that were later discovered by 
Freud’s theory of Eros and Thanatos. His more optimistic attitude towards the 
realization of a society in which the interests of the Proletariat would deter-
mine the existence of social norms, laws, etc., didn’t calculate into the overall 
picture in the instinctual drive towards aggression and destructiveness. Even if 
there was an ultimate triumph of the working class over the Bourgeoisie, even 
if the dictatorship of the Proletariat triumphed and brought about a transition 
from their rule to communism, even if social conditions were most optimal 
for social solidarity, the innermost drives of the human mind – the division 
between the “world-dominating” instincts of Eros and Thanatos – would con-
tinue to ensure that antagonisms, aggression and violence, would plague hu-
manity. For Marx, the problem is not solely outside of the mind, as the social 
consciousness of the people has to be reformed in light of critical analysis, ide-
ology critique, etc., it is however primarily outside of the mind – the material 
world – where the change has to be made most radically. Yet for Freud, it is the 
13 It’s telling that Freud did not include “class” as a unity that organically came from civiliza-
tion. The ones he mentioned in this passage are all libidinal unities, and not a unity solely 
understood as being bound together by a particular “interest” such as class. This maybe 
a tacit critique of Marx’s notion of class unity – that it lacks the libidinal adhesive that is 
characteristic of racial, national, and familial unity.
14 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 69.
15 Marx and Engels, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts, 215.
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inner-world – the ‘struggle between Eros and Death’ – that continues to drive 
the ‘evolution of civilization.’16 Any change to the material world that does not 
take into account man’s conflicting instincts will suffer from a relatively benign 
surface-transformation and will not get to the root of the problem – humanity’s 
own inherent psychological antagonisms. If Marx’s vision of a communist so-
ciety is true – as being the society most conducive to the actualization of the 
human potentials – then an adequate way of sublimating the Thanatos will 
have to be major part of the structure of society; for if it fails to adequately 
discover ways of channeling such instinctual aggression, then such a ‘civilized 
society’ will be ‘perpetually threatened with disintegration’ just as every other 
society has been before it.17
In Marxist theory, class solidarity is the adhesive that binds individuals 
together under the banner of their common interests. Yet Freud is skeptical 
as to whether or not common interests, or as he describes them ‘reasonable 
interests,’ are strong enough to resist the power of instinctual passions.18 The 
highest ideals of mankind, such as Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, are all supreme 
values to which mankind can aspire, but too often prove to be based on weak 
intellectual foundations when opposed by the instinctual passions. Following 
Rousseau, Marx’s assumption that mankind is ‘wholly good and well-disposed 
to his neighbor,’ combined with the idea that private property had ‘corrupted 
his [mankind’s] nature,’ Freud also finds to be an ‘untenable illusion.’19 Freud 
sees a mistake in Marx’s anthropology. He says,
Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost without 
limit in primitive times, when property was still very scanty… it forms 
the basis of every relation of affection and love among people… If we do 
away with personal rights over material wealth, there still remains pre-
rogative in the field of sexual relationships, which is bound to become 
the source of the strongest dislike and the most violent hostility among 
men who in other respects are on an equal footing.20
Freud does not believe that the common ownership of means of production 
would lead to an existence free of hostility and aggression, as the most basic 
16 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 69.
17 Ibid., 59.
18 Ibid., 59.
19 Ibid., 60; Marx and Engels, Philosophic & Economic Manuscripts, 209.
20 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 60–61. It is doubtful Freud had studied Marx thor-
oughly but was instead familiar with certain Marxist tenets.
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of human relationships, i.e. love, sex, marriage, and family, would inevitability 
serve as the conduit in which the death instinct makes its presence known. 
Neither would the abolishment of the traditional family (or the Bourgeois fam-
ily as Marx understood it) have the desired effect of eliminating aggression.21 
Wherever Marx’s revolutionary changes would take society, Freud believed 
that the ‘indestructible feature of human nature [would] follow it there’ as 
well.22 Furthermore, similar to Hegel’s analysis of war and the impossibility 
of Kant’s notion of Perpetual Peace, Freud believes that it is possible to bind 
some together in a common subjectivity as long as there remains an “other” 
that serves as the object of negativity, i.e. it ‘receives the manifestations of their 
aggressiveness.’23 For Freud, peace among some unavoidably means aggres-
sion with others – the “other” has to be there to allow the expression of man’s 
negativity via his death drive. If the “other” is not present, the death drive will 
turn on itself and become self-destructive. Yet Marx believes that resolving 
the class conflict within a nation would end the hostilities between nations, a 
view of humanity’s future that Freud’s analysis of the inherent destructiveness 
of the death drives would reject as overly optimistic as it doesn’t account for 
man’s inherent negativity toward the other.24 In the end, the death instinct will 
find its subject, regardless of the type of society that is constructed. Therefore 
for Freud, it is doubtful if there can ever be ‘an association in which the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ as long 
as human instincts remain the same.25 Even within a fully realized communist 
society, with its liquidation of alienation, man’s destructiveness will inevitably 
break through and sabotage the project of the fully reconciled future society.
Religion’s role in the history of mankind’s ability to sublimate their exist-
ing libidinous energies, including those of Eros and Thanatos, into something 
positive was questioned by the most radical of anti-religious thinkers: Fried-
rich Nietzsche. His ultimate verdict on religion was not a positive one; he did 
not believe it was a great accomplishment of religion that it sublimated and/
or repressed man’s natural tendencies towards aggression, competition, and 
violence, but rather a crime against mankind and his true human potentials. 
To actively confess a religion was already transgressing the true nature of man, 
21 Ibid., 61; Marx and Engels, Philosophic & Economic Manuscripts, 226–227.
22 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 61.
23 Ibid., 61. The ‘other’ for the Marxist, Freud says, is the Bourgeoisie. Yet he wonders what 
will happen when the Bourgeoisie is no longer in existence (Freud, 1962: 62). For certain, 
within his analysis, the Thanatos will find another ‘other’ to direct itself towards.
24 Marx and Engels, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts, 228.
25 Ibid., 231.
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to witness for such religion was to embody the evil that was inherent within 
religions that, for Nietzsche, denied the moral goodness of man’s potential for 
heroism.
 Witnessing and Professing in a Nietzschian Age of Nihilism
In the revolutionary year of 1848, Karl Marx and Friederich Engels published 
their Manifesto of the Communist Party that began by heralding an ominous 
development: ‘a spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism. All 
the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exercise this 
spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German 
police-spies.’26 For Marx and Engels, the dialectics of class struggle had finally 
brought to the foreground of history the revolutionary potentials of the indus-
trial working class. History was on the verge of a new epoch. Just as slavehold-
ers were once overthrown; just as the feudal lords were once overthrown, now 
the Bourgeoisie would soon be overthrown. Communism, predicated on the 
radical use of reason and dedicated to the notion of equality, would eradicate 
man’s domination over man. However, another herald was soon to be on the 
horizon, and his insights into the nature of history and man’s potentials would 
have a far more lasting effect in the West then Marx’s communism.
Friedrich Nietzsche instinctively, intuitively, and philosophically witnessed 
the coming crisis of faith in Europe. Heralding it as the ‘death of God’ and the 
‘triumph of nihilism,’ he saw that the impossibility of maintaining an authen-
tic commitment to religion and traditional metaphysics, and therefore the mo-
rality that was historically legitimated by such religion and metaphysics, was 
becoming impossible to maintain. The advancement of modern epistemology, 
science, autonomous reason, the inability of religions to adequately address 
the questions of theodicy, unconditional meaning, and provide real consola-
tion in the face of human suffering, all pointed to the fact that the West had 
moved into an age on nihilism. Like Marx’s conviction that the historical inevi-
tability of communism was soon to come, Nietzsche believed that nihilism was 
as equally the inevitable state of modern man. He writes,
… why is nihilism inevitable now? Because the very values current 
amongst us today will arrive at their logical conclusion in Nihilism – 
because Nihilism is the only possible outcome of our greatest values and 
26 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), 473.
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ideals – because we must first experience Nihilism before we can realize 
what the actual worth of these ‘values’ was… Sooner or later we shall be 
in need of new values.27
For Nietzsche, man’s traditional values, rooted in Judeo-Christian metaphysics, 
had been the guiding moral values within the West for nearly two thousand 
years. So strongly were those values held, that they once overthrew mankind’s 
most natural values, the master morality of those who overcome their personal 
limitations, their social contexts, and achieve greatness in-and-of-themselves. 
Christian morality, with its worship of the poor, the broken, the weak, and the 
decadent, by sheer power of numbers, imposed on the strong their morality; 
that which was condemnable in nature was elevated to godliness, to virtue. 
Nietzsche thought these altruistic values to be a perversion of man’s poten-
tial for greatness, for heroism, and for the will to power. Although the normal 
functioning of society failed miserably to embodying such “degenerate” values, 
and rather pursued the life of power, pleasure, greed, and gluttony, the moral 
values of Christianity were maintained as truth, deserving of admiration, and 
eternally good, a status that was rarely questioned since the establishment of 
Christianity in the West.
Because these values were so entrenched within the western psyche, within 
its civilizational superego, because they were held to be the supreme good by 
nearly all peoples, the clash against the scientific, rational, and secular values 
that was occurring during Nietzsche’s lifetime was painful and deeply trauma-
tizing. The trauma of this crisis of faith, brought by the accusations against reli-
gion from science, philosophy, and natural history, was increased by the depth 
of the commitment to those Christian values, and therefore he states that 
‘Nihilism harbours in the heart of Christian morals’ itself.28 They were con-
sidered eternally true even if the civilization failed to realize them. Now, the 
whole worldview that was built upon those metaphysical truths was crashing 
under the weight of its inability to defend its claims against modern knowledge. 
‘Nihilism is at our door’ Nietzsche wrote, because the downfall of Christian 
morality left mankind ontologically adrift, detached from any firm metaphysi-
cal moorings and unable to find meaning within a world that was reduced only 
to physical matter and human will.29 Where once Christianity assigned mean-
ing to the world, value to each and every individual life, and an eschatological 
27 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (New York: The Barnes 
& Nobles Library of Essential Reading, 2006) xviii.
28 Ibid., 3.
29 Ibid., 3.
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telos for which the individual could strive, such gifts of religion were no longer 
available to the contemporary individual, leaving them to themselves, alone 
and abandoned by the once meaningful and expansive otherness of God. The 
clash between the absolute necessity of such metaphysics – both psychologi-
cally and socially – and the thief of modernity which robbed mankind of such 
comfort and certainty, is the historical condition of the western man. It is that 
condition which brings about nihilism. Nietzsche states that,
The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been Christians 
for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium which enables us to 
live – for a long while we shall not know in what direction we are travel-
ing. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the opposite valuations, with 
that degree of energy which could only have been engendered in man by 
an overvaluation of himself.30
In Nietzsche’s posthumous book, Will to Power, he defines nihilism in various 
ways. He states that nihilism is (1) ‘the absolute repudiation of worth, purpose, 
and desirability,’ (2) ‘a yearning for non-entity,’ (3) ‘that the highest values 
are losing their value… there is no answer to the question ‘to what purpose,’ 
(4) that ‘life is absurd,’ (5) that ‘we have not the smallest right to assume the 
existence of transcendental objects or things in themselves,’ and (6) ‘Nihil-
ism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long waste of strength, 
the pain of ‘futility,’ uncertainty, the lack of opportunity to recover in some 
way, or to attain to a state of peace concerning anything.’31 To Nietzsche’s keen 
mind, mankind is lost within himself, laboring only for himself, and confused 
about himself; he is without values, without meaning, without purpose, and 
therefore longs for a Buddhistic “nothingness” that would end his ontological 
misery. The connectedness of religion – that it provided mankind a feeling of 
being-with (both with God and others) – has been lost to a form of extreme 
atomization, isolation, and disconnectedness to the world. Man’s “progress,” 
his development of thought and technology, his advancement of a scientific 
and materialist form of being-in-the-world, drives man into a pathological 
condition, where purpose, unity and truth no longer remain valid – they are 
but meaningless verbiage in a meaningless world – a signifier that signifies 
nothing. Nietzsche realized, much like the religious fundamentalist today (at 





Nihilism.’32 Or, as Max Weber understood it, the rationalization of the world 
brings about the disenchantment of the world, wherein mankind no longer 
can find his place; he is a stranger, eternally hostile to the world around him 
as it has been demythologized and transformed into matter that lacks any 
form of moral consideration due to its ontological status that can no longer 
be experienced as having value in-and-of-itself. In such a world we come to 
realize that our most important desiderata, our highest values – unconditional 
meaning, unconditional love, hopefulness, and the certainty of truth – are only 
necessary illusions that exist for our own psychological wellbeing. But in real-
izing their non-existence – their lie – our knowledge undermines our being, 
our progress diminishes our capability for happiness, and we live a life with 
truth but in despair. We live in a post-metaphysical world were becoming leads 
to nothing. Reason cannot point us in the direction of the “totally other” and 
traditional metaphysics are no longer adequate to the psychological, social, 
historical, moral, and political-economic problems of the today. We are left 
alone on our global island: the world has become godless and God – if only as 
a postulant – is worldless.33 ‘Now,’ Nietzsche says, ‘everything is false from the 
root, words and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or overstrained.’34
According to Nietzsche, in the aftermath of losing a metaphysically jus-
tified existence, western man looked for replacement gods to fill the cipher 
for their once religious souls, to give consolation and to bandage the wounds 
that were inflicted.35 The post-religious western society searched for authori-
ties that would slay the chaos created by the descent into nothingness; that 
would pacify the ontological restlessness and would cancel the epistemologi-
cal confusion created by the reality of meaninglessness. Instead of trying to 
32 Ibid., 9.
33 As discussed before, this is an ontological condition that is understood in the West as be-
ing normative for the entire world. However, it is not the case that the Muslim world by 
and large has adopted such a nihilistic attitude towards religion or metaphysics. For most 
Muslims, the de-theologizing effects of the secularization process have not penetrated 
into the religious psyche of the believer. Islam has proven to be much more entrenched 
within the Muslim mind than Christianity was in Christendom, mainly, I believe, because 
the theological underpinnings of Islam were must more reasonable than in traditional 
Christianity. Additionally, Islam didn’t have the same abuse by authorities – thus causing 
so much bloodshed – as it did in Europe. Europeans couldn’t wait to abandon religion 
while Muslims are still holding on to it vigorously. In Europe, to leave religion behind was 
eventually to find a new and truer identity. For the Islamic world, the identity had to be 
found within Islam itself.
34 Ibid., 15.
35 Ibid., 12.
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revitalize the necessary illusions of the past, western society deliberately set-
tled for delusions (deliberately self-imposed illusions). The post-religious man 
was tempted by the new gods provides by racism, nationalism, consumerism, 
egoism (the deification of self via power, status, and wealth), and war. These 
false ideologies, these new consoling idolatrous deities, gave man an artificial 
sense of belonging, a new sense of identity, and a new sense of meaning. By 
losing oneself in the project of the big, the mass, the nation, the race, etc., the 
anxiety of existing in a world confronted by its own meaninglessness was al-
leviated and the individual gained a new sense of power – they were a part of 
something bigger than themselves, greater than their small existence, and they 
experienced themselves as being once again intrinsically full of worth. The iso-
lation that came with the atomized society was momentarily anesthetized, as 
the big project absorbed the alienated into itself and transformed them into 
a congealed mass of power. The fasces blade, held together by the binding of 
individual rods, is a poignant symbol of the capability of these new gods to 
transcend the pain of severe individualism and loneliness. It brought together 
that which had previously disintegrated. By providing control, structure, and 
guidelines, they once again restored mankind to certain equilibrium; he knew 
his place within such a society and thus experienced himself as free within the 
confines of that role. Because the coordinates of his existence were clearly de-
marcated, he felt secure, having escaped the anxiety of rootlessness. Although 
the transcendence of isolation may sound like a net positive for the individual 
and society, we must, as critical religiologists, be keenly aware of the nature of 
the new god these projects were in service to. The gods of modernity, which 
were meant to slay the God of pre-modernity, failed to eradicate the values 
and principles anchored within the Abrahamic traditions, and the post-secular 
condition was the subsequent result. This clash of the modern gods and the 
pre-modern God of Abraham is at the core of the troubles within the post-
secular conditions.
While Nietzsche himself advanced a new set of values, ones that embraced 
the Dionysian way-of-life – which emphasized embracing the will to life, 
the passions of human drama, and potential for overcoming – the rise of the 
übermenschen – he was also painfully aware that the advent of nihilism in the 
European context would lead those of lesser intellectual strength and forti-
tude to gravitate towards ideologies that he thought to be rooted within slave 
 morality – the ethics of the untermensch. Either way, Nietzsche could already 
see from his late 19th century perch that the 20th century would be reduced to 
ashes via society’s attempts to overcome nihilism. These instances were ulti-
mately feeble (yet destructive) attempts to “escape from freedom,” which was 
at the same time an escape from nihilism through the creation of nihilism. 
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In their desire to overcome the state of meaninglessness, rootlessness, insig-
nificance, powerlessness, and disconnectedness – those conditions created by 
the “death of god” – modern man turned to various authoritarian systems – 
the new gods – that guaranteed man’s liberation from the anxiety of freedom 
via the suppression of his autonomy. They became united with the big project 
and in doing so liberated themselves from the burden of individualization and 
their conscience.
In Erich Fromm’s 1941 book Escape from Freedom, he identifies the ‘mecha-
nisms of escape’ that are frequently found within modern man’s psyche when 
confronted with the pain of freedom.36 Witness the social, economic, and 
political chaos that ensued between the two world wars in Germany; the di-
minishment of a proud and industrious people to the level of paupers, the hu-
miliation of defeat and the oppressive insult of the Versailles Treaty, the sense 
that the divine had left them in the ditch of history, the feeling of hopelessness 
for the future, the witnessing of their children’s lives being wasted, and the 
resentment about those at the top of the social latter living a good life while 
the rest scavenge for their daily bread. Although it is an extreme, such a situ-
ation, where the individual finds no sense of meaning, purpose, or prospects 
for the future, leads many to abandon their personal freedom for the rule of 
the authoritarian, for “creative destruction,” and for the newly formed identity 
of the congealed masses – who, by creative propaganda and conditioning, in-
vest themselves into a larger project that they perceive conquers their sense 
of isolation and insignificance. Hitler provided the German people a way of 
regaining their honor, their integrity, and the respect they felt they had lost. In 
order to regain such qualities, the German population had to abandon their in-
dividuality, their autonomy, and their freedom, to which they gladly did. They 
joined a national project through which they received a new sense of purpose, 
a new sense of meaning, a new and powerful identity, a new “secondary bond” 
with the greater community, and a new sense of divine legitimation.37
Within the context of the recent Muslim immigration to the West, we are 
witnessing a similar situation, albeit not one situated within the absolute 
destruction of war. Second generation Muslims, the sons and daughters of 
immigrants to Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Nor-
way, Switzerland, etc., have been raised within two cultural systems; first is 
the religio-moral system of the home and family, where religion and “home 
culture” governs the expectations of the individuals. This “home culture” 
36 Erich Fromm. Escape from Freedom (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1994), 
135–204.
37 Ibid., 205–238.
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determines the rights and responsibilities of the each family member, it teach-
es the individual how to live with others, to fulfill the traditional roles that the 
family expects of one, and inculcates a sense of belonging and an altruistic 
geist in regards to kin and religious community. The home culture is rooted 
in social norms that are still valid within a religious context; it is the result of 
both traditional cultural norms, stemming from Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, Libya, and other Muslim countries, as well as Islam as it is practiced in 
the “home country.” In the formative period of the young Muslims life, during 
the process of bildung (moral formation), and familial acculturation, young 
Muslims are absorbing certain normative beliefs and practices that are deeply 
saturated with religious legitimation – they are good and correct because they 
represent the will and truth of the divine. Even if young Muslim do not become 
actively religious but rather enjoy the secular and often time morally question-
able trappings of life in the West, the belief that such normative values and 
principles are true because they are from the divine rarely dissipates – they 
just happen to be “bad Muslims” at the time. Many Muslim parents, fearing 
they’ll lose their children to the trappings of secularity, work very hard to in-
culcate such traditional values in their children, believing it will be a strong 
defense against the hedonism (which is itself an inadequate answer to the state 
of nihilism) of modern life. If we understand this first home culture as being 
the dominant source of values within the most formative bildung years, then 
we can see how and why it becomes so traumatic later in life for Muslims in 
the West face Nietzsche’s nihilistic culture. Their pre-modern morality is in 
conflict with the modern world, yet simultaneously it is of the modern post-
secular world and cannot totally retreat from it. Everything the home culture 
taught about good and evil, right and wrong, about the meaningfulness of the 
world, its purposivity and goodness, is confronted with a society that is full 
of crass consumerism, spiritlessness, relativism, atheistic idleness, drugs, ex-
treme isolation and atomization, and the abandonment of religious truth for 
a spirit-crushing meaninglessness. The young believer sees the remnants of 
a meaningful world in the churches and cathedrals, but also witnesses that 
which was expressed by Nietzsche when he says ‘what are these churches now, 
if they are not the tombs and monuments of God?’38 Yet, from the perspective 
of the West, what the individual is truly confronted with is freedom – the pos-
sibility of determining oneself outside of one’s heritage, culture, and historical 
baggage. This “freedom” to be that which what one determines oneself to be 
is an incomprehensible possibility for those who have been already pre- 
determined through a religiously constrictive bildung. It means that one has to 
38 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 104.
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consider the abandonment of the home culture for one that lacks theological 
legitimation – as it is conceived and constructed by the individual and their 
secular, individualistic and egoistic culture – as opposed to being inherited 
from generations of pious ancestors. This second culture, embodied in the no-
tion of individual freedom, coupled with the culture of nihilistic narcissism 
and hedonism, is a major challenge for the young Muslim in the West as it con-
fronts them with something religion has rarely gifted its devotees: a radicalized 
notion of personal autonomy.
Yet we are no longer in an age were secularity and post-metaphysics has 
confidence in itself. The secular world, which hardly believes in its own truth 
claims, no longer recognizes the “inherent” value in human life, is  death-friendly 
and crass about direct, systematic and systemic violent, and is pathologically 
directed towards all the new and false gods of the market, has stepped ful-
ly into Nietzsche’s nihilism, yet it has not determined a healthy way of being-
with such nihilism. It has sufficed to simply anesthetize the pain of being in a 
meaningless and godless world by bandaging the wound with the necrophilic 
materialist zeitgeist. Consequently, it is no longer the case that modern man 
is valued because the Divine itself gave him worth, but man is valued based 
on his ability to consume, to purchase, to accumulate commodities. For sure 
he is the bearer of rights, but those rights are not justified by a divine being, 
rather they are advanced by a democratically elected governing institution – 
and therefore those rights are contingent upon such institutions: there is no 
absolute guarantee as there was within religious systems.
The difficulty in internalizing the values of two very different cultures is 
massive and extremely traumatic. According to the Dutch-Muslim psycholo-
gist Bellari Said, depression was most prominent in first generation immi-
grants to Europe – as they longed for their homeland – but schizophrenia 
was most common in the second generation, having never lived in a country 
outside of the country their parents immigrated to. According to Ian Buruma, 
who interviewed Bellari Said, ‘a young Moroccan male of the second genera-
tion was ten times more likely to be schizophrenic than a native Dutchman 
from a similar economic background.’39 The normative expectations of two 
very different cultures tear apart the psychological wholeness of the person 
who is attempting to be both Muslim and western. If this reconciliation does 
not occur at the individual psychological level, the non-amalgamation of both 
creates an intense neurosis in the individual and ‘lead[s] to the disintegration 
of the personality.’40 This disunity within oneself – the house divided – is a 
39 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 121.
40 Ibid., 121.
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 disintegration of the ego that forces the individual to seek out ways of over-
coming the accompanying confusion, anxiety, and the schizophrenic identity.
Such a situation leaves many Muslims with two options: either fully adopt 
the “home culture” of Islam and abandon their parent’s “accommodating” ways, 
or assimilate fully into the predominant culture of the nation-state in which 
the individual resides. Those who choose the former, who withdraw from the 
culture that they’re alienated from, as it has often shunned them through rac-
ism and Islamophobic bigotry, acquire the “zeal” of a convert, which further 
isolates them from the predominant secular culture.
Most people think of a convert as a person who has left one religion and 
has adopted another, but there’s a different kind of conversion that happens 
when a nominal “cultural believer” leaves behind the “religion as official iden-
tity” form of religiosity and enters into a “religion as complete lifestyle” form 
of religiosity. Religious norms, convictions, and ideals become intensified and 
take on a heir of immediacy – for the “convert from within,” the attachment to 
religious thoughts, principles, and practices, stemming from the newly discov-
ered “relevancy” of religion, are all the more intense because they no longer 
identifies themselves with the predominant cultural that has been abandoned. 
In this sense, their religious beliefs are infused into all aspects of the believer’s 
lifeworld because that is all they have. From the perspective of Bellari Said, 
these ‘converts from within’ are looking for a ‘paradise lost,’ a sense of purity 
within religion by which they can cleanse themselves of the stain of secularity 
and nihilistic culture.41 Consequently, the more hedonistic and nihilistic the 
West becomes, the more it drives these young alienated individuals into an 
equally as deep hatred for such culture.
Not all witnessing and professing is positive. Some forms of witnessing and 
professing are highly destructive because they are either integrated aspects of 
diabolic ideologies while others are functionalized to further the aims of nihil-
istic violence. Just as the German of the 1930’s looked to an ideology to over-
come their current social and psychological challenges, many Muslims in the 
West, especially in Europe, look to radical Islam, often referred to as Islamism, 
as a way of overcoming their personal identity conflicts.42 Through adoption 
41 Ibid., 122.
42 I will only use the term Islamism as to denote the transformation of Islam into an ideol-
ogy. I use this term “ideology” in the Marxian sense as “false consciousness” or the “mask-
ing of specific interests behind a religious façade.” I do not consider Islam or any other 
religion an ideology in-and-of-itself and I do not use that term in the non-critical sense 
of a collection of ideas, thoughts, and values. Islamism, in this sense is false – because 
“it is not identical to itself” – as it abandons certain aspects of Islam that are essential to 
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of an authoritarian version of Islam, one that cancels personal autonomy and 
autonomous ratio for the certainty of authority, the literalness of scripture, the 
security of absolute moral correctness and the “purity” of thought and deed, 
the individual alleviates himself of all confusion about the meaning of exis-
tence, all questions of his purpose in life, and all doubts about truth. He hands 
over his schizophrenic existence to a movement that will provide for him a 
single identity – a prefabricated schema in which he melts into. This form of 
authoritarian Islam is a radical cancelation of subjective freedom, which he 
confronted within the secular society but could not find a way to reconcile 
himself to. In handing over his subjectivity to the objectivity of the schema, he 
also intimately ties himself to the “big project” of radical Islamism – the attack 
on the West.
From looking at testimony from former Islamists, we see that this attack 
on the West is both socio-political and psychological. From the first perspec-
tive, it is true that the individual has witnessed many evils done by various 
 western countries to Muslims. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, Israel, etc., these young men have grown up with the 
twenty four hour news cycle, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, where such 
atrocities are witnessed seemingly as a normative practice (albeit denied as 
being intentional) at least since the 1950’s, wherein American foreign policy 
took over the European colonial and neo-imperial projects in the Middle East. 
The witnessing of these atrocities invokes the notion of the ummah, the trans-
national “family” that all Muslims feel themselves a part of, and it increases the 
feeling of global victimization: as western countries victimizes the Muslims in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, they simultaneously victimize all of the global ummah. 
Injury done to some is injury done to all. The bombardment of images of Mus-
lims being slaughtered at the hands of western governments and militaries, the 
powerful symbolic image of Muhammad al-Durra – the 12 year old boy hiding 
behind his father in Palestine who was brutally assassinated by the Israel De-
fense Force (idf) for example, increases the humiliation and rage that is felt 
by the ummah which feels helpless and impotent to aid their fallen brothers 
and sisters in faith. They know that there is a moral imperative that impels the 
community at large to aid their fellow believers, but they are ashamed they do 
not. Nevertheless, the injustices of such actions are felt deeply and hearts are 
wounded.
it (such as substantive spirituality, intellectual inquisitiveness, and compassion for the 
other), without which it is merely formal and can be functionalized for the purposes of 
politics, economics, war, etc.
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Consequently, the confrontation with the West from the perspective of the 
“convert from within” is also a psychological jihād (struggle) against himself. No 
matter how much he wishes to cleanse himself of his upbringing within a west-
ern society, which inevitably has an effect upon his psyche, language, customs, 
etc., he cannot fully eradicate it from his being. It is always there as a constant 
reminder that he is a westerner even if he hates that aspect of himself. The 
convert hates that part of him, loathes it very existence, and desires to extract 
it from his being, for it is seen as a cancer. He psychologically projects such ha-
tred of himself at the abstraction deemed “the West” as a way of killing off that 
which festers inside of him. By attacking “the West” he attacks, suppresses, and 
attempt to assassinate a part of him that constantly reminds him of what he 
now believes is “evil” residing within. The West has become – beyond its own 
sins against the Muslim world – a symbol for his own self-hatred. Psychologi-
cally, that symbol must be destroyed in order to alleviate its own self-hatred. As 
long as the West survives, it survives in him and therefore his personality, his 
ego, remains intractably divided and schizophrenic. Islam as an ideology has 
not the capacity to transform the individual into a fully integrated Islamic per-
sonality, although it promises to do so, as itself lack an integrative wholeness. 
It is a distortion of Islam that has falsely liberated itself from its more pow-
erful and transformative aspects in the name of political expediency. It was 
not the political-economic aspects of Islam that transformed Malcolm x into a 
true Muslim, but the integrated wholeness of its truth content which includes 
its spirituality, its social justice, its intellectual inquisitiveness, its boldness in 
the face of a cruel world, its compassion for the poor, sick, hungry, orphans, 
and widows, etc. In other words, it was not just its politics, but its spiritual 
aspects, its moral code, its epistemology, its history, its radical social claims 
and its theology. Islam, in-and-of-itself, as embodied by the Prophet Muham-
mad, may be capable of such a transformation, but an authoritarian distor-
tion of Islam which merely serves as a political ideology can never serve as the 
catalyst for a revivification of the Muslim world, nor the complete conversion 
of the individual. Islamism is itself a modern form of nihilism, albeit one dis-
guised in the clerical garb of religion. The death-friendliness of Islamism, the 
willingness to unjustly sacrifice self and others for a cause that cannot gain a 
consensus via intellectual contestation and discourse, is a sign of such nihil-
ism. In an attempt to flee from Nietzsche’s nihilism, the Islamist runs into a 
religiously camouflage nihilism: nothing is worth living for except the illusion 
of a restored caliphate, so the Islamist is ready to die for that illusion. However, 
dying for something is cheap as anyone can do it. As Prophet Muhammad once 
said, ‘The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr,’ living 
for something is the greatest of all jihāds as it is the most difficult to endure.
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 Witnessing and Professing after Auschwitz: Theodor Adorno’s 
Poetics
One of the main concerns for the Frankfurt School’s critical philosophy was 
the question of life after Auschwitz. How does one go on living in a God-filled 
world where the mass production of corpses, the idolization of death, and the 
systematic extermination of “life unworthy of life,” is possible? How can one 
believe in any form of metaphysical truth or unconditional meaning, especial-
ly conceptions tied to a deity and or revelation, after the reality of Auschwitz? 
How can one witness and confess anything joyful, eudaimonic, and or hopeful 
in the shadow of absolute catastrophe; is this really a world that a loving and 
all-powerful God created? Or, as Adorno poetically questioned, can we really 
write poetry after Auschwitz?
In order to fully understand Adorno’s philosophy as it pertains to what is 
often called the Holocaust or Shoah, we must first examine why Adorno pre-
fers to neither describe it as “Holocaust” or “Shoah.” The most commonly used 
phrase, “holocaust,” coming from the Greek ὁλόkαυστoς (holokautein), was first 
made popular by Elie Wiesel, who thought it a fitting term to describe the fate 
of the Jews in Europe. Nevertheless, this term is imbued with theological and 
historical problems that render it morally unacceptable. A “holocaust” is a 
“burnt offering,” the word that was used to describe the Jewish ritual act of 
sacrificing animals to the divine in Jerusalem during the two Temple periods. 
When Wiesel appropriated the word from ancient history and used it to de-
scribe the mechanized mass destruction of Jews during the Third Reich, he in-
advertently transformed Hitler into the high priest of Judaism – an unintended 
ramification of a poor choice of words. Hitler, who oversaw the near-complete 
annihilation of the Jews of Europe through gas (Zyklon B) and fire, was likened 
to the High Priest who oversaw the burning of the animal offerings to the God 
of Israel. This would be a perverse insult to the Jewish victims of fascism – an 
unfortunate insight that Elie Wiesel only realized after the word had already 
been well established in literature, etc. In effect, each utterance of the word 
“holocaust” in this context re-victimizes the victims of fascism as Hitler seman-
tically takes his place at the center of Jewish temple worship.
Additionally, the Hebrew word “shoah,” which can be translated as “catas-
trophe,” finds itself substantively inadequate to describe what happened to the 
Jews by the Nazis; it remains too vague a concept to represent what Adorno 
calls ‘the millionfold death [that] has acquired a form never feared before.’43 
43 Theodor Adorno. Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, ed. Rolf Tiedemann. trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 106.
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The systematic mass extermination of the unwanted “other,” the mechanized 
production of corpses, the complete identification of the totalizing concept 
with those who are conceptualized, has no precedent in history, and therefore 
the word or phrase used to express this “new” development should also em-
body this particularity if it is going to be a meaningful term at all.44 “Shoah” 
fails at this task.
It is needless to say that the Third Reich’s own triumphalist title, which in 
itself expresses the eternal desire to rid Europe of its Jewish “pestilence,” is 
also morally repugnant; die Endlösung der Judenfrage (The Final Solution to 
the Jewish Question) need not be considered for the task. It should most cer-
tainly be remembered as it expresses the instrumental rationality, mentality 
and ideology that intoxicated a people with the insatiable lust for racial purity, 
but should not be used to remember the victims. To do so allows the perpetra-
tors to once again define who the victims: they’re the pestilence that warrants 
a “final solution.”
What Adorno, and hence many others following him, including Elie Wiesel, 
have understood to be the most proper term to carry the weight of the history 
and the singularity of the crime is the term “Auschwitz” itself, for “Auschwitz,” 
according to Adorno, embodies the unthinkable beyond the unthinkable. 
History itself has burdened it with the culpability of the crime that had the 
capacity to changed metaphysics entire, to which no previous crime has ever 
acquired the capacity.45 Adorno strips Auschwitz of its limited geographical 
understanding, and transforms it into a concept that embodies the worst that 
modern man is capable of. The little Polish city returns to its Polish name, 
Oświęcim, while the mass extermination of individuals that took place there 
congeals into a conception that represents the totality of human destructive-
ness (in general), that is so clearly articulated in the gas chambers and crema-
torium (in particular). In his analysis of society post-Third Reich, Adorno posits 
that Auschwitz is both the period of the mass extermination of the Jews, as 
well as the ‘world of torture which has continued to exist after Auschwitz.’46 He 
makes it clear that Auschwitz is still with us even after the liberation of the ex-
termination camps. I mean “still with us” not as poetic phrase to  sentimentally 
44 Theodor Adorno. Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1999), 362. 
This is not to say that genocidal acts had never occurred prior to fascist anti-Semitism, 
but that the way in which the forces of industry, mechanization, political-state resources, 
etc., were mobilized to accomplish the stated task of complete annihilation of a group of 
people was new to history.
45 Adorno, Metaphysics, 101, 115–116.
46 Adorno, Metaphysics, 101.
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memorialize the horror and terror that was exacted upon the innocent vic-
tims, but as a way of articulating Adorno’s contention that the conditions that 
produced Auschwitz have outlived Hitler both in the social, political, and eco-
nomic realities of neo-liberal capitalism, as well as in the psychology that is 
molded and conditioned within the parameters of capitalism – particularly 
among authoritarian personalities and those who wish to escape the anxiety 
and unbehagen (uneasiness) that is forced upon the individual while in a state 
of freedom. Just as we can express that Auschwitz is still with us (objectively), 
we may also be impelled to say it is still in us (subjectively).47
The fascistic conditions that remain post-Hitler produces both the rapa-
cious aggressiveness and hatred for the Muslims just as it creates the desire 
within some Muslims to exact revenge upon the West for its crimes against the 
Muslim community. Indeed, the post-secular society, in which secular citizens 
are integrated with their fellow citizens who are still religious, contains within 
itself the potential for a fascist resurgence. However, unlike the first outbreak 
of fascism, in the early 20th century, in which religious and secular fascists 
(via nationalism) colluded against the secular critics of capitalism, the interna-
tional communists, this outbreak could very well be between secular forms of 
fascism and religious forms of fascism. Either way, the failure of the left to in-
tegrate religious communities into the broader body politic, and improve their 
economic conditions, leaves the door open for such a barbaric confrontation.
 History and Metaphysics after Auschwitz
In Horkheimer and Adorno’s essay Elements of Anti-Semitism in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, there is an absence of a direct confrontation with Auschwitz 
in-and-of-itself, but instead they turn their critical analysis towards the phe-
nomenon of anti-Semitism as a symptom within the process of enlighten-
ment’s reversion to barbarism. To reflect on what Auschwitz itself is and was, 
beyond the simple protocol sentences of the positivist social sciences that seek 
to understand the mere mechanics of the extermination camps, deportations, 
and systematic terror of the Einsatzgruppen, is a much more intense and trou-
blesome sort of thinking to engage in. Writing the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
in 1943, Horkheimer and Adorno felt confident that they could offer a theory 
of anti-Semitism that explained National Socialism’s perverse infatuation with 
the Jews, account for the growth of nationalism, and elucidate the increasing 
47 Theodor Adorno, Can One Live After Auschwitz, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 13.
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diminishment of the genuine and autonomous individual within modern soci-
ety. But with their limited knowledge of the Vernichtungslager (extermination 
camp) – which they would later learn more about from Eugen Kogon’s book 
Der ss-Staat – could they explain Auschwitz in-and-of-itself?48 At the time of 
writing the Dialectic of Enlightenment, the full details of the camps had not yet 
been disclosed. Nevertheless, it appears that the optimism that Horkheimer 
and Adorno demonstrated in their ability to explain anti-Semitism in the Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment was stunted when they were confronted with the full re-
ality of Auschwitz’s mass catastrophe. The actual conditions of the pathological 
logic of the lager proved their 1942–1944 theories of anti-Semitism inadequate 
even if it did confirm their notion that the Enlightenment was engaged in self-
destruction.49 Unlike their friend and colleague Walter Benjamin, whose direct 
experiences with fascism led to his own suicide in Portbou, Spain, Horkheimer 
and Adorno only tangentially experienced the totalizing pain, suffering, and 
horror that terrorized the Jewish individual under fascism, as they escaped the 
murderous clutches of fascism by immigrating to America.50 Later, when con-
fronted with the reality of Auschwitz itself – the catastrophe of history that 
Benjamin already anticipated in his Angelus Novus – they were impelled to 
ask a different set of questions: what does Auschwitz ultimately mean? What 
kind of ramifications does the industrialized production of corpses have on 
our previously held conceptions of history, theology, theodicy, and metaphys-
ics? We can clearly understand the calculative and technological thought of 
the fascists, i.e. the logistics; how many Jews could be quartered within a bar-
rack; how many Jews could be gassed and burned within a 24 hour period; how 
many cattle cars will be needed to deport the entire Hungarian Jewish popu-
lation to Auschwitz – our positivistic sciences make this kind of knowledge 
available to us without reflection as to what it means. Their questions were 
more metaphysical in nature: how is ultimate reality different after Auschwitz 
with the knowledge that we live in a world were an Auschwitz is possible? As 
Adorno famously stated: can one really live after Auschwitz?51 From firsthand 
accounts, Horkheimer and Adorno eventually became aware of the conditions 
in the camps, especially through his reading the previously mentioned Eugene 
48 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 195–196; Eugen Kogon, Der ss-Staat: Das System der deutschen 
Konzentrationslager. München: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 2006.
49 Horkheimer and Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, xvi.
50 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: It’s History, Theories, and Political Significance, 
trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge: The mit Press, 1994), 127–148.
51 Adorno, Metaphysics, 110–111.
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Kogan’s Der ss-Staat, and only then could they direct their consciousness to 
‘think[ing through] the last extreme of horror’ in order to understand what 
Auschwitz meant to metaphysics and history.52
In their attempts to imbue some form of ultimate reason and meaningful-
ness into the catastrophe that was Auschwitz, philosophers and theologians 
often posit metaphysical claims, both secular and religious, to gleam some 
kind of conciliation that Auschwitz happened for an understandable reason – 
a reason that may not be manifestly available to us in all its fullness but is in 
existence nonetheless. For some Zionists, Auschwitz was clearly a part of God’s 
plan: the Isaac-like human sacrifice that brought about the state of Israel. For 
other theologians it was a “test theodicy,” equivalent to the afflictions inflicted 
upon Job, to see if the Jews would remain faithful to their ‘abusive God.’53 For 
some philosophers, reading back into Hegel’s optimistic metaphysics, it was 
the violent struggle of absolute spirit working its way through history towards 
its own self-realization. Adorno, in his Negative Dialectics resists all attempts to 
impart a positive meaning to Auschwitz. He writes,
After Auschwitz, our feeling resist any claim of the positivity of existence 
as sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any 
kind of sense, however bleached, out of the victims’ fate. And these feel-
ings do have an objective side after events that make a mockery of the 
construction of immanence as endowed with a meaning radiated by an 
affirmatively posited transcendence.54
In this passage Adorno prepares to defend the idea that Auschwitz is entirely 
meaningless – that we cannot extract any positive meaning out of the suffering 
of the victims no matter how much the human need for meaning impels us to. 
For Adorno, we cannot articulate such a meaning without re-victimizing the 
victim in the process – without producing absurd conclusions about their suf-
fering. No construction of a meaningful history within which an active agent, 
whether it be a divine being or absolute spirit, neither immanent or transcen-
dent, can be taken seriously in light of Auschwitz. In Adorno’s lecture 13 on 
Metaphysics ( July 13, 1965), he states,
52 Ibid., 125.
53 David R. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest. Louisville, ky: 
 Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993; Richard L. Rubenstein. After Auschwitz: History, The-
ology, and Contemporary Judaism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992; Sch-
weizer, Hating God, 2011.
54 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 361.
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To assert that existence or being has a positive meaning constituted with-
in itself and orientated towards the divine principle (if one is to put it 
like that), would be, like all the principles of truth, beauty and goodness 
which philosophers have concocted, a pure mockery in face of the vic-
tims and the infinitude of their torment.55
In light of his claim, any attempt of the theologian to claim Auschwitz as Deus 
Vult (God’s will) inevitably articulates a theodicy that is affirmative in nature – 
it endorses the systematic and discriminate targeting of one ethnic group for 
extermination as being a part of the divine’s plan; that the innocent had to suf-
fer and die while the guilty remain alive and prospered. All answers to the theo-
dicy problem remain untenable post-Auschwitz, including Jewish, Christian 
and Islamic answers. Additionally, any philosophical notion of a telos in his-
tory makes the same mistake as the theologian. This kind of thought, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, advances an affirmative notion that the Jews, 
and their suffering, have a positive meaning in history, which somehow justi-
fies their extermination. All positive notions of history, that express the notion 
that historical events happen for a ultimate-purposive reason, display a certain 
callousness that once again victimizes those already exterminated. Adorno’s 
philosophy finds no metaphysical justification in the suffering of the victim. 
He continues in his lecture to state,
In the face of the experiences we have had, not only through Auschwitz 
but through the introduction of torture as a permanent institution and 
through the atomic bomb – all these things form a kind of coherence, 
a hellish unity – in face of these experiences the assertion that what is 
has meaning, and the affirmative character which has been attributed to 
metaphysics almost without exception, become a mockery; and in face of 
the victims it becomes downright immoral.56
For Adorno, if we feel that we can return post-Auschwitz to any conception 
of history that has a metaphysical meaning, we are wrong. To think that the 
world is imbued with meaningfulness, that it’s full of purposiveness and 
guided by absolute spirit or the divine, is to believe that Auschwitz momen-
tarily suspended such trajectory, and then returned to it after the liberation 
of the dead-not-yet-dead. For Adorno, this is entirely impossible, ‘there can 
be no one, whose organ of experience has not entirely atrophied, for whom 
55 Adorno, Metaphysics, 101–102.
56 Adorno, Metaphysics, 104.
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the world after Auschwitz, that is, the world in which Auschwitz is possible, 
is the same world as it was before.’57 Adorno seems to suggest that the world 
in which Auschwitz happened, and is still capable of producing another Aus-
chwitz, demonstrates the impossibility of a “return” to a world in which there 
is some objective meaning. A mind that comprehends Auschwitz for what it 
is – the death of positive metaphysics – resists all attempts to return to such 
innocence or naïveté. Auschwitz is the final nail in the coffin of metaphysical 
positivity, which had already been slowly lowered into its grave by the Enlight-
enment’s secularization of the lifeworld. Indeed, if we take Adorno’s thought 
even farther, Auschwitz demonstrated the lie that the world ever had objec-
tive meaning. As the advance of Golgotha continues, as the slaughterbench 
of time provides more corpses piling upon one another, the more Benjamin’s 
prophetic image of Angelus Novus, who sees all of history as the accumula-
tion of catastrophe, reveals to us its prophetic core, that any attempt to rescue 
meaning in the face of meaningless slaughter is a fanciful and ultimately fruit-
less endeavor.58 For Adorno, any attempt to rescue or resurrect an imminent 
or transcendent theory of history that posits an intentioned telos, a positive 
metaphysics, or a meaningful explanation of historical suffering, can only be 
unmasked as ideology and false consciousness. It may console, but it is delu-
sional. After Auschwitz, Adorno remains suspicious of any thinking that fails 
to take into account the suffering of the finite individual, the muselmänner, 
and the totality of terror in the extermination camps, as that suffering exposes 
the ideological nature of all positive metaphysical statements in light of suffer-
ing’s ultimate meaninglessness.59 Metaphysical assertions that are saturated 
with meaning only further the subordination and domination of individuals 
57 Ibid., 104.
58 Benjamin, Illuminations, 257.
59 “Muselmänner” is a phrase that became part of the extermination camps’ lexicon. It de-
noted those who were “walking dead,” the “dead-not-yet-dead,” as Primo Levi described 
them. Outside of humans turned specimens, they were the most original product of 
Auschwitz. The muselmann figures in our most vivid images of Auschwitz. Those sur-
vivors who were propped up before the Allied cameras so that the world could see the 
unspeakable horror of mass starvation, sadism, and extermination, rarely survived after 
liberation. Their spirit was broken after being forcibly transformed into a new species: 
a species utterly devoid of human contact, human empathy, or human meaning – the 
wholly depraved. The hatred for them by other Jews in the camps inspired Rudolf Hoess, 
the commandant of Auschwitz to say ‘the Jews… lack solidarity. One would have thought 
that in a situation such as this they would inevitably help and protect one another. But 
no, quite the contrary.’ See Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, trans. Constantine 
FitzGibbon (London, Phoenix Press, 2000), 151.
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to a system of complete domination by providing a sense of comfort and false 
reconciliation. He states,
In view of them, the assertion of a purpose or meaning which is formally 
embedded in metaphysics is transformed into ideology, that is to say, into 
an empty solace which at the same time fulfills a very precise function in 
the world as it is: that of keeping people in line.60
In a world where there is clearly no metaphysical meaning to existence, a 
metaphysics that provides such a sense of purposiveness and ultimate reason-
ing for disaster, suffering, and catastrophe, does nothing for the individual but 
reconcile them to the socially manufactured horror and suffering of their lives. 
Post-Auschwitz, not only are metaphysical claims untrue, their continued an-
nunciation creates more potential victims for the pyre, as they prepare the 
grounds for another Auschwitz: they are illusions that kill.
Only later, after further reflection, did a glimmer of redemption arrive on 
the horizon for metaphysics in the language of the “totally other.” As expressed 
by Horkheimer,
The appeal to an entirely other (ein ganz Anderes) than this world had 
primarily a social-philosophical impetus. It led finally to a more positive 
evaluation of certain metaphysical trends, because the empirical ‘whole 
is the untrue’ (Adorno). The hope that earthly horror does not possess the 
last word is, to be sure, a non-scientific wish.61
Even on Horkheimer’s gravestone he had inscribed Psalm 91:2, ‘In you, eternal 
one, alone I trust.’ But after Auschwitz, did he really mean it?
 Ethics after Auschwitz
The overwhelming catastrophe that was Auschwitz endowed it with a certain 
moral authority, and that authority, rooted in the experience of incomprehen-
sible suffering, has a claim on our thoughts and actions. Hitler himself, ac-
cording to Adorno, imposes a ‘new categorical imperative’ upon us, that we 
60 Adorno, Metaphysics, 104.
61 Horkheimer’s forward in Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt 




‘arrange [our] thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so 
that nothing similar will happen.’62 Adorno refuses to subject this new impera-
tive to any form of logic as to ‘deal discursively with it’ would be an ‘outrage’ 
that would degenerate into a ‘bad infinity.’63 Instead, he believes that this new 
imperative is rooted in the material, i.e. the sensitivity towards the suffering 
of the finite individual, and most importantly to bodily experiences of agony, 
pain, and misery, and not metaphysical speculation. He says, ‘it is quite sim-
ply the moment of aversion to the inflicting of physical pain on what Brecht 
once called the torturable body of any person.’64 Ethics should direct itself to 
the reduction of suffering in the world, that one should not contribute to a 
globe that is already agonizing with weltschmerz (world pain), and that society 
should engage in the task of furthering the goal of a more-reconciled future 
society which resists the one-dimensionality of the culture industry that in-
tegrates the consciousness of the individual into the totalizing system, as well 
as continues Auschwitz through napalm, torture, abc wars, genocide, drone 
strikes, and all other forms of systemic, symbolic and direct violence. Adorno 
takes seriously Benjamin’s notion of the weak messianic power that the present 
generation has to redeem the innocent victims of the past – so that the mur-
derer shall ultimately not triumph over the innocent victim.65 The redemption 
of past suffering, although it will never guarantee autonomous meaning, can 
only occur when the present generation overcomes the conditions that make 
Auschwitz possible.
Adorno advances practical suggestions as to how we should direct our 
thoughts and actions towards the concrete negation of a future Auschwitz: ed-
ucation. He begins his essay Education after Auschwitz with this exclamation: 
‘The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again… 
every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential com-
pared to this single ideal: never again Auschwitz.’66 Although Adorno believes 
that the overall structure of society that enabled Auschwitz to happen remains 
firmly in place, and that the significance of the systematic and industrial 
murder of millions barely penetrates the consciousness of the individual, we 
must nevertheless infuse education with the means to combat that structure. 
 Adorno rejects the idea of appealing to ‘eternal values’ to combat the advance-
ment towards another Auschwitz, as those eternal values have been depleted 
62 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 365; Adorno, Metaphysics, 116.
63 Ibid., 365; Ibid., 116.
64 Adorno, Metaphysics, 116.
65 Benjamin, Illuminations, 254.
66 Adorno, Can One Live After Auschwitz, 19.
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of their significance for those already ‘prone to commit such atrocities.’67 Fur-
thermore, he believes those same “eternal values” that in popular usage are 
understood to be unequivocally good, too often serve as the ideological legiti-
mation for the evil that perpetuate Auschwitz.68 Through their functionaliza-
tion and abuse, they have lost their essential truth-content. Rather, he believes 
that since the root of genocide to be in nationalism – the ideology of blut und 
boden that ideologically binds the already atomized masses together – an edu-
cation thoroughly reformed after Auschwitz must penetrate into the individu-
al’s constitution. He says,
One must come to know the mechanisms that render people capable of 
such deeds, must reveal these mechanisms to them, and strive, by awak-
ening a general awareness of those mechanisms, to prevent people from 
becoming so again.69
Critical self-reflection, thinking against thinking, resistance to identity 
thought – the total identification of concept and those conceived, must all be 
nourished, fostered, and taught, beginning at a young age.70 Additionally, true 
individualism, the autonomy of the self that allows for resistance towards the 
coercive totalizing universal, must be recovered if the individual will have any 
ability to resist the ‘established authorities [when they] once again give them 
the order.’71 For Adorno, the autonomy of self is the only social power that has 
the capacity to resist another nationalist hysteria that would result in another 
Auschwitz. This autonomy is rooted in the individual’s ability to think against 
the universal, engage in self-reflection and self-critique, and act on conscience 
and not out of social pressure. He says, ‘I think the most important way to con-
front the danger of a recurrence is to work against the brute predominance of 
all collectives, to intensify the resistance to it by concentrating on the problem 
of collectivization.’72
Adorno has no illusions about this struggle against barbarization. He under-
stands that the prevailing trajectory of history is on a path towards such a glob-
al calamity, thus making any struggle against this totalizing trend contra mundi 
in essence. Bourgeois coldness, the instrumental rationality that animated the 
67 Ibid., 20.
68 Adorno, Metaphysics, 171.






plans, the production, and execution of Auschwitz, and the incestuous ideolo-
gy of nationalism in service to and in cooperation with capitalism, and the loss 
of the autonomous individual, are the conditions that were necessary for Aus-
chwitz to occur. Unfortunately, as Adorno understood, they are also the pre-
dominant conditions of the world today, and that despite our best efforts, we 
may ‘hardly hinder the renewed growth of desktop murderers.’73 Nevertheless, 
philosophy, thinking, education, and religion, must all be directed towards the 
total ban on Auschwitz ever reoccurring. If ‘perennial suffering has as much 
right to expression as a tortured man has to scream,’ not only can we write po-
etry after Auschwitz, we are impelled to give voice to the suffering through our 
words and deeds so that more victims of Auschwitz are not created.74
 Witnessing the Messianic: The Case of the Martyr Walter Benjamin
The core of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of religion can be found in 
the sensitivity to the suffering of the finite individual who is threatened and 
plagued by both first and second nature, who is subject to the horror and ter-
ror of nature and history, as well as the modern form of exploitation through 
globalized corporate neo-liberalism, neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism, dicta-
torship, and class domination. The modern individual is also subject to the 
growing antagonism between the secular and the religious, the political right 
and political left, the polarizing politics of capitalism and socialism, as well 
as the struggle between various religions and non-religious philosophies. The 
pain of being against the grain of modern society, once acutely felt by Jews 
in Europe, is now what afflicts the Muslims in the post-secular West. Because 
of the alienation and suffering caused by the anachronistic tension of recalci-
trant faith, the longing for messianic transcendence is strongest among them 
today. This comprehensive cage of anxiety, tension and despaire gives birth to 
a powerful longing: the longing for the messianic.
The idea of the messianic is born out of the notion that history is catas-
trophe and the idea that history is catastrophe is rooted in the experience of 
history as unbearable suffering. This sensitivity towards the horror and terror 
caused by the slaughterbench of history can be witnessed most profoundly 
in Walter Benjamin’s messianic infused Theses on the Philosophy of History 
(1940). Written ‘with the thoughts of death’ ever-present, Benjamin’s Theses 
provide momentary glimpses into his thoughts on the catastrophic nature of 
73 Ibid., 33.
74 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 362.
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human existence.75 The intensity of fascism, culminating in the Nuremberg 
laws, Kristallnacht, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Hitler-Stalin Pact), en-
gulfed his thinking about the nature of history, the role of the historian, the 
present-day accounting of past victims of history, and the potential for the 
messianic age. Although Benjamin was deeply influenced by the Marxism of 
Bertolt Brecht, the last worked he penned was saturated with theological and 
messianic content that has puzzled many as to why he consistently resurrected 
theological language that had already lost most of its social relevance in his 
secular age. Was Benjamin simply following Marx in his translation of religious 
semantic and semiotic materialism into secular philosophy, or rescuing phi-
losophy in the form of theology? Was he returning to the religious views of his 
forefathers in light of the historic catastrophe of fascism as so many other hith-
erto secular Jews had done, or was he bringing the two very different and often 
antagonistic worlds together in an uneasy synthesis? Were theology, messian-
ism and radical Marxist philosophy engaged in a détente in Benjamin’s mind 
and working towards the same liberational goal? If so, can the Muslims of Eu-
rope and America today learn something useful from this alliance of theology 
and philosophy?
 The Place for Theology
The debate between scholars of Benjamin’s political theology have divided 
themselves within two different camps, (1) those who interpret Benjamin’s 
theological language symbolically, arguing that Benjamin’s religious language 
should be understood as revolutionary-Marxist language behind the persona 
of theology, always carrying a “materialistic intent” (Tiedemann, Žižek, Wolin, 
Boer, etc.), and that Messianism and Marxism are essentially incompatible, and 
(2) those who interpret Benjamin’s theological language as both revolutionary- 
materialistic and theological (Rabinbach, Jacobson, Buck-Morss).76 Battle 
75 Walter Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin: 1910–1940, ed. Gershom Scho-
lem and Theodor Adorno. Trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994. Adorno stated, “Insight into the objective conditions 
of that fate [private misfortune] gave him the strength to raise himself above it; the very 
strength that allowed him in 1940, doubtless with thoughts of death, to formulate the 
theses ‘On the Concept of History.’”
76 Rolf Tiedemann, “Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the 
Theses ‘On the Concept of History’” in Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. Gary 
Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989; Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes. 
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lines are drawn over Benjamin’s first thesis in his Theses on the Philosophy 
of History, where he conjures up an image of the symbiotic relationship of a 
puppet-automaton and a hunchback dwarf (the perennial image of a  distorted 
life). He says,
The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could 
play a winning game of chess, answering each move of an opponent with 
a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth 
sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors cre-
ated the illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, 
a little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside and guided 
the puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophical 
counterpart to this device. The puppet called ‘historical materialism’ is 
to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the 
services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep 
out of sight.77
A materialist reading is uncomfortable with Benjamin’s image of a “wizened” 
theology that animates the puppet of historical materialism and the idea that 
theology is the force that allowed historical materialism to “win all the time.” 
This seems to subordinate historical materialism under the authority and 
direction of theology, as it is the dwarf that remains in control of the string, 
which conjures up a feeling of odium theologicum among the materialists.78 
From a conventional Marxist perspective, theology, belonging to the realm of 
religion as opposed to science, has the function of dulling the consciousness 
of the masses partly by promising paradise in the hereafter for their quiet ac-
ceptance of the current system of domination. The Marxist does not want to 
wait to be rescued from oppression through death or by a promised Messiah, 
but rather is committed to actualizing a classless and just society in the present 
through revolutionary thought and praxis. Religion for many Marxists, as we 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982; Roland Boer, Marxist Criticism of the Bible. New 
York: Continuum, 2003; Anson Rabinbach, “Benjamin, Bloch and Modern German Jewish 
Messianism” New German Critique Winter 1985, Number 34. 78–124; Eric Jacobson, Meta-
physics of the Propane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2003; Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: 
Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project. Cambridge, Mass: The mit Press, 1991.
77 Benjamin, Illuminations, 253.
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stated earlier, is counterrevolutionary. And yet Benjamin positions theology as 
the grand strategist of historical materialism?
The theological reading suggests that (1) historical materialism has returned 
to its origins in religion – based on the notion that Marxism has secularized 
prophetic and messianic religion – especially with its insistence on the prin-
ciple of equality. In the crisis leading up to 1940, historical materialists like 
Benjamin understood that the previous Feuerbachian negation of religion also 
negated its liberational potential – its ability to point to a possibility of life 
beyond the horror and terror of the already given. This action, stemming from 
a particular anti-religious reading of Marx’s critique of religion, reduced Marx-
ism to the point that it shared in the same scientistic qualities as fascism.79 
(2) Despite the social reality that “God is dead,” theology can once again be 
an agent of change if rescued by historical materialism. (3) Due to the painful 
memory of religion and theology’s criminal history in Europe, and the fact that 
its dictates appear absurd and authoritarian in the modern world, theology 
must hide its “ugliness” in the secular public sphere.
Those opposed to this kind of theological reading suggest that historical 
materialism ‘enlists’ theology, and therefore historical materialism is in fact 
the possessor of agency: ‘it is in control.’80 For Tiedemann and others, theol-
ogy serves historical materialism and does the heavy lifting of revolutionary 
change, but does not possess autonomous authority. In this sense, the mes-
sianic moment is not a matter or theology or religion; the Messiah is not the 
redeemer of the world, but rather the agent of redemption is Marx’s revolu-
tionary working class aided by theology. The materialist readers of Benjamin 
reject the idea that he appropriated traditional Jewish apocalypticism and 
messianism within his Marxist critique of history; rather they read him as say-
ing that secular historical materialism can cooperate with theology (maybe 
not the theologian) to win in all their struggles. Nevertheless, historical mate-
rialism doesn’t resign its revolutionary potential when it enlisted theology, but 
forms a coalition but keeps itself at the helm. Ultimately Theses i, at minimum, 
reserves a place for theology in the struggle for human emancipation and does 
not retreat into a dogmatic “scientific” materialism that was characteristic of 
Soviet Marxism – even ardent materialists such as Tiedemann admit the valid-
ity of this interpretation, albeit uneasily.
Although it may make some secular scholars uncomfortable, one cannot 
deny that Benjamin’s theological impulse permeates his work. He says in his 
Arcades Project, ‘my thinking is related to theology as blotting pad is related to 
79 Ibid., 259.
80 Tiedemann, Historical Materialism of Political Messianism, 190.
chapter 5194
<UN>
ink. It is saturated with it.’81 Although his writing may be saturated with theol-
ogy, which gives “orthodox Marxists” pause, he nevertheless understands that 
it must remain hidden behind the face of historical materialism: hidden behind 
the ‘specter that is haunting Europe,’ is wise but ugly theology. In this sense, 
Benjamin’s philosophy of religion anticipates the post-secular society as both 
religion and secularity are operate in conjunction with each other just as both 
are prevalent within the conditions of modern western society. The question 
is whether or not they can form a mutually acceptable and beneficial alliance 
in bringing about a more reconciled future society as Benjamin’s philosophy 
would suggest it could.
 Messiah, Messianic and the Historian
Benjamin’s three most important works for understanding his philosophy of 
history and messianism are his Theologico-Political Fragment (1921), The Ar-
cades Project (1927–1940), and his Theses on the Philosophy of History (1940) – 
the last being the most substantial work on messianism. In these three works, 
three figures remain at the core of the analysis: The Messiah, the messianic, 
and the historian. Although all three are often woven together in Benjamin’s 
analysis, there is enough space between them to see the three as distinct enti-
ties or “thought constellations.” Benjamin is most explicit about the role of the 
Messiah in his Theologico-Political Fragment, where he makes clear the role of 
the Messiah in relation to history, which makes it the most impenetrable to a 
materialist reading. Benjamin writes,
Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in the sense that he 
alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. For this 
reason nothing historical can relate itself on its own account to anything 
Messianic. Therefore the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical 
dynamic; it cannot be set as a goal. From the standpoint of history it is 
not the goal, but the end. Therefore the order of the profane cannot be 
built up on the idea of the Divine Kingdom, and therefore theocracy has 
no political, but only a religious meaning.82
For Benjamin, no activity within history can claim to be of the Messiah, i.e. it 
cannot redeem or consummate history, nor can it redeem the dead, and no 
81 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 471.
82 Benjamin, “Theologico-Political Fragment” in Reflections, 312.
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political attempt to bring about a more reconciled society can be legitimized 
via the “Kingdom of God.” All of this culminates in Benjamin’s political im-
perative: there can be no theocracy, where the state and religion are identical. 
The historical entrance of the Messiah, who reveals the Deus Vult, is the end of 
history and not the teleological culmination of history. The unredeemed world 
cannot bring about its own redemption according to Benjamin, who draws 
this notion from a certain Jewish understanding of the role of the Messiah.83 
What history is capable of doing is directing the order of the profane toward 
human happiness, i.e. the ideal goal of political economy. Nevertheless, he un-
derstands history as having a dialectical tension within it between the sacred 
and the profane,
If one arrow points to the goal toward which the profane dynamic acts, 
and another marks the direction of Messianic intensity, then certainly 
the quest of free humanity for happiness runs counter to the Messianic 
direction; but just as a force can, through acting, increase another that 
is acting in the opposite direction, so the order of the profane assists, 
through being profane, the coming of the Messianic Kingdom.84
Benjamin isn’t explicit by what he means by “happiness”; whether he has a 
eudaimonic conception in mind or an emotive form of temporary titillation 
that is prevalent within modern consumer society is not fully disclosed. Nei-
ther is he clear on what kind of “profane” society he has in mind: is it a social-
ist, communist, or capitalist society? If we can assume that Benjamin believes 
historical materialism is capable of bringing about the conditions for human 
flourishing (or actualization as he preferred),85 and therefore true human hap-
piness, then we must assume that historical materialism is the unintentional 
handmaiden of the Messiah, as its trajectory towards profane happiness “as-
sists” the interjection of the Messiah into human history; the closer history ac-
tualizes true human happiness, the closer the messianic age comes into being. 
But would the opposite of this analysis consequently be equally as true: the 
worse the world gets is the time least likely for the Messiah to appear? When 
he is needed most is precisely when he will not come? At least in 1920–1921, 
the traditional notion of a Messiah, as a redeemer who ends history, was not 
a complete impossibility for Benjamin, even if it was a radically different un-
derstanding than can be found in Judaism, who understood the Messiah to 
83 Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism, 10–11.
84 Benjamin, Theologico-Political Fragment, 312.
85 Benjamin, Arcades Project, 460.
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be more of a temporal figure who delivers the Jewish people from their trials 
and tribulations. Nevertheless, within Benjamin’s philosophy he preserved the 
idea of a messianic break of history via means that were outside of history, 
something that revolutionary class struggle could not do as it is bound within 
history.
Although the ultimate goal of this fragmentary writing was to warn against 
the legitimization of human activity via the messianic, the Messiah he speaks 
of in this fragment is incapable – by definition – of being understood as sym-
bolic language for revolutionary class struggle. At the time of writing, the Mes-
siah and the messianic (as we can interpret later in the Theses) are wholly 
separate concepts. Only the Messiah can end history. The end of history cannot 
be brought out by the triumph of the working class as Marx would have it, or 
as the working out of absolute spirit as Hegel would have it, for both are within 
history. For Benjamin’s 1921 essay, the historical process can only increase the 
dialectical tension that hastens the appearance of the Messiah (but cannot 
force it to come – not even the disaster of Auschwitz forced the long awaited 
Messiah to appear). It is apparent from history that the Jews, in all their agony 
and desperation, suffer from the same parousia (παρoυσία) delay that Chris-
tians have experienced since the death of Rabbi Jesus of Nazareth: the non-
appearance of the promised and severely needed Messiah.
Benjamin’s notion of the Messiah is one that ushers in the utopian element 
of messianism as well as the violent destruction of the world as it is: the ‘hell’ 
of the ‘status quo.’86 The Messiah breaks into history through the gates of time, 
destroys the world characterized by the aristocratic law of nature, and ushers in 
a total reconciliation of the historical antagonisms that have plagued human 
and natural existence – the wolf will lie down with the lamb and eat straw 
like an ox.87 Yet Benjamin’s Messiah is not restorative and nationalistic in the 
traditional Jewish sense, i.e. restoration of the Kingdom of David in Israel, but 
rather takes the form of a universal apocatastasis (ἀπokατάστᾰσις – restoration 
of primordial conditions) – he is tikkun olam (world healing). Whether or not 
Benjamin, through the influence of Scholem, truly believed in a figure such as 
the Messiah is not truly possible to ascertain from his enigmatic writings. Nev-
ertheless, the importance of the Messiah in his early writings seems to suggest 
that there remained a longing for a Messiah-like figure – one that would ulti-
mately redeem a historically unredeemable world. This ‘longing,’ according to 
86 Ibid., 473.
87 Benjamin, Illuminations, 264; Scholem, Messianic Idea, 17; Isiah, 65:25.
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Horkheimer, ‘unites all men so that the horrible events, the injustice of history 
so far would not be permitted to be the final, ultimate fate of the victims…’88
In Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History, he once again preserves 
the idea of the figure of the Messiah as separate from the messianic, speaking 
of the later in terms of the “we,” i.e. historical materialists historians, whose 
messianic purpose it is to ‘brush history against the grain.’89 The importance of 
the historian can be seen in Benjamin’s most striking image: Paul Klee’s paint-
ing Angelus Novus. In attempting to unravel the meaning of Benjamin’s the-
ses on the Angel of History, many interpreters fail to notice that the painting 
serves as the image for Benjamin’s conception of the historical materialist his-
torian. Benjamin is not making a theological claim but rather is constructing 
a dialectical image that discloses to those influenced by historical materialism 
the importance of seeing history as catastrophe. He writes,
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though 
he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His 
eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one 
pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we 
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The an-
gel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his 
wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we 
call progress.90
Those that see history as ‘one single catastrophe’ are those who have adopted 
the historical materialists conception of history (like the angel of history); they 
are those that see the catastrophic within the ‘cultural treasures’ before them; 
they honor the agony of those who toil – whose blood and tears are the precon-
dition of modern ‘progress’; they remember the suffering of those who built 
the skyscrapers, the castles, the bridges, those who have suffered  alienated 
88 Max Horkheimer, Dawn and Decline: Notes 1926–1931 & 1950–1969, trans. Michael Shaw 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1978), 239.
89 Benjamin, Illuminations, 257. One must note that Benjamin himself never describes any 
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90 Ibid., 257. My emphasis.
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 labor and exploitation, those who have fought the wars started by others and 
for the benefit of others, etc. They are those who have suffered throughout 
history so that the few can have the spoils of life. They cannot rejoice in the 
triumphs of culture as they alone see the destruction that those triumphs are 
built upon. Like the angel of history, they see disaster where others see beauty; 
they see pain where others see joy; they see suffering where others see accom-
plishments; they see all of history as a monad of catastrophe where others see 
an unstoppable linearity of progress. Expressing this insight, Benjamin says, 
‘there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document 
of barbarism.’91 It is the historical materialist who can see clearly the barba-
rism of history – the cross in the rose (to reverse Hegel). Furthermore, it is the 
role of the historical materialist historian to look back into history to give voice 
to the suffering of the victims of history – as proleptic solidarity with the inno-
cent victims of history is the weak messianic power that the present generation 
has against the possibility that the murderer shall not ultimately triumph over 
the innocent victim. In the face of the Messiah’s absence, that is all the living 
can do to rescue the dead. This future oriented remembrance of past victims 
allows the critical historian to reveal the ‘depository of historical knowledge’ 
that is embedded in the existence of those who have been relegated to the 
ditch of history. The present generation must be motivated by the past injus-
tices done unto the ‘enslaved ancestors,’ which Benjamin understands as its 
‘greatest strength’ in the face of fascism.92 In remembering the dead and giving 
voice to their suffering, the critical historian prevents history from becoming 
a ‘tool of the ruling classes’ as the triumph of the victors is denied the ability 
to silence or functionalize the memory of their victims.93 Conversely, in the 
hands of the historical materialist, history becomes the grand inquisitor of the 
victors and not its triumphal creation. This historical materialist approach to 
history aids in the bringing about a ‘real state of emergency’ that ‘will improve 
our position in the struggle against Fascism,’ as the real state of emergency is 
predicated on the full accounting of human suffering.94 According to Benja-
min’s dialectical image, a storm that we [historical materialists] call progress 
is brewing, either in the form of the Messiah’s breaking of the eternal cycle of 
suffering, or the final messianic triumph of the working class which is its own 





199After Auschwitz: Islam In Europe
<UN>
 Benjamin’s Critique of Progress: Witnessing History as Barbarity
‘This storm is what we call progress’ is the key phrase in Benjamin’s theses on 
the Angelus Novus. Benjamin wants to contrast the historical materialist con-
ception of progress to that of the Enlightenment’s conception of progress as 
shared by liberals, social democrats, German idealists, vulgar-Marxists, and all 
others who see history in a linear fashion that is imbued with optimism con-
cerning the perfectibility of man and society. What ‘we’ call progress is not the 
same as what ‘they’ conceptualize as progress, he says,
historical materialism… has annihilated within itself the idea of prog-
ress. Just here, historical materialism has every reason to distinguish it-
self sharply from bourgeois habits of thought. Its founding concept is not 
progress but actualization.95
For Benjamin, the belief in the Enlightenments notion of progress has a heavy 
price. The Enlightenment posited the ideal that mankind and human society 
could be perfected through the mastery of the self and nature; that humanity 
could become the masters of their own fate; that we could bring about a soci-
ety that is rooted in Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité within the bounds of the given: 
bourgeois capitalism; that it would produce an abundance of material goods 
beyond the realm of necessity; that industrial and technological advance-
ments would increase the efficiency of the means of production, thus leading 
to a life lived more abundantly; that scientific knowledge would replace reli-
gious dogmas and provide better conditions for human flourishing. “Progress” 
was synonymous with inevitability, or what Benjamin described as ‘something 
that automatically pursued a straight or spiral course.’96 Yet Benjamin is aware 
that the ‘technological progress’ of humanity, the ‘advance in men’s ability and 
knowledge,’ is not identical with man’s moral advancement, or his actualiza-
tion, or his ability to think and act in universally humanistic ways.97 Tech-
nological advancements, i.e. instrumental rationality, had advanced beyond 
communicative rationality. Human “progress” had not brought about a more 
reconciled world, but a world gone mad (irrational ends) with better tools of 
destruction (rational means). What Benjamin rightly deems “progress,” in the 
95 Benjamin, Arcades Project, 460.




messianic sense, is the ‘first revolutionary measure taken’ against such an op-
timistic world.98
The spirit of Benjamin’s critique of progress can be seen most clearly in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment – which was deeply in-
fluenced by Benjamin’s work – where the light of critique is shined upon the 
dark side of the Enlightenment’s “progress.” The Hegelian optimism that his-
tory is inherently on a trajectory towards its own resolution; that all events 
in history dialectically propel it towards a progressive final outcome; that the 
horror and terror of Golgotha serves a meaningful teleological end, cannot be 
maintained in light of the catastrophic 20th century – which is but the lat-
est layer of historical debris piling skyward. In light of the perennial suffer-
ing of the oppressed, history seems more akin to Nietzsche’s eternal return: a 
never-ending cycle of misery that lead to no resolution or reconciliation.99 For 
Benjamin, if true progress can exist, it is within the historians’ memory of the 
victims of ‘progress’ and the absolute cessation of such ‘destructive’ progress 
via the ‘storm that is blowing from Paradise.’ What remains to be determined 
is whether or not the Messiah or the messianic power of the working class is 
the true agent behind the storm or even if a storm is truly brewing. If we fol-
low Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse’s pessimistic analysis of the diminished 
potential for revolutionary change via the working class, then the messianic 
power of the working class has already been abandoned in theory because it 
was absorbed into the prevailing system of domination by socially modified 
capitalism and nationalism. Consequently, wwi and wwii demonstrated that 
capitalism and nationalism have the power to subdue and neutralize the mes-
sianic qualities of the working class. If the materialist interpretation of Benja-
min’s philosophy prevails, then his political messianism plays very little if any 
role in Critical Theory today. What does remain is his method of translating 
religious semantic and semiotic material into critical social philosophy within 
the tradition of Critical Theory.100
If we remain loyal to the apocalyptic conception of the Messiah, then, as 
before, the world suffers from the pain of delay – the non-appearance of the 
Messiah. The weltschmerz (world pain) of the unredeemed world continues 
unabated through history as neither the Messiah nor the messianic revolu-
tionary working classes have ended the continual slaughterbench. All that has 
come is the consolation of the historical materialist historian, whose calling 
it is to remind us of the victims of history who continue to press their claim 
98 Benjamin, Arcades Project, 474.
99 Ibid., 115–119.
100 Adorno, “Reason and Revelation” in Critical Models, 136–137.
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upon us, for it is he that ‘invites the dead to the table.’101 History, from the per-
spective of Benjamin, cannot redeem itself. That which transcends the given is 
not born within the given; that which makes past suffering meaningful cannot 
have as its genesis the same history that created the suffering. Redemption, if 
there ever can be such a thing, can only break the history created by man and 
nature – it must come from outside of the conditions of the given. Benjamin’s 
hopefulness that such a time-continuum-stopping event could occur is among 
the most distinguishing elements of his theological-oriented form of historical 
materialism. Only through the eyes of the messianic, or through that which 
has the power and authority to redeem, was he given any form of hope about 
the future. For him, it was the only available option left when surrounding by 
history that appeared to him in its most honest form: a single event of catastro-
phe. The theological element in his thought, which cured him of the idealist’s 
optimism, also forced him to witness the barbaric absurdity of history, simulta-
neously rescuing him from the despair through messianic hope.
101 Benjamin, Illuminations, 254; Arcades Project, 481.
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chapter 6
Post-Secularity and Its Discontents: The Barbaric 
Revolt against Barbarism
The summer of 2014 revealed most brutally the pathological and violent stanc-
es that are often adopted by world religions. In moments of crisis, where the 
potential for the greatest forms of reconciliation are possible, they have chosen 
to embrace a deeply antagonistic attitude towards the other that has often led 
to destruction, mass murder, absolute brutality, and the deepening of distrust 
and disrespect, which has resulted in the widening of the gulf that already sepa-
rates them. Whether it be Israel’s war on Gaza’s civilian population and Hamas’ 
war on Israel – resulting in the deaths of over 2,200 people; the war perpetrated 
by Kiev’s liberal-fascist coalition on ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine; isis’s 
war on Yazidis, Christians, and Shi’a Muslims; the very un-Christian-like recep-
tion of immigrants fleeing from violence-infested countries in Latin America 
at the southern u.s. border, or the neo-Nazi response to Muslim immigrants 
fleeing into Europe from Iraq and Syria; or the racial conflict in Ferguson, Mis-
souri, usa, in which aggressive police action was taken against violent street 
protests after the killing of 18 year old Michael Brown by the Ferguson police 
office Darren Wilson; in all these events, religion rarely played any reconcilia-
tory factor, but either helped fuel the fire of division and violence. At best it re-
mained mute and/or ineffective in seeking reconciliation. In some occasions, 
such as in Israel, Iraq, and the Ukraine, clerics blessed those who were killing 
(often indiscriminately) – offering them the legitimation and sanction of their 
religious authorities. In one summer, all these things pointed to the growing 
trend of rebarbarization. But why, if all the statistical trends point to a more 
peaceful world, has such violence become commonplace? What is it about the 
conditions of post-secular modernity that bring this level of violence to the 
forefront of history, and what has religion to do with it all?
In his advocatus diaboli essay, Prof. Morris Cohen wrote about the dark side 
of religion, stating,
cruel persecution and intolerance are not accidents, but grow out of the 
very essence of religion, namely, its absolute claims. So long as each re-
ligion claims to have absolute, supernaturally revealed truths, all other 
religions are sinful errors. Despite the fact that some religions speak 
© dustin j. byrd, 2017 | doi 10.1163/9789004328556_007
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 eloquently of universal brotherhood, they have always in fact divided 
mankind into sects… Even when a religion like Christianity or Islam 
sweeps over diverse peoples and temporarily unites them into one, its 
passionate nature inevitably leads to the development of sects and her-
esies. There is no drearier chapter in the history of human misery than 
the unusually bloody internecine religious or sectarian wars which have 
drenched in blood so much of Europe, Northern Africa, and Western 
Asia.1
Although Professor Cohen’s essay was meant to strengthen the arguments 
of  those who are systematically attacked by the critics of religion, there is 
 nevertheless some truth within their critiques, otherwise such critiques would 
not speak so forcefully to so many in today’s world that have left religion 
out of disgust for either religion’s dogmatic obscurantism or the  seemingly 
warped moral compass of so many believers. According to the Frankfurt 
School’s critical theorists of religion, such critiques of religion shouldn’t be 
dismissed lightly, but should themselves be subject to critical interrogation, as 
such arguments may serve as a vital source of rethinking, self-reflexivity, and 
reform. So, we must ask, is the critic right? Has religion become the opposite 
of what many assumed it is supposed to be? Has it collapsed upon itself due 
to the weight of its own internal fears and anxieties, thus distorting its true 
nature? Is Horkheimer correct in thinking that religions, especially those that 
are rooted in the negativity of the bilderverbot, betray their cause and ideals 
when they become identical with state power?2 These and many other ques-
tions about religion – especially the Abrahamic faiths – in the post-secular 
society as well as in pre-secular societies should be asked and asked repeat-
edly, for if the critics are right, and religion is simply a source of division and 
violence, the sooner we abandon religion the sooner humanity can achieve 
universal peace. If they are incorrect, and religion still can serve as a force 
for universal good, then we must explore how and in what form religion can 
be rescued.
1 My emphasis. Walter Kaufmann, ed., Religion from Tolstoy to Camus (New York: Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1964), 289–290.
2 Max Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason, 34–40; Roland Boer, Criticism of Theology: 
On Marxism and Theology iii (Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2012), 33–42. Also see Michael R. 
Ott, Max Horkheimer’s Critical Theory of Religion: The Meaning of Religion in the Struggle for 




We must begin to look at the problem of absolutivity, or the “absolute claims” 
that Cohen identifies as not only the essence of religion, but also the source of 
its sinful “persecutions” and “intolerance.” From a critical perspective, the no-
tion of absolutivity is dialectical in nature: it maintains within itself two  natures 
that are in tension with one another. First, absolutivity – the idea that a par-
ticular value, belief, or practice, or cluster of values, beliefs, and practices, are 
infinitely correct, morally infallible, and without flaw, precisely because they – 
and only they – are the directives of the divine, and as a by-product of divinity, 
these absolute claims make identifiable ‘sinful errors’ in others. In this case, 
absolutism produces exclusivity in truth. For example, Christianity’s claim for 
Christ’s divinity can either be true or not, but cannot be both  simultaneously. 
To enter into a détente-like status between these two absolute claims is to fall 
into the trap of relativism, wherein another form of “double truth” theory 
reigns: where (1) each individual is subjectively satisfied with the veracity of 
their own particular claim, and (2) individuals abandon any conception of 
objective universal truth.3 While this relativist double truth may help recon-
cile the believers to each other on a social level, and therefore forestall tense 
and aggression, it fails to establish the veracity of the competing truth claims. 
Additionally, such exclusive claims to absolutes often migrate from the purely 
theological into the political, which often has diabolical consequences. An ex-
ample of the most intractable conflict of absolutes resides in the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict, especially over the “right” to the land. For many Israelis, the land 
of Palestine was given to the Jews by the divine as their homeland, and thus 
what God has given to them no man can rightfully take away or give away in a 
peace process. This absolutist stance aborts any meaningful prospect for peace 
that is predicated on “land for peace.” On the other hand, some Palestinians, 
mainly those associated with more radical Islamist groups, in the face of sys-
tematic persecutions by the state of Israel, no longer believe that Jews have 
any rightful claim to the land of Palestine, even if Muslims throughout his-
tory have almost always defended the Jewish right to be within their ancestral 
lands, mostly as minorities. The absolute claims have impeded any meaningful 
attempts to overcome the increasingly entrenched bitterness and hatred for 
3 We must remember that those who “abandon” a claim of absolute truth do so in such a 
 passive way precisely because one cannot positively argue that “there is no such thing as 
absolute truth” without a performative contradiction. Arguing that there is no absolute truth 
is to make an absolute truth claim about the nature of reality and thus betraying the indi-
vidual’s belief in at least one absolutes truth – that there is no absolute truth.
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the other as they do not allow for any room for compromise – the most hated 
word in the “politics of absolutivity.” Compromise, in both matters of dogmatic 
theology, philosophy, etc., as well as in political matters, means a turning away 
from ultimate “Truth”: the construction of half-truths that can hardly be toler-
ated or justified in absolutist discourse. As Cohen implies in his essay, when 
truth is saturated with the authority of the divine, because the particular claim 
is understood to be a directive of the divine itself, then compromise on the 
divinely-given truth is a rejection and/or insult against the divine itself. This 
is a prospect that many religious believers cannot bring themselves to accept. 
For them, the world must be reconciled and governed by the absolute truths 
and values that they adhere to or it is in a state of “sinful error” and therefore 
doomed. As Cohen remarked, absolutism has driven many religious believers 
and institutions to engage in some of the most barbarous activities throughout 
history and will most likely continue to do so in the future.
Secondly, there is the abiding issue of tolerance and relativism. In his 
 discussion of the ills that plague Europe and the rest of the world, Pope Bene-
dict xvi remarked that there were certain limits to tolerance within the post-
secular societies; the danger being that near-absolute tolerance is predicated 
on the acceptance of the validity of various truth claims, or at minimum 
the acceptance of their existence. This may not seem like a very threaten-
ing  development within society, but the consequence of such tolerance for a 
 multiplicity of truth claims too often undermines the very truth claims that 
validate the belief in tolerance itself. If the state, and therefore the society, is 
not predicated on some normative values that are seen to be absolutes, such as 
the equal status of all citizens, the inherent integrity and dignity of all life, and 
the dedication to uphold all human rights, then the state itself relapses into a 
form of arbitrariness. The state, as understood since the Bourgeois revolution 
in France, America, and later other European state, is understood, in Hegelian 
terms, to be the embodiment of the spirit of the people – it is a manifestation 
of their commitment to certain values, principles, and beliefs. Additionally, the 
“pre-political” foundations of the pre-modern state, i.e. the necessity of shared 
history, shared language, shared race or ethnicity, have been forcibly removed. 
Constitutional norms have replaced these pre-political foundations. Norma-
tive values, most of which were first articulated in the Bourgeois revolution 
of the late 18th century, and later critiqued for their inadequate realization by 
the Marxists in the 19th and 20th centuries, now serve as the basis for the state. 
However, the fact of pluralism, i.e. the conglomeration of ideas, truth claims, 
and worldviews – many of which are not only comprehensive but also exclusive – 
within one country, if not predicated upon some normative and/or absolute 
beliefs about the equality of all citizens, becomes a dangerous  disposition, 
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as it fails to establish the required foundation by which such a diverse group 
of people can share the same conception of citizenry, statehood, etc. If the 
liberal-democratic state cannot rely on the pre-political adhesives of race, 
language, and history, but rather most replace them with shared thoughts on 
equality, freedom, liberty, and democracy, than the absolute tolerance of those 
who would undermine this new form of political foundation would lead to a 
certain undermining of itself. In other words, some form of absolutivity may be 
necessary for the modern nation-state, especially in the post-secular society, 
where both religious and secular people are equal citizens even if they disagree 
 vehemently in worldviews, to remain healthy and thus able to produce the 
conditions for the flourishing of a multi-cultural society. An “overlapping con-
sensus” on basic absolutes proves necessary for the social cohesion of a nation-
state whose social reality is diverse and cosmopolitan. If the state is the agent 
for the common good of the nation, and is tasked with overseeing the interests 
of all, then it is an imperative that the citizenry recognize, accept, and internal-
ize the normative values that underlie and give legitimation to the state as the 
institution tasked with the protection and furthering of that same common 
good. Without such a constellation of normative/absolute values, principles, 
or thoughts, at the core of society, which the citizenry are able to draw upon in 
times of discourse concerning the policies, etc. of their nation-state, then, as 
Habermas remarked, society can be transformed into ‘isolated monads acting 
on the basis of their own self-interest, persons who used their subjective rights 
only as weapons against each other.’4 Again, in order to avoid the  degeneration 
of society into a conglomerate of ‘isolated monads’ who are only subject to 
their own self-interest – the realization of Ayn Rand’s Galt’s Gulch – or the 
utopia of absolutized individualism – some social and/or political worldview 
that commits itself to the shared values of human dignity, human sanctity, and 
humanity as a value in-and-of-itself – regardless of race, class, ethnicity, creed, 
etc. – proves necessary in the post-secular society. Again, if we assume the ar-
gument that the secular society has drained the pre-political adhesive of reli-
gion from the modern nation-state, then a secular philosophy that appeals and 
applies universally to all must take its place and be accepted. It must be made 
into an integral part of the society’s overall norms and beliefs. In other words, 
the individual, regardless of their religious, racial, national origin, etc., must 
internalize the philosophy as their own and, through the process of “moral for-
mation” (bildung), impart such values to the next generation.
Continuing with this line of thinking, the opposing side of the dialecti-
cal notion of absolutivity can be identified as the negativity of absolutism, 
4 Habermas and Ratzinger, Dialectics of Secularization, 35.
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i.e. the juxtaposition of absolute humanistic and liberational values against 
the world-as-it-is. As stated before, the secularization process has drained all 
forms of positive metaphysics from modern society. Those who continue to 
posit such metaphysics in the face of such contemporary developments stand 
out like relics from an ancient past, artificially refusing to accept that which is 
clearly present before them. This secularized zeitgeist, the meaninglessness of 
modernity, and ethos of consumption which has been the attempted replace-
ment for religion within today’s market economy, has left many people feeling 
isolated, alienated, without consolation, and hopeless. At least in times where 
religion still had a dominant presence in the thought and being of people, 
there was something that gave hope to the hopeless: an eschatological long-
ing for  absolute justice, true peace, and a utopian afterlife devoid of suffer-
ing.5 Now, with the advent of science, natural philosophy, and atheism – all 
of which  religion had to fight rear-guard struggles against (and lost) – such 
consolation has evaporated. In prior times, religion – especially the church – 
provided  absolutes for society sanctioned by the divine. Now, the collective 
discovers its norms through political-economic and social discourse, and the 
individual has to discover their own personal moral positions independent of 
religion’s absolutes. However, there is always a nagging doubt about the fallible 
rationale that produces such norms, i.e. there is a longing for the assuredness 
of divine absolutes. This longing is expressed in many religious forms, most 
especially in Jewish/Israeli nationalists, Christian (mainly Evangelical Prot-
estants) politics, and Muslim fundamentalism. These groups often reject the 
historical developments that have brought society into the confusion of the 
secular age and wish to replace such democratically deliberated and rationally 
articulated norms with a divinely guaranteed morality. Even within the condi-
tions of post-secularity, these divine absolutes take on two opposing forms; 
they are either authoritarian or humanistic.
 Authoritarian Absolutes, Heteronomy, and the Islamic State  
in Iraq and Syria
An authoritarian form of absolutivity is often rooted in romanticism – the idea 
that the answers to the present and future are solely in the past. This expresses 
a certain desire for a “golden age” it is also rooted in nationalism – which aug-




place all others under the dictates of the power against their will (if needs be).6 
Furthermore, such nationalism emphasizes obedience to a given power and 
 enforces uniformity. A modern example of this nationalistic romanticism can 
be found with isis (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), which has ordained itself 
as the enforcers of Islamic morality within the territories that they have seized 
in the summer of 2014 and after.7 Any form of “sin” or activities not endorsed 
by Islam, or that are explicitly condemned by Islam, e.g. use of alcohol, por-
nography, adultery, cheating customers, etc., are criminalized and punished 
 according their particular understanding of Sharīʿah law. Dura Lex, sed lex?8
Despite the fact that forced morality is no morality at all, but is rather only 
heteronomic compliance, motivated out of fear of repercussions, and is there-
fore not an expression of one’s deeply held beliefs, isis has tasked itself to be 
the judge, juror, and executioner – completely circumventing the established 
Islamic and/or state authorities to regulate and punish criminal activities.9 
Not only does this circumvent the internationally recognized state, it also 
circumvents the will of the people whose opinions were not taking into con-
sideration when isis imposed their order on the population.10 Additionally, 
some scholars may argue that the Qur’anic injunction ‘la ikraha fii din’ (‘there 
is no compulsion in religion’) only pertains to forced conversion.11 However, a 
more dialectical approach to Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:256 – which outlaws religious 
compulsion – reveals a deeper and much more important possibility; that any 
attempt to artificially force an individual to accept a moral precept without 
their truly accepting it as their own has no merit in the Islamic tradition, even 
if the individual is a believing Muslim. If we can say that any particular  religion 
is a system of beliefs, rituals, interpretation of reality and orientation of ac-
tion, and the traditional reading of the āyah (“sign” – verse) forbids Muslims 
from imposing their religion (as a system) on others against their will, then it 
is equally as valid to say that it also pertains to a given particular belief (as op-
posed to a whole system); where the universal is true, so too is the particular. In 
short, the forcing of any particular moral claim upon the individual who doesn’t 
6 See Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.
7 Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of isis. New York: Doubleday, 2015.
8 ‘The law is harsh, but is it the law.’
9 Rudolf J. Siebert, The Development of Moral Consciousness towards a Global Ethos (New 
Dehli, Sanbun Publishers, 2012), 35–36.
10 This may not be the case entirely in some areas of Iraq where isis was seen as a preferable 
option to the chaos of the post-Saddam situation. See Warrick, Black Flags, 223–307.
11 One should note that this verse was revealed in Medina when the Muslims were in power. 
This verse was never abrogated and remains a normative sentiment within Islamic law 
and fiqh.
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accept it as their own is in violation of the Qur’anic injunction and risks the 
possibility of creating injustice. The Qur’an in this matter respects the con-
science (Ḍamīr) of the individual and clearly warns against its violation via 
heteronomically enforced religious pronouncements. Consequently, in the tra-
ditional understanding of this verse, those who were forced to openly pledge 
their alliance to a given religious belief under duress are within their rights 
to revert back to their original beliefs.12 Historically, Muslims have respected 
the individual’s autonomy when deciding whether or not they accept a certain 
matter of faith; it is not by force that the individual accepts Islam (or any other 
religion), but by convincing the individual of the correctness of the belief via 
free and  uncoerced discourse.
With this Qur’anic prohibition, we can see that those who force conversion 
onto others, such as isis, betray their psychological secret: they have little 
 confidence in Islam to be convincing, but rather force a situation where the in-
dividual must pretend to be Muslim just to stay alive so they may secretly retain 
and practice their true religious tradition or non-religion.13 From the perspec-
tive of the al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya (biography of the Prophet Muhammad), these 
actions of isis fall well outside of the domain of the established Sunnah of 
the Prophet, and have been condemned by many important Islamic scholars 
as such.14 In a sense, there was a certain level of civilization in the 7th century 
Arabia – with the birth of Islam – which isis in the 21st century has gone be-
hind. As many critics of isis continually state that they want to return to that 
7th century, their most brutal actions demonstrate that they have  migrated 
to al-jāhilīyah, the age of ignorance prior to Islam, when human life had very 
little intrinsic value and when the early Muslims were forced to renounce 
their faith or face execution. Where forced conversions ended with Islam in 
the 7th century, they continued through the medieval period in Christendom. 
As such, isis embraces a medieval ethic more akin to the Spanish Inquisition 
than one that is associated with the Prophet of Islam. For Shaykh Muham-
mad al- Yaqoubi, a reknown Damascan scholar of Islam, isis is more akin to 
the Khawarij (the succeeders), who are vilified in the Islamic world for their 
12 Surely Muslim have a right to legislate the laws of their lands over the objections of any 
particular individual or group, but they cannot force the individual or group to accept 
such laws and pledge fidelity to them against their conscience.
13 A similar historical analogy may be found in the conversos of newly Catholicized Spain in 
the 14th and 15th century. The crypto-Muslims (Moriscos) and the crypto-Jews (Morranos) 
were forced to publicly live like Catholics while they preserved their personal religious 
beliefs in private.
14 See Shaykh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, Refuting isis: A Rebuttal of its Religious and Ideologi-
cal Foundations. United States: Sacred Knowledge, 2015.
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 succession from the early Caliphate and the murder of the Prophet’s cousin 
and son-in-law ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.15
As previously mentions, heteronomic compliance in issues of morality  cannot 
be made normative within Islam as Islamic law forbids it, even against other 
Muslims.16 Heteronomy (ετερoνoμίας), or the imposition of norms, values, and 
principles upon an individual by external force, robs the individual of their 
capacity to act morally according to their own conscience. It is a non-moral 
action when it is an action simply in compliance with heteronomic forces 
precisely because the actions do not originate in the individual’s autonomous 
being – the inner source of an individual’s moral commitments.17 It is only 
when the individual self-regulates via the willful acceptance of the norms of 
a given society as their own, or through the realization of society’s norms as 
being that which is identical to the norms that autonomously develop within 
the individual, that the individual can be understood a being moral. In other 
words, it is not sufficient for an action to be considered morally good if it sim-
ply ‘conform[s] to the moral law – it must also be done for the sake of the moral 
law.’18 In an Islamic formulation, the action must be done fisibillilah (for the 
sake of Allah) and not simply in compliance with Islamic regulations. If isis 
wishes to create a moral society – a society that is not only formally guided 
by morality but is substantially moral because it is the result of man’s autono-
mous moral development – then it cannot heteronomically impose its morality 
onto the society, but must create the conditions where individuals can realize 
their own autonomy through and in conjunction with moral social norms. From 
a pragmatic standpoint, isis may well be satisfied with a population that is 
compliant with their dictates and submits to their will. However, this does not 
make it an ideal Islamic society, which is a society that balances autonomy of 
the individual’s will and solidarity with the collective will, and one whose stric-
tures are identical with the morality of its people because the people – through 
their autonomous decision making – have chosen it to be thus. From the 
people – whose morality may be rooted in Islam – comes the positive articu-
lation of law and norms of society, not the other way around. From the pro-
phetic example, it cannot be imposed from above but must be freely chosen. 
15 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
16 One always retains the right of objection towards certain laws on the basis of morality or 
a different interpretation of an Islamic principle itself.
17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practice Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
Pt. 1.
18 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 442.
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The  heteronomic imposition of draconian laws upon a populace that doesn’t 
share their interpretation of religion – in this case Islam – may very well have 
the opposite effect; it may fertilize the grounds of resentment towards isis and 
their interpretation of Islam by those very people who isis claims to represent: 
the Muslims. As such, heteronomy is dialectical: the more it is enforced and 
the more the autonomy of the individual’s conscience is eclipsed, the more 
those individuals seek out their autonomy in non-conformist ways. The sup-
pression of autonomy leads to either (1) broken people – their autonomy so 
thoroughly suppressed that they have completely surrendered to the dictates 
of the  regime and thus remain reservedly compliant, (2) rebels – those who 
will express their autonomy in ways deemed unacceptable by the governing 
forces but do not direct their autonomy towards the overthrow of the author-
ity, or (3) revolutionaries, who coalesce around an oppositional philosophy 
(which develops autonomously) and are determined to overthrow the oppres-
sive regime. In the present time, isis is attempting to create the conditions of 
a society that will either be severely crippled; will indirectly encourage social 
deviancy (by their standards); or will end up being opposed by a countervail-
ing force. Either way, the end result will be a brutal non-Islamic society.
The ability to impose heteronomically an interpretation of religion, law, so-
cial norms, etc., onto others without any hesitation is rooted in the confidence 
derived from the absolutization of one’s own particular claims, especially when 
those sentiments are legitimated by a commonly agreed upon absolute, i.e. the 
divine. As stated before, the authoritarian personality believes that which the 
divine has made absolutely true, or morally correct, cannot tolerate critical 
examination, and is thus understood to be universally applicable to all peoples 
at all times.19 The authoritarian personality reacts violently when their views 
are questioned, as they have become identical with what they feel or perceives 
to be absolute. Any questioning of their ideology is perceived as a personal 
 attack against them. Psychologically, they have taken refuge within the abso-
lute  statement that gives them the ability to be in the world with confidence: 
the absolute is on their side. To question that dictate is to undermine their 
authority, which is something the authoritarian finds unacceptable.
Although some may agree with isis’s enforcement of their interpretation 
of Sharīʿah, the authoritarian nature of their regime is witnessed in, (1) the 
absence of consent from the people who are under their rule, (2) the brutal 
imposition of a puritanical orientation of religion, and (3) their consolidation 
of power through the enforcement of draconian laws and regulations. This last 
quality can be seen most clearly in their relations with minorities. isis’s attack 
19 Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, 727–743.
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on Yazidis, Christians, Shi’a Muslims, and other Sunnis who do not agree with 
their pseudo-Caliphate, has little precedent within Islamic history, as can be 
attested by the fact that those communities have continued to exist within the 
majority Muslim world (at least until the 20th century). Doubtless, the his-
tory of inter-religious relations is not without its challenging moments, but 
when taking a larger historical view, the history of Islam in relation to other 
religions is much more peaceful than in Christendom. Thus the religious and 
ethnic  pluralism of the Middle East is threatened by isis’s current seizure of 
churches, impromptu crucifixion of Christians, wholesale slaughter of Yazidi 
men and forced marriages of their women and children to isis fighters, attacks 
on the Kurds, and the frequent beheadings, including the American photo 
journalist James Wright Foley in retaliation for the United States’ bombing of 
isis targets.20
Although it should not have, this “first terror attack” (as the Obama White 
House described the execution of James Foley) on the United States by isis 
provoked intense disgust around the world. Yet the United States was already 
warned. In an August 12, 2014, email to James Foley’s parents, isis articulated 
their desire for retaliation (lex talionis),
Now you return to bomb the Muslims of Iraq once again, this time resort-
ing to Arial attacks and “proxy armies,” all the while cowardly shying away 
from a face-to-face confrontation! Today our swords are unsheathed to-
wards you, GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENS ALIKE! AND WE WILL NOT 
STOP UNTILL WE QUENCH OUR THIRST FOR YOUR BLOOD. You do not 
spare our weak, elderly, women or children so we will NOT spare yours! 
You and your citizens will pay the price of your bombings! The first of 
which being the blood of the American citizen, James Foley! He will be 
executed as a DIRECT result of your transgressions towards us!21
20 Chelsea J. Carter, “Video Shows isis Beheading u.s. Journalist James Foley.” August 
20,  2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/index.html (Ac-
cessed 8/19/2014). Upon hearing of her son’s death, Diane Foley, James’s mother, posted 
the following on facebook: ‘We have never been prouder of our son Jim. He gave his life 
trying to expose the world to the suffering of the Syrian people. We implore the kidnap-
pers to spare the lives of the remaining hostages. Like Jim, they are innocents. They have 
no control over American government policy in Iraq, Syria or anywhere in the world. 
We thank Jim for all the joy he gave us. He was an extraordinary son, brother, journalist 
and person. Please respect our privacy in the days ahead as we mourn and cherish Jim.’ 
https://www.facebook.com/FindJamesFoley (Accessed 8/19/2014).
21 GlobalPost, “Full Text of the Last Email the Islamic State sent to the Foley Family,” August 
21, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/140821/
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In the video that depicted the beheading of James Foley, the masked British 
Muslim, popularly known as “jihad Johnny” – later identified as Muhammad 
Emwazi – took aim at President Obama. The jihadist said,
As a government, you have been at the forefront of aggression towards 
the Islamic State. You have plotted against us and gone out of your way 
to find reasons to interfere in our affairs. Today, your military air force 
is attacking us daily in Iraq. Your strikes have caused casualties against 
Muslims. You are no longer fighting an insurgency: we are an Islamic 
Army and a state that has been accepted by a large number of Muslims 
worldwide, so effectively, any aggression towards the Islamic State is an 
aggression towards Muslims from all walks of life who have accepted Is-
lamic Caliphate as their leadership. So any attempt by you, Obama, to 
deny Muslims their right of living in safety under the Islamic Caliphate 
will result in the bloodshed of your people.
The day after isis released the video showing the decapitation of James Foley, 
President Barack Obama, who is a Christian but also the son of a Kenyan Mus-
lim, as well as the leader of the most powerful secular state, expressed his dis-
gust, forcibly stating,
Jim Foley’s life stands in stark contrast to his killers. Let’s be clear about 
isil [isis].22 They have rampaged across cities and villages killing inno-
cent, unarmed civilians in cowardly acts of violence. They abduct women 
and children and subject them to torture and rape and slavery. They have 
murdered Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, by the thousands. They target 
Christians and religious minorities, driving them from their homes, mur-
dering them when they can, for no other reason than they practice a dif-
ferent religion.
They declared their ambition to commit genocide against an ancient 
people. So isil speaks for no religion. Their victims are overwhelmingly 
Muslim, and no faith teaches people to massacre innocents. No just god 
would stand for what they did yesterday and what they do every single 
day. isil has no ideology of any value to human beings. Their ideology 
is bankrupt. They may claim out of expediency that they are at war with 
text-last-email-islamic-state-sent-foley-family (Accessed 8/22/2014). Capitalizations and 
misspellings are in the original message.
22 The American government refers to the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” as isil, the 
 “Islamic State in Iraq and Levant.”
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the United States or the West, but the fact is they terrorize their neighbors 
and offer them nothing but an endless slavery to their empty vision and 
the collapse of any definition of civilized behavior.23
For the parents of James Foley, who are devout Catholics, their son’s work in 
Syria made him a ‘martyr for freedom.’ According to his father, ‘James felt com-
pelled to bear witness to people in conflict,’ and for that commitment, that 
witnessing, he was murdered by isis as a symbol of their defiance against the 
United States.24 Pope Francis, appalled by the brutal beheading of Foley, and 
seeing members of his church in agony, personally called the family and of-
fered his sincere condolences, offering whatever comfort he could. Despite the 
mass killing of Christians in isis territory, the Pope continues to hold onto 
his Franciscan inspiration and routinely prays for peace in the region, both 
for Muslims and Christians, ex animo.25 On the other hand, isis has in praxis 
 rejected the ethos of inter-religious discourse and a peaceful living together 
that was expressed both by St. Francis of Assisi and by the Sultan Malik al- 
Kamil in Damietta, Egypt, in 1219 ce, and continues to viciously attack reli-
gious minorities who pose no threat to their pseudo-Caliphate. The only threat 
they pose is to the absolutivity of isis’s faith. As long as there exists those who 
don’t believe in their interpretation of Islam, then there exist alternatives to 
their fundamentalist worldview. Those options reveal, just by existing, the in-
securities of isis’s authoritarian faith.
In November of 2014, to the horror of the world, isis decapitated its third 
American, Peter Kassig. Peter was a former Army Ranger who had been de-
ployed to Iraq in 2007. According to various reports, Peter was struck by the 
poverty, destitution, and suffering of the people he was sent to occupy, and 
later wished to return to the region to offer whatever help he could to allevi-
ate the misery caused by the turmoil of the Syrian civil war. In 2012 he formed 
his own non-profit organization Special Emergency Response and Assistance 
(sera) and began his work in Lebanon and Syria, giving medical aid to any 
and all in search of it. In an interview he stated, ‘I am not a doctor. I am not a 
23 Barack Obama, “President Obama’s Remarks on the Execution of Journalist James 




24 Bev Ford and Rich Schapiro, “Pope Francis calls Parents of Slain Journalist James Foley to 
Give Condolences.” August 22, 2014. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ pope 
-francis-calls-parents-james-foley-article-1.1912382 (Accessed 8/22/2014).
25 “from the heart.”
215Post-Secularity and Its Discontents
<UN>
nurse… I am a guy who can clean up bandages, help clean up patients, swap 
out bandages, help run ivs, make people’s quality of life a little bit better. 
This is something for me that has meaning, that has purpose.’26 Motivated 
out his deeply felt solidarity for those who had become victims of history, he 
traveled furthered in the contested areas of eastern Syria, where isis eventu-
ally  captured him. Jailed, beaten, and tortured by isis, Peter would eventu-
ally convert to Islam, taking on the name Abdul-Rahman (servant of the most 
Merciful). Ironically, the mercy Peter showed to Muslims through his charity 
and medical work, even those believed to be members of isis, was not recip-
rocated. Neither was Peter’s heartfelt conversion to Islam honored by isis.27 
Sometime in November, despite the pleas of a grieving mother, who desperate-
ly wanted her child home and safe, and despite the pleas from the al-Qae’da af-
filiate al-Nusrah Front (who remembered Peter as an honorable man who even 
gave them medical attention when needed), Peter was barbarically beheaded 
by isis; his head made into a prop for isis’s latest anti-America propaganda 
video. To gain a convert to Islam was never the goal of isis, to kill an America, 
taunt the President of the United States, and strike terror in the hearts of all 
non-Muslims and Shi’a Muslims was their chief aim. To kill another Muslim 
such as Peter ‘Abdul-Rahman’ Kassig was of no importance; he was simply a 
means to an end. However for Peter, his mission was in stark contrast to that of 
isis. He wrote to his parents ‘If I do die, I figure that at least you and I can seek 
refuge and comfort in knowing that I went out as a result of trying to alleviate 
suffering and helping those in need.’28
In another letter from Syria, Kassig wrote home saying ‘I wish this paper 
would go on forever and never run out and I could just keep talking to you. 
Just know I’m with you. Every stream, every lake, every field and river. In the 
woods and in the hills, in all the places you showed me. I love you.’29 His  parent 
remained deeply proud of their son for living his beliefs. He had become iden-
tical in thought and praxis with those heartful beliefs and died as a martyr in 
the cause of humanity solidarity, empathy, and loving recognition.
26 Michael Pearson and Dana Ford, “Peter Kassig’s Parents: ‘Good will Prevail,’” November 
17,  2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/world/meast/isis-peter-kassig-remembered/ 
(Accessed 11/18/2014).
27 Although some may say he conversion was convenient – an attempt to escape execution – 
his family and friends have maintained that he was interested in doing so long before his 
capture.
28 Pearson and Ford, “Peter Kassig’s Parents: ‘Good will Prevail,’” (Accessed 11/18/2014).





In many ways Peter’s life was a symbol for the potential for Islamic-western 
reconciliation; he began his life in the Muslim world as a Christian soldier, but 
like St. Francis of Assisi, chose to abandon the military life and love his for-
mer enemy. Like Francis, who traveled to the Muslim world and was deeply 
affected by the love and respect he received from Muslims of deep faith, so 
too was  Peter; so affected that he later embraced the very faith of those who 
would murder him. Recognizing the mercifulness of the Islam tradition, he 
chose the Islamic name of mercy: ‘Abdul-Rahman,’ but was showed no mercy 
by isis. From the perspective of Islam, Peter Kassig is a martyr for his faith; an 
altruistic faith that motivated him to give freely to others and risk his life for 
others in attempt to alleviate their suffering. Rightly, Kassig’s father, remem-
bering and mourning the loss of his beloved son, quoted the Gospel of John 
15:13, ‘greater love hath no man than this, than to lay down his life for another,’ 
a sentiment that the Qur’an is fully in agreement with. In a most ecumenical 
nature –  rooted deeply within both the Islamic and Christian faiths – Peter’s fa-
ther asked the people of the world to not only pray for his son Abdul-Rahman, 
but also for the people of Syria, whom his son graciously served most faithfully 
and lovingly. Wheras Peter discovered beauty, mercy and compassion for the 
suffering of frail human beings in Islam, isis only found ugliness, hatred and 
violence.
isis’s threat to civilization, their brutality in the name of religion, and 
their sheer cruelty towards the “other,” led even the most conservative Wah-
habi scholars to denounce them.30 Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti Sheikh ‘Abdul-
‘Aziz Al al-Sheikh, the nation’s highest religious authority, has condemned 
isis’s actions calling them “enemy number one of Islam” and denied that 
they have anything to do with the religion of Prophet Muhammad.31 With the 
full force of his authority, he stated to the Saudi Press Agency, ‘Extremist and 
militant ideas and terrorism which spread decay on Earth, destroying human 
civilization, are not in any way part of Islam, but are enemy number one of 
Islam, and Muslims are their first victims.’32 This statement is significant in 
the sense that many Saudis – raised on a very schizophrenic form of Islam, 
Wahhabism, which is morally obtuse and restrictive while languishing in the 
30 According to many accounts, isis has also been denounced by al-Qae’da. What has mo-
tivate bin Laden’s organization to denounce isis is still up for debate but it is most likely 
born out of competing ideologies, strategies, motivations, and goals.
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house of  luxury – are often accused of supporting some of the most violence 
and reactionary forms of Islam. Wahhabism, which is a “puritan” or “pietistic” 
form of Islam, is akin to Christianity’s nascent “protestant” movement; it di-
rected itself towards simplifying Islam by shedding cultural attachments that 
developed post-Muhammad; they declared a war against bid’a (innovations) 
and set about rejuvenating Islam through returning to its “roots.”33 In attempt-
ing to rescue Islam from the accumulation of non-Islamic practices, beliefs, 
and  cultural norms, it  developed a reactionary and dogmatic attitude towards 
other Muslims who did not adhere to their perceived need to purify Islam. This 
antagonism  appears most often where Saudi petro-dollars support Wahhabi 
inspired clerics, architecture, education, etc., in areas of the Muslim world that 
are more influenced by Sufism or the other religions in the area.34 However, 
simply because Wahhabi Islam is culturally and religiously conservative – 
minus its intense adjustments to the luxuries of global capitalism – it is not in-
herently terroristic as many critics in the West have claimed. It is an extremely 
conservative orientation within Islam, but conservatism does not equal reli-
gious violence, even if it does maintain a reactionary and dismissive attitude 
towards cultural modernization, secularization, etc. With his condemnatory 
statements against isis, the Wahhabi Mufti Sheikh has placed an important 
distinction between conservative Islam and those who’d justify their barbarity 
with a form of Islamism that is even beyond the pale of the most conservative 
of clerics.
Most interesting about Mufti Sheikh ‘Abdul-‘Aziz Al al-Sheikh’s comments is 
that he agrees with Shaykh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, and drew a historical con-
nection from isis back to the Khawarij, the 7th century group of Muslims that 
first supported the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭālib’s claim 
to succession (khalīfah – “successor”), only to abandon him and actively fight 
against him after the arbitration at the Battle of Siffin in 657 ce.35 What was 
the crime that ‘Ali committed that led to such a change in support: arbitration, 
i.e. the compromise between ‘Ali and his foe Muʿāwiyah ibn ʾAbī Ṣufyān. With 
the cry “only God has the right to decide,” the Khawarij believed “Ali to be en-
dowed with absolute authority from the divine and therefore didn’t have the 
33 Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004.
34 Anecdotes about unwanted Wahhabi influences appear in places such as Chech-
nya,  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pakistan, Indonesia, Europe, and the u.s. See Hamid Algar, 
 Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, ny: Islamic Publications International, 2002.
35 The Khawarij are sometimes known as “Kharijites.” The term “khawarij” is generally trans-
lated to “seceders” or “those who have gone out.”
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right to negotiate with those who didn’t accept such authority. It also demon-
strated to them ‘Ali’s lack of faith that Allah would give a victory to the Shi’at al-
‘Ali (party of ‘Ali). Again, the insistence of absolutizing his status, and therefore 
his authority as the successor of the prophet, coupled with the perception that 
he compromised that absolute authority, led to his murder. ‘Ali was later killed 
by the Khawarij assassin Ibn Muljam in 661 ce, thus solidifying the early divi-
sion (fitnah) between what would later become the Shi’a and Sunni branches 
of Islam.36
The Mufti’s comparison of isis to the Khawarij is also appropriate on another 
level; isis, like the Khawarij, practices takfīr: the practice of declaring a  fellow 
Muslim to be a non-Muslim (kāfir) or of engaging in apostasy (riddah) for the 
purpose of oppressing and/or killing them. As it is not lawful  under Islamic law 
for a Muslim to kill another Muslim unless under extenuating circumstances, 
such as in self-defense, punishment for a crime, etc., takfīris (those who en-
gage in takfīr) conveniently appropriate that which is understood in fiqh to 
be the sole prerogative of the divine, i.e. the judging of faith of any  particular 
individual. Takfīris declare the other’s faith to be fraudulent and therefore 
worthy of punishment or even death. However, even Immanuel Kant’s cate-
gorical imperative, which began its pre-secular life as a religious  imperative, 
applies within the Islamic context. When isis and other takfiris appropriate 
the right to unilaterally declare others believers to be kāfirūn (disbelievers), 
they are also tacitly endorsing the legitimacy of others to do the same to them; 
their particular actions become universalized. In this moment, the sole pre-
rogative of the absolute to declare who is a believer and who is not, testified 
in the Qur’anic statement that Allah ‘misguides whom he wills and guides to 
the straight path whom he wills,’ saves humanity from augmenting themselves 
into a divine being with the capability of piercing into the inner-most sanctum 
of one’s religious life: their conscience.37 If the practice of takfir can be rescued 
from the political, economic, and social realm of religious fanaticism, and re-
turned once again to the sole realm of the divine, religious communities can 
return to a more honest and true state of religion; a realization of man’s limited 
ability to know the thing-in-itself, whether that be divine will or the individual’s 
conscience. In the case of Islam, through the rescuing the divine’s authority 
from the hands of authoritarian fanatics – and therefore negating it as an effec-
tive way of dehumanizing the other based on their  religious or non-religious 
36 Heinz Halm, Shi’a Islam: From Religion to Revolution (Princeton, nj: Markus Wiener 
 Publishers, 1999), 6.
37 Qur’an 6:39. My translation.
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conscience – the ummah can deprive the  authoritarian believer both the legal 
and moral ability to render the “innocent other” fit for execution.
 Humanistic Absolutes
When the humanistic core of the Abrahamic religions is coupled with absolute 
authority, such values are different in degree rather than in kind from their 
authoritarian counterparts. Humanistic absolutes have as their utmost con-
cern the wellbeing of the finite human as opposed to the supernatural and/or 
divine being, and are prepared to subject their ideas, thoughts, and values to 
democratic deliberation and scrutiny. Many in today’s religious communities 
believe that humanism is inherently separate from religion, in that it takes as 
its main concern the finiteness of the human subject as the measure of value 
as opposed to upholding religious traditions and/or dogmas, or by measuring 
all human activity by the standard of divine revelation. This is not entirely 
true. Desiderious Erasmus of Rotterdam, a Dutch humanist, Catholic priest 
and theologian, rescued the religion of his time by integrating humanist ideals 
within faith, as the humanistic ideals themselves were embedded within the 
theology of Jesus’ very human suffering.38 Erasmus’ form of Christo-humanism 
could have reformed the church of its ills had not Luther’s revolt taken hold 
of parts of Europe in the 16th century, driving the church into its reactionary 
Counter-Reformation. In addition to the “prince of humanism,” Erasmus, there 
was also Nicholas of Cusa, and the Saint Thomas More, who were also deeply 
concerned with the renovatio Christianismi (renewal of Christianity) by recov-
ering its humanistic potentials which had been long buried in forgotten his-
tory.39 Their work, and the work of many others, was an attempt to rediscover 
the softer and more empathetic side of the Gospel tradition and reintroduce it 
back into Christendom as a way of realigning the church with the compassion 
and mercy displayed by Jesus of Nazareth.
38 We must admit that Erasmus’ inspection of the Bible did cause quite the controversy 
for  the church. For example, he discovered many Bible verses that served an impor-
tant  legitimation function for the church’s authority were not in the original texts but 
were rather additions in the Vulgate. Such a humanist return to the Bible did undermine 
many of the church’s most important claims. See Alister McGrath, Christianity’s Danger-
ous Idea, 28–33.
39 Hans Küng, The Catholic Church: A Short History, trans. John Bowden (New York: The 
Modern Library, 2003), 118–120, 128, 132.
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Religious humanism is a certain form of belief attitude and philosophy from 
within a religious tradition that directs itself towards the wellbeing of man-
kind as one of its primary goals. For instance, many of Dr. Martin Luther King’s 
followers were not men of religion like himself. Nevertheless, their common 
goal was the advancement of certain rights and privileges for minority peo-
ples in the United States, which later, during the 1967 Poor People’s Campaign, 
took on, more sharply than the earlier Civil Right movement, the issue of class. 
Although they could not agree on theological matters, their common goals – 
the advancement of humanity and a just society – allowed them to cooper-
ate most peacefully and productively. The values themselves transcendent any 
particular religions and could be found within the “American values” of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness – freedom, justice, and equality. Malcolm x’s 
founding of the Organization of Afro-American Unity (oaau) was also in this 
vein. It stressed the common humanity of African Americans regardless of their 
 religious and/or philosophical traditions.
In August of 2014, Dr. Tariq Ramadan of Oxford University, one of the 
 preeminent philosophers of Islam in the modern period, spoke to the very is-
sue of values that transcend religious articulation. He said,
As western Muslims and American Muslims, we need to understand 
that the values and principles we promote are not only Muslim values. 
 American Muslims live in a country where justice, dignity, freedom and 
equality are essential values. The Muslim contribution to the future of 
America is to not only speak out as Muslims, but to also speak out as 
citizens in the name of our common values. Our main contribution is to 
reconcile the American society with its own values, those that are not in 
contradiction to Islam. We have a duty of consistency.40
From this understanding, it can be realized that humanistic values are in 
 complete service to the flourishing of mankind, both in humanity’s autono-
my as well as its solidarity. As Erich Fromm, the psychoanalysis and Critical 
 Theorist of society, stated in his essay on Humanistic Socialism,
The supreme value in all social and economic arrangements is man; the 
goal of society is to offer the conditions for the full development of man’s 
40 Tariq Ramadan and Amina Chaudary, “Tariq Ramadan: My Absence Would Certainly 
Be the Most Powerful Speech I have Ever Give at isna,” August 14, 2014. http://www 
. theislamicmonthly.com/tariq-ramadan-my-absence-would-certainly-be-the-most 
- powerful-speech-i-have-ever-given-at-isna/ (Accessed 8/19/2014).
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potentialities, his reason, his love, his creativity; all social arrangements 
must be conducive to overcoming the alienation and crippledness of 
man, and to enable him to achieve real freedom and individuality.41
In other words, humanistic absolutes – which at its essence is the belief in the 
sacredness of mankind – attempts to create the conditions in which there can 
be a friendly living together predicated on the nourishment and actualization 
of man’s potentials to create a more reconciled future society. Such absolutes 
are just as dogmatically maintained as the irrational absolutes of unjust power, 
the rightness of oppression, and the value of exploitation for the benefit of 
the exploitors. In the vacuous situation of modern civil society, where there 
is a deep-seated longing for values that are beyond those of simply having, 
such humanistic values are able to bind religious communities together in 
common projects for the benefit of all. Those religious movements, such as 
isis,  right-wing Israeli Rabbis, Hindu nationalists, and Christian fundamental-
ists, that cannot transcend their own particularity and embrace the religious 
 subjectivity of the other, are often those who either self-ghettoize or become 
violent towards the other, the common humanity of the other is simply ignored 
even when explicitly perceived. The weakness of fundamentalism and extrem-
ist faith positions are witnessed in the anxiety and fear that they have towards 
opposing religious claims; they experience the existence of other religions as 
threats to their own truth claims. Just as we’ve seen in isis, as long as there 
are others who are just as vehement about their faith and their beliefs as the 
fundamentalist, then there is always the possibility that the fundamentalists’ 
faith isn’t true in its absolutivity – the opposition remains the physical manifes-
tation of the doubt that remains behind the veneer of absolute faith. Because 
of this, the fundamentalist, especially when they have power, often seeks to 
destroy the alternative that instills doubt: the Bamiyan Buddha in Taliban con-
trolled Afghanistan, Christians, Yazidis, and Shi’a Muslims in Iraq, Sufi shrines 
and mosques under isis, Native American sites in Colonial America, the Babri 
Mosque in Ayodhya, India, and the auto-da-fé (acts of faith) of “heretics” and 
“unrepentant” Jews by the Holy Inquisition in Spain, etc. Although they ap-
pear to be ardent in their certitude, they are psychologically unstable of their 
beliefs, and thus take solace and comfort in the destruction of the alternative. 
In this light, we can see that these groups and others are not the true believers 
that they claim to be, neither are they the “doubting Thomas’s” that critically 
and thoughtfully reflect on their own positions, but rather are those of weak 
faith who must destroy the other to bandage their own festering uncertitude.
41 Fromm, On Disobedience, 75–76.
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 isis: Same Problem, Different Manifestation
Upon a critical analysis, we can explain the rapid rise of isis and its success-
es in the heart of the Middle East. The three key components that help the 
outside observer understand are (1) its motivation, (2) its ideology, and (3) its 
opportunity. A critical penetration of these aspects of isis helps explain why 
such a return to a barbaric and pre-Islamic way of life has been resurrected 
amidst the post-secular society; which is a society of relative peace, security 
and material abundance.
(1) Motivation: That which drives isis and other similar groups is abun-
dantly clear when looked at through the lenses of recent history. It is their 
 contention that the 20th century must be overcome. Its long shadow still casts 
a spell over the Muslim world and today’s militants are attempting to break 
out of the shadow and develop what they think is a viable alternative to the 
 western model of the nation-state and the destabilizing and culturally dam-
aging process of western globalization. In today’s increasingly secular world, 
groups like isis view themselves as breaking the chains of colonial and im-
perial oppression, especially in the form of the ‘Arab façade’ – the Arab face 
that hides the West’s involvement and/or interests within the nation-states’ 
affairs.42  Additionally, in the particular case of isis, they want to cancel the 
1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that was responsible for the artificial divisions in 
the Middle East  between the French and British spheres of influence. They re-
member that the Ottoman Empire and the last Caliph of Islam were destroyed 
at the end of wwi and they believe such destruction to have been a historic 
crime against the Muslim community. This agreement was itself already a step 
in the secularization process, as it wrestled power away from traditional re-
ligious authorities in favor of secular governments – both collaborating and 
imperial. Where Islamic authorities once governed – or at least claimed to – 
via the Qur’an and Sunnah, in its place were imposed the western backed 
nation-states. In the mind of many isis members, their destruction of those 
artificially created boarders between what is now Iraq and Syria was not only 
a symbolic act, but also a concrete attempt to undue that which should have 
never been done to the Muslim ummah: divide et impera (divide and conquer) 
by western imperial powers. It is also a step in isis’s primary goal: to estab-
lish an Islamic state through the reintroduction of the Caliphate within the 
heart of the Muslim world. Partially to atone for the historical crime perpe-
trated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk), who abolished the Caliphate in 1924, 
42 See Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians. 
 Cambridge, ma: South End Press, 1999.
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isis has installed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (his nom de guerre) as the head of the 
Muslim community.43 The recreation of the caliphate has been a long await-
ed desire of many Muslims, who believed the leaderless status of the Muslim 
world was one of the main reasons why the dar al-Islam had moved into the 
backseat of history, why it is no longer respected, and why it has become so 
weak.  Additionally, it is the idea that the Muslims who were at the head of the 
ummah prior to the  demise of the last caliphate were religiously insufficient, 
unfaithful, and corrupt. isis’s brand of redemptive religiosity is one of “puri-
fication for fortification” – in order to protect the Muslims the caliphate must 
be restored; in order to restore the caliphate the Muslim world – especially 
the Arab Middle East – must be purified of all those who would oppose such 
a development, i.e.  religious minorities, ideological opponents, and Shi’a Mus-
lims. Purity of faith and community is seen as a pretext for the tajdīd, or the 
“rejuvenation”/“renewal” of Islam and the Muslim world, and such rejuvena-
tion contains within itself the potential to overcome history and redeem the 
ummah. The historical crimes perpetrated upon the Muslim community via 
western powers as well as those within the Muslims world who collaborated 
with the West, must be overcome so that the Muslim world can once again live 
in dignity, and possibly expand the boarders of the dar al-Islam. Thus, tran-
scending the 20th century –  negating those developments that so crippled the 
Muslims – is an utmost concern for isis.
Ironically, the symbolic power of the Caliphate resides in its concreteness; it 
is a physical manifestation of the revenge motive – revenge against the West 
for its humbling of the Muslim world, i.e. the restoration of Islam to a place 
of honor and dignity, as well as the sincere desire of Muslims to live under 
divine law. Symbolically, the caliphate does violence against the dominance 
of western-style democratic capitalism; it provides an alternative possibility 
to the status quo by undermining its principles; demonstrating to the West 
that Muslims may have accommodated themselves to western values, which 
are understood to be universal, but remain first-and-foremost followers of a 
different metaphysics: a religiously permeated worldview that stands diamet-
rically opposes to the world devoid of the divine, separated from divine law, 
and  living in accordance to the will of the self as opposed to the will of the 
creator. Where proponents of the secularization theory would have it, religion 
should have disappeared by now, but isis reminds them that not only has it 
failed to evaporate, it continues on with a new sense of vitality and intensity. 




The caliphate is a symbol for resurgent religion in a secular and western domi-
nated age. Indeed, it is the most poignant proof of the post-secular condition.
For Hans Küng and other critical historians of religion, this attempt to res-
urrect the Caliphate within the Muslim world represents a feeble attempt to 
undue history; an act that’s meant to restore Islam to a historical paradigm 
that could only have existed within an entirely different set of historical co-
ordinates.44 For Küng, the paradigm of Arab empire is over; the classical 
paradigm of the Muslim world is over; the paradigm of ‘Ulamāʾ and Sufis is 
over, and the modernization paradigm is also over. What’s now before the um-
mah is the  imperative to create a new paradigm, a vibrant, post-modern and 
 contemporary Islamic paradigm that doesn’t reject the modern world for a 
foolish attempt to return to a historical ‘golden age’ but rather embraces that 
which it can and make into its own that which is beneficial in modernity while 
not simultaneously abandoning its core characteristics and values.45 From the 
perspective of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of religion, just as Pope 
Francis has made the rediscovery of the Jesus’ humanistic gospel a primary 
goal of his papacy, the recovery of Islam’s humanistic core, those social prin-
ciples that made it most attractive to the poor, the widows, the orphans, the 
slaves, and the broken, is vital to the survival of Islam in the modern period. 
A recovery of this kind will not only prolong its life, but also make it a vital 
force for good in political economics and culture, precisely because those 
same values can be articulated in a variety of conceptual languages, making 
it understandable to a multiplicity of peoples outside of the Muslim commu-
nity. Therefore the motivation of isis has to also be the motivation of those 
who wish to rescue Islam both from post-secular modernity and from the vio-
lent reaction to such modernity: fundamentalism. The motivation to rectify 
that damage of colonialism, imperialism, neo-conservative war and economic 
exploitation – which was done for the benefit of western powers – must be 
shared with progressive and humanistic Muslims, albeit their answers to such 
a motivation must remain true to the humanistic core of the Islamic tradition 
itself. It cannot return behind al-jāhilīyah as isis and other groups have done.
Ideology: It has often been claimed that after the 1991 fall of communism 
in the Soviet Union that we live in a post-ideological era. It is said to be a time 
where activism has no concrete goals, no guiding principles, and no thought 
beyond the immediate condemnation of what is the case. In this state of 
confusion, the “then what” questions have not been answered or really even 
44 Hans Küng, Islam: Past, Present & Future, trans. John Bowden. New York: Oxford  University 
Press, 2007.
45 Ibid., 433–662.
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 explored. Case-in-point is the Occupy Wall Street Movement; the sentiments 
were correct concerning the abuses perpetrated on the world by global capital-
ism, especially the banks, whose risky yet lucrative actions led to the economic 
collapse of 2008, which only furthered the suffering of those who were already 
the victims of systematic and systemic violence within the coordinates of neo-
liberalism. Along with those already suffering from the ravages of economic 
exclusion, the collapse created many new victims among the working class and 
poor.46 Yet, how such problems where to be remedied was unfathomable to 
most in the Occupy Movement as it failed to articulate any form of grand proj-
ect, normative philosophy, or even stated goals beyond minimal reformism. 
The masses were gathered simply to protest the crimes of capitalism without 
any concrete contributions as to how it should be overcome and what should 
replace it. As such, it never coalesced into a political force within American 
(or European) polity. The ultimate deficiency of the Occupy Wall Street move-
ment that doomed it to the footnotes of history was that the problem itself – 
capitalism in crisis – defined the movement; it failed to define itself as a 
alternative to capitalism by only addressing the symptoms of capitalism. Here 
I agree, most regrettably, with the “radical for capitalism” Ayn Rand, who in a 
column entitled “Blind Chaos,” written for the Los Angeles Times in September 
of 1962, stated, ‘a majority without an ideology is a helpless mob, to be taken 
over by anyone.’47 Does this not illuminate what is already suspected about 
our post-ideological claims: the lack of a coherent and systematic ideology (in 
the non-Marxian sense) is the core reason for the failures of good movements 
such as Occupy Wall Street, whereas groups like isis, who are well-entrenched 
within a system of ideological convictions, are able to bend history towards 
their goals?
To the minds of many, including the philosopher Slavoj Žižek, this post-
Cold War zeitgeist is satisfied with modest adjustments to the overall system 
of political economy and therefore fails to demand radical change.48 In other 
words, there is no dominant philosophy that serves as a countervailing force 
against the domination of global capitalism and neo-liberal “ democracy.” 
46 I include the “middle class” in the description of “working class,” as they may be pros-
perous, but that prosperity is based within their working hours and salaries. Simply be-
cause they often do not want to be identified as working class does not mean they aren’t. 
I  consider the term “middle class” as part of the overall ideology of capitalism – it is meant 
to hide a certain reality about political economy, that the majority of the population is 
still workers even if they’ve bought – or have been integrated – into the system.
47 Ayn Rand, The Ayn Rand Column (Irvine, ca: Ayn Rand Institute Press, 1998), 44.
48 Slavoj Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (New York; Verso, 2012), 77–89.
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 Sadly, it seems to many that the right-wing Hegelian Francis Fukuyama’s  theses 
about the end of history – that history has come to the point where the larg-
est and most important questions about what society should be – have been 
answered.49 The apex of history has culminated in the very bourgeois ideals 
espoused by the American ruling class. Thus the utopian visions of an egali-
tarian society, predicated on the equal distribution of resources, freedom, 
and justice, that served as the Bourgeois revolutions’ inner-criticism, have all 
but been forgotten as “daydreams,” “fairytales,” or “lost causes,” and we have 
come to recognize the confluence of neo-liberal democracy and free market 
capitalism as being our fate because – it is claimed – it is most natural and, 
via utilitarian logic, it is argued to be the most beneficial to the most amount 
of people. However, this claim, in-and-of-itself, is ideology, or the clever mask-
ing of national, class, and racial interests, especially behind the veneer of 
nature – it is a reification (Verdinglichung) of ideology (false consciousness 
and/or necessary appearances) that is presented to the world as being self-
evident and therefore beyond question. It is then presented to the world as 
being the standard that all other nations must aspire to embody, regardless 
of a nation’s history, religion, language, culture, and normative conception of 
legality and morality.
It is clear that we are not in a post-ideological era, but in an era of  mono- 
ideology, where one particular ideology prevails over all others because of its 
ruthlessness and cunning. Falsely, because it is perceived to be the “last man 
standing,” it is presented as being without any alternative. Nevertheless, isis 
and its affiliates do not see it that way and thus their true – but often hidden – 
danger to the West. The Caliphate is seen as the “other” of western democratic- 
capitalism: it is the divinely sanctioned alternative that is, in their minds, 
bound to triumph over the substancelessness of western modernity.
On August 21, 2013, the then u.s. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, said 
isis was ‘beyond just a terrorist group’ and ‘beyond anything we’ve seen.’50 
Hagel’s dire warning about isis was meant to prepare the American public 
for another round of conflict against an organization that was believed to be 
not only a threat to our “allies” in the Middle East but also to civilization itself. 
isis, being not only a terrorist group like al-Qae’da, but an ideological move-
ment with goals of not only destruction (like al-Qae’da), but with a goal to 
 construct a society unlike one that exists in the world today, presents itself as a 
49 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books, 1992.
50 Jake Miller, “Chuck Hagel: isis ‘beyond anything we’ve seen,’” August 22, 2014. http://www 
.cbsnews.com/news/chuck-hagel-defends-failed-james-foley-rescue-attempt/ ( Accessed 
8/22/2014).
227Post-Secularity and Its Discontents
<UN>
 challenge to Fukuyama’s thesis about the apex of history; clearly not everyone 
has accepted neo-liberalism to be the end of history. isis’s attempt to  create 
a modern Caliphate as a viable alternative model for national, social, and 
political-economic being within the Muslims world is a threat to ideological 
claims of global capitalism and democracy, which many Muslims  themselves 
have accepted as being the de-facto state of the modern world. Being so, it 
is also a threat to the human rights, war crimes legislation, rights of religious 
freedom, etc., that were established since the Enlightenment, wwi, and wwii, 
as it articulates the moral and legal status of people through the eyes of their 
particular religious identities as opposed through internationally agreed upon 
norms and laws, especially those deriving from the western Enlightenment. 
isis, as a religious ideology, not only challenges political establishments, but 
the entire way the modern world as developed, as it returns these questions 
back to religion and away from international and democratic (and secular) in-
stitutions. Democratic deliberation, informed by the disastrous experiences of 
the 20th century, as a way of determining the validity of social laws and norms, 
is rejected in favor of the absolutes of divine law. Sharīʿah, for isis and oth-
ers, is a divinely guaranteed system of government and administration of jus-
tice. The post-metaphysical age of the modern West is thoroughly rejected for 
the pre-modern faith in revelation. In order to create a just society that could 
be endorsed by the divine, arguments must be rooted in sacred text and not 
man’s autonomous, yet faulty, reason. Although reason is not entirely negated 
by groups such as isis, it is subordinate to revelation, which takes precedence 
over human understanding. In western terms, the epistemology of Descartes, 
with its emphasis on reason as the sole source to determine truth, is replaced 
by the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, which takes the truth of revelation 
prior to that of reason.
As can be witness by their actions, isis takes their particular articulation of 
Sunni Islam as the organizing principle for all activities within their domains. 
Not only is Islam “perfected” and therefore petrified in that perfection, Islam’s 
claim to be comprehensive is absolutized; nothing is outside of the purview of 
Islam according to isis, and therefore that which is legislated and governed by 
religion demands a religious enforcer. With the melding of religion with the 
notion of totality, isis rejects the idea of the separation of religion and state, 
as articulated by the Bourgeoisie – especially the American founding father 
Thomas Jefferson – but rather leaves intact what had been married prior to 
the secularization of the state: what God has enjoined let no man tear asunder.51 
51 Although he is critical of the Bourgeoisie on a multiplicity of issues, Marx confirms his 
agreement with the separation of church and state in his essay On the Jewish Question. 
Marx, Marx-Engels Reader, 31–34.
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Rejecting the idea that morality should be separated from legality, their ide-
ology believes to enforce morality upon the people is to follow not only the 
legal norms as expressed in the Qur’an and Sharīʿah law in any particular case, 
but to make identical God’s demands and “Islamic” society. Thus, an important 
 factor in isis’s thought is the instilling of Qur’anic norms within all aspects 
of the community; from marriage to courtship, banking to farming, eating to 
urinating – the sunnah (way) of Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an must be 
made operational from the micrological to the macrological if such a society 
can be worthy of the descriptor “Islamic.” But is this a deus ex machina in re-
gards to the conditions of the Muslim world in a secular zeitgeist?52 To answer 
this we have to return to recent history.
Since 1979, the West has been pathologically infatuated with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the figure of Ayatollah Khomeini.53 The abolition of 
the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s secular western-oriented regime and 
its “foreign” cultural influences was the vision of Khomeini, a cleric of the 
highest order who advocated the political activism of the clergy and the 
overthrow of the monarchy. In its place he implemented the vilayat-i faqīh, 
or “rule of the jurist.” This jurist, in the absence of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam 
that currently, according to the Shi’a, remains in occultation (‘ghayba), has a 
duty to rule until his return. As such, society cannot be left without righteous 
guidance. Therefore those who are most familiar, experts in, and embody 
themselves, the laws and regulations of the divine, must stand in the place of 
the Mahdi until his return. In Khomeini’s treatise on “Islamic Government,” 
he explains his position on the need for a religiously rooted form of rule. He 
states,
According to one of the noble verses of the Qur’an, the ordinance of 
 Islam are not limited with respect to time or place; they are perma-
nent and must be enacted until the end of time. They were not revealed 
merely for the time of the Prophet, only to be abandoned thereafter, with 
 retribution and the penal code of Islam no longer to be enacted, or the 
taxes prescribed by Islam no longer collected, and the defense of the 
lands and people of Islam suspended. The claim that the laws of Islam 
may remain in abeyance or are restricted to a particular time or place is 
contrary to the essential credal bases of Islam.
52 Deus ex machina – “artificially contrived solution,” literally “a god from a machine.”
53 Dustin Byrd, Ayatollah Khoemini, 1–23; Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 223–313.
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He continues,
Since the enactment of laws, then, is necessary after the departure of the 
Prophet from this world, and indeed, will remain so until the end of time, 
the formation of a government and the establishment of executive and 
administrative organs are also necessary. Without the formation of a gov-
ernment and the establishment of such organs to ensure that through 
enactment of the law, all activities of the individual take place in the 
framework of a just system, chaos and anarchy will prevail and social, 
intellectual, and moral corruption will arise. The only way to prevent the 
emergence of anarchy and disorder and to protect society from corrup-
tion is to form a government and thus impart order to all the affairs of 
the country.54
Although the Shi’a concerns about the absence of the Mahdi distinguish Kho-
meini’s analysis from that of isis, the overall trajectory is very similar: the 
abandonment of the revealed way-of-being-in-the-world as embodied by the 
Prophet Muhammad was a historical mistake – one that was brought upon 
the Muslim both by outside colonial powers and by the many religiously-lax 
“cultural Muslims” within the ummah itself. This mistake must be corrected 
if the Muslim world is going to drag itself out of the ditch of history and thus, 
in the case of Khomeini, a righteous jurist – an Ayatollah (preferably a marja-
i taqlīd or “source of emulation”) – should govern society until the return of 
the  Mahdi.55 In the case of isis, it is the Caliph, not an Ayatollah, who must 
assume the responsibility as the Amīr al-Mu’minīn (leader of the faithful) and 
restore the spirit of Islam to a spiritually fallen ummah.
It would be a mistake to think, as some western scholar do, that because 
isis and other affiliated groups emphasize the political – or the struggle for 
recognition as Muslims – in Islam, that they are engaged in sheer ideology that 
is devoid of “true” religion, as if “true” religion has no political component. This 
is entirely untrue; religion has been involved in politic affairs from its earliest 
forms, including the theocracy of King David, the political-theology of Jesus 
of Nazareth, to the construction of the first Islamic city in Medina, in present 
day Saudi Arabia. Religion is not simply spirituality devoid of socio-economic 
and political concerns; it is not simply the establishment of a personal rela-
tionship between man and his god, but also one that is deeply entrenched in 
54 Ayatollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkely: Mizan Press, 
1981), 41–42.
55 This is the Farsi rendering of the phrase. In Arabic, it is Marja al-Taqlīd.
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the affairs of this world. In other words, religion impels the believer to engage 
this world in ways that are consistent with their religious beliefs. This is espe-
cially true for the Abrahamic faiths, which distort themselves when they artifi-
cially compartmentalize the various aspects of the human experience, making 
some “ religious” and therefore “private” affairs and others public and therefore 
“secular.” The ethical life cannot be “rendered unto Caesar” when it all belongs 
to God. Nevertheless, the strict apartheid of religion and polity opened up a 
space for the civilizational progress in the West since the Enlightenment; the 
 suffocating strictures of authoritarian religion were lifted and the genius of 
European inquisitivity was let loose. However, the trend towards privatizing 
 religion within civil society – that has predominated in the West since the Bour-
geoisie guillotined the nobility of France – is precisely what isis is attempting 
to suture. Similar to Iran, if a Sunni state can be constructed with Islam as its 
organizing principle, it will potentially serve as an example of an Islamic alter-
native to western secularity. However, if it chooses to do this predicated upon 
ethnic cleansing, mass murder, and barbarity, it will fail, as such activities can 
hardly be justified by the constitutional norms of the Islamic  tradition itself.
For all of isis’s claims about fighting for the cause of Islam, the Qur’anic 
prohibition on murdering innocent civilians has been so ignored that one has 
to wonder what sort of Islam is isis fighting for. The Qur’an, in Sūrat  al-An’ām, 
verse 151 states ‘and do not kill a soul that Allah has made sacred except by 
 [legal] right.’56 Nevertheless, isis continues to articulate their own inter-
pretation of Islamic “legal rights” in order to justify their slaughter, but such 
 imaginary “rights” have been rejected by Islamic authorities throughout the 
Muslims world to no avail.
Throughout history, as groups brought states into existence, their status as 
states was dependent on the recognition of others; they would ask: do other 
states recognize the newly formed entity as a state; do they have a legitimate 
system of justice; do they have a legitimate government; do they have a right 
to create the entity or is it disputed; do they have a continuous land mass; are 
there any extenuating reason why such an entity should not be recognized as 
a state? The process of recognition – which is the process by which one state 
accepts the sovereignty of another – is solely a political matter as there really 
is no absolute consensus as to what criteria an entity must achieve in order for 
a state to be recognized as such. Therefore, states recognize each other based 
56 Qur’an, 6:151. My translation. Legal right excludes systematic mass killings of individu-
als and groups simply because they are from another religion. One’s adherence or non- 
adherence to a religion has never qualified someone for summary execution in the 
Islamic tradition.
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on their own interests. In the case of isis we recognize a new dynamic. Their 
struggle for recognition is not dependent upon western countries or any other 
countries per se. As they do not accept the “power” of non-Muslim states to 
grant them statehood, nor do they recognize the legitimacy of most of the gov-
ernments that rule over Muslims; there is no authoritative “other” who can 
recognize them and thus officially impart legal statehood. Non-recognition, in 
this case, is entirely superfluous as the “Islamic state” only respects the deter-
mination of itself by itself – it grants itself statehood in the name of Islam, not 
international laws and norms. For international law this is clearly not enough 
to join the world community, but for those who remain within the frame-
work of fundamentalist religion, the de-legitimized Muslim governments or 
non-Muslim states and their views of isis matter little. The Calilphate has 
been declared in the name of the ultimate sovereign, the divine, and that’s 
all the recognition that isis requires in their estimation. In that sense, it is a 
“ self-recognizing authority.” Would it like the recognition of Muslims as being 
the legitimate caliphate: yes. From its own perspective, does it require it: no.
A robust critique of isis is certainly warranted, especially on the level of its 
abuse of communities within its domain, but in order for it to be meaningful 
to isis itself, such critique cannot be made from the standpoint of western 
values, laws, and legislation, as those do not hold any validity among isis-
minded individuals. Rather, the critique must derive wholly from the Islamic 
tradition itself, for only an argument that is rooted in the ultimate source of 
Islam, i.e. the Qur’an and Sunnah of Muhammad, can persuade those who 
reject any other source of justification and/or legitimacy. Inner-critique – or 
critique from within the Islamic tradition – must be called for, as only Islam 
has the principles and conceptions that are normative, and therefore binding, 
on all Muslims. If isis is not to be destroyed, as the u.s. Secretary of State 
John Kerry says it will be, but rather reformed, it must make itself identical 
to Islam via Islam itself, not by force from the outside.57 Nevertheless, at this 
moment in history, it does not appear that this process of becoming identical 
with Islam will be peaceful, as isis itself, through its very un-Islamic practices, 
has  alienated most of the world, including millions of Muslims. However, the 
futility of killing those who hold certain beliefs without addressing the validity 
of those beliefs is well known, as beliefs have a longer shelf-life than those who 
articulate them. Therefore no amount of drone strikes, no amount of bomb-
ings by coalition forces, nato and Russia will affect the resolve of isis. It will 
take a concerted effort by Muslims to eradicate such a barbaric and distorted 
57 John Kerry, Twitter – 8/20/2014. (Accessed 8/22/2014).
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interpretation of Islam through a concerted effort to convince them that they 
have deviated from Islam. Inner transformation via inner critique is what is 
needed.
Despite the ineffectiveness of critiquing isis from the standpoint of 
 western values, one can engage in a sociological investigation of isis’s likely 
future  success and failures. Based on a Marxist reading of their ideology, it 
can be surmised that isis will ultimately fail as a movement to change the 
overall conditions of the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. It will 
not bring about a new caliphate that garnishes universal recognition, nor even 
recognition from the majority of Muslims (including the Sunnis). This is for 
one very important reason that Marx articulated in the introduction to his 
 Contribution to the   Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843). When Marx 
set about  identifying the class that possessed the potential to be the concrete 
agent of historical transformation, one that would replace Hegel’s metaphysi-
cal world  spirit (weltgeist), he looked for an entity that represented the uni-
versal interest of mankind. For Marx, those groups that solely represented a 
particular – their own interests at the expense of all others, and saw all  others 
as  opponents within a much larger competition for advancement – were 
 disqualified as the true agents for substantive change. In mid-19th century 
Prussia, the nobility, state bureaucracy, and monarchy, were all competing fac-
tions within civil  society. As such, they experienced the other simply as op-
ponents with which they were locked in an eternal conflict as the interests 
of each limited the realization of the interests of all. To Marx, none of them 
could transcend their own particularity; because of this limitation they could 
not serve as the instrument for universal human emancipation. Systematical-
ly and constitutionally trapped within their particularity, the degree of real 
emancipatory change was severely limited if possible at all. What was needed 
was an agent that represented the universal interest of human emancipation. 
Marx writes,
What is the basis of a partial, merely political revolution? Simply this: a 
section of civil society emancipates itself and attains universal domina-
tion; a determinate class undertakes, from its particular situation, a gen-
eral emancipation of society. This class emancipates society as a whole, 
but only on condition that the whole of society is in the same situation as 
this class… No class in civil society can play this part unless it can arouse, 
in itself and in the masses, a moment of enthusiasm in which it associ-
ates and mingles with society at large, identifies itself with it, and is felt 
and recognized as the general representative of this society. Its aims and 
interest must genuinely be the aims and interest of society itself, of which 
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it becomes in reality the social head and heart. It is only in the name of 
general interests that a particular class can claim general supremacy.58
Just as the Bourgeoisie represented that emancipatory class during the French 
Revolution of 1789, the proletariat – those whose situation in society could only 
be advanced through the total transformation of all existing conditions – bore 
the burden of revolutionary change; they were Marx’s concrete absolute spirit 
of history (at that historical moment). Thus revolutionary workers, for Marx, 
were the only faction within civil society that embodied the universal interest 
of all, and therefore they, and only they, could emancipate society entire.
However, in order for there to be a radical change in consciousness concern-
ing the possibility of emancipation within the suffering classes, the oppress-
ing classes have to be thoroughly identified and revolutionary action must be 
 directed against them through a popular movement. He continues,
In order to attain this liberating position, and the political direction of 
all spheres of society, revolutionary energy and consciousness of its own 
power do not suffice. For a popular revolution and the emancipation of a 
particular class of civil society to coincide, for one class to represent the 
whole of society, another class must concentrate in itself all the evils of 
society, a particular class must embody and represent a general obstacle 
and limitation. A particular social sphere must be regarded as the notori-
ous crime of the whole society, so that emancipation from this sphere 
appears as a general emancipation. For one class to be the liberating class 
par excellence, it is necessary that another class should be openly the 
 oppressing class.59
From the perspective of critical religiologists, informed by the Frankfurt 
School, who learned from Marx his concrete dialectics of history, isis, and any 
other organization, group, class, or movement, that fails to embody the burden 
of the universal interest, but remains shrouded within the interest of a par-
ticular, who define themselves against the interests of all, will ultimately fail 
to transform society in such a way that it brings about a totally-reconciled and 
peaceful society. isis, as the present manifestation of militant Sunni particu-
larity, like the nobility of 19th century Prussia, fails to transcend its sectarian 
limitations, may make history, but will fail to define it. Despite their attempts 
to overcome the oppression of other groups, their own particularity limits 




their historical significance. Yet one could affectively argue that the uprising 
of Sunnis against the ‘Alawiyyah in Damascus and the Shi’a led government in 
Baghdad takes the form of a liberating class struggling against the oppressing 
class that represents the “evils of society” and the “notorious crime.” It is true 
that the Damascus and Baghdad governments systematically suppressed the 
Sunni population and failed to allow them to adequately realize their political- 
economic potentials within civil society and the state. This oppression, to 
some, legitimated the isis led uprisings. However, this line of argument is 
fundamentally flawed due to the fact that isis and the Sunni affiliates cannot 
represent the universal against the particularity of the ruling elites precisely 
because they themselves have clearly articulated that they are exclusively sec-
tarian in nature: they are Sunni and for the Sunnis. Against this kind of particu-
larizing thought, Marx defines this emancipatory class as such,
A class must be formed which has radical chains, a class in civil soci-
ety which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution 
of all classes, a sphere of society which has a universal character be-
cause its sufferings are universal, and which does not claim a particular 
 redress because the wrong which is done to it is not a particular wrong 
but wrong in general. There must be formed a sphere of society which 
claims no  traditional status but only a human status… a sphere, finally, 
which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all the 
other spheres of society, without, therefore, emancipating all these other 
spheres, which is, in short, a total loss of humanity and which can only 
redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity.60
In this sense, isis’s attack on Damascus and Baghdad is not an attack by a 
liberating universal movement, but one sectarian group struggling against an-
other. It does not wish to transform all of society by destroying those social 
and political strictures that limit human emancipation, but rather they sim-
ply wish to replace the rule of one particularity with the rule of another: the 
 universal interest is wholly absent.
Opportunity: The 2003 American led attack on Iraq opened up a Pan-
dora’s box in the Middle East that had been suppressed by the various dicta-
torial regimes. Like Yugoslavia, which was held together by a socialism that 
emphasized communist universal equality over nationalist particularities, 
the  decision of Bush and Cheney – rooted in Neo-Conservative ideology 
60 Ibid., 64.
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(the combination of Leo Strauss’s political philosophy and the economics of 
Milton Friedman) – to remove the Ba’ath party from power and therefore 
de-emphasize the nation (the singular), set loose the violence of sectarian 
particularity. For decades the different sects and religions lived relatively peace-
fully under the secular regimes of the Middle East, but their removal, both by 
invasion (Iraq) and the Arab Spring (2010–2012), once again created a space 
for sectarianism. The  particularity of tribe and sect overcame all thoughts of 
the solidarity among “Iraqis”; nationhood as the basis for demos was replaced 
by ethnos and religious identity as the signifier for “in” and “out” group. How-
ever, what did not occur was violence against rival sects based solely on their 
religion per se, but their identity as the “other” served as the motivation for 
violence. In other words, differences of opinion regarding kalam, fiqh, ‘aqēdah, 
etc., did not animate the attacks, but rather the feeling that the other was (or 
would) gain the upper hand politically and economically provided the motiva-
tion for the violence. In the case of Iraq, the Sunnis were marginalized by the 
governing coalition (led by Ambassador Paul Bremer) after being in power for 
decades as a minority (via the Ba’ath party).61 Consequently, the feeling of dis-
respect, dishonor and of being cast out ran deep among the Sunni which later 
fueled their resistance to the American led occupation of Iraq.62 Although 
the Shi’a had much more to gain by cooperating with the American authori-
ties, Muqtadā al-Ṣadr and his Mahdi Army led a fierce insurgence against the 
United States for the majority of time they occupied the nation. Although he 
remain steadfast in his opposition to the American occupation, he did encour-
age the Shi’a to participate in the elections which would eventually bring about 
a Shi’a led government under Nuri al-Maliki. As the United States withdrew 
their forces under President Barack Obama, Iraq was squarely in the hands 
of the Shi’a who systematically began to purge all Sunni influences from the 
state – once again advancing the particular over the universal. Consequently, 
the actions by the Shi’a led-government created a massive cadre of disaffect-
ed Sunnis who abandoned their allegiance to Iraq and embraced their Sunni 
identity more strongly than ever before.
In the spring 2011, protests against Syria’s ‘Alawite President Bashar al-Assad 
began nationwide, mainly by Sunnis and secular Shi’a. Unlike in Egypt, where 
President Hosni Mubarak relinquished power without resorting to an outright 
61 We should be clear that the Ba’ath party was a secular party that held within itself mem-
ber of various religions, tribes, and sects. However, the Sunni Arabs were by far the most 
dominant.
62 Warrick, Black Flags, 101–220.
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war upon his people, Assad would resist capitulating at all costs.63 He believed 
the ‘Alawiyyah would be subject to genocide if the Sunnis were to gain control 
of the state. As such, he thought the fate of his people rested upon his ability to 
remain in control of his country, and thus he elicited the military assistance of 
his ally Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, who entered the fight against 
isis and the Syrian rebels in the summer of 2015. Many groups determined to 
wrestle power from the hands of Assad developed in the rubble of Syria. Some 
of these groups were more secular in orientation, such as the Free Syrian Army, 
while others were clearly jihādist, such as Islamic Front, al-Nusrah Front, and 
the Army of Mujahideen. Among these was isis, who had begun as al-Qae’da 
in Iraq (aqi), but had taken on an even more sinister orientation.64 Now that 
those same Sunni fighters and Ba’athists who were driven out of Iraq by the 
 coalition forces had honed their skills in combat by fighting the Syrian army, 
resulting in their takeover of 1/3 of Syria, they turned their attention back to 
Iraq where the Shi’a led government was quickly showing itself to be incom-
petent, overly sectarian, and incapable of mounting a adequate defense of the 
nation.
Unable to find the motivation to fight for “Iraq,” as nationalist sentiments 
had been drained in favor of sectarian ones, many Iraqi fights abandoned their 
posts, surrendered to isis, or fled to Baghdad, hoping for American interven-
tion into the conflict. These soldiers for Iraq proved not to be martyr material – 
the state of Iraq could not instill in them any feeling of patriotic belonging, 
i.e. their personal identity and that of the state were fundamentally different 
and therefore many were therefore unwilling to die for something they could 
not identify with: the Shi’a led American manufactured Iraqi state. In the face 
of the Shi’a dominated state, many Sunnis in the western and northwestern 
provinces of Iraq, where the Sunnis are the majority, welcomed isis’s redemp-
tive mission – to restore Sunni pride and power.65 They saw within isis the 
possibility of creating something better than the old Iraq, with its multieth-
nic and multi-religious complexion. They saw the potential to create a new 
 caliphate. In their vision, 19th and 20th century style nationalism, an attempt 
to overcome religious sectarianism, as well as language, cultural, and historical 
divisions, under the banner of a secular state, was at an end in the Middle East. 
63 See Dustin J. Byrd, “On the State of Islam: Thoughts on Revolution, Revolt and Reform,” 
in Global Future of Religion: Probing into Issues of Religion and Religiosity in the Postmod-
ern World, ed. Seyed Javad Miri (London: International Peace Studies Centre Press, 2012), 
289–311.
64 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, isis, 20–47.
65 Warrick, Black Flags, 223–307.
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Now was the time for states to reflect the religious composition of the people. 
Against the grain of history, isis and their Sunni backers believed that the re-
ligious state – the new theocracy – had to be born within the modern period; 
that was the only true answer to both (1) western influence in the region, and 
(2) the dominance of the non-Sunni sects’ rule: the ‘Alawites in Syria and the 
Shi’a in Iraq.
The 20th and 21st century’s attack on socialism, be it in Europe or in the 
Middle East, and the undermining of socialistic equality – that emphasized 
humanity and class over religion, ethnicity, race, and culture – bears immense 
responsibility for the descent of history into tribal barbarity. Where once the 
equality of peoples was slowly materializing, albeit often in less-than-desirable 
circumstances, capitalism’s insistence on inequality within society, as well as 
the West’s ruthless pursuit of its own interests within the Muslim world, led 
to the evaporation of egalitarianism. Now, in the 21st century, tribalism, sec-
tarianism, and crass nationalism – predicated on the hatred of the other – has 
replaced the drive for the egalitarian; where once religion emphasized that 
which is common to all mankind, and thus the source for universal solidar-
ity, it is once again in the service of those who see difference as a reason to 
destroy, a reason to fight, and a reason to annihilate. The failure of socialism 
and communism in the 20th century to create a society of equality – one that 
actualizes the empty promises of the Bourgeoisie – is partly to blame for cre-
ating the space by which modern religious fundamentalism thrives. But then 
again, socialism and communism can hardly be blamed for its own failures, as 
it was never allowed to emerge from its “siege mentality” due to the capital-
ist world’s perpetual attempts to destroy it. The secular non-capitalist alterna-
tive to western globalization, which had begun to develop within the Muslim 
world, was systematically undermined by the West during the Cold War for fear 
that those countries would be more friendly to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
these newly liberated countries could not be allowed to create a functioning 
socialist alternative to both liberal democracy and/or Bolshevism.66 The West 
was  indeed correct; those anti-colonial and emerging nation-states mostly 
saw their future in socialism, either in conjunction with the Soviet Union or in 
 cooperation with them, and near universally rejected the ideals of capitalism, 
seeing it as just another form of colonialism. nato and the West in general, 
attempted to undermine and/or overthrow all attempts throughout the world 
to create such a viable secular alternative to western capitalism along the lines 
of Marxism or Marxist-Leninism; whether that be in Iran, Afghanistan, various 
66 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, The Cold War, and the Roots of 
Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.
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Latin  American and Caribbean countries, etc. As such, secular-leftist govern-
ments, many of which were democratically elected, were the victims of coups 
d’états, assassinations, and invasions. The destruction of this alternative forced 
many, especially those in the Middle East, to retreat back into their religios-
ity as a form of defense against the neo-colonialism of the United States and 
its allies. In other words, religious extremism is the “blowback” for the defeat 
of socialism/communism. Just as the capitalist West functionalized religious 
voices against the Soviet Union, such as in Afghanistan, the ugly side of reli-
gion was later resurrected to fight against the ugliness of capitalism and neo-
imperialism.67 isis is just the latest manifestation of that phenomenon.
The term “religion” etymologically has to with “that which binds.” However, 
the dark side of religion, as Cohen describes it, has to do with that which fails 
to be bound; for everything that is bound together must simultaneously be 
 separated from something else. In other words, religion inherently and simulta-
neously binds as well as separates one group of people from another. Although 
this is the nature of religion, religious communities always have the capacity to 
emphasize one aspect or the other. They can either accept that they are bound 
together as one ummah (community) while also choosing to embrace the 
 other in all their differences, or they can allow their particular identity to serve 
as a barrier against which the others may not cross, which inevitably leads to 
a fractured humanity. Religion, in all its singularity, can either transcend its 
sectarian nature or embrace the universal – which threatens to dissolve their 
singularity into the universal – or they can remain self-ghettoized behind their 
singular identity – and the whole remains antagonistic towards itself. Because 
religions always define themselves against something else: Christianity against 
Judaism, Islam against Christianity, Buddhism against Hinduism, all religions 
against secularity, etc., they are always in the business of constructing an iden-
tity for the other. The same dynamic can be found in sects, but because sects 
are so close in identity, and usually only separate themselves on minute details, 
such small differences take on a much more important meaning; the intensifi-
cation of meaning does not augment the actual differences, only the meaning 
between the difference. This has the effect of communities having to inten-
sify the antagonism between the rival identities even though those identities 
are overwhelmingly similar and share similar roots. In other words, the small 
differences between sects take on a much bigger meaning than the big dif-
ferences between various religions, precisely because their differences are so 
slight.  Being that the particularities between sects are minute, their hatred for 
the other has to be enflamed as to distinguish between the two. For example, 
67 Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 119–177.
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the hatred between the Irish Catholics and Irish Protestant is deeply seated 
despite the fact that they both share Christian beliefs, a common ethnicity, 
shared language and customs, and a shared history. In a more reconciled so-
ciety, those small differences would serve as a basis for discourse and hopeful 
reconciliation, not the intensification of hate. But in our present antagonis-
tic, atomized and ego-centered society, the microscopic differences have to be 
augmented as not to reconcile communities to each other which would con-
fuse the distinct identities, because reconciliation is the transcending of the 
inherent negativity of particular identities in favor of the universal identity: 
humanity beyond its differences.
Nevertheless, it is up to the religious believers to decide if their religious tra-
dition will aid in the realization of a more-reconciled future society (universal 
solidarity) or if it will contribute to furthering the barbarity of war, violence, 
and mass death, the result of absolutized singularity. However, we must re-
member the sentiment of Adorno in his Negative Dialectics that was informed 
by the mass destruction of humanity in the Shoah: pure identity is death.68
 American and Euro-Jihādis
Among the discourse concerning the descent into barbarity at the heart of the 
Middle East is the looming fear in Europe and the United States that many of 
isis’s western-born fighters may return home to carry out attacks upon the 
West itself. Indeed, with the beheading of James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David 
Haines, and Peter Kassig at the hands of Mohamed Emwazi, a British Mus-
lim, as well as the murder of the American aid worker Kayla Mueller, the 
West has become painfully aware that many of its Muslim sons have turned 
against their homelands and have adopted a very different ideology: radical 
jihādism.69  According to published reports, thousands of isis fighters hail from 
Europe and a few hundred may be from the United States. isis has  recruited 
fighters from at least 81 countries via the Internet – and sometimes even ac-
tive headhunters – and swarms of young men, many of them  disaffected by 
their lives in the West, have responded to the call. Additionally, many young 
68 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 362.
69 I agree with the defenders of the traditional sense of the word “jihād,” that it is first an 
inner struggle towards righteousness, and second, a war of self-defense, etc. However, 
I use the word “jihādi” to designate those who ideologically appropriate the term “jihād” in 
order to legitimate their un-Islamic actions. For those I think are engaged in a legitimate 
struggle for self-defense, etc., I prefer the term mujahideen.
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 western-Muslim girls have traveled to Syria to become “brides” of isis fight-
ers. Overall, it is estimated that by the end of summer of 2014, over 12,000 isis 
fighters from countries other than Iraq and Syria have joined the fight. It is 
estimated that there are more foreign fighters in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict than 
those who fought against the Soviet Union in the 1980–1988 war in Afghanistan 
and these fighters makes up approximately one-third of isis’s forces.70 Addi-
tionally, according to the Canadian government, by the fall of 2014, approxi-
mately 130 Canadian “extremist travelers” have gone to Syria to fight with isis, 
including Damian Clairmont, brothers Collin and Gregory Gordon, and Farah 
Shirdon. Damian Clairmont was killed in action just one month after arriving 
while fighting in Aleppo against the Free Syrian Army.71 All four of these jihādis 
were from Calgary and attended the same downtown mosque. It appears that 
Canada, despite its political differences with the United States, shares similar, 
if not the same, cultural problems that serve as fertile grounds for radicalism.
Unlike the West, which is engulfed within a hyper-atomized civil society that 
has few resources to bind people together in substantive solidarity, the con-
cept of ummah and the establishment of a “caliphate” have immense  power 
to attract fighters to its banner, a power that is almost inconceivable within 
the extreme atomistic civil society of the West. As Slavoj Žižek has  remarked, 
the West is languishing in its Nietzschian “Last Man” stage of history – where 
we’ve become complacent in our material luxury, happy to engage in mindless 
busy-ness, and undisturbed by the existential crises that surround us; we are 
‘apathetic creature[s] with no great passion or commitment. Unable to dream, 
tired of life, [we] take no risks, seeking only comfort and security.’72 The West’s 
once powerful dreams of creating a society rooted in liberty, equality and fra-
ternity, have given way to a life of materialist stupor; drunk on our own suc-
cesses, we fail to commit ourselves to any vision of a more just society, and for 
this lack of vision beyond the given we tacitly accept our existentially empty 
status quo as our ultimate fate. However, this status quo is predicated upon the 
submission of other parts of the world to our capitalist imposed world-order, 
70 Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria (Soufan Group Report, June, 2014), 6. One should 
bear in mind that those Arabs that fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union later 
created al-Qae’da (the base).
71 Public Safety Canada, “2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: Respond-
ing to Violent Extremism and Travel Abroad for Terrorist Related Purposes,” Her  Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Canada, 2014; David Fitzpatrick and Drew Griffin, “Canadians 
have Joined isis to Fight – and Die – in Syria,” September 10, 2014. http://www.cnn 
.com/2014/09/10/world/canada-isis-jihadists/ (Accessed 9/10/2014).
72 Slavoj Žižek, “isis is a Disgrace to Fundamentalism,” New York Times, September 3, 2014.
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yet we rarely witness this fact as it is thoroughly camouflaged in the jungle 
of consumerist abundance. “We in the West,” says Žižek, ‘are… immersed in 
stupid daily pleasures, while the Muslim radicals are ready to risk everything, 
engaged in the struggle up to their self-destruction.’73 The ‘transcendental 
cause,’ which animates isis and other jihādist groups, is a unifying force dedi-
cated to the destruction of the status quo; the same status quo that the West 
has imposed on the world and has enjoyed since wwii. But Žižek’s analysis 
is lacking in one important feature: because of the relative comfort the West 
currently enjoys, we are too often unaware that there are alternatives to day-
dreams of a petit-bourgeois existence; we’ve come to believe that our way-of-
life is normative throughout the world and thus all opposition to it is a gross 
violation of the natural order. Happy in our complacency, we rarely journey 
out of ourselves and into the lifeworld of the other where real transcendental 
causes still animate and motivate humanity beyond its simple social, econom-
ic, and political reproduction. The true danger of the “Last Man” is that in his 
automaton-like existence, he is unaware that his degraded life isn’t universal, 
but remains within the trap he’s found himself in, while at the same time he 
reflexively supports those that would export this automaton culture to other 
parts of the world in the name of “universal values.” The globalization of the 
Last Man is both a goal and a hidden truth for the man languishing within Max 
Weber’s “Iron Cage” (stahlhartes Gehäuse).74 It may now be the case that the 
absolute barbarity of isis will either (1) disturb the iron cage of the western 
automaton, or (2) further enforce his false-consciousness concerning its truth 
and inevitability.
 Hegel, War and Individualism
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, an additional problem has plagued the post-
secular West. As stated above, despite its abundance of individual and formal 
political rights, its common projects have already been depleted; the bourgeois 
revolution survived its inner-critique, i.e. communism, and empty consumer-
ism has become the new way of life. Or, as Walter Benjamin claimed, capital-
ism itself has become the western world’s new religion. He writes, ‘a religion 
may be discerned in capitalism – that is to say, capitalism serves essentially 
to allay the same anxieties, torments, and disturbances to which the so-called 
73 Ibid.
74 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (Los 
Angeles, ca: Roxbury Publishing Co., 2002), 123.
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religions offered answers.’75 Since the demise of religion as a way-of-being 
for western society, as well as the diminishment of its secular translation in 
socialism/communism, the West has failed to provide a new common proj-
ect that could unify itself, other than its own militarized defense. Going back 
further, since Luther introduced the individual as a concept of upmost impor-
tance, detaching the individual’s salvation from the salvation of the whole or 
the community, which was later secularized with the development of democ-
racy and capitalism, the West has rarely been able to overcome its social at-
omization, it social fragmentation, and its inter-societal competitiveness, and 
when for a brief moment it has transcended its atomization, it has resulted in 
disasters such as wwi and wwii.76 In the increasingly secular society, religion 
ceases to supply the sufficient motivation to galvanize the West into a project 
that points beyond itself at any given moment. As the aggregate masses of de-
teched individuals experience the “other” in society as their competition, their 
antagonist, and not as a fellow participant in the whole, a sense of a friendly 
living together in a particular cause fails to materialize. Indeed, even collective 
practices, such as electoral politics, are in service to the individual who purely 
votes for “his/her self-interests” and not the interests of the whole. The indi-
vidual is led to believe that his or her own interests are identical with the inter-
est of the whole. With this being the case, politics proves to be too divisive to 
motivate substantive solidarity, while at the same time free market economics 
augments and perpetuates these social divisions within democratic/capitalist 
nations. Given this situation, what then motivates the masses towards univer-
sal ideals?
Philosophy (despite its hidden pervasiveness) – no matter its overall weak-
ness in the world – yields more social significance in Europe than in America, 
where its abstract vocabulary invokes suspicion of Euro-elitism. Yet even in 
Europe philosophy fails to motivate adequately, nor does it aid in overcoming 
the social ailments associated with atomization, but often serves to separate 
communities and nations instead of uniting them. Marx’s idea that philosophy 
could take as its object the revolutionary working class, and therefore realize 
philosophy within history, failed to materialize as the revolutionary work-
ing class refused to embrace the revolutionary cause in much of the West.77 
75 Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Vol. 1: 1913–1926, ed. Marcus Bullock 
& Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, ma: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2004), 288.
76 Herbert Marcuse, A study on Authority (New York: Verso, 2008), 12–34.
77 Marx stated in his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction, 
that ‘just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat 
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 Additionally, the pre-political foundations of nations, i.e. their language, his-
tory, religion, and ethnicity, have all been formally negated as bases for the 
modern enlightened secular state and therefore their potential to bind the 
masses has been removed, unless the bureaucratic neutrality of the state 
is broken by nationalist negativity: xenophobia, racism, and Islamophobia 
(as one variant of religion-hatred). Through its negativity the state may be 
able to conjure solidarity among the atomized, and thus stabilize itself, but 
the consequences of such conjuring has proven to be diabolical in the 20th 
century.
However, this conjuring of the nation-states’ negativity may adequately 
serve as a potential catalyst for overcoming the languishing political, economic 
and culture life in the West, but it may not be what the western world ulti-
mately wants.
Hegel pointed out in his Philosophy of Right that there is a tremendous po-
tential for social solidarity through ravishes of armed conflict. War, as a way of 
stirring civil society out of its automaton-like slumber, may instill in a society 
sufficient motivation to congeal around a given issue short of delivering a na-
tion to a perpetual state of war. For Hegel, nations may have to risk doing “evil” 
in order to realize the ethical moment of war. He writes,
For war should not be regarded as an absolute evil (Übel) and as a purely 
external contingency whose cause (Grund) is therefore itself contingent, 
whether this cause lies in the passions of rulers or nations (Völker), in 
injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be… War is 
that condition in which the vanity of temporal things (Dinge) and tem-
poral goods – which tends at other times to be merely a pious phrase – 
takes on a serious significance, and it is accordingly the moment in 
which the ideality of the particular attains its right and becomes actual-
ity… The ideality which makes its appearance in war in the shape of a 
contingent external relationship is the same as the ideality whereby the 
internal powers of the state are organic moments of the whole. This 
is apparent in various occurrences in history, as when successful wars 
have averted internal unrest and consolidated the internal power of the 
state.78
finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy… philosophy can only be realized by the abo-
lition of the proletariat, and the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of 
philosophy.’ Marx and Engels, Marx-Engels Reader, 65.




In peace, the bounds of civil life are extended, all its spheres become firm-
ly established, and in the long run, people become stuck in their ways. 
Their particular characteristics (Partikularitäten) become increasingly 
rigid and ossified. But the unity of the body is essential to the health, and 
if its parts grow internally hard, the result is death. Perpetual peace is of-
ten demanded as an ideal to which mankind should approximate. Thus, 
Kant proposed a league of sovereigns to settle disputes between states, 
and the Holy Alliance was meant to be an institution more or less of this 
kind. But the state is an individual, and negation is an essential compo-
nent of individuality. Thus, even if a number of states join together as 
a family, this league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and 
create an enemy.79
For Hegel, war and the threat of war can potentially deliver enough motiva-
tion to congeal society into a common project, albeit predicated upon fear 
(whether true of simply perceived) and aggression towards the other. wwi, 
wwii, and the Cold War forced nations to think about their national com-
monality over and above the all-consuming peace-time concerns of individu-
als; the fact that all were targeted for nuclear destruction during the Cold 
War forced them to become self-reflective about their own singularity and 
mortality; they become conscious of the fact that their existence depends 
on the existence of others and most importantly the state, which serves as a 
common bond and an apparatus for self-preservation within a nation. In this 
case, singularity dissolves into the concerns of particularity – the people of a 
given nation as a whole, but does not rise to the level of universal – humanity 
in its totality. However, as Hegel already knew, in peacetime, when the ex-
ternal pressures of war are not bearing down upon the populace, society 
descends into isolated ghettos of selfishness and individuality, leaving behind 
the concerns for collectivity. In the post-Cold War period, the West may be 
completely depleted of its ability to sustain any substantive form of solidarity 
with and for itself. War may even be exhausted of its social solidarity poten-
tials that Hegel witnessed to, as the West – the United States in particular – 
have continually been in war which has depleted the legitimacy of democratic 
semantics. Not even Hitler’s right-wing Hegelian political-theologian, Carl 
79 Ibid., 362. My emphasis.
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Schmitt, and his dictum, that the  essence of politics is the identification of the 
enemy, can muster enough emotional  sentiment against the external enemy 
to unite the West, even after the enemy has been identified as being radi-
cal Islam: the conceptualized “totally other society” against which the West 
defines itself.80
However, the lack of social solidarity may be a structural phenomenon with-
in capitalist society that is steered primarily on the interests of multi-national 
corporations. Remember the American President George W. Bush’s response 
to 9/11: he asked the American people to go about their business-as-usual, to 
“enjoy life,” and not be afraid; in other words to “go shopping.” It was a perverse 
but logical move by the President not to encourage the populace to think of 
themselves as being part of the war effort against al-Qae’da, but rather they 
were commanded to do their patriotic duty and consume while ignoring the 
war that the nation was now engaged in. Solidarity, or the congealing of a na-
tion within a common project or common sentiment, was understood by Bush 
to be the death-knell of capitalism, especially because many Americans popu-
lation perceived that – following the wwii example – they should sacrifice a 
part of their own economic happiness for the war-effort. Out of the residue of 
religious guilt, it did not appear to them to be appropriate to enjoy the “bless-
ings of freedom” through consumptive activities while others were suffering, 
dying and killing to protect it. Nevertheless, for capitalism, the atomization 
and extreme individualism that exists within peacetime had to be maintained 
if the war was to be successful. Economic self-sacrifice for the common cause 
would hinder the already fragile economy and thus the nation’s ability to 
pay for the war without selling more debt to communist China. The logical 
conclusion from this observation repeats what Max Weber (and Karl Marx) 
already knew: capitalism by nature depends upon the division of individuals – 
solidarity is its poison, and not even a massive foreign war can now dislodge 
the collective zeitgeist of individualism in the West. Culturally, we have all 
become collectively socialized to be radical individualists (with some excep-
tions).  Additionally, if capitalism was going to be protected by the state against 
al-Qae’da, the workers of America had to continue to drive the engine of the 
economy via their purchasing prowess, which too often translates into massive 
personal debt to financial institutions who profit off the financial misery of 
working class people.
80 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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 isis and Western Alienation
Many young Muslims who have grown up in the West are alienated from the 
social freedoms that are normative within society; they yearn for a form of 
religious life that permeates all areas of being; they want to have a religious 
society that is governed not on the basis of individual freedom, but on God’s 
law; they desire a society that abolishes that which their religion deems im-
moral, and makes pertinent that which God demands upon his creation. Islam, 
being a religion that is rooted in sacred law, and thus refuses to separate mo-
rality and legality, is seen as the only viable way of establishing a society that 
could be endorsed by the divine. True freedom, many of these young believers 
think, can only materialize within the bounds of God’s laws. Cultural freedom, 
as articulated and practiced in the West – as freedom to be autonomous from 
traditional religious morality – for many of these young believers, cannot lead 
to a good life, a moral society, or a state predicated on the principles of abso-
lute justice precisely because it lets loose the anomic nature of the nafs ( ego, 
desires, instincts, etc.). The religiously-rooted moral component in secular 
 society is missing and the anxiety of working through vexing moral questions 
and subjectively establishing moral commitments without scriptural guidance 
overburdens the individual’s psyche and leads, he/she believes, to moral mis-
takes and social mischief. Certainly a society that dictates a preconceived mor-
al system appeals to a certain form of religious authoritarianism, as it releaves 
the burden of the individual to engage in moral deliberation and coerces the 
individual to act in conformity with the beliefs of others. It’s a form of moral 
scholasticism: one that starts with the moral truths (as already having been es-
tablished by revelation) and works its arguments backwards to legitimate and 
prove those moral “truths.” Consequently, societies that enforce religious mor-
als, such as what isis has attempted to do, do not allow for sufficient living- 
space for an individual to actually become moral, but rather demands one be 
moral if only on the surface. In other words, there is no public space for trial-
and-error in morality; the individual must simply conform: no becoming, only 
the appearance of being. On the other hand, in the moral vacuousness of the 
West, isis’s brutal implementation of morality is a powerful magnet for those 
who wish to see the construction of a true Islamic state – political, economic, 
and cultural embodiment of Islamic morality. To quote Freud, ‘where id was, 
there ego shall be,’ or, ‘where enslavement to individual desires is, there reli-
gious law shall be.’81 From the perspective of isis, the id of the West must be 
81 Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 100.
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subdued by the ego of Islam, and that process starts with the abolishment of 
western values,  practices, and culture in the Muslim world.
The magnetism of isis and other fundamentalist groups is made especially 
poignant when the alienation of Muslims in the West is coupled by a feeling 
of dejection, as if they are not wanted within those western countries, wheth-
er that feeling is the result of specific government policies, a cultural climate 
that cannot be reconciled with Islamic morality, or an overt Islamophobic or 
miso-Islamist environment. This feeling makes it easy for young Muslims to 
abandon any form of allegiance they once had to their home countries and 
adopt the rhetoric and lifestyle of the Islamic militant, even if cultural pat-
terns of  western society run deep within the individual. There is a sense of 
“coming home” even when that same young Muslim remains in the West but 
has spiritually migrates to the dar al-Islam (or what is imagined to be the dar 
al-Islam), often times through self-radicalization facilitated by the internet. 
The homecoming is even more profound when the young Muslim joins those 
who he believes to be fighting for an Islamic utopia-state as it gives him a 
sense of purpose, a sense of belonging, and a transcendent project, all that 
which was missing in the atomized West. The struggle to establish an Islamic 
state – and more importantly an Islamic society – is a common project within 
the Muslim ummah that, like Hegel remarked, wrestles the individual out of 
his singularity; it is a war that binds disparate individuals from various nations 
into a whole with common purpose. This ‘redemptive’ project disturbs the 
‘lasting calm’ that makes society “stagnant.”82 Seemingly, isis’s call for the re-
juvenation of the caliphate has fundamentally disturbed the delicate balance 
within the Muslim ummah between those who long for Muslim liberation 
and those who accommodate themselves to the status quo. As such, isis is 
forcing Muslims to take sides: are you with the rejuvenation and restoration 
of Islam as a world force or are you with the western-backed world order as-
it-is? Many Muslims simply reject this binary proposition, citing both sides to 
be fraudulent answers to the problems facing Muslims within the conditions 
of modernity.
Yet some have chosen sides. After an isis-inspired Algerian group behead-
ed Hervé Gourdel, a 55 year old French hiker on a tourist trip to Algeria in 
 September of 2014, French Muslim youth took to the streets and to their social 
media in protests. Antagonized not only by the murder of Gourdel, but also by 
the insistence of isis’s propaganda encouraging western Muslims to kill other 
82 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 361.
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non-Muslim westerners, including the ‘dirty French,’ these youth courageously 
claimed ‘We are also Dirty French.’83 Joining their British counterparts in their 
Not in My Name campaign, the French Muslims insist on the authenticity of 
their religious identity as well as their faithful commitment to the French na-
tion, even if that relationship has been strained in the recent past.84 For isis 
and other extremist groups, such siding with a western nation, especially one 
that has shown aggression towards Muslims, both in and outside of France, 
can only be met by severe hostility and a declaration of apostasy (takfīr). 
They understand the “we” in ‘we are also dirty French’ as being linguistically 
 symbolic of the divided loyalties of the French Muslim community, which is 
unacceptable in their eyes. Consequently, it is so believed, they have divorced 
themselves from the greater Muslim community and allied themselves with 
those who seek to harm that same Muslim community. For isis, this is trea-
son. For the other side, this isn’t treason at all, but one of the highest forms of 
witnessing against tyranny and professing ‘asabiyya (Islamic solidarity) with 
others, even if they are non-Muslims.
 Internationalism
The fact that thousands of western Muslims are making their way to the 
Middle East to fight with isis and the potential that they could eventually 
turn their jihādist expertise against western governments and societies, only 
gives credence to the claims of Islamophobes and miso-Islamists who have 
denounced Islam and Muslims as being ‘inherently’ violent, anti-democratic, 
and a fifth column within Europe and America. It also demonstrates the power 
of religious ideals over secular nationalism. From the perspective of capital-
ism, the internationalism of Islam, much like the internationalism of commu-
nism, is a threat to the established world order. Western governments often 
do not believe they can trust the allegiance of their Muslim citizens because 
they perceive that the Muslims too frequently have divided loyalties. For some 
83 Sara Miller Llana, “French Muslims to Islamic State: We are also ‘Dirty French,’” Septem-
ber 26, 2014. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/0926/French-Muslims-to 
-Islamic-State-We-are-also-dirty-French (Accessed 9/28/2014).
84 See the insightful works of John R. Bowen, Blaming Islam. Cambridge, ma: The mit Press, 
2012; Can Islam Be French? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010; Why the French 
Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007.
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Muslims this is true; some Muslims choose to reconcile their religious opinions 
and practices with their national identity and remain faithful to both; they find 
some way of being Muslim and American, Muslim and British, Muslim and 
French, etc., while others find this compromise of Islam and national iden-
tity as being too distorting. Again, for them, there can be no compromise in 
the truth of Islam if it is a “perfected” and therefore a “petrified” religion – a 
 religion of absolutes (in terms of identity). For these Muslims, Islam will al-
ways take precedent over the nation because national citizenship is less im-
portant to their identity than their religious faith. The metaphysical reality of 
Islam is a higher priority than the accidentals of history, including citizenship 
in any given country. Nationality is a matter of “this-life,” while the adherence 
to the dictates of Islam is a matter of the “next-life,” which for the believer is 
of utmost concern. As such, Islam and the ummah, which both transcend all 
political boarders, are the primary objects of loyalty, and not any particular 
nation-state. As stated before, all ideologies, philosophies, and religions that 
transcend the boundaries of nation-states are often times looked at with deep 
suspicion in the modern period.
During the early and mid-20th century, communism’s emphasis on class 
solidarity, which cut across national boundaries, was perceived as an ideol-
ogy that would create division within nations as it advanced working class 
solidarity over and above national solidarity and national identity. In other 
words, the working class of Germany, for example, had more in common with 
its  fellow workers in Russia, Italy and France, than it did its own ruling class, 
and therefore they, the communists argued, should subsume or abandon their 
national allegiance in favor of their class allegiance. Although this was a pow-
erful idea, the advent of wwi demonstrated just how weak and superficial it 
was. To the disgust of the Marxists, including the members of the Frankfurt 
School, workers almost uniformly chose to fight for their nations over their 
class, thus dividing the working class on national lines and forcing them to 
fight each other in the horrible trenches. The workers of the world failed to 
unite and so their class chains continued. It is feared by many that Islam, espe-
cially in its radical form, may be able to pierce through national loyalties and 
ferment solidarity on the basis of religious identity, just as communism once 
attempted to do.
Like their views on Islam, many right-wing politicians and activists in Eu-
rope and America today see the internationalism of the Catholic Church as 
being a threat to the West as well. Christian internationalism, which places the 
universality of humanity over the particularity of nationhood, when coupled 
with the desire to be merciful, charitable, and giving towards others, creates 
the conditions where the Catholic Church seems to be the open flank by which 
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Muslims can invade Europe.85 They are perturbed by Pope Francis’ concilia-
tory remarks about Muslims, calling them “brothers,” and advocating on their 
behalf in Europe, all of which invokes the ecumenical spirit of Vatican ii’s Nos-
tra Aetate – especially its remarks on Islam, which state,
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems [Muslims]. They adore 
the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, 
the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains 
to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abra-
ham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, sub-
mitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they  revere 
Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they 
even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judg-
ment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been 
raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and  worship 
God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting.
Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have 
arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to 
forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to 
preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind 
social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom.86
For these right-wing commentators and politicians, the attempts of the church 
to be reconciled with Muslims, to engage in a friendly living together, has 
opened the doors for the Trojan horse; radical Islam – and isis’s ideology in 
particular – will follow those Muslims into the West. Because the church, un-
der Pope Francis, wants to reform itself in light of the Gospels’ social teachings, 
it will increasingly emphasize Christian compassion for the poor, the suffering, 
and dispossessed, which includes the Muslims. For the political right, this is a 
western sign of weakness that radical Islam will exploit. It will, in their view, 
85 Diversity Chronicle, “Pope Francis Invites the Homeless, Undocumented Immigrants and 
Prostitutes to Exclusive Catered Vatican Banquet,” April 11, 2014. http://diversitychronicle 
.wordpress.com/2014/04/11/pope-francis-invites-the-homeless-undocumented 
- immigrants-and-prostitutes-to-exclusive-catered-vatican-banquet/ (Accessed 9/6/2014).
86 Pope Paul vi, “Nostra Aetate: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non- Christian 
Religions,” October 28, 1965. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican 
_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html (Accessed 8/27/2014); 
Vatican Radio, “Pope Francis to Muslims: We Must Confront Common Challenges,” 
http://www.news.va/en/news/pope-francis-to-muslims-we-must-confront-common-ch 
( Accessed 8/27/2014).
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not reciprocate such compassion when it attacks Europe, but will rather use 
such conciliatory language to integrate into Europe in hopes of seizing the op-
portunity to engage in jihādi attacks, just as we witnessed in the 2015 and 2016 
attacks on Paris and Brussels. In their thinking, the ecumenical and Argentin-
ian Pope Francis himself is the gullible fifth column of Europe. Statements like 
the following enrage the European right: ‘many people forced to emigrate suf-
fer, and often die tragically; many of their rights are violated, they are obliged 
to separate from their families, and unfortunately, continue to be the subject 
of racist and xenophobic attitudes’ once in Europe.87 This sympathy for the 
ominous other does not go very far with those who believe that Islam itself 
is a threat to the existence of Europe and European culture. For these critics, 
immigrants from North Africa, Syria, Libya, etc., may not come into Europe as 
isis, but they may radicalize while in Europe and become future isis members 
camouflaged in the midst. Each immigrant, it is so believed, has a potential 
for the same kind of radicalization that occurred to the perpetrators of the 
Charlie Hebdo massacre, and so do their children, and thus the Trojan horse of 
immigration. They think that with each immigrant allowed to stay in Europe, 
generations of potential terrorists come about. Greeting them with Christian 
agape, as the Pope advocates, is the wrong attitude to adopt because it leaves 
Europeans exposed to the ever-growing threat of radical Islam. For these crit-
ics, it is not only a matter of Europe’s identity, but of its survival as Europe.88
 Seeking Heaven at the Barrel of a Gun
Attacks on the West by Muslims are already a source of deep distrust for many 
westerners. Since the rise of isis, the suspicion of Muslims living in western 
nations has only increased. Just in the year 2014, numerous stories of Ameri-
can and Euro-jihādis have surfaced, sparking intense measures by their gov-
ernments to stem the flow of western fighters into Syria. Moner Muhammad 
Abusalha, a 22-year-old American of Palestinian and Italian descent from 
Florida, who was drawn to a deeper faith in Islam, became the first American 
suicide bomber to blow him up fighting against the forces of Bashar al-Assad. 
His attack on May 25th, 2014, killed 37 people on Jabal Al-Arba’een. Moner was 
87 Elise Harris, ‘Pope Denounces “Racist, Xenophobic” Attitudes towards Immigrants,’ July 
15, 2014. http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/pope-denounces-racist-xenophobic 
-attitudes-toward-migrants-84304/ (Accessed 9/10/2014).
88 Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within. 
New York: Broadway Books, 2006.
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recruited into jihādi ideology via the Internet by Anwar al-Awlaki, the Ameri-
can shaykh of Yemeni descent who was killed by a drone attack ordered by 
President Obama in 2011. Moner fought for Jabhat al-Nusrah (al-Nusra Front) 
after arriving through Turkey.89 Before his death, he recorded numerous ti-
rades against the American government, accusing it of attacking Muslims, call-
ing it the ‘capital of al-Dajjal (the anti-Christ),’ and threatening ‘we are coming 
for you.’90 Reflecting his experience with the nihilism of American consumer 
society, he stated in his video testimony that,
I lived in America. I know how it is. You have all the fancy amusement 
parks and the restaurants and the food and all this crap and the cars. 
You think you’re happy. You’re not happy. You’re never happy. I was never 
happy. I was always sad and depressed. Life sucked. I had to walk from 
my work [to] home… and I begged Allah, cried to Allah, get me out of this 
land. All you do is work 40, 50, 60 hours a week, and then you go waste it 
on garbage… this is what you do your whole life.91
Moner overcame his alienation from western culture through a complete adop-
tion of Islam; absorbing his autonomous subjectivity into an all-encompassing 
religious tradition that gave him direction, an interpretation of reality and 
an orientation in action, and a transcendental cause. Additionally, it instilled 
within him the longing for absolute and perfect justice, which he believed could 
only be realized through the revivification and conquest of Islam.  However, 
Moner’s religious immaturity, coupled by the zeal of the jihādi, led him to 
sacrifice himself unnecessarily in the process of killing others, who were also 
Muslims. As there is a dearth of qualified Muslim scholars in the West, Moner’s 
potential to be become a bridge between the secular West and the dar al-Islam 
was great, but unfortunately isis’s ideology distorted his sincere religiosity and 
led him into a form of religious nihilism – the twin sister of secular nihilism 
which he was attempting to escape via his hijrah (migration) to  Syria.92 Moner 
89 Jabhat al-Nusra is an al-Qae’da affiliate and has been named a terrorist organization by 
the u.n., the u.s., and other nations.
90 Meg Wagner, “American Suicide Bomber Feared the fbi was Hunting him when he Fled from 
Florida to Syria,” August 28, 2014. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/american 
-suicide-bomber-feared-fbi-hunting-article-1.1919902 (Accessed 9/2/2014).
91 YouTube. “Inside the Mind of a Terrorist: Moner Mohammad AbuSalha (Abu Huayrah 
al-Amriki)” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSdtCcWTaSI (Accessed 9/02/2014).
92 In the video posted to youtube.com, Moner talks about Anwar al-Awlaki’s lecture, stating 
“In a lecture, Anwar al-Awlaki said when you make hijrah (migration) it’s like a cliff, jump 
off the cliff and you don’t know if the water is deep or shallow. Don’t know if there’re rocks 
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was both the victim of post-secular modernity’s  meaninglessness – its reduc-
tion of human life to simple material possessions and the imperative to “enjoy” 
as way-of-being-in-the-world – as well as the ideological distortion of Islam by 
jihādi militants, who are more necrophilic than biophilic in their religious life.
Mona Muhammad Abusalha al-Amriki wasn’t the only American fighting in 
the Middle East. In August of 2014, the world was introduced to African Ameri-
can Douglas McArthur McCain and his Native American friend Troy Kastigar, 
two men from Minneapolis who converted to Islam and chose to fight for isis 
in Syria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. After a life of petty crime in Minnesota, 
McCain moved to San Diego, California, where he became closer to the religion 
he was first introduced to by his Somali friends in Minnesota. By the spring 
of 2014, McCain journeyed to Turkey to study Islam but instead joined isis in 
Syria where he was eventually killed fighting the forces of Bashar al-Assad. His 
friend, Troy Kastigar, going by the name Abdal Rahim Muhammad, had a simi-
lar experience. In 2008 Kastigar told his family he was leaving to study Islam in 
Kenya but instead went to Somalia where he was killed fighting for al-Shabaab, 
the Islamist organization that effectively controls much of the country. In the 
summer of 2013, al-Shabaab released a recruitment video entitled Minnesota’s 
Martyrs: The Path to Paradise, which featured Kastigar talking about his time 
in Somalia and extolling the virtues of jihādi warfare. With a mix of youthful 
immaturity and appreciation for religious solidarity, Kastigar said,
This is the best place to be. I can only tell you that you have the best of 
dreams, you eat the best of food, and you are with the best of brothers 
and sisters who came here for the sake of Allah. If you guys only knew 
how much fun we have over here. This is the real Disneyland. You need to 
come here and join us.93
However, Somali Disneyland killed Kastigar soon after making the video.
Both men felt alienated by the American way of life; both men felt under- 
appreciated, unrecognized, and seemingly without control of their own desti-
nies, until they chose to abandon their American “freedom” and join a group 
or if it’s going to be very deep. You just have to jump and put your faith in Allah that it’s 
going to be deep and you won’t be harmed, that you’re going to be safe after you land in 
the water.” “Interview with Moner Mohammad Abu Salaha aka Abu Hurayra al-Ameriki 
Part 1: Hijra.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvCUMagTiC0 (Accessed 9/2/2014).
93 Alex Grieg, “Almost a Dozen Men from Minnesota are Fighting for isis in Syria, Say 
 Officials,” August 29, 2014. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2737982/Almost 
- dozen-men-Minnesota-fighting-ISIS-Syria-say-officials.html (Accessed 9/2/2014).
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that could furnish them with a sense of belonging, a sense of identity, and 
a sense of purpose beyond simple materialism. Islam filled the existential 
void that they had developed through their experience of American poverty, 
 marginalization, and moral vacuousness. Like Moner Muhammad, these men 
looked for guidance in a post-religious society and found Islam being the most 
capable of instilling in them a sense of truth, purpose, and meaning. Subjec-
tive freedom, through which they chose their religion, left them existentially 
untethered, morally adrift, and without a transcendental cause. Unfortunately, 
their turn to Islam was distorted into a turn towards the jihādi ideology, which 
ended in their unnecessary premature deaths – or what they believed was 
their sacred martyrdom.
Moner Muhammad, Douglas McArthur McCain and Troy Kastigar were 
never able to return to their home country to engage in subversive or terroris-
tic activities. However, others who did go to the Muslim world for training did 
return to deploy their crafts upon the unsuspecting. The Chechen-American 
brothers Tamerlan Anzorovich Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Anzorovich “Jahar” 
Tsarnaev were both born in what was the Soviet Union, but came to the United 
States as asylum seekers between 2002 and 2004. After a life of struggle within 
the u.s., trying to create an hybrid American/Islamic existence in university, 
boxing, and various failed relationships, etc., the older of the two brothers, 
 Tamerlan Tsarnaev, traveled to Russia (north Caucasus) in 2012 where he came 
into contact with various Chechen and Dagestani jihādists, including some 
family members, who furthered his resentment towards the West, especially 
the United States and its latest “war on terror.” On April 15, 2013, the broth-
ers planted pressure-cooker bombs in the audience at the finish line of the 
Boston marathon; once exploded, these bombs killed 3 people and wounded 
more than 250. What motivated the brothers, according to the testimony of 
Dzhokhar, was America’s killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other 
words, the attacks on Boston were understood to be a retaliatory strike against 
a nation that was guilty of killing thousands of innocent believers in the Mid-
dle East and Central Asia. While hiding from police in a boat stored in the 
backyard of a Boston suburb, Dzhokhar wrote the following,
I’m jealous of my brother who ha[s] [re]ceived the reward of jannutul 
Firdaus [paradise] (inshallah) before me. I do not mourn because his soul 
is very much alive. God has a plan for each person. Mine was to hide in 
this boat and shed some light on our actions. I ask Allah to make me a 
shahied [shaheed] (iA) to allow me to return to him and be among all the 
righteous people in the highest levels of heaven. He who Allah guides no 
one can misguide. A[llah Ak]bar!
255Post-Secularity and Its Discontents
<UN>
The us Government is killing our innocent civilians but most of you 
already know that. As a [ui] I can’t stand to see such evil go unpunished. 
We Muslims are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all. Well at least that’s 
how muhhammad (pbuh) wanted it to be [for]ever. The ummah is begin-
ning to rise. [ui] has awoken the mujahideen. Know you are fighting men 
who look into the barrel of your gun and see heaven, now how can you 
compete with that. We are promised victory and we will surely get it. Now 
I don’t like killing innocent people it is forbidden in Islam but due to said 
[ui] it is allowed. All credit goes [ui]. Stop killing our innocent people 
and we will stop.94
Like Moner Muhammad, Douglas McArthur McCain and Troy Kastigar, the 
Tsarnaev brothers had both expressed their alienation from American cul-
ture openly. For example, in a Boston University article entitled Will Box for 
Passport: An Olympic Drive to Become a United States Citizen, which was pro-
duced before the bombings, Tamerlan told the author that, “I don’t have a 
single American friend. I don’t understand them.”95 Furthermore, he found 
the American Muslim community’s stance towards American culture and cul-
tural icons, such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., too accommodating, believing 
that a local Imam’s comparison of Dr. King to the Prophet Muhammad to be 
blasphemous.96 In the midst of a khuṭbah (serman), Tamerlan yelled at the 
Imam, Yusuf Vali, exclaiming that he was a kāfir (disbeliever) and was pollut-
ing the minds of the Muslims.97 For Tamerlan, more so than his little brother, 
the conditions of the western Muslims were indicative of a community trying 
to assimilate and integrate into a society that was radically different from the 
94 This is a direct quote from the prosecutor’s filings. The odd abbreviations seemed to have 
been added by the prosecutor and not explained in the document. However, the “ui” 
seemed to be the areas where damage was caused by the bullets fired into the boat. See 
the u.s. prosecutor’s court filings against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Carmen M. Ortiz (United 
States Attorney), “The United States of America v. Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev (Defendent), 
Case 1:13-cr-10200-gao” http://c.o0bg.com/rw/Boston/2011-2020/2014/05/22/BostonGlobe 
.com/Metro/Graphics/tsarnaev1.pdf (Accessed 3/14/2015).
95 Johannes Hirn, “Will Box for Passport: An Olympic Drive to Become a United States Citi-
zen.” The Comment 2010, 18–19.
96 Beth Daley and Martin Finucane, “Marathon Bombing Suspect’s Disrupted Cam-
bridge Mosque on Martin Luther King Day,” April 21, 2013. http://www.boston.com/ 
metrodesk/2013/04/21/marathon-bombing-suspect-outbursts-had-disturbed-cambridge 
-mosque-goers/HUM4K1dm5IKWqRRKktFM9L/story.html (Accessed 9/5/2014).




one they truly belonged to, and in doing so were diluting Islam. Islam could 
not be reconciled to American culture, not even the most prophetic within 
American history, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Additionally, Tamerlan believed 
the West had to pay for its immorality, for which Tamerlan blamed his own 
personal failures, temptations, and shortcomings. Had the United States been 
a proper religious state, one that understood that morality could and should 
not be separated from the divinae legis (divine law), then he would not have 
been able to engage in practices that are formally condemned by Islam. In this 
sense, not only was Tamerlan alienated from western culture, but blamed it for 
his own deviance from Islam. As Slavoj Žižek remarked in a New York Times 
Op-ed, one can feel that, in fighting the sinful other, they [jihādi terrorists] are 
fighting their own temptation.98 In this sense, the April attack on Boston was 
a violent suppression of Tsarnaev’s own struggle to be a devout Muslim amidst 
the hedonistic post-secular culture of modern American capitalism. Unfortu-
nately his victims paid the price for his lack of faith.
 Material Poverty or Poverty of Being?
Some thinkers have suggested that the motivational cause for the high num-
bers of European and American fighters in isis can be found solely within 
their economic conditions. Poverty, for these thinkers, has given birth to 
those who are willing to fight for a cause that, according to them, is not really 
their fight, but rather is a way of overcoming economic disparity. The answer 
to this problem is the rearrangement of the economic map that determines 
their class status within western societies. Echoing a simplistic Marxist senti-
ment, and one that fails to comprehend the existential and religious motiva-
tions for westerners to become jihādists, this analysis is woefully insufficient. 
Although poverty may be a factor within the radicalization of Muslims in the 
West, it is not the core factor that motivates them to join isis or other radical 
groups. Many young Muslims from prosperous families, including Mohammed 
 Emwazi, also known as “Jihādi John” – due to his the famous British accent he 
had as he  beheaded westerners on video – have come from prosperous and 
educated families.99 Poverty, although it may in some cases play a part in the 
98 Slavoj Žižek, “isis is a disgrace to True Fundamentalism.” (Accessed 9/5/2014).
99 Mohammed Emwazi was born in Kuwait but raised in London. In 2009 he graduated from 
Westminster with a degree in information technology. After being suspected of Islamist 
activities in Tanzania and later at home in Britain, he joined isis in 2012 and become the 
famous British “spokesman” behind their gruesome beheading videos.
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 radicalization process, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ex-
plain the phenomenon. The answer to this problem goes much deeper into the 
spiritual and existential condition of Muslims, especially the second genera-
tion of Muslims living in the West.
In Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard book Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist 
Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe, they studied the Muslim populations 
of various European countries only to find that the Muslims of Britain are se-
curely within the middle class, have a high degree of education, and the major-
ity of which are gainfully employed. On the other hand, the situation in France 
wasn’t as positive; their study of converts to Islam in France  demonstrated 
that they were disproportionately from lower socio-economic strata, educa-
tion  beyond secondary school was severely lacking, and a majority of con-
verts were unemployed with a large percentage being under-employed (low-
skilled,  low-wage jobs).100 Clearly, differences in socio-economical standings 
throughout Europe and North America should caution analysts to avoid mak-
ing  blanket judgments about poverty being a prime factor in individual’s deci-
sion to join a  radical organization. According to a University of London Study 
done in the summer and fall of 2014 demonstrated that ‘financially stable 
British-born Muslims who take their security for granted are most at risk of 
radicalization by terror groups, according to new research’ and that ‘ socially 
isolated and depressed Muslims are also identified.’101 What the research 
demonstrated was that poverty was not necessarily a determining factor for 
radicalization, but rather  psychological instability, stemming from a failure to 
integrate and  assimilate, as well as social alienation stemming from the dual-
identity phenomenon (being both European and Muslim), serves as a prime 
factor in whether or not an individual can resist the lure of radicalization. The 
individual who has no ontological and existential attachments to the West or 
western culture, nor has invested themselves in its ideals and values, but rather 
feels emptiness about life in a secular modern capitalist country, which is often 
times coupled with social rejection, are most susceptible to a worldview that 
provides a believable articulation about “ultimate concern.”
What we can deduct from this insight is that no matter the socio-economic 
status of the given Muslim, the call for a radical jihād against the West, in de-
fense of the ummah, or with the dream of building a caliphate, transcends 
100 Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, Eurojihad: Patterns of Radicalization and Terrorism in 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
101 rt. “British-born, rich & isolated Muslims more likely to be radicalized – study,” Septem-




the given economic misery (or non-misery) of the individual believer. Socio-
economic status is not the determining factor in the decision to join isis and 
other terroristic groups, but is rather ancillary. What is more likely is that 
those Muslims within the middle class in Europe have identified a horrible 
truth about the secular world; that the religious lifeworld has been replaced 
with nothing that can adequately address the existential needs of humanity. 
As Jürgen Habermas has written: something is missing.102 While submitting to 
the reality of the spiritual emptiness in the modern technological world, many 
Muslims also have a growing sense of victimization; they are watching atten-
tively and in horror as the purveyors of that deflated reality continue to export 
their same spiritual emptiness to the dar al-Islam, often times at the barrel 
of a gun. The shock of watching western armies ravage the cities and homes 
of their co- religionists is overwhelming; the terror of watching the Islamic 
way-of-life  being undermined by another way-of-being – which has caused 
much social chaos with very little beneficial return – is painfully poignant; 
the  disillusionment with the West because of its theory-praxis disconnect – 
its insistence on democracy and freedom while propagating dictatorships and 
oppression – leads many to believe that the West’s interference within the 
Muslim world is a one-sided proposition, i.e. only one side stands to gain any-
thing. Islamist ideology, which is in part rooted in the reality of the Muslim 
world today and its relationship with the West, is the driving factor for young 
radicalized Muslims to join groups like isis. It is not simply the case that their 
socio-economic status drove them into the arms of the radicals., as the major-
ity of poor Muslims do not become radicalized. However, Islamic radicalism is 
empowering among those who have experienced life through the prism of the 
politically powerless. Through their radical stance, they experience themselves 
as a redeeming power; they can cleanse the Muslims world of the corrosive ef-
fects of the western secularization and neo-colonial politics, and they can once 
again return the Muslim world to the forefront of history. Failure to achieve, 
maintain, and/or integrate into a petit bourgeois existence within Europe is 
not the root cause of their rejection of the West; the answer is much more 
102 This critique of the West is not a defense of the Muslim world. I do not believe that what is 
missing within the secular zeitgeist of the western civilization is necessarily found within 
the Muslim world. There is a lot missing there as well, especially within those Arab coun-
tries that are ruled by brutal and repressive dictators. However, for many Muslims, that 
which is missing in the secular West can be found within Islam, especially in its more 
 politically militant expressions. Additionally, Islam is not identical with the nation in 
which Muslims live as majorities, so often times this same kind of political Islam provides 
what the “Muslim countries” are missing as well.
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 accusatory than that. In some sense, the Muslims who abandon their western 
nations for the chance to fight against the West and its influence in the Muslim 
world are the strongest condemnation of the West; it is a failing project.
On the issue of poverty, what alienated Muslims in the West are experienc-
ing more so that material poverty is a poverty-of-being. As stated before, this 
poverty takes the shape in meaninglessness, dejection, and humiliation, a life 
unguided by truth and virtue, and a sense of detachment from any true tran-
scendental purpose. Material poverty, which the Qur’an teaches the  Muslims as 
being a test from the divine, can be reconciled with Islamic  values, an  Islamic 
interpretations of history, and Islamic ideals – it is an affront to the divine if 
poverty is not fought against, but in-and-of-itself, it is not an insult towards 
the divine if Muslims are materially poor. As stated before, their poverty is the 
pre-condition that makes Islam possible, for without the poor, zakāt (alms-
giving) and ṣadaqah (charity) become meaningless for those who give zakāt 
and ṣadaqah. However, the poverty-of-being, that is the by-product of secular-
materialism and most poignantly capitalism, is, for the Muslims, a direct insult 
against the divine, because it denies the divinely created entelechy (ἐντελέχεια – 
“purposivity”) for its creation, especially for mankind. This spiritual vacuous-
ness drives many into a state of kufr (disbelief), as the neo-pagan ideals of 
western capitalist/consumerist society idolize money, power and status.103 The 
purpose of mankind, according to Islam, is not the accumulation of commodi-
ties, i.e. necrophilia (νεkρoφιλία), nor is it a simple “ ticklish” form of happiness, 
but rather a form of spiritually induced eudaimonia (εὐδαιμoνία  – “human 
flourishing”) within the confines of “Islam,” i.e. the submission to God.104 For 
Islam, the poverty-of-being must be overcome by the complete and total sub-
mission to the will of the creator, which reclaims divine entelechy for mankind. 
Additionally, the ummah is the protective vehicle by which the spiritual entel-
echy of mankind is safeguarded. When that ummah is infected by the secular 
value of capitalism, i.e. greed, competition, social antagonisms, social stratifi-
cations, and severe individualization, it cannot protect the spiritual wholeness 
of the community. As Marx already knew, under the conditions of capitalism, 
the community becomes fractured, the family becomes dissolved, and the so-
ciety turns upon itself through the structural and sometimes direct violence 
that capitalist conditions impose. Therefore, when the instrumental values 
of secular capitalism overcome the communicative values of Islam; when the 
103 See Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976), 15–64.




markets socialize the following generation by advertisements; when there is 
an increased desire to own for the sake of owning; and an individual’s worth 
and value is predicated on what they possess, substantive life is replaced by the 
empty-life of commodities. These fractures within society are reproduced with-
in the family, which only serve to weaken society, thus allowing more space for 
capitalism to extend its tentacles.
Most ironically, in light of their poverty-of-being among western Muslims, 
many of the young have been socialized by capitalist optimism to believe that 
they can do anything if they direct their mental and physical energies towards 
achieving it; they are the pampered generation that has been sheltered from 
the reality of the true human condition, i.e. its frailty and limitations. Believ-
ing this pseudo-capitalist ideology, born out of the society of over-abundance, 
they have betrayed the original point of their ideological bildung and have di-
rected that optimism towards supposedly “Islamic” goals. Even in the midst of 
combat in the Middle East and East Africa, the western foreign fighters are the 
most optimistic about their own future and the future of the “Islamic State” 
for which they are gladly giving their lives, realizing the optimistic spirit of 
liberal-capitalism which was taught to them by the market economy in the 
West. Either way they are existentially fulfilled by their radical-praxis; they will 
either achieve their goals and establish a so-called Islamic State or achieve 
martyrdom in the process.
 Genealogy of Terror
When discussing modern terrorism, it is important to have a future-oriented 
remembrance of it genealogy, as it gives us a clear insight into the nature and 
purpose of terror itself. Against the common – in America – misconception 
that so-called Islamic terror began with al-Qae’da’s September 11th attack on 
the United States or the establishment of the Taliban in Afghanistan, we should 
be aware that the original template for the westerner turned Islamic terrorist 
is certainly not John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban who was captured 
by American forces in Afghanistan in 2001, nor was it Jose Padilla, the Ameri-
can “enemy combatant” that planned a dirty bomb attack on the United States 
after receiving training in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002; it was 
not Richard Reid, the ”shoe bomber” who attempted to blow up an American 
Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in 2001, nor was the archetype Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the British-Nigerian “underwear bomber” who attempted to 
blow up a plane traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on  Christmas day in 
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2009.105 In fact, the archetype for westerners turned jihādis was not the per-
petrators of the July 7, 2005 London bus bombings, Muhammad Sidique Khan, 
Shehzed Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, and Hasib Hussein, all British Muslims; 
neither was it those responsible for the 2004 training bombing in Madrid, 
Spain. Not even the western educated Arabs that perpetrated the attack on 
New York and Washington d.c. on September 11, 2001 provide the template 
for international terrorism. Indeed, the 2015 and 2016 attackers on Paris and 
Brussels had a very differnet model to follow other than Usama bin Laden. The 
original archetype for this form of jihādi was neither European nor a Muslim, 
he was not an Arab or any other ethnicity commonly associated with Islam; 
his name was Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, a.k.a. “Carlos the Jackal.” “Carlos,” who 
has been all but forgotten in the modern history of terrorism, was born the 
second son of a Marxist intellectual-lawyer in Venezuela. He was named, as 
was his two brothers, after Vladimir Ilich Lenin, in whose philosophy his father 
schooled him from a very young age.106 After a brief and incomplete education 
in Moscow, Carlos lent his talents to the Palestinian struggle via the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (pflp), a Marxist-Leninist organization 
determined to bring about the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine as 
well as the construction of a leftist secular Arab state rooted in Che Guevara’s 
notion of the “new man,” who was the revolutionary humanist-socialist who 
worked for the benefit of the masses through armed struggle against colonial-
ism, imperialism, and capitalism primarily in Latin America and Africa.107 
While there, he worked for and trained with Wadie Haddad, the commander 
of the military wing of the pflp. The pflp was a secular “pan-Arabist” organi-
zation, believing that the basis for Arab independence resided in inter-Arab 
solidarity, not on the basis of religion that would divide the Arab world.108 For 
Wadi Haddad, there was no going behind the fall of the caliphate; the modern 
Muslim world needed a modern ideology to combat America and the West 
105 Mark Kukis, My Heart Became Attached: The Strange Odyssey of John Walker Lindh. 
 Washington d.c.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003. The title of this book, the strange odyssey of John 
Walker Lindh, betrays the time-core of truth; what seemed strange in 2003 that a western-
er from an affluent background would leave it all behind to join a terrorist organization, 
in his case the Taliban, has become all too familiar in 2014.
106 John Follain, Jackal (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1998), 1–18.
107 Michael Löwy, The Marxism of Che Guevara (Lanham, md: Rowman & Littlefield Publish-
ers Inc., 2007), 17–19. Also see Karl Marx’s essay The Jewish Question, as it is this transfor-
mation of man from a being of selfish particularity to a being of collective solidarity that 
he discusses. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 26–52.
108 Follain, Jackal, 19–36.
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during the Cold War and its smaller manifestation in the Israeli/Palestine con-
flict.  Having fully adopted the Palestinian cause as his own, Carlos engaged 
in various  attacks in Europe, including attacks on prominent Israeli business-
men, banks, airlines, and media outlets that were supportive of Israel. He was 
connected with the Baader-Meinhof group, the German Revolutionary Cells, 
and other left-wing terrorist groups, that frequently engaged in violent activi-
ties against neo-fascists, the American military, and other pro-western Mus-
lim groups in Europe. His most notorious action occurred when he kidnapped 
the representatives opec during their annual meeting in Vienna, Austria, in 
1975, resulting in the taking of 60 hostages and the death of three individuals, 
among them a member of Libya’s opec delegation. The goal of the attack was 
to assassinate the oil minister from Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, 
as well as the Iranian oil ministers from Iran, Qatar, and the United Arab Emir-
ates, who Carlos and the pflp viewed as traitors to the Arab/Palestinian cause 
for their lifting of the 1973 oil embargo. He would later escape capture by de-
manding a flight to the Middle East (Iraq) but ended up in Algeria where he 
was released in a deal brokered by the Algerian Foreign Minister Abdalazziz 
Bouteflika. His inability to assassinate the intended victims led to Wadi Had-
dad’s ejection of Carlos from the pflp. After becoming a “freelance” terrorist, 
employed by various Middle Eastern states including Hafiz al-Assad’s Syria as 
well as Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Carlos was eventually captured in 1994 while 
recuperating from an operation on his testicles in Sudan.109 French Domestic 
Intelligence Services (dst), in cooperation with u.s. intelligence services, cap-
tured him and later tried him for the murder of two French policemen who had 
been investigating his activities in France in 1975. Carlos has been in a prison 
in France since he was captured in 1994. His official prison term began in 1997. 
Despite his  attempts to appeal his conviction, Carlos remains imprisoned in 
France. Before Usama bin Laden’s  campaign of terror, Carlos the Jackal was the 
leftist-Arab cause célèbre of the West. It is to no surprise to many of his detrac-
tors that he converted to Islam after being captured by the French (or possibly 
earlier) and later, with the help of his French wife and lawyer, wrote the book 
L’islam Revolutionaire (Revolutionary Islam), in which he argued for the mor-
phing of leftist-communist ideals into the Islamic tradition.110 Reminiscent of 
the works of ‘Ali Sharīʿati, the ‘Red Shi’i’ intellectual of the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979, Carlos believed that Islam was the carrier of the revolutionary spirit 
in world history. For Carlos, Marxism’s potential for radical change has been 
exhausted in its manifest form, but could realize its potentials tacitly through 
109 Ibid., 195–228.
110 Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, L’islam Revolutionaire. Éditions du Rocher, 2003.
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its  translation into prophetic religion, i.e. “revolutionary Islam.” In a reversal of 
Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of translating theological potentials into histori-
cal materialist revolution, Carlos argued that religion, more succinctly revolu-
tionary religion, was the proper vehicle by which a true revolution could occur. 
If Marxism was to survive the triumphalism of capitalism, especially after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, it would be through radical Islam.
Although the memory of Carlos the Jackal, the Latin American Che Guevara-
like revolutionary of leftist and Arab causes has abated in post-9/11 America 
and Europe, when he was alive the fear that he created in the governments of 
the West were driven by the fact that he was both a westerner himself – familiar 
with the culture, able to move around undetected, a master of languages – 
and completely committed to his transcendental cause: anti-imperialism. His 
willingness to become a martyr was only overshadowed by his uncanny abil-
ity to escape detection and arrest, frustrating authorities as he lived to fight 
another day.111 Although they completely lack the suave demeanor of Carlos, 
who indulged himself in women, drink, frivolity, embodying the mystique of 
an anti-capitalist James Bond, the latest western jihādis are just as committed 
to their vision of a Muslim world renaissance, guided by the values of Sunni 
Islam. However, where Carlos the Jackal, despite his unjust attacks on inno-
cent civilians, may hold a legitimate claim to the adjective “revolutionary,” isis 
and its affiliates are hardly so. Revolutions, as Carlos himself would insist, are 
 inherently in the service of humanity in its universal form, not in the service 
to a particular religion, religious sect, or ethnicity. Nevertheless, Carlos cre-
ated the template for the international westerner-turned-terrorist that many 
would-be terrorist today aspire to, even if their memory of terrorism only goes 
back to Usama bin Laden.
What’s more important than the template of an international terrorist that 
was established by Carlos was his dialectical method of war. Having studied 
dialectical materialism in Moscow and before with his father, Carlos intro-
duced a more dialectical way of engaging the enemy that the West has never 
properly prepared for, especially since it was off the traditional battlefield. 
The ability to adapt to the conditions in which one is fighting as opposed to 
111 Some biographers of Carlos accuse him of being too narcissistic and vainglorious to have 
given his life for the cause. I find this to be an extremely deficient reading of his life. Every 
operation he was engaged in risked his life and could have potentially made him a martyr. 
His perpetual enjoyment of luxury confuses their analysis; they assume all revolutionar-
ies are religious ascetics (or secular ascetics) who, on principle, would refuse to indulge 
in the “goods” of capitalism. Carlos, however, was not an ascetic, but that should not be 
mistaken for narcissism or weakness in believing in his cause.
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having a rigid and pre-conceived “form” of warfare allowed Carlos to evade 
capture for years;  he was always “one step ahead” of his positivist-educated 
enemies, already anticipating their reactions and tailoring his movements and 
methods to account for their deficiency. Additionally, he made the everyday 
landscape, the world of business, skyscrapers, restaurants, banks, etc., into a 
new urban battlefield for which domestic “policing” was not adequate to coun-
teract, often using the tools of modernity more creatively and effectively than 
the states and corporations that invented them. The same can be said about 
the insurgency in Iraq after the 2003 invasion; while the United States and 
its allies fought a war within a “traditional” military mindset, the insurgency 
dialectically adapted to the Coalitions strategies and weapons until the u.s. 
itself,  under the Army General David Petraeus, educated in the u.s. Military 
Academy and Princeton University, learned the dialectical skills of counter-
insurgency (which was never adequately learned in the Vietnam war). After 
Petraeus took command of the armed forces in Iraq and enacted his own dia-
lectical form of war (the “surge” of 2007), the insurgency nearly disappeared. 
However, the  dialectical method of warfare resurfaced again outside of Iraq, 
this time in Syria in the form of isis, led by the Soviet educated Ba’ath gener-
als. At the present moment, those who’ve retreated back into a non-dialectical 
form of warfare that has proven to be unable to abate their advances are en-
gaging isis. While I write this book, isis continues to gain territory despite the 
heavy bombing of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and the push-
back by the Kurdish Peshmerga. Only the Russian forces, led by Vladimir Putin, 
the Soviet educated dialectician, have been able to make substantial advances 
in pushing isis back.
There may also be an important factor as to why the United States and its 
core allies have failed to defeat isis; unlike the Israelis, who see their fight with 
the Palestinians as a fight for survival, and therefore the Israeli state has very 
little regard for any form of Palestinian life, the American administration un-
der President Obama either (1) sees itself, or (2) wants to be perceived as being 
a nation in service to the universal (humanity, civilization, etc.), as opposed to 
the particular (any given nation-state, as in the case of Israel). This may prove 
to the weakest point in the battle against the foes of the West. The United 
States and its allies do not want to be perceived as being against an authentic 
tajdīd (renewal) of Islam, nor does it want to be perceived as being the killer of 
Muslims, which would only enforce the West vs. Islam framework that so many 
in the Muslim world already suspect of being the case. No, the West, especially 
the United States, wants to be perceived as the protector of Muslims, as well as 
the minority faiths of the Middle East. Israel makes no apologies for its particu-
laristic fight against the Palestinians; it serves no altruistic cause, but rather is 
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done purely out of their own national interests, and there is no equivocation 
on this point.
Despite its attempt to prove otherwise, the United States is seen throughout 
the Muslim world as being a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”; in the name of the uni-
versal it pursues its own interests. And after the unprovoked attack on Iraq by 
President George W. Bush, in which Iraq neither had weapons of mass destruc-
tion nor ties with Usama bin Laden and the September 11th, 2001 terror attack, 
but was rather a preconceived plot and desire of the neo-conservatives, led 
by the Project for the New American Century (pnac), the idea that the United 
States represented the will of the world, the universal good, evaporated.112
In light of its assault on isis, it is most likely that the terrorist group will 
attempt to counter the airstrikes of the United States and its allies by disap-
pearing within the everydayness of the Arab world in Iraq, Syria and Libya – 
and possibly every other post-Arab Spring country – by becoming, at least in 
the eyes of the populace, a legitimate state by addressing the social problems 
of health, education, retirement, property, etc.113 In doing so, it will become 
nearly impossible to distinguish between isis and the average Arab/Muslim 
in the region, and thus perpetuating and facilitating the dialectical method 
of war – strike and retreat into society as camouflage – that Carlos “the Jakal” 
perfected in his insurgency against neo-imperialism.
This melding into the populace causes sever problems for those who claim 
to represent the universal interest of mankind (the United States and its al-
lies), as killing innocent women and while hunting isis will undermine their 
claim to be in on the side of the common good. Those that do not share that 
claim, and represent the particular, such as Putin’s Russia, who wants to aid 
the  Syrian regime against its enemies, including both isis and the “moderate” 
rebels, do not share the same problem. However, with every bomb dropped on 
isis, with every attack on the so-called “Islamic State,” with every monarchial 
and dictatorial Arab state that joins its coalition, the more sympathy there will 
be for isis, especially if it achieves its ends: the construction of a true Islamic 
state that adequately addresses the needs of its people. The dialectical dilem-
ma for the West is thus: through their constant attacks on isis they can unwit-
tingly increase isis’s legitimacy, thus making them appear more “Islamic” to 
112 Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservativism and the New Pax Americana (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 181–221; Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and 
Breaking of Global Rules from fdr’s Atlantic Charter to George W. Bush’s Illegal War (New 
York: Viking, 2005), 174–204.
113 As of 2015, they have already begun to print their own currency and have taken on other 
functions associated with a legitimate state.
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more people. Another way to delegitimate the terror group must be found, and 
that must be through Islam itself.
 Symbolic Message
Just as the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001, were not only episodes of 
direct violence upon America – but were also meant to send a retaliatory mes-
sage about American capitalism, militarism, and empire – so too is isis’s vio-
lence not only directed towards certain individuals, but meant to broadcast a 
much broader symbolic message to the West and to other Muslims. Their mes-
sage is clear if one can read the symbolic nature of their actions.
isis’s flag is rich with symbolic meaning. First, their flag is black, which 
recalls the color that Prophet Muhammad preferred when engaging in jihād 
bil-saif (struggle of the sword); second, the top lettering of the flag is the first 
part of the Shahada (declaration of faith), i.e. La ilaha ill Allah (There is no god 
but God), and last, the round symbol on the bottom is the seal of the Prophet – 
a rendition of Prophet Muhammad’s signet ring by which he signed his offi-
cial correspondence. These, in-and-of-themselves, bear no inherent violent or 
jihādi intention, but taken within the context of isis’s broader ideology and 
worldview, these symbols take on a new and perverse meaning. isis’s flag uses 
an early form of written Arabic that was rudimentary during the time of the 
Prophet; it lacked diacritical marks and the artistic stylization that later came 
to be the hallmark of the Qur’an and a much more sophisticated – and therefore 
“this-worldly” – Islam. The simplicity of the flag’s script anchors isis’s claim of 
Islamic authenticity within the framework of Muhammad’s life; the message 
being that isis is a legitimate return to the sunnah (way) of the Prophet es-
tablished in Arabia within the 7th century, as if Muhammad himself set his 
“seal of approval” upon their worldview and actions. Many other jihādi groups, 
including al-Qae’da, various mujahideen groups in the Caucasus, Islamic Jihad, 
al-Nusrah Front, Hamas, and even the national flag of Saudi Arabia, use the 
shahada, but it’s written in intricate calligraphy (generally in Tuluth or Naskh 
script). Symbolically, those scripts represent a form of Islam that, while in-
creased in worldly and artistic sophistication, have conversely lost the purity 
and authenticity of Islam’s original simplicity; this simplicity is represented in 
the uncomplicated nature of the Prophet’s seal and the script used on isis’s 
rendition of the shahada. In this simplicity resides the way Islam and Muslims 
ought to be for isis, while the more sophisticated and artistic (and therefore 
less purely religious) script indicates the corruption of later Islam – an Islam 
concerned with the trappings of empires, administration, wealth, etc. Although 
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it became a necessity to develop the Arabic language beyond its simple begin-
nings, including the use of diacritical marks to preserve the original meaning 
from being distorted by non-Arabic speakers, it nevertheless distanced the be-
lievers experience of Islam and the Qur’an from that of the ṣaḥābah (Prophet’s 
companions) who experienced the Qur’an in its most purest and primal form. 
For isis, the truth of Islam resides within its purest or most undiluted form, i.e. 
the form it took during the life of the Prophet, and they believe it is imperative 
to recover this so-called purity. Thus, the flag of isis conveys their desire to 
reform Islam back to what they believe is its most genuine form – the para-
digm of Islam during the time of the Prophet. Nevertheless, this being-towards-
authenticity does not mean they wish to “return to the 7th century” as so many 
western analysts claim. isis is a fundamentalist group by nature, which means 
it is perfectly satisfied to employ modern means of technology in service to 
pre-modern beliefs. This was not the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad nor 
of the early Muslim community. Most naively, isis and other fundamental-
ist groups believe certain achievements of modernity can be utilized for the 
advancement of religion, without every carefully considering the corrosive 
 effects such an ill-advised appropriation can have. Instrumental rationality, the 
rationality of efficiency, calculative thought, quantification, and bureaucracy, 
has a way of infiltrating and deflating the communicative nature of religion, 
especially that of the Abrahamic faiths.114 This is the very reason why so many 
fundamentalists within other religious traditions, including Christianity and 
Judaism, shun the modern world in its entirety; the technological world, which 
is predicated on the instrumentalization of reason – the fetishization of cal-
culative and cold reason – brings about an undermining of non-instrumental 
reasoning, including religious ethics, theology, and spirituality. It is the Trojan 
horse within the religious community.
In the propaganda videos that isis released showing the beheadings of 
James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, and Alan Henning, the men appear 
to be wearing orange colored prison suits. Again, this must not be over-looked, 
as it is no mere coincidence. isis is invoking the West’s suppressed and shame-
ful memory of the many crimes it has perpetrated upon the Muslims from 2001 
to the present, especially when the victims were made to wear similar garb 
while in American custody. Seeking a symbolic retaliation, isis effectively res-
urrects the images of Muslims (supposedly al-Qae’da members) detained in 
Cuba’s Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, wearing  orange 
prison suits as they were interrogated, tortured, and imprisoned for years 
114 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication Action: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society, Vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
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 without due process.115 The orange symbolized the shame and guilt that the 
West bears for engaging in crimes against innocent Muslims (and supposed 
Mujahideen), as well as the United State’s practice of “extraordinary rendition,” 
by which the  u.s. government would outsource the torturing of “unlawful 
combatants” to friendly countries who were not bound by anti-torture trea-
ties.116 Additionally, some of these “detainees” were moved to cia secret de-
tention centers, also known as “black sites,” in countries that either looked the 
other way or were unaware of the cia’s clandestine activities. In other words, 
the orange suits are a reminder that isis’s violence against James Foley, Steven 
Sotloff, David Haines, and Alan Henning is a retaliatory strike against the u.s. 
and other western countries’ abuse, torture, and murder of Muslims, both in 
Bush’s “war on terrorism” and Obama’s “war on terrorists.”117 Consequently, it is 
no mistake that the isis members that killed these men were dressed in black; 
the Islamic color of armed struggle against tyranny. Orange is the historical 
crime; black is its revenge.
 Reign of Terror: Bourgeois and Muslim
As individuals, the murdered James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Alan 
Henning and Peter Kassig (Abdal-Rahman Kassig) take on a symbolic meaning 
that is greater than the direct violence that was perpetrated upon them. Ironi-
cally, these violent murders are akin to a pivotal moment within  western  history: 
the Bourgeois Revolution. During the anti-monarchy evolution in France, the 
nobility was systematically beheaded through revolutionary  violence via the 
guillotine: the “cross” of Bourgeois dominance. The beheading of the nobility, 
including King Louis xvi and his family, was a concrete message to the rest of 
Europe: the age of monarchy was at an end and a new era had begun. This dia-
lectical moment in the history of class struggle had produced its new subject 
and the old has been determinately negated saecula saeculorum.118 This is why 
the young French Republic adopted a new calendar; the calendrier révolution-
naire français was a physical representation of the cancellation of the old order 
115 Sands, Lawless World, 143–173; Mohamedou Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, ed. Larry 
Siems. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015.
116 The practice of extraordinary rendition began with President Bill Clinton and was further 
developed under President George W. Bush.
117 isis specifically mentioned Obama’s air attacks on isis fighters as a motivation for their 
execution of Foley and Sotloff.
118 ‘For ever and ever.’ Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (New York: Verso, 2008), 415–416.
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and the birth of the new: a starting point in a new history. Nothing could have 
been a more graphic and compelling sight to demonstrate the end of the reign 
of monarchs than to see the king of a nation – once secure in his “divine right” – 
beheaded in front of his own “subjects.” According to Ruth Scurr, in her book 
Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution,
News of Louis xvi’s execution spread like a stain across Europe. In Eng-
land Prime Minister Pitt pronounced it ‘the foulest and most atrocious 
deed which the history of the world has yet had occasion to attest.’ In 
Russia Catherine the Great, shocked and grieving, took to her bed and 
decreed six weeks’ mourning for her whole court. Spain immediately 
 recalled its ambassador. Public opinion in all these countries turned 
 unremittingly against the Revolution. The reaction in America was more 
ambivalent – distant support for the embattled new republic, mingled 
with sorrow for its regal victim, who, in his time, had supported the colo-
nists in their struggle to found their own modern republican government 
on the other side of the Atlantic. ‘As Americans we regret the loss of the 
life of the King,’ wrote the religious minister and diarist William Bent-
ley, ‘but we remember the liberties of mankind are dearer than any life 
whatever.’119
The revolutionary message was clear; gruesome beheadings were to be the fu-
ture of the European monarchy if they refused to relinquish power to the new 
subject of history. In Paris’ Place de la Révolution, the political component of 
the age of the Enlightenment began with the systematic annihilation of the 
monarchy in France, and to a lesser degree in the United State of America. 
Revolutionary terror constructed a new world, a world that was fundamentally 
different than the one presided over by God’s divinely appointed kings. This 
would be a world that was determined by the masses, not by the few who con-
fused their prerogatives with that of God’s. Society, religion, politics, econom-
ics, business, and all other manners of state, civil society and family, would be 
fundamentally changed forever, as the beheading of King Louis xvi began the 
downfall of European nobility and ushered in an era of Bourgeois dominance – 
a change of events that not even Napoleon – the self-declared Emperor – could 
overturn.120
119 Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution. (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2006), 257.
120 See Žižek’s discussion of “revolutionary terror” or “divine violence” in Robespierre: Virtue 
and Terror (New York: Verso, 2007), vii–xxxix.
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In the same vein as the French Revolutionaries, albeit for very different 
purposes, isis’s beheading of Foley, Sotloff, Haines, Henning and Kassig was 
a message to the West: the era when the United States and its allies feel free 
to interfere in the affairs of the Muslims is at an end. However, this time it is 
religion that strikes back at secular modernity, against the first form of secular 
 Enlightenment, the Bourgeois, as it had already perceived itself to have de-
stroyed the second secular Enlightenment (Marxism) in Afghanistan (Soviet-
Afghan war of 1980–1988) which precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union. Sym-
bolically, the victims represented not a President, a congress, or a parliament, 
but an age; their killing ushered in what they hopeds was the beginning of the 
historical end of Euro-American dominance in the world, especially in the dar 
al-Islam. From their perspective, the empire of America must cede itself to 
a new age of resurgent religion. Yet, just as the beheading of King Louis xvi 
didn’t automatically bring about the death of monarchy in all of Europe, it 
did illuminate a trajectory of history that could not be stopped. isis hopes 
for the same. In this sense, isis is making clear that they are the new agent 
of history in the world and they have the capacity to bend history towards 
their goals. History, they believe, is identical with their ideology and can be 
guided by their “revolutionary” terror, which is legitimated by the supreme 
goal of reestablishing a Syrian-Iraqi (Umayyad-Abbasid) Sunni caliphate and 
Islamic dominance over the Muslim world.121 Although their actions may not 
ultimately witness their desired effect, their symbolic language is clear: impe-
rial America’s power to create the world in its own image no longer functions 
in the heart of the Muslim world. As such, they believe that both history and 
the divine are on their side. Unfortunately, James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David 
Haines, Alan Henning, and Peter Kassig who were all gruesomely beheaded 
by isis, were the first sacrifices (both concrete and symbolic) to this new era 
of jihādist barbarism. Nevertheless, at least for Hegel, the conditions that al-
lowed for an “Islamic Empire” in which the Muslims were the dominant force 
in world history has passed; new conditions in history do not allow us to return 
to a paradigm that could only have existed in the past.122 In the end, isis will 
find that it is the American and the Slavic world that is now in the forefront of 
the historical process and there is no way resurrect that which was only pos-
sible in  another age.123
121 In no way do I think isis is revolutionary, but rather blend revolutionary-like violence 
with deeply flawed counter-revolutionary goals.
122 Hegel, Philosophy of History, 355–359.
123 Hitler made this same mistake; he believed he could resurrect a German empire in a 
time where European imperialism was coming to an end. Had he understood Hegel’s 
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 The Perverse Dialectic of Apology
In the context of isis’s peculiar form of barbarism, a familiar phenomenon 
appears: all crimes committed by Muslim[s] are accompanied by the western 
world’s demand for an apology by Muslim authorities, clerics, and the gener-
al population alike. Muslims are told they have to apologize for the suicide 
bombings, the beheadings, the insurgencies, and every attack on civilians that 
are done by others who happen to share the same faith, even if they express 
and/or practice that faith in starkly different ways. Consequently, a feeling of 
remorse, born out of a mistaken sense of collective guilt tacitly compels many 
Muslims to not only condemn act of terror – which is appropriate – but also to 
apologize for their fellow religious believers, as if the ummah bears the burden 
of collective tauba (repentance) or metanoia (μετάνoια – “change of mind”) 
for the acts of all members of its community.124 The question becomes, are 
these public acts of apology (1) appropriate, (2) helpful, and (3) defendable? 
Do they express sincere but ultimately misguided remorse for the violent act 
or would it be more appropriate if the global Muslim ummah expressed a sin-
cere form of sympathy – “the act of suffering with” – instead? The question 
must be asked, wouldn’t Muslims have to first agree with isis and other forms 
of terrorism perpetrated by fellow Muslims and thus bear some of the respon-
sibility for the barbarism in order to have a “change of mind,” i.e. metanoia? Or, 
like  Horkheimer and Adorno suggested, are they partially responsible simply 
because they share space within the same “organized” religion?125
There is a piece of “common sense” (perverse ideology) in the United States 
that is played out within mainstream media nearly every night: when a crime 
is perpetrated by an African American, their race is to blame; when a crime 
was done by a Caucasian American, their mental stability is to blame; when a 
crime was done by a Muslim, their religion is to blame. This apothegm secretly 
philosophy of history, he would have known that the historical conditions that allowed 
Europe to engage in empire making was already waning.
124 For a condemnation of isis and its activities that actually has both intellectual weight 
and authenticity, see the Open Letter sent to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by 126 Muslim scholars 
in the appendix. Furthermore, see Chapter 7 for a discussion of this Open Letter.
125 Speaking of religions and political philosophies in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Hork-
heimer and Adorno write ‘in this way, Christianity, idealism, and materialism, which in 
themselves contain truth, also bear guilt for the villainies committed in their name. In 
proclaiming power – even a benign power – they became themselves highly organized 
historical powers, and as such played their bloody role in the real history of the human 




expresses the ideological core of America’s attitude towards violence and its 
perpetrators: race, mental stability, and religion are all sources of irrational-
ity and unacceptable behavior in light of the “accepted norms” of American 
civil society. Most concretely, it demonstrates our inability or unwillingness 
to abandon the ready-at-hand identifiable characteristics of “otherness” that 
American society still maintains precisely because those characteristics pro-
vide a convenient explanation for the apparently unexplainable – how could 
anyone transverse the “rational” norms of American democratic and capitalist 
culture? From an ideological perspective, when a nation is closely identified 
with the will of God, it becomes sacrilegious and politically heretical to oppose 
its “national destiny.” Yet, many do oppose the prevailing ideology of the most 
powerful nation in the world. Why? And why specifically through the lenses of 
religion?
Although violence done in the name of religion (or against religion) has 
abated in the modern period, it is not uncommon within countries that are 
wrestling with cultural, political, and economic crises, including areas of the 
Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, Africa, and Europe. However, when 
certain actors from particular religions engage in religiously inspired violence, 
very rarely are their religious compatriots asked to burden themselves with the 
perpetrator’s guilt and expand it to the whole. It is understood that individu-
als bear the responsibility for their own actions; that no one can alleviate the 
guilt of the actor by donning their “sins”; that the individual must assume full 
responsibility for their transgressions even if they were inspired by a religion 
or had felt that they acted in service to their religion. Religions are not put on 
trial, individuals are – religions lacks a body to incarcerate and have no soul 
to damn, even if they are sometimes sources of motivation for violence and 
terror. However, in the international public sphere, the grand inquisitor not 
only demands justice for the wronged by the perpetrator, but also demands 
the members of the religious community apologize for the transgressions 
of the one. Today, Islam may be the only religion that stands condemned with-
in the international public sphere for the actions of some of its members.
However, distancing average Muslims from the heinous acts of murder, 
 barbarity, and destruction may temporarily put worried non-Muslims at ease, 
and therefore diminish the possibility of an Islamophobic backlash. Muslims 
often feel compelled to demonstrate that not all believers express their faith 
through violence, not all believe jihād is an act of totalen krieg (total war) 
against non-Muslims and minority sects, and that not all Muslims sanctify 
the bloody acts of the few. Indeed, from the perspective of humanistic soli-
darity, public condemnations of barbarity, whether perpetrated by Muslims or 
others, should be done; a united front of Muslims and non-Muslims against 
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civilization’s devolution into a new Golgotha should be expressed most force-
fully. Indeed, an inverse apologia is an attitude more congruent with revolu-
tionary Islam as well as the Critical Theory of Religion as expressed by the 
Frankfurt School; one should not simply condemn the act of terror, but live in 
sympathy, empathy and solidarity with the victims of religious terror regard-
less of sectarian considerations and regardless if the act of terror emanated 
from within one’s own religious, national, or ethnic community. Yet, do cer-
tain Muslims’ compulsive need to apologize for the violence of other Muslims 
somehow not perversely express to others – especially miso-Islamists who al-
ready suspect all Muslims to be terrorists – that all of the ummah are tacitly 
guilty for the crimes? Does not the apology somehow unjustly disperse some 
of the guilt upon the innocent? Does not the act of seeking forgiveness – the 
goal of  apology –  betray not only a misplaced blame but also a misplaced guilt?
In 1947, the German philosopher Karl Jaspers published his book Die Schul-
dfrage (The Question of Debt), exploring the issue of guilt and debt of the 
 Germans as a whole for what was done to Europe in general and the Jews in 
particular during wwii. Jaspers rejected the idea of collective guilt, under-
standing that the individual who committed the crime cannot dilute their 
crime by passing guilt onto others, nor can others willfully appropriate the 
guilt of the criminal. He states,
It is nonsensical, however, to charge a whole people with a crime. The 
criminal is always only an individual… It is nonsensical, too, to lay moral 
guilt to a people as a whole. There is no such thing as a national character 
extending to every single member of a nation… Morally one can judge 
the individual only, never a group… One cannot make an individual out 
of a people. A people cannot perish heroically, cannot be a criminal, can-
not act morally or immorally; only its individuals can do so. A people as 
a whole can be neither guilty nor innocent, neither in the criminal nor in 
the political… nor in the moral.126
For Jaspers, to collectivize the guilt of the individual was to engage in what 
Adorno deemed “identity thought”; to collapse the multiplicity, the various, 
the particularity of each and every individual into a conceptual singularity. In 
the case of Islam, all 1.6 billion Muslims become the singular “the Muslim,” 
and in this artificial singularity it bears the responsibility of all crimes that its 
members perpetrate, as if the sin of the individual infects the whole. With the 
126 Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2000), 34–35.
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destruction of the European Jews in mind, Jaspers writes, ‘for centuries this 
mentality has fostered hatred among nations and communities… it has been 
most viciously applied and drilled into the heads… It was as though there no 
longer were human beings, just those collective groups.’127 For Jaspers, as well 
as many other critical voices who’ve been stigmatized by the transgression of 
others, this form of collective guilt – or guilt by association – has no merit, 
and misguided collective apologies mend no wounds, but only creates more 
victims. However, the most dangerous aspect of this collective guilt is that it 
 creates the conditions for collective violence. Just as the individual perpetra-
tor’s guilt warrants punishment by a legitimate system of justice, so too does 
the collective if the guilt is dispersed. It is too easy, as Jaspers reminds us, to 
replace the individual with the guilty collective, which has only led to mass 
murder and genocide in the past. Yet for Jaspers, the absolution of collective 
guilt is not the end of the story; there is the matter of collective liability to con-
sider. Again, in light of the catastrophe of the Third Reich, he writes,
Every German is made to share the blame for the crimes committed in 
the name of the Reich. We are collectively liable. The question is in what 
sense each of us must feel co-responsible. Certainly in the political sense 
of the joint liability of all citizens for acts committed by their state – but 
for that reason not necessarily also in the moral sense of actual or in-
tellectual participation in crimes. Are we Germans to be held liable for 
outrages which Germans inflicted on us, or from which we were saved as 
by a miracle? Yes – inasmuch as we let such a régime rise among us.  No – 
insofar as many of us in our deepest hearts opposed all this evil and have 
no morally guilty acts or inner motivations to admit. To hold liable does 
not mean to hold morally guilty.128
For Jaspers, the collective liability for the rise of the Third Reich lies in 
 Germany’s inability and/or unwillingness to prevent, arrest, and/or destroy 
fascism in its infancy, to allow it to fester, and ultimately to allow it to gain 
control over the society. For Jaspers, too many good Germans retreated into 
their own private space in order to survive the fascist takeover of the state. 
They refused to publicly oppose fascism and because of their inaction, mil-
lions, including Germans, were killed. In the face of the Nazi’s early crimes, 
only the Communists – and some Christians – actively opposed them; nearly 
127 Jaspers, German Guilt, 35.
128 Ibid.
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all other peoples of good will remained silent or acquiesced.129 Yet, is the same 
true for the Muslims? Is there a form of fascism that has grown within the dar 
al-Islam that the Muslims are afraid of opposing? Do they bear collective li-
ability if not collective guilt for the crimes of isis and other terrorists groups? 
It is clear that isis was not a product of a state – like the Taliban, which was 
created by isi (Pakistani Intelligence Service) – but rather the absence of an 
Islamic alternative to the secular-dictatorial and monarchial states in the Mid-
dle East. Additionally, isis brutally imposed its rule upon its subjects without 
their democratic  deliberation. In other words, it was established against the 
will of the populace (for the most part) and was not a product of a democrat-
ic religio-political  will-formation. In the case of other terrorist organizations 
such as al-Qae’da, who do not swear any allegiance to any particular state, nor 
have they attempted to create one, the guilt of their heinous crimes cannot 
be made the guilt of those who have absolutely no input upon their activities. 
For Jaspers, the Germans may bear a certain amount of liability for fascism 
precisely because they allowed it to occur within their state – through par-
liamentary maneuvers, by giving fascism freedom to operate within the Wei-
mar republic, which was the pre-condition for fascism’s growth in the political 
realm. In light of this, he believes that a certain degree of liability rests with the 
demos. However, this is certainly not the same dynamic one finds amidst the 
Muslim world; Muslims have rarely had any democratic input in what regimes 
rule them for centuries, including isis.
 Hypocritical Apologetics and the Recovery of the Prophetic
2011 saw one of the worst massacres in Europe since wwii; Anders Behring 
Breivik, a 32 years old right-wing Norwegian-Christian extremist, murdered 
77 individuals in a bombing in Oslo and a shooting rampage on Utøya Island. 
 Although the “mental stability” defense was attempted, claiming that he was 
a paranoid schizophrenic, it was clear from Breivik’s manifesto 2083: A Euro-
pean Declaration of Independence that he simply chose sides in what he be-
lieved was Christian Europe’s need to defend itself and its values against the 
onslaught of the Muslims and “cultural Marxists.” Although he wasn’t shy 
129 Certainly there are many exceptions, most important among them are the Protestant Bek-
ennende Kirche (Confessing Church), die Weiße Rose (The White Rose, a group of students 
and professors who opposed Hitler – the most famous being Sophie and Hans Scholl), and 
many conservative Catholic groups, among them Father Rudolphi. See Rudolf J. Siebert, 
Georg W. Rudolphi’s Prophetische Politische Theologie. Frankfurt a/m: Haag + Herchen.
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about  expressing his supposed devotion to Christianity, no voices of protest 
demanded that the rest of the Christian world (whatever that is today) apolo-
gize for his vicious attack. Although he claimed to be motivated by the defense 
of Christendom (Christ’s domain), “Christendom” felt no need to apologize for 
what their  religion “supposedly” created in Breivik; it was tacitly understood 
that his actions, although congruent with similar acts of terror against inno-
cents perpetrated by the Church throughout its history, were not a reflection of 
the  Gospels, the life of Jesus of Nazareth, nor the Church as it stands today. The 
sheer absence of apology in the face of mass murder demonstrates two very 
important insights. First, that a defense of Christendom today seems anach-
ronistic in light of our secular society. Christianity need not be apologized 
for  because Christianity as a social power is nearly non-existent. “Christen-
dom” is a concept of the past, a relic of a time-gone-by, a figment of Breivek’s 
imagination, as it has no real existence today in the minds of those suppos-
edly within Christendom. As such it lacks agency and those who would fight 
for its cause appear to be anachronistic at best. In Europe, Christianity is no 
longer understood to be a substantive pre-political social or identity adhesive 
in the modern post-secular society, but rather a semblance of collectivity that 
remain recalcitrant despite it being obsolete (so the secularists say). Second, 
the West has become so individualized that it would never occur to most to 
think that they share in the blame of the crimes of another, even when those 
crimes were born out of the society that was created by its collective culture. 
The concept of the  individual is so absolute, we no longer think in terms of 
our own collective guilt or even, as Jaspers would point out, our own collective 
liability. The  radical individualism of modern capitalism, which began with 
Martin Luther’s form of spiritual individualism, and was introduced into poli-
tics through the Bourgeois revolution, now grants no legitimacy to substantive 
social collectivity. It negates any possibility of thinking in terms of collective 
guilt or liability.
As is often pointed out through many critical voices, the Israeli state is re-
sponsible for some of the worst human right abuses in the modern era. Under 
state guidance (or willful neglect), Jewish settlers frequently – almost daily – 
attacks Palestinians, the state confiscates the Palestinian lands, robs them of 
their possessions, randomly fires their weapons at Palestinian protesters (who 
are often children), restricts access to water and natural resources, bulldozes 
their homes, and engages in other abhorrent practices that have been banned 
by international law. In light of the ongoing crimes, there is too often a deafen-
ing silence from the international public sphere. Ironically, never is the west-
ern Jewish community asked to apologize for the sins of their brethren in Israel 
in any meaningful way. Is this not precisely because they are not seen to be 
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responsible for those crimes?130 Not even when Rachel Corrie, a young Ameri-
can peace activist, was intentionally run over by an Israeli bulldozer in 2003, 
and was killed without mercy, was the Jewish community collectively asked 
for an apology for murdering an American civilian who posed no threat – 
unless one can think of “peace” as being threatening. Even though many 
Israelis  expressed their outrage over her murder, an apology from the whole of 
the Jewish community was never called for, and rightly so. However, perversity 
arose: the Palestinians and Rachel Corrie were overwhelmingly blamed for their 
own victimization both in the western and Israeli press.131 Nevertheless, when 
misguided Muslims in the West attack Jews and synagogues to express their 
outrage against Israel’s aggression against Palestinians, these acts are  taken as 
example of how Islam itself is inherently anti-Semitic, as opposed to seeing it 
for what it is: a criminal act of individuals of a certain faith community.
When Hindu nationalist parties, who see no future for Muslims in India, 
attack Muslims, their mosques and their families, does the world cry out for 
apologies from all Hindus? When secular right-wing anti-immigrant parties in 
Europe attack Muslims on the streets, does the public sphere cry for apolo-
gies from other secular communities? Clearly it does not. Yet, when a Muslims 
commits a heinous act of aggression, the Muslim community, from the United 
States to Europe, from the Middle East to Indonesia, is expected to apologize for 
a crime they did not commit, (and often were the victim of). However, a  fatigue 
has set in within the Muslim community; many voices are exclaiming that they 
can no longer apologize for those who speak in their name but violate the most 
basic tenets of their faith. Although often associated with Wahhabi Islam, a 
takfīri (excommunication) impulse is beginning to emerge among Muslims 
who cannot identify with the brutality of some of their co-religionists.
The inner-contradiction that reveals the perverse dialect within the apology 
is thus: each apology further ingrains the notion that Muslims are all equally 
to blame for any given crime by a Muslim. With each expression of public re-
morse, the Muslim community inappropriately acquires and legitimates col-
lective guilt, even if the victim of the terror is Muslim. For many, including crit-
ic of Islam such as Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, the unifying factor in all 
130 The notable exception to this can be found in the anti-Semitic attacks on Jews in Europe 
and the u.s. However, this is usually the act of those who adhere to anti-Semitic senti-
ments regardless of the actions of particular Jews and or Israel. In other words, they are 
usually neo-Nazis who are pathologically against the Jews regardless of what happens in 
Palestine/Israel.
131 See Rachel Corrie, Let Me Stand Alone: The Journals of Rachel Corrie. New York: 
w.w.  Norton & Co., 2008.
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crimes made by Muslims is Islam itself. By sharing a faith – that he believes is 
constitutionally barbaric – all Muslims bear the guilt of their criminal minority. 
It is believed that when a Muslim proves to be a criminal, it is because they are 
faithful to the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet. When they are ecumeni-
cal, peace loving, law abiding and open for modernity, they are on the boarders 
of apostasy. What Wilders and others would prefer is that the Muslim com-
munity reconciles itself to its evil religion so that the truth about Islam would 
cease to be clouded by the claim that Islam is a “religion of peace,” which, in 
their view, is a pernicious lie. This type of thinking strikes the scholar of Islam, 
Daniel A. Madigan, as being quite peculiar as it denies the Muslims the right to 
interpret their sacred texts and traditions in a more ecumenical and peaceful 
way. Additionally, the outsiders’ interpretation of the sacred text, which privi-
leges the “medieval voices” from the Islamic past, is an attempt to ‘deny any 
possibility to change [the meaning] and [to engage in] dialogue.’132 Do critics 
like Wilders really prefer that the Muslim world interpret their sacred texts 
more violently as opposed to strengthening the claims of those  Muslims who 
see peacefulness as a supreme value emanating from within those same texts? 
If so, why? Who benefits from such a violent hermeneutics? Does the Muslim 
who sees solidarity with non-Muslims behind every verse in the Qur’an have 
to apologize for the crimes of those who interpret the text through a binary “us 
vs. them,” especially if the latter is the preferred interpretation for anti-Islamic 
voices? We have to ask what motivates those non-Muslim critics who dimin-
ish the ecumenical voices of Islam over the violent and barbaric. What is their 
agenda and why are they invested not in reconciliation between peoples but 
increased antagonisms?
By Islamic standards of justice, unjustified killing, i.e. murder, and especially 
mass murder, is a grievous enough crime as to consign someone to jahannam 
(hell) for eternity. Yet many Muslims inadvertently take on the guilt of the 
mass murderer when they engage in collective apologies for crimes they did 
not do. The more the ummah apologizes for the crimes they are not guilty of, 
the more it draws itself into the guilt of the damned. In other words, the more 
the Muslim ummah apologizes for the terroristic actions of the few, the more it 
bears the burden of guilt for those actions, and thus the more liable it becomes. 
Where it was innocent, it becomes guilty; it stands condemned even though it 
is free of blame.
Believing that religious authorities have some influence over their adher-
ents, many in the West demand Islamic institutions apologize and condemn 
132 Daniel A. Madigan, “Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Difficult Times” in Catholicism and 
Interreligious Dialogue, ed. James L. Heft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 63.
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all terrorist acts. These demands from the various “authorities” in the Islam-
ic world are also a misguided proposition. In this matter, it does the critical 
analyst well to remember an important distinction developed by Hegel: the 
distinction between “objective” and “subjective” religion. In his Tübingen Es-
say, written in the mid 1790’s, Hegel claims there are two forms of religion, the 
first being the “objective.” This form, which he associates with theology, i.e. 
the systematic construction of religious thoughts, institutions, and authori-
ties, remains in the realm of the abstract for the believer. It is often outside 
the world of the believer and they retain a certain level of reservation when 
investing themselves within the objective. As it is “doctrine and dogma,” it is 
outside the purview of the average believer.133 This form of religion is codified 
and institutionalized; it is priestly and represents an outside bureaucratic au-
thority. The average believer’s religiosity often remains un-affected by official 
doctrine, which proves to be incapable of penetrating the core of the believer’s 
religious being. In this way, the believer remains secure within his “subjective” 
form of religion, which Hegel called Volksreligion (religion of the people).134 
Their  religiosity is not a matter of official form but of live experiences,  feelings, 
and  sentiments. Subjective thoughts take on a religious legitimacy – they be-
come their true religious authority despite the fact that their views may be 
heterodox from the standpoint of the official tradition. Hegel states that ‘every-
thing depends on subjective religion; this is what has inherent and true worth. 
Let the theologian squabble all they like over what belongs to objective reli-
gion, over its dogmas and their precise determination.’135 With this insight in 
mind, the demand for apologies from the “objective,” i.e. Islamic institutions, 
for the crimes of the “subjective,” i.e. the individual believer, reveals itself as be-
ing impotent. The objective authorities can no more harness control over the 
individual believer’s subjective religiosity as can the state. The religious sub-
jectivity of the individual is the authoritative core that motivates, legitimates, 
and justifies his actions, including those actions that to many seem to be ter-
roristic. Although the objective form of religion may condemn such actions 
via official dogmas, it is the wrong standard of judgment for the believer’s own 
subjective religious positions and as such gains no influence on the believer. 
Condemnations of the crimes may alleviate the collective suspicion of the ob-
jective  religious tradition, but it will not help alleviate the tendency towards 
133 Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 127–128.
134 Volksreligion was often times called “riff raff” religion by Islamic scholars such as Imam 




violence residing within the subjectively constructed religious worldview of 
the believer.
From the perspective of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of religion, 
solidarity with the suffering, remembrance of the victims, and the enactment 
of what Walter Benjamin described as our weak messianic power to bring about 
a more reconciled future-society is a more appropriate stance to take in the 
face of religiously-inspired terror.136 Where the ummah bears collective guilt 
is when it collectively forgets about past suffering and fails to stop future suf-
fering. If it collectively wants to alleviate this metaphysical guilt, it cannot do 
it by constantly apologizing for the actions of the guilty few, but it must rather 
live in solidarity with the suffering of the innocent regardless of their creed. 
Solidaristic fitnah, or a division within the ummah in the name of the suffering 
(and with the suffering), is the only just position to take in light of terroris-
tic fitnah, which already divides the ummah among the suffering, broken, and 
terrorized against those who create suffering, break the body and spirit, and 
terrorize the populace.137 In other words, it is only by being-with all victims 
of terror (in the name of Islam) that Muslims can affectively fight against the 
fitnah of terrorists. Muslims must always remain on the side of the innocent 
victims of history, never the cruel victors. Most dialectically, the call for fitnah 
amongst the Muslims is conversely a call for solidarity amongst the Muslims 
against oppression and terrorism, as it congeals the prophetic within Islam in 
the name of those who suffer at the hands of the brutal – those who have left 
the prophetic way-of-being in search of power, prestige, and comfort. When-
ever Islam’s inherent negativity, its adversus mundi, is perverted in such a way 
that it legitimates the brutality of a state, or faux-state as in isis, it has lost its 
essential prophetic core and is, for all intents and purposes, no longer Islamic, 
but just a shallow surface expression of Islam: an ideology, i.e. false conscious-
ness. As long as it remains in opposition to all forms of oppression, brutality, 
and barbarity, including that of other Muslims, it embodies the ruh Muham-
mad (spirit of Muhammad); when that is abandoned, when it loses its longing 
for the totally other than the world as it is, it becomes more important than ever 
for Muslims to live with the victims of this “untrue” Islam – to witness and 
136 It is interesting to note that Horkheimer did not believe in Benjamin’s ‘weak messian-
ic  power’ thesis. He pessimistically believed the dead are dead and nothing the living 
do can redeem them of their past suffering. See John Abromeit, Max Horkheimer and 
the Foundations of the Frankfurt School (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
230–231.
137 Fitnah is Arabic for “division,” as in a division amongst a single group or collective.
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confess on behalf of the prophetic and give shelter and aid to the vulnerable, 
abused, and hunted. The weak but still messianic power within the community 
is dependent on the Muslims identifying not with the victors of history, but 
with its victims, not the predators but the prey. It is only within such a rela-
tionship that Muslims are capable of wrestling history out of the hands of the 
barbaric and deliver it to a more-reconciled future state of existence.
<UN>
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chapter 7
The Globalized Post-Secular Society and  
the Future of Islam
 From the West to the Rest
For Habermas, the discussion concerning post-secularity is one that is 
squarely situated within the European and North American context, as it is 
the West that has been thoroughly secularized in most aspects of its society. 
However, with the advent of globalization, especially in the form of aggressive 
neo-liberalism, secularity has become increasingly normative within civil so-
ciety and the state throughout the world, leading the critical observer to note 
that the rest of the World is now going through similar traumatic experiences 
that the West went through in the past couple centuries. We must now come 
to realize that there is a globalized post-secular condition, where religious 
societies remain within an increasing globalized secularity. These societies, 
especially those within the heart of the Muslim world, only a few centuries 
ago were predominately guided by the dictates of religion, religious insti-
tutions, and religiously rooted authorities, and could hardly have fathomed 
living within a society that was devoid of the guidance of the Qur’an and 
Sharīʿah. However, the colonial situation brought to many of these countries 
a new form of government, one that was tangentially – or only culturally – 
associated with religion but would later be steered on the basis of secular 
power and its way-of-being, especially instrumental rationality. These colo-
nial powers often masked their racist-imperialism within the shroud of al-
truism; it was their duty to “civilize” those darker skinned people who have 
yet to discover the benefits of western society. The Enlightenment, as an 
“accomplishment solely of the West,” produced an infectious arrogance that 
alienated many Muslims who resented their conquerors’ claims of superior-
ity. To their humiliation, the colonies not only learned secular sciences, phi-
losophy, autonomous art, etc., but also a lesson in power and violence, as the 
will-towards-freedom of the victims of colonialism was suppressed under the 
rather un-Enlightened colonial boot of systematic oppression. However, as 
colonialism retreated into the dustbin of history throughout the 20th century 
at the hands of liberation struggles from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, the 
secular and capitalist structures of political-economy often remained intact 
and served as the basis by which many newly liberated peoples constructed 
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their own independence.1 This can be clearly seen in places like India and 
Pakistan, where the remnants of British colonial rule can still be witnessed in 
the functioning of their administration of justice, parliament, and economic 
system. From traditional economics to capitalism; from religious laws to sec-
ular democratic governance; from Sharīʿah law to English Common Law, the 
ghosts of colonialism remains deeply imbedded within the framework of the 
post-colonial society. Additionally, the universal laws that have been estab-
lished by the United Nations and other bodies of international governance 
have been introduced into the constitutions and legal systems of former co-
lonial countries, because of which they have had to modify their own legal 
systems, often based in religion or religious sentiments, to accommodate for 
international norms (which are clearly articulated in western Enlightenment 
language).
In addition to this reality, former colonial states, some of who have been 
able to create a fairly vibrant synthesis of colonial era laws and customs with 
their own indigenous culture and legal norms – while many other have not 
had the opportunity to do so due to western interference – have had to absorb 
the onslaught of secular modernity while still on the shaky political-economic 
grounds left by colonialism. Neo-colonialism, via globalized neo-liberalism, 
has arrived even before the ghosts of colonialism have been exorcised. Not 
having fully recovered from their European occupation and exploitation, 
these traditional societies have become saturated with the latest version of 
European and American imperialism: aggressive globalized secular capitalism – 
this time under the camouflage of “free-trade.” Once again the southern hemi-
sphere, the “third world,” and the darker segments of the global population, 
have found themselves ensnared in the trap of a system not of their own design 
or making, nor does it have their economic interests at heart. Nevertheless, 
they are forced to participate within the this system or accept a pariah state 
of international existence, as for example, socialist Cuba, who has paid a high 
price for their recalcitrance in the face of American aggression and for their 
refusal to be integrated into the neo-liberal economic system. With only a few 
1 Evidence for this claim can be witnessed in how many former colonies attempted to over-
come their colonial-capitalist past by attempting to bring about a socialist state. This is true 
for many of the colonies in Africa, Latin America and South East Asia. Capitalism was as-
sociated with colonialism and therefore it was thought that it must be removed in order for 
a more just and equal society to blossom within the post-colonial situation. Unfortunately, 




exceptions, participation in the capitalist system is either a voluntary surren-
der or a forced integration.2
As stated above, this produces the condition where nations and cultures – 
while in the process of rethinking and retooling their own religious and cultur-
al resources so that they could provide a basis for a stabilized and functioning 
state within the modern world – were recolonized by a power that is even more 
insidious than direct colonialism, as it masquerades as a force for good, for lib-
eration, and emancipation, as opposed to historic colonialism, whose brutality 
was often on full display. In this sense, the world, being the stage for globalized 
neo-liberalism, is increasingly becoming more secularized as the culture of big 
business, technology, commercialization, commodification, i.e. international 
corporate capitalism, becomes increasingly normative. Traditional religious 
life withers and is replaced by the new religion of commodities, exchange and 
the idolatry of money. As Marx already understood, wherever the system of 
bourgeois capitalism goes, it destroys the native culture, it undermines the tra-
ditional view of the world, it infects the family with the values of civil society, 
and it transforms ‘all that is holy [into] profane.’3 Because of this, traditional 
societies, especially in the dar-al-Islam, increasingly find themselves in a world 
that no longer speaks to the values associated with religious adherence, the 
spiritual life, and the guidance found within sacred traditions, personalities, 
and texts. In other words, religion itself has become alienated within a secular-
ized global lifeworld; it no longer sees itself in the world it once molded; it no 
longer sees itself in itself, as religion itself has been reshaped and deformed 
by a secular world and its commodification of the lifeworld; it no longer sees 
itself in nature, as the natural world has been disenchanted and sacredness 
has evaporated from the environment; and it no longer sees itself within its 
“believers,” for even they have become thoroughly secularized despite their 
surface adherence or their commitment to identity politics. Just as in the 
West, where religion is forcibly removed from being the dominant force within 
polity, economics, and culture, and turned into a private affair that few take 
seriously, the Muslim world has watched – especially since the beginning 
of the 20th century – as this same weltlichen geist (secular spirit) quickly re-
placed religion in the daily life of the Muslim. In some areas this process has 
moved fairly slowly, such as in many of the Persian Gulf States, where others it 
was a enforced act of government, such as Mustafa Kamal Pasha (Attatürk)’s 
brutal secularization and westernization of Turkey – often called “Attatürk’s 
2 John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hitman. New York: Plume, 2004.
3 Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party” in the Marx-Engels Reader, 476.
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Reforms” or Attatürk Devrimleri – after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate 
post-wwi.
However, against the classical secularization theorists, religion has not 
totally disappeared even as these nations have increasingly secularized, indus-
trialized, and capitalized.4 On the contrary, the opposite phenomenon is true; 
the dialectic of secularization has also appeared in the Muslim world; as secu-
larization of the lifeworld has continued to expand, in equal proportion, so too 
has the existential crisis-conditions it creates. These “soulless” and “heartless” 
conditions beckon for a return to religion as a way of overcoming the reduc-
tion of the world to material acquisition as a comprehensive doctrine or way-
of-being-in-the-world.5 As secular capitalism exports its spiritual vacuousness 
into the Muslim world, creating a society of “having” as opposed to a society of 
“being” rooted within a religious worldview, Muslims have increasingly turned 
towards religion as a way of fixing that which capitalism broke: the human 
spirit and the spirit of “asabiyya (solidarity). In other words, the more secular-
ization penetrates into the dar-al-Islam, the more many Muslims retreat into 
their religion as a way of opposing this new form of colonization.
There is another factor that must be understood: because of the nature of 
Islam, which has often attempted to reconcile its theology and metaphysics 
with the natural sciences, Aristotle with Muhammad, reason with revelation, 
the metaphysical basis of the Islamic worldview was never undermined thor-
oughly by western positivism and empirical sciences. Consequently, the secu-
larization process, being a natural outcome of the diminishment of Christian-
ity in the West – which resulted from its metaphysical deterioration in light of 
natural sciences, positivism, etc. – encounters a religious society that is still 
deeply rooted within its own faith. In other words, the necessary cracks within 
religion and metaphysics, by which modern doubt penetrates, are not present 
within the Muslim community at the level that they were in Christendom at 
the beginning of the Enlightenment. The Christian Church fought rearguard 
struggles against science for centuries in Europe, which produces significant 
fractures in the faith of its adherents. Whereas in the Muslim world, science 
was integrated within religion from the beginning and the natural sciences in 
particular where seen as religious disciplines themselves. Science was a reli-
gious endeavor in the Muslim world, as it corresponded to the idea of God’s 
holistic creation – to research nature was to research the divine and its cre-
ation; to contemplate the natural world was to fulfill Allah’s divine command 
4 Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project, 60.




to “ponder” his creation.6 Therefore, “secular science” – science strictly outside 
the bounds of religion and metaphysics – is not a phenomenon that ever truly 
exists in the Muslim world.7 What this demonstrates is that even though the 
colonial powers saturated the Muslim world with their secular (and later bour-
geois) worldviews, the neo-colonial expansion of capitalism into the Muslim 
world is not finding a world sufficiently fractured in its religion, even if it is 
fractured in its polity. Religion, because it is one of the few social phenomena 
that are still relatively intact throughout the Muslim world, despite seculariza-
tion and capitalist atomization, has become the main motivation and vehicle 
for the opposition to the secular neo-liberalization of the Muslim world. No-
tice, it is not the state that resists neo-liberalism in the Muslim world, it is not 
the economics systems, it is not the majority of western-oriented intellectual 
elites, it is the religious communities – both those in authority and laity – that 
voice their opposition to the globalization of secular capitalism. Yet, lest we 
descend into some form of religiously inspired triumphalism, we have to be 
very cognizant of not only the great determination of neo-liberalism to gain 
a strong foothold in the traditional Muslim world, but its very ability to do 
so, and the fact that it has already done so to a large degree. Traditional Islam 
and religiously rooted thought – post-Islamo-Marxism ala “Ali Sharīʿati – is the 
only major countervailing force against neo-colonial capitalism in the Muslim 
world.
Because of the continual integrity of religious belief, today, many Muslims 
in the traditional Muslim-majority countries find themselves in a situation 
that appears to be similar to the Muslims of Europe and North America; they 
are an anachronistic religious presence within an increasingly materialistic 
and religionless world. Because of this, just as Muslim in Europe have to find 
a way to articulate their ultimate concerns, their religious norms, their pro-
tests, and their ethical and moral sensibilities in a language that is “publicly 
accessible” to all members of the society, Muslims now within the dar-al-Islam 
6 In Sūrat al-Baqarah, 2:164, Allah says, “behold! In the creation of the heavens and the earth; 
in the changing of the night and day; in the ships that sail through the ocean for mankind’s 
benefit; in the rain sent down by Allah from the skies and the life that he gives to the dead 
earth; in the various animals that he spreads throughout the world; in the changing winds, 
and the clouds that follow like slaves the sky and earth; here indeed are signs for those who 
are wise.” (My translation). Indeed, the command to reflect, ponder, and study the creation 
of Allah is replete throughout the Qur’an.
7 Most Muslims certainly deny the validity of “scientism,” an alternative ideological worldview 
that attempts to supplant religion and metaphysics with the findings of science. For Muslims, 
the divine is always behind that which science takes as its subject, but the scientific method 
is seen as ultimately deficient as it cannot account for that which is outside of the physical.
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have also to find a way of (1) remaining true to their Islamic identity, while (2) 
fully integrating within the global community that is increasingly secular, lest 
they become a pariah state. The post-secular conditions of Europe and North 
America are increasingly becoming the post-secular condition of the world. 
Yet, the common language system that allows members of different societ-
ies to speak to each other via mutual-recognition and mutual-respect has not 
been adequately developed. Indeed, the opposite is more true; the most vocal 
and present response to the globalized post-secular condition has been the 
reactionary rejection of it, i.e. Muslim fundamentalism, extremism, and ter-
rorism, on the one hand, and on the other hand the international struggle for 
supremacy by western powers that undermine the idea of the “world commu-
nity,” which is fostered in corporative international institutions like the United 
Nations. It is not the case that all Muslim have responded through violence 
against the pervasive secularity that penetrates the lifeworld via the expan-
sion of neo-liberalism, but those voices who have attempted to engage in a 
robust dialogue, discourse and debate concerning the nature of Islam in the 
modern period, such as the Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan, have had a 
minimal impact within the Muslim ummah worldwide.8 Where Tariq Rama-
dan and others serve as a sturdy bridge between the secular West and religious 
Muslims – as they are adept both in western culture, history, and philosophy as 
well as in the traditional Islamic sciences (theology, philosophy, law) – they are 
perpetually overshadowed by the reactionary violence of bin Laden, al-Qae’da, 
and isis. Likewise in the West, those anti-Islamic voices that condemn all Mus-
lims as terrorists or potential terrorists have the loudest and most powerful 
platform by which they can mold public opinion. It is not the case that bridges 
cannot be built, but that those who attempt to build the bridge watch them 
burn down before they reach to the other side.
The post-secular societies, where religion and secularity are becoming in-
creasingly antagonistic, destructive, and blind to the concerns of the other, 
must find within themselves representatives that can translate the thoughts, 
beliefs, and utmost concerns of the “other” into a common language that can 
serve as the basis for trans-civilizational discourse with the practical intent of 
increasing reconciliation, peace, and friendly living together. However, such a 
friendly living together could only happen if the antagonistic and oppressive 
8 See Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenge of Modernity, trans. Saïd Amghar. 
Leicester, uk: The Islamic Foundation, 2001; To Be a European Muslim. Leicester, uk: The 




conditions of neo-liberalism are replace, as exploitation of one segment of 
humanity over another cannot serve as the basis for reconciliation. In other 
words, the demand for inter-civilizational reconciliation is the demand to give 
up the conditions that prevent reconciliation, i.e. neo-liberalism. However, the 
opposite as occurred; the drift between the West and the rest has continued to 
fuel religious fundamentalism as well as nativist racism, xenophobia, Islamo-
phobia, and miso-Islamism.
 Theocracy as a Response to the Globalized Post-Secular Society
For Habermas, the expansion of modern secular capitalism into parts of the 
world that are still governed, either on the political or personal level, by tradi-
tional religious worldviews, has provoked a variety or responses. They include 
(1) missionary expansion, (2) fundamentalist radicalization, or (3) the instru-
mentalization of the inherent potential for violence.9 In some cases, more than 
one applies to a given group. In the case of the global Muslims world, all three 
have been witnessed as responses to the increased secularization and capital-
ization of the lifeworld.10 For example, ‘Abd al-Al’a Mawdudi (d. 1979) called 
for a fundamentalist-oriented evangelism as well as the necessity to defend 
Islam via violence (if necessary); the archetypical Egyptian activist/author 
Seyyid Qutb (d. 1966) and his book Ma’alim fi l-Tarīq (Milestones) called for 
the continual jihād (struggle/effort) within the world to spread Islam until all 
of humanity submits to the will of Allah, which is in stark contrast to the mere 
submission to the nafs (instincts/desires) that is more normative in the West.11 
These scholars, and many others, have synthesized Islam with anti-western, 
anti-colonial, and anti-modern philosophy, the result of which has brought to 
the foreground the hostility that many Muslims experience towards western-
oriented secular modernity.
9 Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project. 61.
10 To Habermas’ first point, Islam continues to be the fastest growing religion in the 
world, both by birth rate as well as through da’wa (invitation to Islam). Indeed, with 
the advent of the globalized cyberspace age, Muslims have been able to propagate 
their message across the world through popular social media, which has led many – 
especially in the West – to embrace Islam as their religion and way of life. I have dubbed 
this use of social media for the purposes of propagating religion “cyber-da’wah” or 
“e-daw’ah.”
11 Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, Jihad in Islam (Damascus: The Holy Qur’an Publishing House, 1977), 
5; Seyyid Qutb, Ma’alim fi l-tariq (Beirut: 1982), 62–91.
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Although most of the ummah experiences modernity in the same way, 
their responses to it have created deep divisions within the Muslim world.12 
The Muslim community has become split within itself depending on how 
they relate to secularity, capitalism, democracy, cultural modernity, etc. Can 
Islam co-exist with democracy? Is capitalism compatible with Islamic law? Is 
secularity a good thing if it provides political freedom for Muslims to practice 
their religion? To what extent should Muslim participate in contemporary cul-
ture, especially when it’s morally questionable, or even unavoidable? In other 
words, to what degree should Muslims accommodate themselves, their societ-
ies, and their religious praxis to the secular zeitgeist? Should the Muslim com-
munity try to accommodate itself to technological advances and leave behind 
cultural liberalization? Should it reject secularity as a whole and encourage a 
wholesale adoption of Sharīʿah law? Should it attempt to create its own form 
of Islamic modernity that determinately negates both western concepts of the 
secular state as well as traditional Islamic law? These and similar questions 
have been grappled with by Christian, Jews, and other faiths, as some have 
fully rejected the modern world and have become anachronistic within the 
world around them, while others have made enormous accommodations to 
modernity which threatens their very identity as believers. Although it is too 
broad of a topic to discuss all forms of response to the globalized post-secular 
age, for this study we want to focus on two of the most dynamic: the funda-
mentalist, who is himself the product of modernity but nevertheless rejects 
many aspects of it, and the guardians of traditional Islam, who view modernity 
with suspicion but understand that Islam cannot survive if it does not confront 
modernity on its own terms, and therefore seek a balanced approach to Islam 
in the modern secular world. These traditionalists believe that Islam has the 
resources within itself to not only survive modernity but to thrive within the 
post-secular modern world while at the same time maintain deep connections 
with their tradition. It is this traditionalist – but not necessarily conservative – 
school of thought in Islam that is most vocal against the distortion of Islam by 
Muslim fundamentalists and extremists; this distortion being their attempt to 
answer the question of Islam in modernity.
As detailed above, groups such as isis, The Taliban, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab 
and al-Qae’da reject the cultural modernization of the Muslim world, i.e. the 
12 One should not confuse the divisions in the Muslims world regarding the appropriate 
method and or stance to be adopted in light of the secularity and capitalism with division 
within Islam itself. Muslims disagree on what would be the best way to relate to secularity, 
but this is not a disagreement intra-Islam, i.e. it does not affect the fundamentals of Islam 
itself, but rather conditions the way in which Muslims can practice their faith.
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autonomy of the individual as expressed through individual rights, openness 
towards alternative sexualities, freedom to blaspheme, equal rights of citizens 
to adhere to the religion of their choosing, and “western” notions of women’s 
rights, etc.13 In the mindset of these believers, nothing good has come from 
the West; it is a cesspool of sin, over-indulgence, heedlessness, forgetfulness 
of the divine, irreverence for sacredness, vulgar materialism, pornography, 
atheism, and shirk (polytheism) via the gods of the market – power, status and 
wealth. These reactionary fundamentalists are deeply wounded by the corro-
sive effects of western modernization, and in reaction to that corrosion, they 
defensively construct an identity that is radically anti-West and anti-modern 
(despite being a product of modernity itself). Often unbeknownst to them, the 
perversity of constructing an identity on the basis of being the other of that 
which is rejected, is that the identity of the other is given the power to influ-
ence the reactionary identity thus created. In other words, in becoming the op-
posite of the other, the other remains an integral part of the newly developed 
identity; its negativity serves as the foundation of the new identity, albeit in 
its rejection. In this way the rejected other still has power, or is granted power, 
over the identity of those who reject. On the other hand, those who remain 
deeply suspicious of the modern world, especially as it is articulated by the 
post-Christian secular West, but nevertheless refuse to build an identity based 
upon being the opposite of the West, are able to create an identity for them-
selves that is dynamic, open, and on its own terms; the other is known but not 
given power. In other words, it doesn’t allow the other to define who it is (either 
positively or negatively) but rather safeguards its own prerogative to do so. Be-
cause it recognizes the other for what it is, both good and bad, it doesn’t create 
its identity against that of the other, but on an equal footing as the other, and 
thus can stand defiantly against the other while at the same time appreciating 
what the other has accomplished in history; it is secure-in-itself and therefore 
not threatened by the existence of the other. This tension between Muslims 
whose identity is rooted in the hatred for the secular West and those who 
have adhered to the traditional Islamic identity while honestly engaging the 
western world, is on full display amidst the battle between isis with its leader 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the traditional fuquha, mutakalimun and ʿUlamāʾ 
(jurists, theologians and scholars) that have bravely spoken out against them.
In light of isis’s advances within the heart of the Muslim world, many 
traditional scholars of Islam feared that isis would be witnessed as being 
identical with Islam; in other words, to the world, isis would appear to be 
13 This is not to say that all “fundamentalist” groups share monolithic answers to their is-
sues. This is but a general observation of their general orientation.
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the perfect manifestation of all the negative accusations leveled at Islam and 
Muslims since the 7th century.14 In order to counter such a threat, in September 
of 2014, 126 internationally-renown scholars, Shaykhs, Imams, jurists, and theo-
logians from throughout the Sunni Muslim world, signed an open letter in Eng-
lish and Arabic to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri, a.k.a. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
the leader of isis, as well as to ‘the fighters and followers of the self-declared 
“Islamic State.” The letter thoroughly argued 24 ways in which isis had distorted 
Islam according to an ‘overwhelming majority of Sunni scholars over the 
course of Islamic history,’ and how those distortions discredit and/or prove 
that the “Islamic State” fails to reflect the true values of Islam via the qualifica-
tion set forth by Islam and the Qur’an.15 Refuting many Wahhabi-Salafist inter-
pretations of Islam, the letter was directed squarely at Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
They declare in their letter that isis has,
provided ample ammunition for all those who want to call Islam barbaric 
with your broadcasting of barbaric acts which you pretend are for the 
sake of Islam. You have given the world a stick with which to beat Islam 
whereas in reality Islam is completely innocent of these acts and prohib-
its them.16
The fact that isis appears to be the embodiment of every Islamophobe’s and 
miso-Islamist’s accusation against Islam was enough to elicit a definitive re-
sponse from the highest levels of Islamic authority, with the hopes of defend-
ing Islam from those who distort its meaning and praxis from within and also 
to safeguard its reputation and image from those outside of Islam who would 
use the barbarity of isis as a tool for spreading their anti-Islamic message.
In light of this open letter, we must ask what exactly are these scholars 
safeguarding? Surely it’s not the case that Muslims are innocent of all crimes 
throughout their 1,400 year history, or that there aren’t some inherent vio-
lent tendencies within its core doctrines. All major religions have a criminal 
14 This very phenomenon led the World Council of Churches (wcc), as well as many other 
non-affiliated Christian denominations to denounce u.s. President George W. Bush’s 2003 
war on Iraq. In an attempt to separate Christianity from Bush’s “crusade” (his words), the 
wcc stated “war against Iraq would be immoral, unwise and in breach of the principles 
of the United Nations Charter… the fact that the most powerful nations of this world 
again regard war as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy” had to be condemned. 
See Religious Groups Issue Statements on War with Iraq. March 19, 2003. www.pewforum 
.org/2003/03/19/publicationpage-aspxid616/ (Accessed 10/15/2014).




history and all religions have a modicum of violence or violent tendencies 
inherent within them, which can either take the form of direct violence, 
structural violence, symbolic violence, or even the threat of metaphysical- 
eschatological violence. To say the least, the Muslim world is not a society of 
angels and Islamic doctrine does, under strict circumstances, legitimate all 
four forms of aforementioned violence. For Muslims to think of themselves 
or their history as being free from criminality is an unrealistic self-image, and 
one that diminishes the possibility for an honest discourse with the other 
(and with the self), as it imbues a false aura of innocence on one civilization 
while demonizing the other. As Daniel A. Madigan writes, ‘each partner has a 
strong tendency to compare his own ideals with the reality of the other. The 
result is that each assumes the moral high ground, and with a sense of supe-
riority speaks down to the other.’17 Only within the gap between the distorted 
self-image and the lies of anti-Islamic propaganda can one find the reality 
about Muslims and their history and in doing so lay down the necessary condi-
tions for an inter-civilizational discourse.18
Despite these issues, the 126 scholars want to make a clear distinction be-
tween Islam as a religious tradition that can either be adhered to or rejected, 
and Muslims, who have the agency to adhere or reject. These two entities, 
Islam and Muslims, are neither synonymous nor are they identical, but of-
ten times find themselves conflicting on a multitude of matters. Muslims 
fail to live up to the high standards set forth by the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
of the Prophet, and Islam often seems to fail to supply sufficient motiva-
tion for Muslims to adhere to those strictures. Nevertheless, these scholars 
believe Islam represents a force for absolute good within the world, as it 
represents the will of the world’s creator. It is this force for good that they 
seek to safeguard against the distortions made by isis and others. As such, 
the Wahhabi-Salafi inspired orientation within isis had to be publicly re-
sisted, if only to demonstrate that the whole of the Muslim world does not 
identify with their violent barbarism. It was a necessary condition that this 
be done in the form of an inner-critique – a critique from within the Is-
lamic tradition using only shared Islamic sources, i.e. al-Qur’an, Ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīṯh, 
and in some cases the ijma’ al-’aimmah (consensus of the scholars) and the 
ijma’ al-ummah (consensus of the community). For the 126 scholars, this is 
the shared worldview and language by which a discourse with isis can be 
made as they have become impenetrable to critiques from outside of Islam. 
17 Daniel A. Madigan, “Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Difficult Times,” 67. My emphasis.
18 Ibid., 67.
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However, the 126 scholars may have been too optimistic; critiques from out-
side of isis’s Wahhabi-Salafi orientation, no matter how Islamicly valid, may 
also fall on deaf ears as they often reject the legitimacy of arguments that 
do not correspond with their authoritarian interpretation, thus making their 
thinking an extremely closed system of self-enforcing arguments that inher-
ently resists democratic deliberation or scholarly debate and interpretation. 
It may be the case that the necessary discourse partner with isis can only be 
a recognized authority within the Wahhabi-Salafi orientation of Islam, as au-
thorities outside of that orientation lack isis’s recognition.19 However, such 
voices are often either mute or in tacit support of isis’s war on the Shi’a and 
other non-Sunni forces.20
As Hegel demonstrated in his philosophy of history, empires that develop 
out of the dialectical process often prove to be civilizing forces, moving hu-
manity closer to its realization of true freedom, breaking the chains of the 
previous society’s irrationalism and replacing it with better and more sophisti-
cated thought and praxis. They tear down the old society’s ossified structures; 
they destroy its unreasonable restraints; they answer the existential questions 
that the old empires and civilizations fail to answer; they replace the old gods 
with gods that are more appropriate for that epoch’s intellectual development; 
their historic vitality incorporates the good from the old and builds anew while 
it discards that which was a hindrances to humanity in the old. When we look 
at Islamic history, we see that the breakout of Arabia by the early Muslims of 
the 7th and 8th century would likewise prove to be a great leap forward in the 
progressive dialectic that structures the historical process. Islam brought with 
it a radical sense of equality, women’s rights, protections of minorities (both 
ethnic and religious), and a new desire for learning (both religious and “secu-
lar” sciences); Islam’s radicalism and spirit of progressivity broke down the de-
caying and often times oppressive structures of the Byzantine and Sassanian 
Empires, opening up the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, and the Indus 
Valley for a new civilization that was predicated on justice, the development 
of the intellect, spiritual inquisitiveness, moral excellence, and multi-religious 
19 Although intra-religious exclusion is not rare in the history of religions, it is rare in Islamic 
history. Throughout Muslim history, differing “schools of thought” (madahib), such as the 
Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, Hannafi, and even the Shi’i Jafar’i have been accepted as equally 
valid. However, the Wahhabi-Salafi orientaiton of Islam is radically exclusionary and thus 
overwhelmingly rejects the cacophony of authoritative Islamic voices.
20 Alastair Crooke, “You Can’t Understand isis if You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism 




and multi-ethnic tolerance.21 Indeed, later on in history, “Orthodox” Christians 
of the Balkans frequently said, “better the turban of the Arab than the miter 
of the Pope,” as to live under the conditions of Muslim rule was much more 
beneficial and peaceful for “heretical” Christians (“heretical” in the Roman 
view) than to live under the tyranny of the Roman Popes.22 As this quote dem-
onstrates, even centuries after Islam’s exodus from Arabia it was considered 
a more progressive force than those who came before – both Christian and 
pagan. Islam, in this view, was a force for civilizational advancement, espe-
cially when it challenged the dominance of a quickly decaying Christendom 
around the Mediterranean. The evidence for this advancement can be seen in 
the political, economic, and cultural state of the Muslim world while Europe 
was in its dark ages; where European civilization crashed post-Rome, which 
St. Augustine believed was the work of divine providence, the Muslims appro-
priated the knowledge of the ancient Greeks, Romans, and the Hindus, etc., 
to build a society that was vibrant, educated, and culturally sophisticated.23 It 
developed a system of theology with the use of Greek logic; it improved on the 
Greek philosophical tradition and reconciled it to Qur’anic revelation; it incor-
porated Hindu mathematics, astronomy, and natural sciences and studied the 
architecture of ancient Rome. Although not at the standards of the modern 
period, with its secular Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it even culti-
vated a progressive form of tolerance for Jews, Christians, and other religious 
denominations that were the envy of those minorities living n Christendom. 
It founded major universities that studied all subjects, some of which are still 
in existence today. It invented the modern hospital, by which patients would 
be segregated based on their illnesses, and even pioneered forms of surgery 
that were considered sacrilegious in Europe. Although this would come as a 
shock for many in the West, especially in light of the brutality of isis, the Mus-
lims developed a system of rights and responsibilities for prisoners of war and 
their captors. This system prefigured many of the stipulations with the Geneva 
Conventions. All in all, the Muslim world was a much more hospitable and 
advanced place to live during Europe’s civilizational collapse into darkness.
However, the modern period, especially from the colonial period onward, 
has not been kind to the Muslims, who have fallen behind the West in its 
21 Dustin J. Byrd, “On the State of Islam: Thoughts on Revolution, Revolt, and Reform” in 
Global Future of Religion: Probing into Issues of Religion and Religiosity in the Postmodern 
World, 289–311.
22 Eamon Duffy, Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes. New Haven; Yale University Press, 
2006.
23 St. Augustine, City of God, 2014.
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technology, scientific advancements, levels of education, and tolerance, i.e. its 
social progressivism.24 Now, some parts of the Muslim world have nearly for-
saken the spirit of social progress that once animated the Muslims to achieve 
great civilizational heights. isis is but the latest manifestation of the descent 
back into pre-Islamic times; a new age of jāhilīyah (ignorance), where the ad-
vances made by Islam for centuries have been all but cancelled; such openness 
and willingness to experiment with thought is often seen as a door through 
which the West can enter into the Muslim world and forcibly open it up to its 
corrupting influence. Therefore many Muslims adopt a reactionary stance to-
wards modernity that has had a devastating effect of their religion. They advo-
cate a closing of Islam and the Muslim world – a retreat into a fundamentalist 
mindset that bunkers itself behind a preconceived orthodoxy and intellectual/
religious simplicity. Unfortunately, this regression into reactionary-ignorance 
is now happening in the name of the same religion that once spawned the 
most progressive civilization. Understanding the power differential between 
the Muslim world and the West, especially in terms of economics and military 
might, the defensive Muslims often believe that there is no other option than 
to fortify Islam via conservatism: it is a survival tactic, or a coping-mechanism 
design to respond to the trauma brought on by neo-liberal secular modernity 
and western aggression. However, this retreat disfigures the message of the 
Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims who believed in, 
stood up for, and built a progressive society wherein the aims were the estab-
lishment of justice, a society of learning, and a culture of equality.
This claim may strike some as biased, being that it comes from a western 
academic, but it is essentially the claim made by the 126 Muslim scholars who 
wrote the open letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In this letter they claim that 
he and his group have engaged in ‘warmongering and criminality,’ perpetrated 
‘heinous war crimes,’ to have committed act of violence that are ‘absolutely 
forbidden under Islamic law,’ and have destroyed centuries of work of Muslim 
scholars. To the last point, like much of the world, the scholars of Islam have 
attempted to eradicate slavery from the Muslim majority countries. However, 
isis has triumphantly resurrected various forms of slavery within the heart of 
the Muslim world. To this historical mistake, the scholars write,
24 This is most certainly a relative term, as many minorities, especially religious minorities 
have fared better in the Muslim world, even after it decline, than they did in the West. 
There is nothing comparable to the Holocaust/Shoah in the Muslim world, even if the 
Turkish attack (or genocide) on the Armenians in 1919–1920 is often offered up as a paral-
lel. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the critical theory, both societies have much 
more work to do when it comes to tolerance and/or acceptance of minorities.
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after a century of Muslim consensus on the prohibition of slavery, you 
have violated this; you have taken women as concubines, and thus re-
vived strife and sedition (fitnah), and corruption and lewdness on the 
earth. You have resuscitated something that the Sharīʿah [Islamic Law] 
has worked tirelessly to undo and has been considered forbidden by con-
sensus for over a century. Indeed all the Muslim countries in the world 
are signatories of anti-slavery conventions… you bear responsibility for 
this great crime and all the reactions which this may lead to against all 
Muslims.25
The scholars continue their critique of isis by condemning their clear viola-
tions of the Qur’an, especially its clear injunction against forcing individu-
als into Islam or forcing them to accept their version of Islam. La ikraha fii 
din (there is no compulsion in religion), they remind isis. Invoking Sūrat al-
Baqarah 2:256, they state,
It is known that the verse: “There is no compulsion in religion” was re-
vealed after the conquest of Mecca, hence, no one can claim that it was 
abrogated. You have coerced people to convert to Islam just as you have 
coerced Muslims to accept your views. You also coerce everyone living 
under your control in every matter, great or small, even in matters which 
are between the individual and God. In Al-Raqqa, Deir el-Zor and other 
areas under your control, armed groups who call themselves “al-hisbah” 
make their rounds, taking people to task as thought they were assigned 
by God to execute His commandments. Yet, not a single one of the Com-
panions did this. This is not enjoining the right and honourable and for-
bidding the wrong; rather it is coercion, assault, and constant, random 
intimidation.26
What the scholars have pointed out in this particular critique of isis is their 
transgression against the autonomous subjectivity of the individual to either 
conform to Islamic norms – which the individual may or may not think to be 
valid or pragmatic – or reject them. From the scholars” perspective, the indi-
vidual can only be truly religious if they take upon themselves the dictates of 
the religion as their own, which must be done out of their own free will as a 
free subject. In other words, they have to be convinced of their truth and free-
ly accept them. In doing so, they “self-institute” (αυτo-νoμoύνται), or regulate 
25 126 Muslim Scholars, Open Letter, §12.
26 Ibid., §13.
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themselves out of their own conviction that the religion is true and represents 
the way of righteousness that they want to embody in their own subjectivity. 
Anything less, as the scholars have alluded to, is heteronomy: the forced imposi-
tion of power upon an individual, which robs them of their freedom to accept 
the religion or not (at least in the public sphere).27 In legal theory, actus me 
invito factus non est meus actus can be invoked as a defense in order to plead 
innocence against an heteronomically imposed act, precisely because only 
through a free subjective appropriation of a belief can agere sequitur credere 
(actions follow beliefs).28 In the heteronomic situation, actions come before 
belief and as such are fraudulent, or at best questionable, because they do not 
reflect the free conscience of the actor. In order for a true Muslim society to be 
achieved, it cannot be predicated upon the heteronomic compliance, but rather 
on the free identification of the self with the religious tradition and its moral 
claims.29
What isis has done to the people living under their control has negated 
their ability to autonomously choose, and therefore the ability to be truly re-
ligious. isis and others make a logical jump; they believe since the religious 
tradition itself has moral authority because it is from the divine, that they have 
the moral authority to enforce its ethical tenets. However, the tradition itself 
gives no one the moral authority to impose divine strictures on others. In do-
ing this, they have created the illusion of a religious society. Yet since they have 
failed to convince the people via discursive means, it remains nothing but a 
self-satisfying illusion. Had they truly convinced the people of the rightness 
of their cause, they would not have to enforce their interpretation of Islam by 
violence; the power of the argument itself would have compelled the masses to 
embody their values, and thus they would auto-regulate.30
Ironically, under religious rule – under theocratic tyranny – the ability to 
produce a population that accepts religion as their own is greatly reduced; 
that can only be achieved in a state of freedom where the population chooses 
for itself to be united with and guided by religion. In this sense, freedom to 
choose is the necessary pre-condition for a truly religious population. What a 
state that enforces religion can produce is outward/public conformity, while 
the individual in his/her private life remains in defiance towards the state as 
a way of safeguarding their subjectivity in the face of a heteronomic power 
27 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997.
28 “the act done by me against my will is not my act.”
29 See Chapter 6.
30 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: A Harvest Book, 1970), 35–56.
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that attempts to impose upon them values that they do not claim as their own. 
Indeed, a heteronomic state nearly always guarantees that the religion that is 
being imposed will also be the religion that opposes the state, as individuals 
re-appropriate their own personal autonomous religiosity in defiance of the 
“official” (coopted) version of religion. In this case, a subjectively autonomous 
interpretation of Islam struggles against the objective heteronomic Islam.
Recall Iran’s 2009 Green Movement, in which the discontented youth, who 
represented the first generation educated post-Islamic revolution, as well as 
many of the first supporters of Iran’s 1979 revolution, expressed their discon-
tent with the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by protesting his reelection 
which they believed to be fraudulent.31 The absence of a coherent alternative 
philosophy was striking; what many of the protesters were calling for cannot 
be reduced down to a simple political demand – the ouster of President Ahma-
dinejad as a political fraud – but rather must be seen in the light of Khomeini’s 
peculiar form of Islamism: his blending of revolutionary Shi’a Islam and the 
Hussein model of anti-oppression action.32 These youth, even with their pro-
western sensibilities, demanded a closer adherence to a more enlightened 
form of Islam – one that would be morally and ethically loosened from hetero-
nomic state power; one that would increase personal freedom, diminish cor-
ruption, would open the doors for dialogue with the West on an equal footing, 
and would not deny the “civil rights’ of its citizens by denying their vote (which 
was symbolic of their collective will). Islam, in their view, could not be iden-
tified with the clerical ruling elites, but was rather the guarantor of the civil 
rights that where eclipsed under the rule of the Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamenei. 
Their interpretation of Islam set them against those who spoke for the hetero-
nomic “official Islam”: Islam that blesses the rule of the few. Most dialectically, 
the more Shi’a Islam was pressed into the service of the ruling elites, the more 
Islam liberated itself from their rule and engrained itself among the masses. 
Islam, and the standards it upholds, became their weapon against those same 
elites. To read these protests simply as a rejection of Khomeini and the Islamic 
Republic in favor of a western consumer society, as many western analysts did, 
is entirely wrong, as it fails to see the religiously polyphonic nature of the Shi’a 
community in Iran as well as the commitment to the vision of a just Islamic 
society that was first articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini during the revolu-
tion against the Shah. The Green Movement was a reform movement, one that 
wanted to change the particularities of the state and society, but not the overall 
31 Hamid Dabashi, Iran, The Green Movement, and the usa: The Fox and the Paradox. New 
York: Zed Books, 2010.
32 Byrd, Ayatollah Khoemini, 41–45.
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structure, ideals, or philosophy of the Islamic Republic. In other words, it was 
not a revolution, but one interpretation of Khomeini’s Hukumat-i Islami (Is-
lamic governance) in conflict with other interpretations.
From the perspective of the Qur’an, in order to avoid these forms of divi-
sion within the Muslim community, all forms of religious coercion, as the 
Qur’an states, are illegitimate and in violation of Allah’s commands. Having 
been revealed when Muhammad regained control of Mecca, la ikraha fii din is 
normative on all levels of society; the political, economic, and socio-cultural 
included, and those who functionalize Islam for their own purposes, especially 
political purposes, inadvertently contribute to the recovery of Islam’s revolu-
tionary core: Islam as a means by which religious subjectivity liberates itself 
from religious heteronomy.33 By legitimating oppressive force via Islamic lan-
guage, one dialectically articulates what Islam is not; the struggle against het-
eronomy makes this clear to the victims of the elites.
Yet, many Muslims feel that the ummah is required to have a central au-
thority, such as a caliphate, as the Muslims had always had such a political-
religious structure of authority since the death of the Prophet, beginning with 
the Khulafāʾu ar-Rāshidūn (Four Rightly Guided Caliphs) for the Sunnis, or the 
Twelve Imams for the Shi’a. Indeed, the 126 Sunni scholars themselves testify 
that, ‘there is agreement (ittifaq) among scholars that a caliphate is an obliga-
tion upon the ummah.’34 However, from the perspective of our modern secular 
society, and the increasingly secularization of the world, and now post-secular 
conditions that are appearing in various nations, can a religious authority that 
seizes real temporal power truly exist in a meaningful and beneficial manner? 
Would not a transnational religious authority be anachronistic in the modern 
pluralistic and multi-cultural world of the 21st century? Would the extrac-
tion of religious authority out of civil society and restoring it back to the state 
not be a devastating blow for the modern world, not to mention for religion 
itself? Furthermore, isn’t there something much more perverse at the core of 
theocracy – God’s rule on earth via authority invested in homo religious, espe-
cially when it fuses the will of man with the will of the divine?
Even if isis refuses to proclaim itself to be a theocracy, in that they 
refuse to claim that they are taking the prerogatives of the divine as their own 
33 One shouldn’t deny that there are indeed certain exceptions. Parents have a right to “im-
pose” a religion on their children. However, when they are of the age of political emanci-
pation, they would gain the right to choose to be religious or engage in religious activities 
or not. Additionally, they also have the right to demand justification for religious beliefs, 
i.e. to have a faith predicated on “post-conventional” morality.
34 126 Scholars, Open Letter, 15.
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or ruling in his name, their actions, as condemned by the 126 scholars, show 
that they engage in theft of the divine sovereignty, especially when isis’s mem-
bers intervene in activities that are strictly between the individual and God. 
Furthermore, if we can define theocracy as a form of government in which the 
law of God, in this case Sharīʿah, is the governing law, and such law is rooted in 
or legitimized by a sacred text or tradition, and/or the leader of the religious 
state is said to be – or claims to be – acting as the divine’s enforcer of law, thus 
synthesizing their will with the supposed will of the divine, then it is by all 
measures a “theocracy,” even if it would be more accurate to describe it as a 
“cleritocracy” (rule of the clerics). Theocracy is an amalgamation of religion 
and state power; the state becomes identical with the norms and ordinances of 
the religious tradition, with the ultimate consequence being the legitimization 
of the ruler’s actions by divine sanction; a human agent becomes the divine’s 
grand inquisitor, judge, and executioner. God and temporal power become 
one, as the human agent serves as a conduit for the divine’s will on earth, and 
as such his temporal powers take on the power of the absolute. To oppose the 
temporal authority is to oppose the will of the divine. Aut Caesar aut nihil.35
The danger of theocracy takes on a Feuerbachian meaning when one thinks 
in terms of how isis and their cohorts “project” onto the divine their own bias-
es, animosities, and hatred, which they then legitimate via a distorted reading 
of the Qur’an and prophetic traditions (ḥadīṯh). In a most penetrating passage 
that lends itself to isis, Anne Lamott, a progressive novelist, wrote in her book 
Bird by Bird, ‘you can safely assume you’ve created God in your own image when 
it turns out that God hates all the same people you do.’36 The identification of 
earthly rule with divine sanction by way of isis resulted in the oppression of 
women, raping of girls, subjugation of religious minorities, brutal executions 
of Syrians and the Iraqi Shi’a and Sunni Muslims, the mutilation of corpses, the 
torture and burning of soldiers and dissidents, the traumatization of children, 
the destructions of shrines and mosques, the slander or takfīr (accusation of 
apostasy) of pious believers, and the comprehensive distortion of Islam, which 
Muslims believe is a mercy to mankind from the creator, but appears to much 
of the world to be more of a curse. It is no mistake that isis finds these groups 
to be distasteful, and thus targets them with the supposed sanction of the di-
vine. From the perspective of the 126 scholars as well as the critical theory of 
religion, such a return to barbarity as a response to the barbarity unleashed 
by colonialism, neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism – that which continues 
35 “Either Caesar or nothing”: a phrase that embodies the absolutism of the authority.
36 Ann LaMott, Bird by Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life (New York: First Anchor 
Books, 1995), 22.
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to divide Muslims via nationhood, tribe, and class, cause conflict within the 
heart of the ummah, and facilitate unending wars – cannot be legitimated via 
prophetic religion, Islam, nor revolutionary theory, nor can such barbarity be 
functionalized as being a bad means to good ends.37 From the view of many 
Muslims, the only way to resist the constant destruction of the ummah via fit-
nah and neo-liberalism’s expansion is a return to a theocratic caliphate. But is 
that really a viable solution in today’s increasingly secular world?
From the perspective of his philosophy of religion and state, the critical 
theorist Walter Benjamin sees a more troubling eschatological aspect of the-
ocracy; one that makes it a misplaced phenomenon within the history of man-
kind. He states,
Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in the sense that he 
alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. For this 
reason nothing historical can relate itself on its own account to anything 
Messianic. Therefore the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical 
dynamic; it cannot be set as a goal. From the standpoint of history it is not 
the goal, but the end. Therefore the order of the profane cannot be built 
up on the idea of the Divine Kingdom, and therefore theocracy has no 
political, but only a religious meaning.38
For Benjamin, the claims of the theocratic regimes, that their rule is based 
within the will of Allah, that they somehow have a special status that grants 
them the authority to rule in the place of God (or in the place of the hidden 
Imam for the Shi’a), or that their regimes represents the telos of history, are 
misguided as it denies the finality that only the Messiah (or Mahdī) can bring 
to history; he, and only he, consummates history.39 Therefore, that which is me-
diated by history, i.e. any form of political-economy, charismatic individual, 
clerical leadership, etc., cannot be the messianic that ends history – history 
does not have within itself the eschatological qualities needed in order to bring 
37 The argument that “the ends justify the means” has been soundly rejected in Islamic 
thought. Forbidden (haram) means, even if they result in good ends, cannot be justified, 
as it would mean to violate the law of Allah.
38 Walter Benjamin, “Theologico-Political Fragment” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Auto-
biographical Writing, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1978), 
312. My emphasis.
39 One should be aware that the valayat-i faqīh (the rule of the jurist), in Khomeini’s thought, 
is only the temporary placeholder for the messianic figure, but does not appropriate the 
prerogatives of the Mahdi himself. Ayatollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writing and 
Declaration of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 27–166.
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about its own consummation; that which has the capacity to congeal history 
into the perpetual jetztzeit (now time), to establish the messianic utopia, to 
realize the longing for the totally other, comes from outside of history and as 
such nothing burdened by the historical process can claim such prerogatives. 
In his philosophy, Benjamin preserves the messianic and prophetic by denying 
any earthly regime the right to claim itself as the embodiment of God’s will. 
The object of the state, according to Benjamin, is to construct the coordinates 
of society by which man can achieve abiding and substantive felicity. Ironical-
ly, the actualization of felicity can only be done within the same coordinates of 
freedom that allow the believers to subjectivity realize religion. In other words, 
freedom is both the precondition for individual felicity and true religiosity. By 
imposing the “will of God” upon those who do not accept it as the will of God, 
nor as their own, the state destroys the possibility for both felicity and religios-
ity, and thus, for Benjamin, it must stay out of the messianic-utopia business.
The utopian negativity of the 2nd commandment, the bilderverbot, which 
can also be found within Islam’s negativity towards the world-as-it-is and its 
prohibition on making idols of the divine, i.e. ossifying that which is created 
into that which creates, rejects such combination of the divine with earthly 
rule, as it pulls the ineffable down into the broken, the distorted and the cor-
rupt; it makes that which is unarticulatable into that which is deficiently artic-
ulated; and falsely sanctions that which is odious by the standards of prophetic 
and revealed religion. No, as Walter Benjamin stated and the 126 scholars al-
luded to, religion cannot be legitimately co-opted by any given ruler, nor can 
theocracy be seen as the goal of history. In the history of Islam, never has a ca-
liph been the Kalām Allah (speech of God), rather only an “Abdallah (servant 
of God), and an “abd (servant) knows his place.
The “political meaning” of theocracy that Benjamin invokes, can be identi-
fied only with the Messianic age, when the rule of the divine – through his 
Messiah – is the reality of the world, its summation and endpoint. But only the 
Messiah can achieve this, not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi nor anything else that’s 
subject to the historical process. Until the Messiah (or Mahdī) breaks into 
human history, the longing for the totally other – which is both expressed in 
Christianity and Islam – cannot be articulated within a deficient and temporal 
power, as to do so brings the authority of the totally other into concert with the 
earthly familiar, thus creating an idol. Rather, for Benjamin, being rooted in the 
bilderverbot, the “otherness” of the totally other must remain unarticulated, as 
it serves as the unexpressed utopian vision (rooted in negativity) of what the 
world ought to be, and as such it retains its revolutionary potential to critique 
that which is the case: the world and all its brokenness, all its brutality, and all 
it barbarism.
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 Post-Secular Solidarity: A Proposal for an Intra-religious 
Constitutionalism
In our struggle to find a way to abate contemporary barbarity, devolution of a 
world-being-towards-violence – a global civil war – we have to begin to think 
beyond the bounds of the traditional notions of nations and states. We have to 
think in terms of a global solidarity that transcends the traditional geography 
of national politics, religious communities, and ethnic barriers. In order to do 
this, I want to return briefly to a theory advanced by the political theorist Dolf 
Sternberger but most associated with Jürgen Habermas – “constitutional pa-
triotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus) – and see if we can modify it in such a way 
that it can be expanded outside of national borders. In attempting this, we are 
in pursuit of a post-secular and post-nationalist form of solidarity; one that 
can serve as the basis for a more reconciled future society that transcends the 
bounds of civilizational particularism.
For Jürgen Habermas, the post-secular and post-metaphysical conditions 
of the West make it necessary for societies to create ways in which they can 
govern themselves democratically without appealing to pre-political founda-
tions, i.e. race, ethnicity, common language, religious worldview, and cultural 
heritage, etc. Because of the plurality of its citizens, the modern cosmopolitan 
state is no longer capable of sustaining a close connection between “demos” 
and “ethnos,” as it once had; the reality of multiculturalism demands a differ-
ent way of formulating a national identity.40 In other words, “demos” has to be 
divorced from “ethnos.” Habermas observes that in secular modernity, ‘each 
nation is now supposed to be granted the right to political self-determination. 
The intentional democratic community (Willensgemeinschaft) takes the place 
of the ethnic complex.’41 Against any forms of nationalism, modern democra-
cies and democratic cultures are comprised of a symphony of ethnicities, lan-
guages, customs, and religious beliefs, making a functioning democracy rooted 
in a particular ethos no longer viable, as it denies entrance into the citizenry 
to those who do not share the historical ethnos (or any given pre-political 
characteristic). For Habermas, something else must replace the shared ethnos 
that once served as the national adhesive. In searching for this, he turns his 
attention to the aftermath of the French Revolution, which philosophically 
and politically augmented the possibility of citizenship to those outside of 
the predominant ethnos. For the French revolutionaries, the bonds of ethnos 
were broken first by those who cared little for their own ethnicities, but rather 




ruled solely in the interest of their class: the aristocracy. In other words, the 
ruling class showed scant solidarity with those in classes beneath them regard-
less of their shared ethnicity. This fracture in the edifice of ethnos contributed 
to the revolutionary Bourgeois’ formulation of the universal philosophical 
categories: freedom, justice, and liberty, as these values transcended those 
pre-political foundations and are applicable to all those who assent to their 
validity as universals. To be a nation was to be a ‘nation of citizens,’ that ‘finds 
its identity,’ Habermas writes, ‘not in ethnic and cultural commonalities but in 
the practice of citizens who actively exercise their rights to participation and 
communication.’42 At this point Habermas believes that the republican form 
of governance completes its separation with all pre-political foundations – 
they simply cannot provide an adequate basis for a nation that finds its adhe-
sive in shared ideals and shared polity. In Bourgeois society, the “demos” from 
this point on is not a racial group, a religious group, or a group sharing the same 
language; the modern demos is united as a democratic community of the will, 
and this will collectively adheres to certain “universal” values and together at-
tempts to manifest those values in their polity, economics, culture, etc. In this 
way, the “demos” is not only a political entity within a given state, but takes on 
the characteristics of a way-of-being that transcends formal politics.
Yet the conditions within the contemporary democratic societies of Europe 
and North America have become much more complex than the Bourgeois rev-
olutionaries could ever have imagined. The bonds created by the powerful civil 
religion of the United States, which has brought different ethnic and religious 
groups together through the past two centuries of shared civic rituals, holi-
days, and practices, has begun to disintegrate, transforming into mindless and 
xenophobic nationalism or political-economic apathy – driven by the national 
discourses concerning healthcare, immigration, gun control, police brutality, 
and the role of the state in civil society.43 In Europe, where the philosophi-
cal values of the Bourgeois revolution have progressed beyond their original 
intent and freedom and has been extended beyond what was ever imagined 
during the Enlightenment period, strong voices of dissent among both reli-
gious and non-religious groups have questioned the legitimacy and universal-
ity of such Enlightenment values. It is often argued that those values have gone 
too far in their accommodation of non-European – meaning “non-liberal” and 
“non-democratic” – culture. Some “communities” residing in “cultural ghettos” 
within the demos simply cannot abandon their pre-political foundations be-
cause those foundations are essential to their cultural identity as something 
42 Ibid., 495.
43 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 118.
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other than liberal Europeans. As such, they have difficulties integrating and 
assimilating into a demo that has left behind the concreteness of pre-political 
foundations and found their identity within particular abstract philosophical 
values, ideals, and notions. Additionally, other critics, such as the fundamen-
talist Muslims and Christians, believe the West’s liberal culture is too open and 
free and therefore without the confines of concrete moral bearings. In the phil-
osophical abstractness of freedom, liberty, and pursuit of happiness – which 
leads to radical atomization – anything is permissible to the individual and 
therefore there is no real community, no real demos. From that perspective, 
the abstractness of ideals fails to congeal the aggregate of individuals into a 
unity. Consequently, what in theory should unite the people – democratic and 
enlightened ideals – are no longer universally accepted, but are highly debated 
within the disjointed communities that comprise multi-cultural societies.
As not to descend into the moral and political chaos that would accompany 
a return behind the Bourgeois Enlightenment and re-establishing a state predi-
cated on pre-political foundations (as many on the right demand), and to avoid 
cultural suicide by capitulating to the voices of Muslim radicals who condemn 
all things western, or nativists who demonizes all things “Islamic,” Habermas 
attempts to find a way in which the modern cosmopolitan state can create a 
basis for cross-cultural national unity, discursive citizenship, and democratic 
stability that still preserves the polyphonic nature of modern democracy.44
In this pursuit, Habermas turn to Sternberger’s conception of “constitution-
al patriotism,” which can be understood as a post-nationalist adhesive within 
a given society in which the citizens subjectively and freely attach themselves 
to the values, principles, ideals and democratic procedures that have been 
crystalized within a democratic constitution. Symbiotically, the constitution 
reflects the core values of the people and the people willfully bind themselves 
to that document. In this sense, allegiance to the constitution is an affirma-
tion of the values by which the individual lives; thus the citizen can recognize 
44 Roland Boer makes an interesting observation when discussing those in Europe who are 
now resurrecting the ‘old alliance between God and state, between Europe and Christian-
ity.’ He believes that this insistence on Europe’s Christian heritage is emphasized only by 
those who ‘only know what a church-building looks like from the outside.’ This touches 
on an interesting point; it is not a “return to religion” that these critics advocate, but rather 
a sense of a pre-political foundation that includes an aspect of religion. Christianity, as 
part of European heritage, is juxtaposed to Islam, which is not. Religion therefore plays an 
important role in their emphasis on shared history as foundation for the society, but they 
do not seek a resurrection of the church in the lifeworld of the average person. See Roland 
Boer, Criticisms of Theology: On Marxism and Theology iii, 38.
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themself in the ideals articulated with the constitution. As such, patriotism, 
which does not abandon critical reflection on the way the constitution is 
enacted or interpreted, is cultivated outside of the bounds of the “nation” 
(the community of the pre-political foundations), but rather is cultivated via 
discourses surrounding constitutional matters. Allegiance is owed to the values 
of the constitution as well as to all those who adhere to those values regardless 
of their ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc., backgrounds. In this sense, the values 
expressed by the constitution have no ethnicity, no religious allegiances, and 
no prejudices towards a certain group; the constitution is intentionally devoid 
of pre-political considerations.
However, knowing the power of nationalism – man’s mythical connection 
to his blut und boden (blood and soil) – many, Habermas admits, doubt that 
such an abstract and content-less notion can bind a diverse group of people 
together within one political entity; for them it is ‘too weak.’45 With that cri-
tique in mind, Habermas insists that for constitutional patriotism to work, the,
citizens must be able to experience the fair value of their rights also in 
the form of social security and the reciprocal recognition of different cul-
tural forms of life. Democratic citizenship can only realize its integrative 
potential – that is, it can only found solidarity between strangers – if it 
proves itself as a mechanism that actually realizes the material condi-
tions of preferred forms of life.46
In other words, constitutional patriotism must deliver on its promises; it must 
not share the fate of Bourgeois society by promising greatness – such as equal-
ity, fraternity, and liberty – while systematically failing to deliver on those 
promises. It must demonstrate that the shared citizenship of all, that their 
common allegiances to the constitution, and that their abatement of radical 
self-interest in the search for the common good, has benefits for all who assent 
to this post-pre-political foundational collective. As such, if a country is to bind 
itself to the values expressed within its constitution, Habermas believes that
each individual [must] come to recognize and appreciate citizenship 
status as that which links her with the other members of the political 
community and makes her at the same time dependent upon and co-
responsible for them. It [becomes] clear to all that private and public 
45 Ibid., 118.
46 Ibid., 118–119.
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autonomy presuppose one another in the circuit of reproduction and im-
provement of the conditions of preferred ways of life.47
In many ways the constitution that Habermas is proposing is a codification 
of the “overlapping consensus” between various comprehensive worldviews. 
It is, in effect, the product of discourse between different peoples within the 
multicultural and cosmopolitan nation; their agreed upon values take form 
within legislative and democratic structures under which they agree to be gov-
erned. In this sense, the constitution preserves both the universal values as 
the guiding spirit of the document while understands that the document is 
a living document that is subject to perpetual contestation. If disagreements 
arise within the community of citizens, the constitutional values will have to 
judge between the interpretations as to what interpretation is most congruent 
with the original intent of the constitutional value in question as well as what 
interpretation is most adequate for the given contemporary situation.48 The 
democratic process must always be regarded as legitimate, even if the outcome 
of discourse fails to garnish universal consensus. Peaceful and legitimate dis-
course is therefore an inherent component within constitutional patriotism. 
The allegiance to the ideals expressed within the constitution is not aban-
doned although they may be strained by discursive activities.
If Habermas believes that this model can be achieved within a given state, 
can we legitimately use it as a framework for global religious communities? 
Can various religions enter into a “constitutional convention” through which 
they attempt to create a governing and ecumenical document that expresses 
their “overlapping consensus” on shared concerns? Or will the secular origins 
of the modern notion of a constitution prove to be unworkable within a reli-
gious context?
 Ecumenism and Inter-Religious Constitution Building: Modern 
Slavery
Soon after Pope Francis returned from his historic 2014 trip to the secular Re-
public of Turkey, a country that is overwhelmingly Muslim, he gathered to-
gether leaders from various world religions at the Vatican in Rome. Together 
47 Ibid., 120.
48 We should also admit that the “original intent” thesis of a constitution is also a matter of 
contestation. If the original intent is no longer adequate to the times, it is a democratic 
prerogative to rethink the society’s conception of that particular ideal.
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these leaders, representing the Anglican Tradition, Orthodox Christianity, Hin-
duism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam (both Sunni and Shi’a), and Catholicism, dis-
cussed, debated, and contemplated what the Pope called the ‘atrocious plague’ 
of modern globalized slavery.49 Despite the many differences these religious 
leaders have in theology, eschatology, liturgy, religious philosophy, and ethi-
cal systems, they were able to each retrieve a moral commonality from within 
their own traditions that allowed them to come to a binding agreement with 
other religions concerning a pressing moral dilemna. Regardless of the pres-
ence of slavery within many of these religions’ histories, slavery was universal-
ly condemned as being ‘a crime against humanity’ in the resulting document. 
In declaring it as such, these religious leaders engaged in a twofold practice; 
first, they were explicitly critical of their own communities that often prac-
ticed slavery (sometimes sanctioned by religious authorities), and two, they 
were determined to abate, arrest, and eradicate the practice within their own 
communities in the near future. These religious leaders were able to transcend 
their religious exclusivism – their particularity – in order to come to a univer-
sal consensus; together they created an inter-religious constitutional opinion 
that is deeply rooted within each of their religious traditions, especially their 
humanistic elements. By putting forward an articulation of a moral claim from 
within their traditions, entering into an inter-religious discourse, coming to 
an agreement about the nature of slavery – in this case its evilness – and then 
working towards a document that translates all their particular articulations 
into a universal declaration, they have produced a constitutional document 
by which they can judge themselves, their communities, and each other. This 
constitutional document can now serve as the starting point for a more fruit-
ful and peaceful cooperation between religious communities on various other 
49 Reuters, “Pope, World Religious Leaders, Pledge to Fight Modern Slavery,” December 2, 2014. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/02/us-pope-slavery-idUSKCN0JG1KM20141202 
(Accessed 12/3/2014). Below is a list of religious leaders present at the conference and 
the religions they represented: Hinduism: Her Holiness Mata Amritanandamayi (Amma); 
Buddhism: Venerable Bhikkhuni Thich Nu Chan Khong, representing Zen Master Thich 
Nhat Hanh, Thailand; Venerable Datuk K. Sri Dhammaratana, Chief High Priest of 
Malaysia; Judaism: Rabbi Abraham Skorka and Rabbi David Rosen ksg, cbe; Orthodox: 
His Eminence Emmanuel, Metropolitan of France, representing the Ecumenical Patri-
arch Bartholomaios i; Islam: Abbas Abdalla Abbas Soliman, undersecretary of State of 
Al Azhar Alsharif, representing Mohamed Ahmed El-Tayeb, Grand Imam of Al Azhar; the 
Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi; Sheikh Naziyah Razzaq Jaafar, special 
advisor, representing Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Basheer Hussain al Najafi; Sheikh Omar 
Abboud; Anglicanism: His Grace Most Reverend and Right Honourable Justin Welby, 
archbishop of Canterbury.
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issues that plague the modern world. If they can come to an agreement on the 
barbarity of slavery and its need for eradication, then it is also possible that 
they can come to an agreement on issues of war, abortion, economic exploita-
tion, poverty, and many other moral conserns.
The language of the Joint Declaration of Religious Leaders for the Eradication 
of Slavery states,
We, the undersigned, are gathered here today for a historic initiative to 
inspire spiritual and practical action by all global faiths and people of 
good will everywhere to eradicate modern slavery across the world by 
2020 and for all time.
In the eyes of God, each human being is a free person, whether girl, 
boy, woman or man, and is destined to exist for the good of all in equality 
and fraternity.50 Modern slavery, in terms of human trafficking, forced 
labour and prostitution, organ trafficking, and any relationship that fails 
to respect the fundamental conviction that all people are equal and have 
the same freedom and dignity, is a crime against humanity.
We pledge ourselves here today to do all in our power, within our faith 
communities and beyond, to work together for the freedom of all those 
who are enslaved and trafficked so that their future may be restored. To-
day we have the opportunity, awareness, wisdom, innovation and tech-
nology to achieve this human and moral imperative.51
From the perspective of the Pope, world religious communities have a poten-
tial for revolutionary and moral change even within our post-secular societies, 
where practices such as slavery have failed to be eradicated by secular moder-
nity. This potential for good is augmented when there is cooperation between 
religious authorities, especially when they bring their moral strength to bear 
on their own communities.
It is also important to note that the joint declaration does not excommu-
nicate secular voices from their attempts to alleviate the suffering of modern 
slavery; they intentionally included the phrase ‘people of good will’ as an in-
vitation to those who can no longer believe in religion but can recognize the 
50 The Grand Imam of al-Azhar preferred the word “religion” as opposed to “God” in this sen-
tence. The inclusion of his concern demonstrates the recognition of the group towards 
certain theological sensitivities.
51 Vatican City, “Declaration of Religious Leaders for the Eradication of Modern Slavery,” 




validity of their condemnation of modern slavery. With this door wide open, 
religious and non-religious people can now come to an agreement about how 
to translate this religious document into secular language that can be fully 
grasped and approved of by secular humanists and atheists who also shared 
their abhorrence towards modern slavery.
However, certain intrinsic problems do remain; does this constitutional 
document simply remain a statement of common morality without the force 
of law, or can it become a piece of legislation that can engender within itself 
coercive powers? Can it become both moral law and legislative law? In other 
words, can this document be enforced by political and/or religious authorities 
among the adherents of the world religions represented at this conference? Do 
individual states have the ability to legally enforce what is essentially a joint 
statement of religious morality? Needless to say, all forms of slavery are already 
illegal under international law, i.e. the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (udhr), which in Article 4 states, ‘No one shall be held in slavery 
or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’52 
Does the fact that this secular legal document already exists make the Pope’s 
Joint Declaration redundant and therefore facile – especially if religion has 
been pushed into civil society and can no longer enforce itself on its members? 
Such international legislation already has the force of law even if it member 
states fail to enforce it within their territories. Being so, is this joint declaration 
just an affirmation of what secular authorities have already decided?
We should remember that the particular individuals at the Pope’s confer-
ence were not representatives of states, but were the representatives of reli-
gions that have very little power if any in their countries beyond the moral 
persuasion they hold within their own communities. However, the observer 
must not forget that religious power is often trans-national and not subject to 
political boarders. Because religious communities are international forms of 
identity, solidarity tends to transcend the particularities of states, and with this 
internationalism it wields a different form of power than the authority of the 
state. However, because such an international authority is often free from the 
political constraints of any particular state, it can be both dangerous regres-
sive and/or progressive. History has demonstrated to us time and time again 
the destructive power of Popes, Caliphs and other transnational organizations; 
such power should be wielded carefully. On the other hand, if that authority, 
like the authority used to enter into a discourse with the Pope on the issue 
of modern slavery, is bent towards progressive means, i.e. the augmentation 
52 United Nations. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/ (Accessed 12/4/2014).
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of peace, justice, and freedom, than it may very well be the form of author-
ity most needed in a global public sphere that is often stunted by intra-state 
parochialism.
What the power of these international religious authorities makes impera-
tive is that their religious language be translated into secular language through 
which their beliefs can be introduced into the public sphere including political 
and legislative bodies within their own home countries. Although these reli-
gious authorities are interested in benefiting all of humanity, the universal, and 
not just their own particular communities, the state must remain the agent of 
the common good in society, as the state is the entity that labors on behalf of 
the common good. The temptation for parochial advancement at the expense 
of other sub-communities remains too strong within religions to ensure such 
a task to any particular religious tradition. Because of this, the constitutional 
declarations devised by religious authorities must be translated into secular 
political-philosophy and debated, approved and enacted by proper state au-
thorities. However, what then would be the purpose other than to say that this 
new inter-religious declaration supports that which is already international 
law, i.e. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? What are these religious 
leaders adding to this discourse? The signatory nations to the udhr already 
have the obligation to enforce its strictures within their national boarders – 
would this declaration aid in their enforcement? The question for the religious 
authorities is whether or not they can help enforce such tenets upon a popula-
tion; not through the use of force or coercision, but through persuasive via the 
language of morality?
It seems to me that this declaration could serve as the beginning of a paral-
lel authority; one that is not rooted in a system of justice that is rather rooted 
in a moral worldview that depends not on law for its enforcement but upon 
the universal acceptance of the moral argument that is represented and ad-
vanced within the Joint Declaration (or any other inter-religious constitutional 
document). Returning behind the Enlightenment and granting religious in-
stitutions the power to enforce their moral claims among their populations 
cannot be the answer to modern slavery and other vices that plague the 
world. What the religious leaders can do is convince their communities of 
the legitimacy of their agreed upon constitutional moral claims, aid in their 
self-regulation, and seek to transform their societies without illegitimately, i.e. 
heteronomically, limiting the autonomy of the individual, but rather by aug-
menting their knowledge of the ecumenical nature and validity of their mor-
al claims. Ultimately what such an inter-religious constitutional convention 
can produce is a united nations of morality – rooted in a process of consensus 
building via democratic discourse between representatives of various religions. 
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Additionally, as the Pope and his convention have demonstrated, this discourse 
must remain open to all who have a concern for the suffering of the finite in-
dividual, the plight and predicament of the broken, and the misery of those 
who have been damaged by world history, society, and mankind’s imposition 
of unnecessary suffering.53
The procedures of constructing a constitutional document between reli-
gions that could be advanced into governing bodies are important to acknowl-
edge. Taking a cue from the Pope’s discourse on global slavery, we can see a 
functioning procedure develop: a twofold translation process. First, the legiti-
mate authorities of the religious communities enter into a robust discourse 
concerning the constitutional values that they can all agree upon; secondly, 
these agreed upon values are recorded in such an ecumenical way that all the 
discourse partners can also agree upon the universalistic – yet still religious – 
language of the constitutional document, and lastly, this document is then to-
gether translated into secular – and most likely – philosophical language that is 
suitable for submission into the secular political realm. This process is slightly 
different than Habermas’ proposal, as he would have all religious groups work 
independently of all others; each community is responsible for translating 
their own particular religious claims into secular language as well as advanc-
ing those claims through the political process. In my proposal, religious voices, 
especially those that have the most invested within a given society, are asked 
to first enter into a learning process with each other before they attempt to 
offer their claims to the democratic process. The benefit of this procedure is 
that religions first come to diminish their own antagonisms with each other to 
avoid becoming simply another solitary voice amongst the aggregate of voices 
in the democratic process. The downside, of course, is the possibility that the 
religious authorities will fail to agree upon certain constitutional values, their 
universal religious language, or the language used in their translation. How-
ever, if they fail on one or more of these accounts, there is always Habermas’ 
individualistic approach to translating religion into secular discourse. Yet I ar-
gue that if religions can first transcend their own faith-based isolation, find 
common ground with other religious believers, the potential for meaningful 
reconciliation with secular society will be intensely augmented. The Catho-
lic theologian Hans Küng reminds us that there must first be peace among 
the world religions before there will be peace among the nations. In light of 
that sentiment, it may be discovered that this procedure is not only a chance 
for religious communities to participate fully in their nation’s political dis-
course, but also a peace process among the religious communities. How 
53 Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium, 26–55.
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powerful of an example would be set if the world religions, with all their dis-
functionality, their criminal history, and their antagonistic relationships with 
each other, transcended their provinciality and came to a common agreement 
rooted in common concerns, especially if those common concerns, interpre-
tations, and remedies could be made available to the secular society? Once 
again they could be a potential source of good in history. That being the case, 
the post-secular society – the society devoid of God but full of prophetic and 
Socratic religion – could lay the foundations for the future society of reconcili-
ation and peace.
 Conclusion
An inter-religious constitutional convention within the conditions of the post-
secular society is a start towards a more-reconciled future society that has 
been the dream of many prophets, mystics, sages, philosophers, theologians, 
workers, the impoverished and revolutionaries for thousands of years. Chal-
lenges and resistance will be a constant companion, especially by those who 
find it impossible to shed the veil of particularity in a search for the universal, 
those who believe ecumenisms is a dilution of their “pure” faith, those who 
stagnate their dynamic religion through their dogmatic and legalistic under-
standing of “perfection,” and those who fundamentally find all religions to be 
the sickness of mankind instead of an agent of mercy, compassion, kindness 
and a potential source for coming together. However, in the face of the growing 
antagonism between the secular and the religious, the growth of fundamental-
istic belief attitudes among certain religions as well as the religionless, and the 
barbaric violence perpetrated upon those who have not the means to defend 
themselves, what other alternative do religious communities have if they wish 
to be a part of the world healing process? If religion is to maintain itself in the 
face of the increasingly secular world, should it not direct its attention to the 
healing of mankind and not its destruction? What can believers do if they are 
in the company of men like St. Francis of Assisi and Sultan Malik al-Kamil, who 
risked their lives to further peaceful reconciliation between religious commu-
nities? Can the religious communities of the modern world simply leave their 
faith in the hands of the extremists and the ecumenically mute who wish to 
use their religions as a tribal defense against the demonized other; can the 
secular communities that wish to know their religious neighbors not so that 
they can hate them more efficiently, but come to know them as friends – can 
they leave their secular Enlightenment beliefs in the hands of those who would 
distort them into a battering ram of western hegemony against their fellow 
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citizens of Islamic faith? What choice do we have today concerning the ongo-
ing conflict between religion and secularity other than to talk with each other, 
be with each other, and reason together in a respectful dialogue that takes in 
account the cacophony of voices and sensitivities? If we cannot find a com-
mon language that allows us to communicate in an inter-subjective fashion, 
we will only have war – either within one society or between nations. Must we 
learn to witness and confess our beliefs, whether they be secular or religious, in 
a way that reaches towards a vision of society of reconciliation, not reproduces 
the horrors and terrors of the past. The post-secular condition is a unique op-
portunity for dialogue and friendly discourse, as it opens up the geography in 
which members of differing religious communities and secular citizens can 
engage each other in a manner that alleviates misunderstandings, hatred, and 
despair. Hoc natura est insitum, ut quem timueris, hunc semper oderis.54 Is it 
not time for fear and hate to be replaced by recognition, reconciliation, inter-
subjectivity and unconditional solidarity? In my estimation, the world cannot 
wait any longer.
54 “It’s an innate thing to always hate the one we have learnt to fear.”
<UN>
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